OUR
JIHAD ADDICTION, bY HUSAIN HAQQANI
CONFRONTING THE JIHADISTS
COMPREHENSIVELY WILL MAKE PAKISTAN MORE SECURE.
It
shook Pakistan and stunned the world. But the carnage on Dec. 16 at the Army
Public School, Peshawar, marked only an escalation in the brutality of
Pakistani militants, not its beginning.
Over
the years, Pakistan’s homegrown terrorists have bombed the places of worship of
the Shia, the Sunni, Ahmadis, Christians and Hindus. Since 2009, the Taliban
have attacked over a thousand schools, mainly in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province.
They have targeted ISI offices in several cities, Navy and Air Force bases, garrison
mosques, the Karachi Airport, and even the Army’s General Headquarters. If this
breadth of attrition has not cured Pakistan of its jihadist addiction, can the
deaths of 134 innocent children and the burning alive of their teachers in
Peshawar result in a fundamental change of heart?
The
jihadist worldview is as stubborn as it is toxic. Soon after Peshawar, Maulana
Abdul Aziz of Islamabad’s infamous Lal Masjid refused to condemn the Taliban’s
heinous attack, and Hafiz Saeed of Jamat-ud-Dawah (née Lashkar-e-Taiba) went on
television to blame New Delhi for the school attack and vowed revenge inside
India.
The
security establishment’s obsession with India, in which jihadism is rooted,
goes back to Partition, the Two Nation theory, and the abiding fear that external
powers want the dismemberment of Pakistan. The breakup of Pakistan in 1971 only
reinforced the national paranoia instead of convincing the country’s Punjabi
elite of the need to come to terms with Pakistan’s size and power and to seek
security within the parameters of reality.
Pakistan’s
constructed identity emphasizes religion and ideology at the expense of ethnic,
linguistic, and sectarian diversity of a complex society. As a result, the
country’s approach to national security has been driven by ideological rather
than pragmatic considerations. Although
Pakistan’s military and civil bureaucracy both originated from institutions
created under the British, their approach and attitudes have progressively been
driven more by the ‘ideology of Pakistan’ than the professionalism that they
often project to outsiders.
The
relationship between Pakistan and jihadism cannot be understood without
understanding the country’s ideological dimension, the fact that it was created
as the result of an idea. Pakistan has a national narrative, a national milieu,
and a national identity—all built around Islam. For the first 30 years of
Pakistan’s existence, the clamor was for religiosity within and Pan-Islamism in
foreign policy. For the next 30 years, global jihadism was the overarching
security and foreign policy idea that advanced the ‘ideology of Pakistan.’
Even
though three successive commanders of the Pakistan Army—Gen. Pervez Musharraf,
Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, and now Gen. Raheel Sharif—have sought to curtail the
jihadists’ influence within Pakistan, including through military operations,
their efforts have always fallen short because of the nation’s ideological
compulsions. The ‘ideology of Pakistan,’ and the falsified historic narrative
taught in schools to justify it, produces sympathy in society for Shariah rule,
for an Islamic caliphate and an Islamic state. This works in favor of more than
33 militant groups that operate out of Pakistan. Pakistan’s strategic planners
may see no difficulty in eliminating global terrorists and fighting local
jihadists while supporting regional ones. But the public is conflicted in its
attitude toward jihadist groups. Unfortunately for those who want to stop the
Pakistani Taliban, their rhetoric about Shariah and against Western values resonates
with supporters of other, ostensibly ‘more palatable’ jihadist groups even if
their methods are abhorred by Pakistanis.
For
most countries, nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee against invasion or
territorial extinction. But to the disciples of the ‘ideology of Pakistan,’
security is not enough. Built in into the Two Nation theory is the notion of
parity between Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India. The events of the last 67 years
may have rendered the Two Nation theory redundant. The number of Muslims living
in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh is now roughly equal and there are more
Muslims in the subcontinent that live outside Pakistan than in it. But the
ideological conception of Pakistan requires that it claim the mantle of Muslim
nationhood and pursue equivalence to India in status, power and international
standing.
Pakistan’s
size and economy do not allow it to be on a par with much larger and
increasingly wealthier India. The machinations of the Cold War that enabled
Pakistani leaders to punch beyond their weight through alliance with the West,
especially the United States, are also over. That leaves asymmetric warfare
through jihadists as the only strategic option for Pakistan’s ideologues. The
other course, that of pursuing security and prosperity of geographic Pakistan
and its people without insisting on the ‘ideology of Pakistan,’ has simply not
found sufficient resonance among Islamabad’s powerful quarters.
The
case made by Pakistan’s ideologues is appealing to Pakistanis even as it drags
the country down the road of tragedies similar to the recent one in Peshawar.
In 1947, the country inherited few resources and feared strangulation at birth.
The Partition riots and the exclusion of Jammu and Kashmir scarred Pakistan’s
founding generation. The country survived because of its people’s resilience
and its leaders’ adept Cold War alliances.
As
early as 1948, Pakistan’s first military foray into Kashmir involved lashkars from
the tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan. The irregular fighter added
to the Pakistani military’s muscle. Engaging the tribesmen in jihad across the
Indus, in Kashmir, preempted the possibility of their becoming involved in
schemes for “Pashtunistan,” the land of the Pashtuns—advocated at the time by
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the government of Afghanistan. Thus began
Pakistan’s tolerance and support for nonstate actors tied by ideological
nationalism to the strategic vision of Pakistan’s military establishment.
In
the 1980s, Pakistan’s policy received a shot in the arm with the U.S. decision
to support the mujahideen in Afghanistan in order to combat the Soviet Union.
As substantial amounts of money, weapons and fighters flowed in, Pakistan’s
security establishment began setting up camps to not only train fighters to
battle in Afghanistan, but also in Jammu and Kashmir. Today, a wide array of
militant organizations operates in Pakistan with safe havens in urban and rural
areas. Some of these include sectarian organizations that target religious
minorities and Muslim sects (Sipah-e-Sahaba), anti-India outfits
(Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed), anti-Afghanistan groups (Mullah Omar’s
Taliban and the Haqqani network), and militants waging war against the
Pakistani military (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan).
The
9/11 attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan was the first turning
point in the nature of militancy in Pakistan. General Musharraf was quick to
sever ties with the Taliban government in Kabul and supported American
operations in Afghanistan. To give the peace process with India some traction,
he put a temporary halt on militant flow into Jammu and Kashmir. In April
1999, Musharraf had told a group of retired military officers that the “Taliban
are my strategic reserve and I can unleash them in tens of thousands against
India when I want.” By 2002, he had changed his tune, nominally banning groups
such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. But the banned organizations and their leadership
were allowed to operate under new names.
Under
Musharraf, Pakistan began differentiating between jihadist groups. While
foreign terrorists with links to Al Qaeda were handed over to the U.S., local
and regional militants (sectarian, anti-India and anti-Afghan groups) were left
alone. Some militants built capacity to challenge the writ of the state right
under the nose of Pakistani security forces. They have inflicted huge
casualties on security forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan over the years. Other
groups such as the Haqqani network were allegedly ‘managed’ by intelligence
agencies in a bid to exert influence on events in Afghanistan.
The
current Pakistani problem of increasing terrorism at home is the result of that
policy. While the state might differentiate among terrorists, the jihadists
often tend to be sympathetic and supportive toward one another. The jihadists
supported by the establishment end up supporting terrorists attacking
Pakistan’s Army and civilians. As is often the case with ideologically
motivated militants, ideology takes precedence over strategy. Even jihadists
accepting or extracting state support see the value of some fighters using
force to Islamize Pakistan further, even at the cost of undermining the
country’s stability.
Pakistan’s
adherence to an ideological nationalism based on Islam has allowed radical
groups to propagate their message and raise large sums of money without much
hindrance. Further, while the coercive military and
intelligence apparatus has been strong, the local police have never been
provided the political support, resources and skills required to be able to
combat these radical outfits. Faced with a poorly trained and demoralized
police force, some groups run extortion and kidnapping rackets in urban
centers. They also raise money through narcotics trafficking and trade of
smuggled goods. So the militant organizations have a sophisticated system of
fundraising to support their activities. This would enable them to operate even
after the Pakistani state has made a final decision to cut them off.
For
years, Pakistan has been living in denial. For years, Pakistan denied support
for the Afghan Taliban or the existence of Kashmiri jihadist training camps.
The presence of Al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, was attributed to
the inadvertent consequences of Pakistan’s involvement in the anti-Soviet jihad
of the 1980s. But denial does not offer a way forward. Pakistan’s
Islamo-nationalism has bred radicalism, diminished economic growth and weakened
its international standing. Also unknown is the extent of ideological
radicalization within Pakistan’s military, which remains the country’s dominant
institution.
There
have been numerous instances of military officers, noncommissioned officers and
enlisted men cooperating with jihadists or deserting their service to join
jihadist ranks. But the Pakistani military tends to hold back information on
the matter, making an assessment of the extent of this problem difficult. The
PNS Mehran attack in 2011, the attack on the Air Force’s Kamra base in 2012,
and the foiled attempt last September by Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent to
take over a Navy frigate in Karachi harbor all point to the persistence of
jihadist influence within the ranks of the Armed Forces.
It
is unlikely that the Pakistani establishment would want to give up its
decades-long pursuit of paramountcy over Afghanistan. Faced with international
pressure as well as growing threats from the Pakistani Taliban, Pakistan has
cleared out known jihadist sanctuaries in North Waziristan. This has deprived
Afghan groups such as the Haqqani network of their former headquarters. But
Pakistan has neither acted against nor militarily confronted the Afghan
Taliban; and the Haqqani network is believed to have relocated to other parts
of the federally administered tribal areas.
Pakistan’s
policy in the immediate future would likely be to engage with Afghanistan and
the U.S. to find a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. At the same time
Pakistan could continue to try and militarily change the ground situation in
Afghanistan to force the world to deal with de facto Taliban control of parts
of Afghanistan as fait accompli. In Islamabad’s view, this would enable it to
determine the final terms of an Afghan settlement, resulting in India’s
exclusion from Afghanistan and the northwestern neighbor being acknowledged as
Pakistan’s sphere of influence.
But
are fantasies of parity with India and paramountcy over Afghanistan realistic
policies? For 67 years, Pakistan has developed one element of national
power—the military one—at the cost of all others. The country’s institutions,
ranging from schools and universities to the judiciary, are in a state of
general decline. The economy’s stuttering growth is dependent largely on the
flow of concessional flows of external resources. Pakistan’s GDP stands at $245
billion in absolute terms and $845 billion in purchasing price parity—the
smallest economy of any country that has so far tested nuclear weapons.
Almost
half of Pakistan is very poor. Pakistan’s literacy rate is 57 percent, and a
staggering 38 percent of Pakistanis between the school-going ages of 5 and 15
are out of school. The low literacy rate and inadequate investment in education
have led to a decline in Pakistan’s technological base, hampering economic
modernization. With one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios in the world, at around
9 percent, a GDP growth rate of 1.7 to 2.4 percent and population growth rate
of 1.5 percent, Pakistan needs foreign as well as domestic investments in
addition to drastic changes in local laws, all of which need broad political
consensus and stability, both of which are lacking. With almost 40 percent of
its population urbanized, the Pakistani government spends around 2.6 percent on
public healthcare. As a result, social services are also in a state of decline.
On the other hand, Pakistan spends almost 6 percent of its GDP on defense and
is still unable to match the conventional forces of India, which outspends
Pakistan 3 to 1 while allocating less than 3 percent of GDP to military
spending.
Over the decades,
Pakistan has managed to evade crises and failure status primarily because the
international community has bailed it out. But now the rest of the world sees
Pakistan as Jihad Central. Camps nestled in the tribal areas have trained and
equipped militants who have gone on to fight in the name of Allah in different
regions of the world. Foreign fighters trained in Pakistan have reportedly
been in action in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Mali, Nigeria and China’s Xinjiang
region. It is no longer possible to keep Pakistani jihadists as a strategic
reserve “only to cause damage to India.”
Instead
of securing parity with India and paramountcy over Afghanistan, jihadists have
only caused crisis and disruption within Pakistan, which must recognize the
heavy cost being exacted by its pursuit of regional influence through
asymmetric warfare. Fighting some jihadists while embracing others is
self-defeating. Thirty years of escalated jihadism have caused erosion of the
writ of the Pakistani state and decline in the capacity of state institutions,
especially its coercive apparatus.
Even
with sporadic military operations, Pakistan’s tribal areas will remain host for
some time to a wide range of militant organizations with local, regional and
global agendas. Punjab is now the main recruitment ground not only for the
Pakistani Army but also for assorted jihadist groups. The growing presence of
jihadists in south Punjab and northern Sindh and even in Pakistan’s financial hub,
Karachi, does not augur well for the economy.
Pakistan’s
jihadists are already exercising virtual veto over Pakistan’s relations with
India. The Mumbai attack proved Lashkar-e-Taiba’s ability to undermine the
initiatives of a civilian government for normalization of India-Pakistan
relations. They could, in future, force the Pakistani military’s hand in a
similar manner. Pakistan needs to
get out of denial that there are any jihadist groups that can be trusted or
considered allies of the state. However useful they might have been for
external purposes, nonstate actors will always be a danger for the state
internally. Instead of increasing Pakistan’s strategic options, as they were
designed to do, the jihadists are now limiting Pakistan’s foreign policy choices.
Instead
of doubling down on its jihadist misadventures, Pakistan can plot its course
out of the disaster. To do so, it would have to change the defensive national
narrative about Pakistan’s creation, raison d’être and prospects of survival.
So far, any discussion of the nation’s origins that does not conform to the
‘ideology of Pakistan’ has been treated not as history but as an attack on the
country’s foundation.
After
mobilizing support for the demand for Pakistan, and establishing it as an
independent country, successive Pakistani leaders have chosen to keep alive the
divisive frenzy that led to Partition. If Pakistan was attained with the slogan
‘Islam in danger,’ it has been built on the slogan ‘Pakistan in danger,’
creating a constant sense of insecurity among its people, especially in
relation to India and internal demands for ethnic identity or pluralism.
Huseyn
Shaheed Suhrawardy had opposed the conjuring of this ‘ideology of Pakistan.’ He
had told Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly in March 1948 against building
Pakistani nationalism around the notion of Islam being under threat. According
to him, the rhetoric used to mobilize Muslims for the creation of Pakistan was
no longer needed after Independence. “You are raising the cry,” he said, “of ‘Pakistan
in danger’ for the purpose of arousing Muslim sentiments and binding them
together in order to maintain you in power.” Suhrawardy warned against
transforming Pakistan into a state “founded on sentiments, namely that of
‘Islam in danger’ or of ‘Pakistan in danger.’” He declared that, “a state which
will be held together by raising the bogey of attacks” and “friction” with
enemies “will be full of alarms and excursions.”
Suhrawardy’s
words seem almost prophetic today. He said, “You think that you will get away
with it but in that state there will be no commerce, no business and no trade.
There will be lawlessness and those lawless elements that may be turned today
against non-Muslims will be turned later on, once those fratricidal tendencies
have been aroused, against the Muslim gentry and I want you to be warned in
time.” He also defined the two key issues for the new country. The “fundamental
aspect of the foundations of Pakistan,” he asserted, should be “the goodwill of
the people and of the citizens of Pakistan within the state” and “the mutual
relationship between the Dominion of Pakistan and the sister dominion, Indian
Union.”
If
Peshawar has indeed changed Pakistan, it will heed Suhrawardy’s advice.
Haqqani,
Pakistan’s former ambassador to the U.S., is Director for South and Central
Asia at the Hudson Institute. From our Jan. 10-17, 2015, issue.
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