President
Obama's participation in India's Republic Day celebrations on January 26 is
more than a gesture. It is an attempt to advance the idea of a strategic
partnership, which Washington has sought off and on since the 1950s but has not
materialized partly because of India's preference for non-alignment in
international relations. Just as the Americans tend to seek allies overseas,
India builds friendships and avoids alliances. An alliance implies dependence
whereas economic and military self-sufficiency is India's desire.
India's
Republic day celebrations commemorate the day the national movement led by the
Indian National Congress declared complete independence (Purna Swaraj) from
British colonial rule as their goal. Unlike several former British colonies,
Indians were not content with being a dominion under the Queen's or King's
titular reign. They wanted to be a Republic, which India became in 1949, just
two years after the British departure from the subcontinent.
Indians
and Americans share a commitment to democracy, federalism and their republics.
But they have not always seen eye to eye in the realm of foreign policy.
Obama's Delhi visit comes less than six months after the Washington visit of
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The frequency and intensity of high-level
contacts reflect a growing desire for deeper U.S.-India ties. But the two
countries still remain separated by their respective definitions of a strategic
relationship.
For
the United States, a strategic relationship is one in which defense and
economic ties are paramount. The U.S. is closest to those countries with which
it has a deep economic-defense partnership: Europe's NATO members, Japan, South
Korea, Australia, Canada and Israel. With these allies, the U.S. maintains ties
not only at different layers of government but also between the legislatures,
academia, think tanks and corporations.
America's
alliance relationships are not affected by tenures of individuals in office or
by short-term goals of administrations. The economic and military exchanges
between the U.S. and its allies create interest groups, especially in
Washington, but also in the private sector that deem the foreign relationship
critical.
But
India's nonaligned foreign policy and its aversion to military alliances has
not created tie-ups between India and the U.S. that are similar to those
between the U.S. and, say, Israel, South Korea or Japan. Over the last six
decades, India accepted economic and some military aid from the U.S. but it did
not pursue the sort of defense ties that result from buying U.S. military
equipment on concessional terms or integrating the training of officers.
In
its pursuit of independence and self-sufficiency, India bought arms from a
variety of sources and sent its officers to train with the forces of several
countries, including the U.S. and the Soviet Union at the same time during the
cold war. American generals and defense suppliers had closer ties for years
with Pakistan than they did with India because Islamabad pretended to be
Washington's ally while Delhi abjured an exclusive alliance relationship.
The
relationship changed after the end of the cold war. In 1995 India and the U.S.
agreed to set up a Defense Policy Group (DPG) and Joint Technical Group (JTG).
A decade later in 2005 they signed a "New Framework for the US-India
Defense Relationship" that established a new subgroup on Defense
Procurement and Production.
The
US-India Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) of 2012 was meant to
expand defense trade and technology cooperation. During Obama's upcoming visit,
India and the US are likely to sign a new 10-year defense framework agreement.
But India will still be different from US allies that buy US defense equipment
without insisting on learning how to make it on their own.
Most
Americans see India as a counterpoise to China, which is clearly a rising
military power in addition to being an economic giant. But the U.S. has been
slow to appreciate Indian concerns in relations to Pakistan-backed terrorism,
which does not enhance Indian trust in a receding superpower seen widely as
fickle, at least in India's backyard.
The
slow pace of India's economic reforms have undermined its capacity to compete
with China. Still, India is the world's top importer of major arms accounting
for 14 percent of global arms imports. Over 70 percent of India's defense
equipment needs are currently met through imports. From 2009-2013, Russia
accounted for 75 percent of Indian arms imports whereas 7 percent came from the
U.S. and 6 percent from Israel. In 2014, Indian defense procurements from the
U.S. were worth about $15 billion.
Most
U.S. defense sales to India are through the government -to-government or FMS
(foreign military sales) route rather than through DCS (direct commercial
sales). In late 2012, cumulative FMS sales to India were valued at over $8
billion. In 2015, India is expected to complete several large defense purchases
from US companies: over $1 billion for Sikorsky Aircraft's S-70B Hawk
helicopters, and over $2.5 billion in orders for Boeing's AH-64D Apache and CH-47
Chinook helicopters. But from America's point of view this is only a small
proportion of the estimated $250 billion India is expected to spend on military
acquisitions over the next five years.
India's
private sector was allowed to enter the defense market in 2001. As of 2013,
however, the Indian private sector has a share of only 6 percent share in the
country's defense spending with the public sector defense enterprises and major
foreign companies continuing to play a key role.
In
an attempt to incentivize corporate participation the government raised the cap
on foreign investment in the defense sector from 26 percent to 49 percent and
also removed the strenuous license requirements on 60 percent of defense
products for private manufacturing companies. At the Vibrant Gujarat summit Mr.
Modi also pledged "to cut red tape, pursue predictable policies, ensure
stable taxes and make India the 'easiest place' to do business."
Presumably, this would apply to the defense sector as much to other areas of
the economy.
India-U.S.
bilateral trade ties stand at around $100 billion in goods and services. The
two countries seek to boost this to as much as $500 billion. Secretary of State
John Kerry expressed hope that "Together, we can create an environment
where all of our companies play leading roles in bringing cutting-edge
technologies, equipment, capital, and know-how not just to India but to
countless countries that need this growth and development now."
It
is unlikely this goal will materialize without expanded Indian purchase of U.S.
military technology and enhanced defense cooperation. Obama and Modi have to
overcome traditional modes of thinking in the defense establishments of their
respective countries to make that happen. The U.S. will have to accept the fact
that India will not be a formal ally like some of its other partners; India
will have to recognize that acquiring state-of-the-art U.S. military
technologies comes at a price.
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