Operation Sindhoor II, escalation, Dynamics in South Asia: Afghanistan’s Role and the Prospect of a Three-Front War
An analysis by Dr Shabir Choudhry
Introduction: The Tinderbox of South Asia
South Asia today stands at the edge of another dangerous military confrontation. The first half of 2025 witnessed a limited but intense clash between India and Pakistan—what came to be called Operation Sindhoor.
It tested both militaries’ readiness, political nerve, and diplomatic insulation. Now, as the second half of the year unfolds, the region is once again being pushed towards conflict. A series of coordinated terrorist attacks — in Delhi, Islamabad, and Wana — has reignited the blame game, heightened military alert levels, and created a volatile triangle involving India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, with China observing and calculating its moves quietly in the background.
The situation is no longer about isolated terror incidents or localised insurgencies; it is about strategic manipulation, intelligence warfare, and the reshaping of regional alignments. Each side is reading the same events through its own security lens — and all interpretations lead to confrontation.
The Immediate Triggers: Wana, Islamabad, and Delhi
The first major shock came with the attack on Wana Cadet College, a well-known educational institution in South Waziristan, where over 525 students and 25 staff members were present. It was not just an act of terrorism; it was a psychological strike against the very idea of Pakistan’s military youth development and morale. Early reports suggest the attack was carried out by a suicide squad trained and dispatched from across the Afghan border.
Pakistan’s initial reaction was to accuse New Delhi of being behind the attack — not directly, but through Afghanistan as an operational conduit. Islamabad’s military spokesmen argued that Indian intelligence had been cultivating anti-Pakistan militant groups in Afghan territory since the fall of Kabul, and that such attacks were part of a broader hybrid strategy to destabilise Pakistan internally before an external confrontation.
The situation turned more complex when a powerful explosion in Delhi killed dozens and injured many more. India immediately blamed Pakistan-based militant networks, describing it as yet another “cross-border terror act.”
Pakistan, in turn, called it a false flag operation—a planned act designed to justify an Indian offensive. The political timing of the attack—coming just after the Bihar elections—is crucial. With the electoral pressure gone, the Indian government now has room for a decisive military response without appearing to manipulate public sentiment for votes.
Within 48 hours, a suicide bombing in Islamabad further inflamed tensions. The Pakistani narrative again pointed to Afghan territory as the launchpad for these operations. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) hinted at an “external hand” working through Kabul, implying coordination between Indian and Afghan intelligence networks.
The Afghan Factor: Proxy Strategy or Strategic Diversion?
Afghanistan, in this context, is both a pawn and a player. Since the Taliban regained power, Pakistan has expected Kabul to be its strategic partner. However, the relationship has deteriorated dramatically. Cross-border attacks have become routine, and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) continues to enjoy safe havens inside Afghan territory.
Now, analysts in Islamabad argue that the Afghans have a new motive: to divert Pakistan’s attention and military assets away from their western border. If Pakistan is dragged into a major confrontation with India, the Afghan regime can consolidate power internally and expand its influence along the border regions of Khost, Paktika, and Nangarhar.
Moreover, Afghan intelligence networks have inherited both Taliban and former Northern Alliance capabilities—meaning they can operate flexibly, switching between ideological and strategic goals. Attacks like those in Wana or Islamabad could therefore serve two purposes: undermine Pakistan’s internal security and provoke India-Pakistan escalation that relieves Kabul of Pakistani military pressure.
From a purely strategic perspective, it would be in Kabul’s interest to see India and Pakistan preoccupied with each other. A two-front war for Pakistan would cripple its capacity to impose any conditions on the Afghan regime.
But the question remains: are the Afghans capable of such complex coordination?
The answer lies in the evolving structure of the Taliban’s internal factions. The Haqqani Network, the Kandahari core, and the Intelligence Directorate (GDI) are no longer fully aligned. The Haqqanis — historically closer to Pakistan — now feel betrayed by Islamabad’s harsh stance on cross-border militancy. The Kandahari faction, on the other hand, wants to project Afghan autonomy by demonstrating the ability to hit Pakistan through proxies. Intelligence reports suggest that ‘rogue’ Taliban commanders are indeed collaborating with TTP and other splinter groups, some of which may be receiving logistical assistance from Indian operatives in Iran or Central Asia.
India’s Calculus: Strategic Restraint or Operation Sindhoor II?
The Indian leadership faces a dilemma. After the Delhi blast, there is enormous public and political pressure to retaliate. The security establishment believes that strategic deterrence must be reasserted. The argument is simple: every time India shows restraint, Pakistan’s deep state interprets it as weakness.
However, the Indian response will be carefully calibrated. New Delhi has already mobilised its northern and western commands, increased surveillance flights over the Line of Control (LoC), and reinforced its air defence network around Punjab, Rajasthan, and Jammu sectors.
The pattern is eerily similar to the prelude of Operation Sindhoor I, though this time, the operational objective may be broader—targeting not just militant infrastructure, but also military logistics in PoJK (Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir) and southern Punjab.
If India chooses to strike, it is unlikely to limit itself to a single retaliatory raid. The security environment, the nature of the attacks, and the growing confidence of the Indian Air Force suggest that a sustained limited war—lasting 7–10 days—could be envisaged under the umbrella of conventional deterrence.
The risk, however, is that Pakistan may interpret even a limited Indian strike as an existential threat, compelling a nuclear signalling response. Islamabad could mobilise its Nasr (tactical nuclear) systems as it did during the February 2019 crisis.
Pakistan’s Dilemma: Two or Three Fronts at Once?
Pakistan is under severe pressure. Its economy is struggling, its currency is weak, and its politics are paralysed. The last thing it can afford is a multi-front confrontation. Yet the facts on the ground point precisely in that direction.
1. Eastern front: Possible Indian retaliation, including cross-LoC air or missile strikes.
2. Western front: Constant cross-border attacks from Afghan territory and TTP infiltration.
3. Internal front: Political instability, terrorism, and sectarian unrest.
There are credible reports that 152 suicide bombers with Pakistani ID cards have recently entered the country from Afghan territory. Whether these individuals are part of the TTP, Daesh-Khorasan, or an independent proxy force is unclear. But the psychological impact is severe. Pakistan is in a permanent state of high alert.
If war breaks out with India, the TTP and other anti-state groups could launch coordinated domestic attacks to paralyse internal mobility. The goal would be to create chaos behind the front lines, forcing the army to divide its forces. In that sense, a conventional war with India could trigger Pakistan’s internal unravelling.
The Chinese Dimension: Strategic Patron or Silent Partner?
China’s position is nuanced. Beijing has deep investments in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), but it has no appetite for an all-out South Asian war. However, China’s strategic interest is clear: a weakened, distracted India suits its regional objectives.
If hostilities escalate, China could support Pakistan indirectly—by:
• Supplying advanced munitions and spare parts through fast logistics routes in Gilgit-Baltistan.
• Conducting high-intensity patrols in Eastern Ladakh, to pressure India militarily.
• Launching cyber and electronic warfare operations to disrupt Indian communication systems.
But China will avoid open involvement unless India attacks CPEC assets or crosses a red line in Gilgit-Baltistan. In such a case, Beijing might open a limited second front—not a full-scale invasion, but tactical pressure through airspace violations and PLA movement near Depsang and Pangong sectors.
Bangladesh: The Subtle Eastern Factor
While Bangladesh is not a military threat, it remains a political wildcard. Dhaka’s relations with Islamabad have, over the past months, improved, and both countries have good working relations, including matters related to trade, economy, defence, intelligence and security. If a major India-Pakistan conflict erupts, Bangladesh may not join the conflict but could facilitate certain actions.
Global Context: The Great Powers’ Shadow
In Washington, London, and Brussels, the response will be ambivalent. Western powers would prefer regional stability, but they also see value in India asserting itself as a strategic counterweight to China. Any escalation between India and Pakistan would complicate this, but it would also stretch China’s attention across multiple theatres.
Russia, meanwhile, continues to maintain quiet but important ties with both India and Pakistan. Moscow’s goal is to prevent total regional chaos that might endanger its own Central Asian security belt.
If hostilities erupt, the United States and the European Union will call for restraint, while quietly backing India’s right to self-defence. China will call for dialogue, but its logistical support for Pakistan will continue.
War Scenarios: Operation Sindhoor II
If the second round of conflict — “Operation Sindhoor II” — begins, the most likely sequence would be:
1. Indian pre-emptive air or missile strike on selected targets in PoJK and Pakistan.
2. Pakistan’s counter-strike, possibly including drone or artillery shelling across the LoC and in India.
3. TTP and allied militants could launch attacks inside Pakistan, targeting military bases and infrastructure.
4. Afghan border escalation, as Pakistan retaliates against alleged TTP camps inside Afghanistan.
5. China may increase military activities in Ladakh, forcing India to stretch its forces.
In this configuration, Pakistan would face not just India but a three-front crisis — military, internal, and geopolitical.
Conclusion: The Road Ahead
The current situation in South Asia resembles a chessboard where every move carries existential risk. Afghanistan’s role, though often underestimated, may prove decisive. Whether acting on its own or in coordination with others, Kabul has demonstrated the ability to influence regional security calculations.
India’s patience is wearing thin. Its domestic political freedom after the Bihar elections gives it space for assertive military action. Pakistan, already fragile, stands on the edge of both military confrontation and internal implosion. China will not ignite the fire, but it will ensure the flames do not burn its interests.
In the coming weeks, diplomacy may yet prevail — but only if back-channel communications between New Delhi, Islamabad, and Beijing can interrupt the momentum of escalation. If that fails, Operation Sindhoor II may begin not as a planned war but as an unstoppable chain reaction — ignited by miscalculation, fuelled by mistrust, and sustained by the geopolitics of revenge.
South Asia has seen many wars. Another one will not bring victory; it will only deepen the region’s collective wounds. But for now, all actors seem to be preparing for the inevitable. The peace of the subcontinent, once again, hangs by a thread.
Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.
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