If conflict in West Asia continues, what might the US and Israel do? United States strategy. Dr Shabir Choudhry, London. 2 April 2026

 If conflict in West Asia continues, what might the US and Israel do?

United States strategy. Dr Shabir Choudhry, London. 2 April 2026

The US typically pursues these parallel objectives in West Asian conflicts:

A. Prevent a full-scale regional war

Washington generally seeks to:

• Protect Israel and ensure Israel’s dominance in the region
• Give free hand to Israel to attack neighbours, destroy their infrastructure, occupy their land and terrorise them
• Safeguard American strategic, political and economic interests
• Avoid direct large-scale war with Iran
• Protect Gulf allies
• Keep energy routes open, especially the Strait of Hormuz
• Maintain global economic stability

Even when tensions rise, US doctrine tends to favour:

• naval deterrence
• air defence deployments
• limited targeted strikes rather than a full invasion

B. Protect Israel’s qualitative military edge

Israel remains a key strategic partner.

Possible US measures:

• missile defence support
• intelligence sharing
• diplomatic cover in international forums
• deterrence messaging to regional actors

C. Prevent nuclear escalation

The US priority is to avoid:

• regional nuclear proliferation, but let Israel develop and improve their nuclear arsenal
• collapse of non-proliferation frameworks
• wider multi-front war involving proxy actors

Israel’s likely approach

Israel’s security doctrine traditionally emphasises:

• Keep on attacking the neighbours and occupy their land,
• Continue with the old policy of killing the Palestinian people and destroying their infrastructure.
• Keep increasing Israel’s geography by attacking neighbours and call it self-defence,
• Pre-emptive disruption of perceived threats,
• Maintaining deterrence credibility,
• Preventing strategic encirclement.

Likely actions if conflict continues:

• targeted strikes on military, economic and educational infrastructure,
• cyber operations
• intelligence operations
• diplomatic engagement with Western allies

Israel usually avoids a prolonged multi-front war unless an existential threat is perceived. This means Israel and America need a ceasefire to prepare for a new wave of attacks to intimidate neighbours and expand their military and strategic objectives.

2. Impact on India and Pakistan

India

India is highly sensitive to Gulf instability because:

• A large share of oil imports comes from the Gulf region
• Millions of Indian workers live in Gulf countries
• Remittances are economically significant

Possible impacts

• Higher oil prices → inflation pressure
• Shipping insurance costs rise
• Pressure on foreign exchange reserves
• Strategic diversification toward:
• Russia
• Africa
• United States energy supplies

India also needs to revisit the wisdom of its policies of the recent past, which have harmed its international standing. A new strategy must be employed to balance relations with:

• China,
• Russia
• US
• Israel
• Gulf states
• Iran

India generally avoids direct military involvement.

Pakistan

Pakistan faces:

• energy import vulnerability
• foreign exchange constraints
• domestic economic pressure
• diplomatic balancing between:
• China
• Gulf countries
• United States
• Russia

However, Pakistan has played its diplomatic cards extremely well and has enhanced its standing at the international level.

Pakistan often promotes mediation diplomacy in regional tensions.

Could India and Pakistan clash militarily?

Direct military confrontation between India and Pakistan over a West Asia conflict is unlikely but not impossible.

Reasons:

Why unlikely

• Both face economic pressures
• Nuclear deterrence creates restraint
• International actors discourage escalation
• Both militaries avoid multi-front risk

Possible indirect tensions

• naval presence competition in the Arabian Sea
• intelligence rivalry
• diplomatic positioning
• influence competition in the Gulf states

However, if somehow Pakistan is dragged into the West Asian conflict, or Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan further deteriorate, India may take advantage of the situation and try to settle the score with arch-rival Pakistan.

3. Impact on CPEC and BRI

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

CPEC is part of the wider:

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Belt and Road Initiative

Risks from prolonged conflict

• Maritime insurance costs rise
• Investor caution increases
• Regional instability affects timelines
• Security costs increase in the Gwadar region
• Energy price volatility affects project economics

Strategic advantages for CPEC

If Gulf instability persists:

Gwadar may gain importance as an alternative logistics node linking:

China → Pakistan → Arabian Sea

Long-term, strategic corridors become more valuable when chokepoints are unstable.

4. If the West Asian conflict continues, will China continue its current policies?

China generally follows long-term strategic continuity.

China’s likely priorities:

A. Energy security diversification

China imports energy from:

• Middle East
• Russia
• Central Asia
• Africa

China prefers:

multiple supply routes to reduce dependence on any single chokepoint.

B. Stability preference

China typically supports:

• diplomatic resolution
• non-interference principle
• negotiated settlements

Instability disrupts trade flows critical to China’s growth model.

However, in my view, Beijing will not stand as a spectator and let a close ally like Pakistan and Iran sink because it will have a serious impact on their economic and strategic agenda.

C. Gradual geopolitical expansion through economics

BRI strategy is based on:

• infrastructure
• trade connectivity
• financial integration

China often avoids direct military involvement unless core interests are threatened.

5. Big picture scenario outlook

If conflict remains limited:

• Oil prices volatile but manageable
• Shipping routes adapt
• Diplomacy intensifies
• Proxy tensions continue

If conflict expands regionally:

• global energy markets disrupted
• Inflation rises worldwide
• Shipping security becomes a major concern
• Alternative corridors gain importance
• Geopolitical blocs become more defined

6. Key strategic takeaway

Short-term:

Hormuz stability remains critical.

Medium-term:

Countries diversify supply routes.

Long-term:

Connectivity projects like CPEC and BRI gain strategic relevance but require stability to succeed. END.

 

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Dr Shabir Choudhry

 Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) said: "Say what is true, although it may be bitter and displeasing to people."

If Hormuz remains closed, can Gwadar and Karachi help? Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 1 April 2026

 If Hormuz remains closed, can Gwadar and Karachi help?

Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 1 April 2026

Recent reports indicate that disruption in the Strait of Hormuz could remove 13–14 million barrels/day of oil supply, roughly 20% of global petroleum trade. 

Asia is most vulnerable because 80–89% of Gulf oil exports normally go to Asian markets, including India, China, Japan, Pakistan and South Korea. 

LNG supply is even more fragile since Qatar’s gas exports (≈20% of global LNG) largely depend on Hormuz with no viable bypass pipelines. 

Strategic importance of Gwadar and Karachi

1. Gwadar Port – Long-term strategic potential - Gwadar Port

Gwadar is often discussed as a potential alternative logistics hub because:

Advantages

• Located outside the Persian Gulf chokepoint
• Connected to China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
• Could theoretically handle energy imports from Africa or Central Asia
• Strategically positioned near major sea lanes of the Arabian Sea
• Less exposed to Gulf military escalation

Limitations

• Infrastructure still developing
• Limited refinery and storage capacity
• Road/rail pipeline connectivity incomplete
• Cannot rapidly substitute Gulf export volumes
• Political/security constraints in Balochistan

Conclusion:

Gwadar is strategically important long-term, but not immediately capable of replacing Hormuz flows.

2. Karachi Port – operational but capacity-constrained - Port of Karachi

Karachi is Pakistan’s main commercial port and already handles:

• crude oil imports
• LNG terminals
• container trade

However:

• It depends heavily on Gulf suppliers
• LNG cargoes often originate in Qatar
• Shipping insurance costs rise sharply in wartime
• Storage capacity is limited relative to national demand

Pakistan has already reduced LNG purchases due to supply uncertainty and price increases. 

Key strategic reality: the bottleneck is not only routes but also capacity

Even where pipelines bypass Hormuz (Saudi Petroline, UAE Fujairah route), analysts note ports themselves limit how much oil can be redirected — only about 25% of normal Hormuz volumes can realistically be replaced in the short term. 

Therefore:

Gwadar + Karachi cannot compensate for the closure of a chokepoint through which 20 million barrels/day normally pass. 

Implications for South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh)

Likely effects

1. Energy shortages and higher prices
2. LNG shortages affecting power generation
3. Shift back to coal or domestic fuels
4. inflation and slower economic growth
5. supply chain disruptions
6. pressure on foreign exchange reserves

Asia may temporarily increase coal use to offset LNG shortages caused by the crisis. 

Economic modelling suggests prolonged disruption leads to broader inflation and growth shocks beyond oil markets. 

Big geopolitical insight

If Hormuz disruption persists:

• Energy supply routes diversify
• Russia, Central Asia, and Africa are becoming more important suppliers
• CPEC, Gwadar and Indian west coast ports gain long-term relevance
• Maritime chokepoints become strategic military targets
• The global power balance may gradually shift eastwards

But such transitions take years, not weeks.

Bottom line

Gwadar and Karachi can help partially, but cannot replace Hormuz.

They are:

• strategic backup nodes
• useful for diversification
• geopolitically important
• insufficient to offset a major Gulf supply disruption

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most critical energy chokepoints in the world economy. END.