LIES and deception have often
been used to cover up blunders, conspiracies and military misadventures spanning
Pakistan’s 70-year history. Facts are hidden from the nation though known
otherwise. Failure is celebrated as victory. As a result we could never learn
from our mistakes and wrongdoings.
What happened in the 1965 war and
the causes behind the dismemberment of the country in 1971 have not been
acknowledged publicly. Mystery continues to shroud the presence
of Osama bin Laden in a high-security garrison town and the
raid on his hideout by the US forces in May 2011.
Enquiry commission reports on
all these incidents have been consigned to the back room in the name of
national security. More shocking is the fact that some of these reports were
leaked through foreign sources, though they may still not depict the whole
truth.
This situation has caused a
widening trust deficit between the public and the authorities. Unsurprisingly,
the people tend to believe the foreign publications on the issue, however
unrealistic they may be. So sensitive have the security agencies become that
even public debate on these issues is seen as breach of national security.
A new book offers
illuminating details about the Kargil fiasco.
The Kargil
military misadventure is one such event that has not been fully
probed largely because of the same reason. The incursion that embroiled
Pakistan in serious military and diplomatic embarrassment and ultimately led to
yet another military coup has only been discussed and examined in a civil
versus military binary.
But a new and well-researched
book From Kargil to Coup authored by
veteran journalist Nasim Zehra has examined the fiasco in great detail.
Chronicling how the entire Kargil operation was
conceived and carried out, it also analyses in a historical context the
India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir that has led to three wars between the two
nuclear-armed nations.
Indeed the misadventure exposed
the civil- military gap, but that was only one aspect of the story. The real
issue was how a coterie of generals could bring the country to the brink of a
nuclear conflagration. So much so that even the senior military leadership was
unaware of the operation until things started unravelling.
The Kargil clique, as the
author described the “group of four top generals” who later usurped power
overthrowing the elected government, declared it a brilliant strategic move
that failed to achieve its objective because of “spineless” civilian
leadership. The book has assumed greater significance because the Kargil issue
had not even been discussed or critically examined at various military forums.
From Kargil to Coup confirms
that the civilian leadership was never taken into confidence on the operation,
leave aside getting its approval that is legally required. It was in May 1999,
almost six months after the start of the operation, that the then prime
minister Nawaz Sharif and the Defence Committee of the Cabinet was given a full
briefing by the military leadership about it. By then, the incursion had
already become known. “This was near identical replay of the operation
Gibraltar with the only difference that in Kargil the civilian and military
leadership were not on the same page,” the book points out. Operation Gibraltar
was the code name for the incursion into Kashmir that led to the 1965 war.
The Kargil operation,
code-named operation Koh-e-Paima, was launched a year after both India and
Pakistan conducted nuclear tests that made them nuclear weapon states. The
secret operation led by the then army chief General Pervez Musharraf was based
on the assumption that the control of strategic peaks overlooking the main
highway that worked as a supply line to the Indian forces in Siachen could
force New Delhi to come to the negotiating table.
According to the author, the
decision to go ahead with the operation was based on several factors that
included drawing international attention to the Kashmir issue. “The clique of
generals was confident about achieving its objectives.” Contrary to the
calculation the operation turned into a fiasco. Pakistan was forced to pull out
without any preconditions. In fact, the Kargil misadventure dealt a huge blow
to the Kashmir cause, with Pakistan losing support of the international
community on the issue.
Inevitably, the operation
further intensified civil-military tension, resulting in the military coup by
the same Kargil clique. Understandably, no enquiry could be conducted into the
debacle that cost the country hugely. The book provides much needed information
on the secret military operation that has been missing from the public debate.
Its objectivity and non-binary
approach has earned the publication positive response. However, another book
that also came out last week has evoked intense reaction from the security
agencies and political leaders.
The Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI,
and the Illusion of Peace, co-authored by former ISI chief retired Lt Gen Asad
Durrani and A.S. Dulat, former chief of India’s premier intelligence agency
RAW, was launched last week in India. The book contains remarks by the former
Pakistani spymaster on some of the issues obstructing peace efforts between the
two South Asian neighbours.
General Durrani, who is also a
central character in the infamous Asghar Khan case, is barred from leaving the
country as he faces inquiry for potential violation of the military code of
conduct. What has probably angered the military most are his comments that the
Pakistani military leadership may have had prior information about the US raid
on Bin Laden’s residence.
One may agree that because of
his sensitive position the general should have been more discreet in his
remarks, but there is nothing he has said that has not been written about
before. The reaction reflects the narrow-minded perception of the military
about national security. Even a former general is not spared. General Durrani
has certainly not revealed any state secrets and the travel restriction on him
appears extremely harsh. What is most interesting is that some other senior
military officers, including former military ruler Gen Musharraf, have written
much more candidly. An open debate on our mistakes and bungles can only
strengthen the state, not weaken it.
The writer is an author
and journalist.
Twitter: @hidhussain
Published in Dawn, May 30th, 2018
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