August 6th, 2015
Reams are being written about lack of India’s Pakistan policy or more
specifically policy to impose costs for waging relentless proxy war through
terrorist organizations, subversion in Kashmir and indigenous Indian
organizations like SIMI and IM. These terrorist outfits are being subverted by
ideologically driven radicalism.
This is coming about in the face of open provocations by the likes of
Hamid Gul who are challenging India to respond in kind if it has the gumption.
NSA, in his recent remarks in Mumbai has talked about ‘proportionate response’
to Pakistani provocations but the larger question is options in the face of
calculated Pakistan strategy of provoking India.
Years of neglect and impervious political decision making has resulted
in non development of credible asymmetric capabilities even as Pakistan
continues to blame India for activities in Karachi or Baluchistan. There is no
point in crying over spilt milk, these asymmetric capabilities will require
time and political resolve to develop. This leaves India very much with the
option of punitive conventional response. There is a tendency among the
strategic community which percolates to policy makers that conventional Indian
response that could provoke Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds. This notion needs
detailed analysis and Pakistan’s bluff called.
India needs to unequivocally declare that India’s see’s unabated proxy
war as breakdown of conventional deterrence and reserves the right to
appropriate military response. Mere articulation will not be enough? India’s
standoff military or what is euphemistically called “non contact” capabilities
must be exploited and demonstrated. This will require close coordination
between intelligence agencies and the armed forces. Possible option could be
targeting various elements of terror network and their support structures which
can be internationally highlighted as state sponsored. No doubt there will
be noise and brinkmanship by Pakistan and even some military action, it will be
important for Indian state to not only ride these out but inflict retaliatory
punitive costs. What is being proposed is cross border strikes on targets (not
merely camps) which India believes supports the terror network.
Second is developing capability and capacities for “Myanmar Raid” like operation.
Action will be required to degrade surveillance and communication systems,
backed by credible force insertion capability. Without going into too much
details idea is to demonstrate will and resolve. These actions must be
initiated in the backdrop of limited mobilization of conventional forces and
quick response if so required. There is no doubt that Pakistan will respond by
some sort of military action however surprise and speed of action backed by
credible retaliatory capability will provide requites payoffs. This will
require orchestration of operations both at military and national levels
including diplomatic shaping of environment. The notion that Pakistan is
operating on interior lines is a myth. With recent redeployments in Northern
and Western commands adequate forces are available for quick response backed by
credible and deterrent air power, which must be the backbone given are relative
air superiority.
There are many other options which can be considered to demonstrate
Indian will and resolve. These no doubt have escalatory nuances, but what is
the point of raving about conventional superiority if it cannot be leveraged. There
is perception in Pakistani military elites whom the author has been meeting in
Track II Dialogues over last three years that India has no response to proxy
war and conventional escalation can be checkmated by battlefield nuclear
weapons. It is this myth India will have to challenge and debase. No doubt it
carries a risk but sooner than later Indian state will have to demonstrate this
resolve if it does want to be subsumed by rising tide of radicalism and
Pakistan’s state sponsored terror. If any lessons are to be drawn we should
look at what happened in 1971 war and how Pakistani forces capitulated against
Indian manoeuvre and resolve. The doctrine of ‘retribution’ already stands
vindicated in the NATO and American air strikes against ISIL in Iraq, Syria and
Libya.
Perception of Sino – Pak collusion is overplayed
particularly the two front war. Chinese are pragmatic; they realize the
scenario of ongoing India – Pakistan confrontation is going to be harmful to
its one road – one belt policy on which hinges its economic development and
extended sphere of influence. Any precipitate action by Chinese will surely and
firmly push India into American camp a development which will be grievous to
its Asian and global ambitions. Pakistan it must be realized is a bit player
with nuclear weapons, who’s utility in the “Great Asian Game” at best is
marginal. From Chinese perspective strong Indian economic and military power
which is antagonistic to China will be antithesis to its ambitions. Therefore
it will be nuanced player which can be balanced by broader Indo – Pacific
partnerships that India is attempting to evolve. Put simply there are limits to
which China will go in supporting Pakistan?
So coming back to Pakistan, I am afraid in the developing scenario,
India should go through the current round of bilateral negotiations with
Pakistan impressing upon them the consequences of its support to cross border
terror and the proxy war. It is very unlikely Pakistan will take heed, knowing
a little about their thinking and mindset. It is when they try and exploit our
perceived weakness India should retaliate suddenly, resolutely and without respite.
Message of retribution and costs must be driven home.
Last word: such a policy or option
cannot succeed without bipartisan support. This is an imperative. In its
resolve to take military action perpetrated by Pakistan; nation must stand firm
and united. Unless we develop such credible response capability and political
resolve India will continue to bleed not only in J&K or Punjab but across
its length and breadth. Indian dream will be truly and fully become
unrealizable.
All very true. But does India have the equipment and ammunition for a sustained campaign.
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