The Dangers of
Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons, by Sajid Farid Shapoo
Why Pakistan’s tactical nukes are inherently a threat to the country’s
nuclear security.
Nuclear weapons today are a part of Pakistan’s belief system, having been
built up over the years because they seem to have provided a credible deterrent
against Indian aggression. Pakistan is convinced, maybe rightly so, that its
nuclear capability has been able to deter India from escalating hostilities in
the last three decades. Pakistan is now on a journey to strengthen its
deterrent.
Pakistan today has the world’s fastest growing nuclear stockpile,
according to a report published in
2015. Given the rate of its plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)
production, it may be able to produce another 200 nuclear warheads in next five
to 10 years, taking its arsenal to close to 350 warheads. The production of
such a staggering stockpile has been associated with an extremely worrisome
trend: a majority of nuclear warheads produced by Pakistan in the last decade
are thought to be low-yield tactical weapons. The rapid tacticalization of a
strategic asset in a region considered to be a nuclear flashpoint has
raised plethora of security and strategic questions.
Pakistan is at the epicenter of global jihadi terrorism. The country has
faced some devastating attacks on its defense apparatus by jihadists in the
past decade or so; there have been repeated instances, for example, where some
of these attacks were mounted with the help of insiders within the Pakistani
military establishment. This internal chaos, coupled with perpetual tensions
with its eastern neighbor, India, makes Pakistan a bit of nuclear nightmare.
Its willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons even against a limited
conventional incursion by India further complicates this situation.
The Dynamics of Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Though the Indian Army had long refrained from formally accepting
“Cold Start” as a professed strategy of the armed forces, the recent statement
of India’s army chief acknowledging the existence of Cold Start has
generated friction between Islamabad and New Delhi. Cold Start envisages
several division-size integrated battle groups to be on a standby alert all the
times so that if need be, they can surge deep into Pakistan across several
theaters and seize a portion of Pakistan territory, which could be then used to
bargain with Pakistan.
In spite of the Indian army’s ambiguity toward Cold Start, Pakistan’s
military leadership seems convinced that it is India’s military doctrine.
Pakistan as a result has shifted its own doctrine from strategic deterrence to
what it calls full spectrum deterrence. In essence, this
means Pakistan’s willingness to adopt a nuclear first use policy in a tactical
environment. Pakistan believes the most credible way to deter a conventional
war against a nuclear India is to asymmetrically escalate a conflict by
threatening first use of tactical nuclear weapons on advancing Indian forces
once they cross the border into Pakistani soil — deterrence by denial. Such
a move would, in Pakistan’s view, blunt India’s conventional
assault and give India little justification for a disproportionate nuclear
strike on Pakistan’s strategic centers, because Pakistan would not have
targeted Indian cities. In this scenario, the burden of the Pakistani posture
would be on first-strike capabilities in a limited theater setting using
tactical battlefield weapons.
TNWs, experts believe, have the ability to end a conflict or at
least de-escalate the engagement. However, just
because TNWs were an effective deterrent during the Cold War in a European
setting does not mean that this can replicated in South Asia. Even a small
“kill range” weapon may result in a large number of civilian casualties in a
region with one of the highest population densities in the world.
The use of TNWs against an enemy force on its own soil would also have
tremendous repercussions for Pakistan. First, it may result in killing large
chunks of its own population in the event of sudden
crisis, as Pakistan would not have sufficient time to move its
population. Second, the entire strategic game plan would fail if India decides
to respond by using its own strategic weapons against Pakistan’s main cities.
Third, the expected destruction of enemy forces as a result of the use of TNWs
may not be sufficient to either end the conflict or deescalate the same.
One recent report suggests that
a TNW attack on Indian advancing forces may end up destroying 20 to 30 tanks
and equal number of Armored Personnel Carriers, at the most. It adds that in
such a case India would keep advancing into Pakistan and/or give a matching if
not bigger response. There have been conflicting views on the extent of
destruction a TNW could cause on an advancing army. This combined with absence
of actual battlefield information about the TNWs clouds their deterrent value
to a large extent.
The Dangers of Tactilization: Command and Control Vulnerabilities
The credible threat of battlefield tactical weapons is predicated
on these being in battle-ready mode. As Tim Hoyt writes, “It
is apparent that Pakistan’s command and control procedures are delegative, lean
heavily toward the always side of the always/never divide, and
probably include both devolution and possibly pre-delegation in order to ensure
the use of weapons.”
Pakistan is forced to keep some of its TNWs in a ready state if
they are to prove useful in stopping an Indian incursion and, more importantly,
make deterrence-by-denial appear a credible instrument. This means that
tactical weapons in a ready state would have to be stationed close to the
frontline. It would be challenge for the National Command Authority (NCA) to
exercise its control on these ready weapons. In a chaotic crisis situation, the
decision to launch a tactical nuclear strike may rest with a mid-level
theater commander, who would have limited battlefield vision. One retired army
general conceded that in a crisis situation a theater commander would probably
take matters into his own hands; should a trade-off be required, battle
effectiveness of the nuclear force will trump centralized control.
Such command and control procedures, which are a result of Pakistan’s
heavy tilt toward using TNWs in a crisis situation, makes the entire edifice
vulnerable to rogue elements within its armed forces.
Threats to Pakistan’s Nuclear Security
The terrorist use of nuclear weapons, with its tsunamic global and
regional consequences, is any country’s worst security nightmare. Such a
situation appears highly unlikely, but even a miniscule probability of it
happening should be enough to motivate intense focus on the proper steps to
mitigate such a risk. Pakistan claims to have made significant improvement in
its nuclear security environment, but there are no independent reports which
can sufficiently verify these claims. Pakistan’s opacity in sharing
any kind of details about its security procedures makes it impossible to
ascertain the veracity of its security claims.
In the past five years there have been at least half a dozen attacks on
the facilities that reportedly store Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The Kamra Air
Base near Islamabad has been attacked three times by terrorists belonging to
the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Meanwhile, the gradual radicalization of the Pakistani army over the
past three decades poses a grave danger to Pakistan’s nuclear security in terms
of insider threats. These insiders have time and again allied with various
jihadi organizations to strike at the state at will. The gravest threat to
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is posed by this insider-jihadi collaboration. The
possibility of these two potentially dangerous elements coming together and
acquiring a nuclear weapon is perhaps one of the most underappreciated threats
to international peace and security in the region.
The extent of terrorist infiltration in Pakistan’s nuclear-armed
military was highlighted when a group of terrorists, acting with alleged
intelligence assistance from “insiders,” mounted an attack on one of Pakistan’s
biggest naval bases. In 2011, jihadists belonging to the 313 Brigade of Ilyas
Kashmiri attacked the Mehran Naval Base near Karachi. Since 2005, the 313
Brigade has acted as an armed extension of al-Qaeda. The unit is manned by
former Pakistani army officers who were earlier working with Ilyas Kashmiri; he
reportedly had a strong contingent of ISI and Pakistan army alumni as advisors.
This alumni contingent was working under the banner of “Jund al-Fida” (Army of
Martyrs), a name suggested by Osama bin Laden himself.
Major (Retd.) Abdur Rehman
Hashim, once the director of Jund al-Fida operations on behalf of
Ilyas Kashmiri, reportedly instructed David Headley, one of the
primary figures accused of scouting on behalf of the
Lashkar-e-Taiba attackers in Mumbai in 2008, to conduct surveillance on the Bhabha
Atomic Center. Another Pakistan Army alum linked to Jund al-Fida, Major Haroon Ashiq, was arrested for
the murder of Major General Ameer Alvi in 2009. Haroon’s younger brother, Capt.
(Retd.) Khurram Shehzad was killed
fighting Canadian forces in Afghanistan on behalf of al-Qaeda in 2006.
With such a battery of ex-army officers at his disposal, it was not
surprising that Ilyas Kashmiri was able to get vital insider information about
Mehran Airbase. These army officers used their past contacts to spot radical
elements within the armed forces and then tried to recruit them to join
al-Qaeda. These insiders then provided critical information to groups like
al-Qaeda and the TTP. The AQIS attack on the Pakistani naval frigate PNS Zulfiqar in
September 2014, again with the help of serving and retired Naval officers,
revealed the deep rooted nexus between terrorists and radical elements within
the Pakistani defense establishment.
The level of infiltration inside the Pakistani military has
been growing vertically, with even a middle-ranking officer having been
arrested for links to al-Qaeda. It may not be completely impossible for
radicalized serving officers to get hold of a tactical nuclear warhead in a
crisis situation.
Conclusion
Responding to U.S. concerns about Pakistan’s frenzied race to develop
battlefield nuclear weapons, Lt. Gen. (retd.) Khalid Kidwai, the former head of
Pakistan’s Strategic Planning Division, said that TNWs were there to stay and
Pakistan was not apologetic about that
fact.
Pakistan takes immense pride in its nuclear capability, which is indeed
formidable. But it is time Pakistan conveyed its nuclear maturity by talking
more about its nuclear security provisions. Such debates would create awareness
amongst the Pakistani masses about their individual responsibility toward their
country’s nuclear arsenal. It would also deter attempts by non-state actors to
involve the local population in any sabotage attempts against nuclear
facilities.
The innately unstable civilian-military dynamic, the risk of an
internal rogue threat, the highly charged domestic jihadi environment, and
rapidly multiplying TNW arsenal combine to put Pakistan near the top of the
list of global nuclear threats. Unless these adversarial threats are
eliminated, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will continue to be a source of high
threat perceptions. Pakistan needs to appreciate that a robust and impregnable
security system is essential not only for its own nuclear stability, but also
for global peace and security.
Sajid Farid Shapoo is a highly
decorated Indian Police Service officer at the rank of inspector general (two
star general) with 18 years of progressively senior experience in sensitive and
high-profile assignments across India. He is currently pursuing his Masters in
International Affairs with at Columbia University, New York.
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