Obama in India and
Xi in Pakistan, Michael Krepon
Trend lines on the
subcontinent have become more pronounced after President Obama’s visit as chief
guest at the Republic Day parade and reports of Chinese President’s Xi
Jinping’s upcoming visit for Republic Day celebrations in Pakistan. The
juxtaposition of Obama’s visit in New Delhi with a near-total power blackout in
Pakistan was brutally stark. While Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi were
signing up to a new ten-year defense framework agreement, Pakistani Chief of
Army Staff Raheel Sharif was visiting Beijing.
China
and Pakistan will remain “all-weather friends,” with Beijing picking up some of
the slack of a contracting U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Chinese help with arms
co-production and development – presumably a subject of discussion between Gen.
Sharif and his hosts – will grow as Washington gravitates more toward New
Delhi. None of the joint ventures in defense production announced during
Obama’s visit were eye-popping, but this trend is unmistakable and will be
given further impetus by incoming Secretary of Defense Ash Carter.
The George W. Bush
Administration hyped a transformation in U.S.-India relations, symbolized by a
civil-nuclear agreement. A weak Congress-led Indian government couldn’t begin
to meet the hype, and the nuclear deal became a glaring example of the gap
between promise and performance. Obama is now working with an ambitious,
results-oriented counterpart who enjoys wide popular and parliamentary support.
The impasse over liability needed to be addressed to demonstrate Modi’s ability
to deliver. Whether a “breakthrough” has been found to facilitate plans by
Westinghouse and General Electric to build nuclear power plants in India is
still not clear, but at least New Delhi can now claim to have gone the extra
mile in finding one.
The
hype of the Bush administration has now been replaced by a mutual agreement not
to over-promise while working in a more concerted fashion where interests are
in concert. Symbolism and substance are in greater alignment. One area of
converging interests relates to China’s more assertive behavior in the
Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean.
Beijing
downplayed the significance of Obama’s trip to New Delhi, but has surely noted
that the joint statements released after Modi’s visit to Washington (shortly
after receiving Xi in India) as well as after Obama’s trip both referenced
maritime muscle flexing by China’s Navy. Here are the relevant passages from
the “U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean
Region” released during the Obama visit:
We affirm the importance of
safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over
flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.
We call on all parties to
avoid the threat or use of force and pursue resolution of territorial and
maritime disputes through all peaceful means, in accordance with universally
recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea.
The
Indian Navy is hard to find in the South China Sea, but it’s rare for New Delhi
to poke at the Dragon. China poked first with port visits along the littoral of
the Indian Ocean. Xi Jinping made an error in judgment when his visit to India
in September, 2014 was accompanied by aggressive patrolling by the PLA along
the disputed Sino-Indian border. Modi’s message to Xi (translated from the
Hindi), was, “Even such small incidents can impact the biggest of relationships
just as a little toothache can paralyze the entire body.”
Xi’s
more muscular approach to asserting China’s interests around its periphery has
generated push back from a more assertive Indian leader. New Delhi isn’t in the
business of containing China; it is in the business of seeking more trade and
investment with China – while improving conventional and nuclear capabilities
oriented toward China. Modi’s success in improving relations with the United
States could help him leverage improved relations with China. How these two
confident, dynamic leaders choose to deal with their border dispute will be
telling.
Where
does this leave Pakistan? Closer to China and farther behind India. Pakistan’s
sense of insecurity wasn’t helped by the Obama visit, and subsequent steps demonstrating
greater U.S.-Indian cooperation will be vexing. Washington’s choices mirror the
divergent national fortunes of India and Pakistan. The United States has never
been able to move beyond a transactional relationship with Pakistan. Washington
will continue to help Islamabad refinance its debt and help Rawalpindi’s
undertake counter-terrorism operations, while waiting for Pakistan’s leaders to
come to grips with the underlying sources of its economic and internal
insecurities. U.S. ties with India have the potential to move beyond a
transactional relationship because they have far greater upsides.
A
presidential visit with perfect pitch to India produced discordant notes in
Pakistan. National Security Advisor Sartaj Aziz issued a statement of concerns,
qualms, and disappointments, touching on familiar bases, especially U.S.
nuclear deal-making with India and assisting India’s entry into the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and other oversight bodies. Pakistan has not yet taken
initiatives to recast its position in the nuclear order and to facilitate its
entry alongside India into the NSG.
The
rapport between Obama and Modi can come in handy in the event of another
nuclear-tinged crisis on the subcontinent. India-Pakistan relations cannot
improve in the absence of dialogue, but Modi is focused on more important
diplomatic initiatives. In the past, dialogue has been interrupted by grievous
acts of terror on Indian soil perpetrated by groups like the Lashkar e-Toiyba.
The Pakistani government has yet to clarify whether its new counter-terrorism
plans apply to the LeT. The absence of dialogue diminishes India. Another
attack against India by the LeT or another group finding sanctuary within
Pakistan will further diminish Pakistan.
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