Khadim Hussain Rizvi And Rise Of Religious Extremism 2.0
In Pakistan
Introduction
Until January 4, 2011 nobody was aware of
Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi, who later gained popularity for his firebrand
style of oratory. Khadim Hussain Rizvi is a religious cleric born on June 22,
1966 in the Pindi Gheb area of Attock District Punjab. A Hafiz-e-Quran and
Sheikh-ul-Hadith, Rizvi used to deliver Friday sermons at Lahore’s Pir Makki
Masjid, located near Daata Darbar, during his stay in the Punjab Auqaf
Department. Many mistake him as a Shia because of his last name, but he is a
staunch follower of Imam Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi, the 19th century founder of
the Barelvi
sect.
Rizvi came into
limelight of media and political elite after his firm support for Mumtaz Qadri,
a man who was supposed to protect the Governor of Punjab Salman Taseer, but he
killed him in accusation of committing blasphemy through calling country’s most
sensitive blasphemy law as a “black law”. Although large swathes of the
citizenry condemned the act, but Rizvi supported the murder and deeply involved
in organizing public support for Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code,
which deals with blasphemy committed against Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).
Since then he earned the nickname of “blasphemy
activist” in religious circles. And after the execution of Mumtaz
Qadri on February 29, 2016 some religious parties including the followers of
Khadim Hussain Rizvi staged the protest against the act and blocked the D-Chowk.
However the protestors dispersed after negotiations with the authorities and
claimed that government had accepted their demands including no change in blasphemy
law.
On October 2, 2017 the Federal Government of
Pakistan led by Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) passed the ‘Elections Act, 2017’
containing a controversial amendment in the nomination paper about the finality
of Prophethood (Khatm-e-Nabuwat). In the previous bill, the nominated candidate
‘solemnly swear’ that I believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the
prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH), however in the new bill the government replaced
the words “I solemnly swear” in Form-A with “I believe” in a clause relating to
a candidate’s belief in the finality of the prophethood, which termed a
suspected move of ruling party to allow Qadiani’s and Ahmedi’s to hold top positions in public offices.
The said amendment
sparked anxiety and antagonism in religious circles against the ruling party
and they demanded the sacking of federal law minister, who they believe was the
suspect behind the amendment. But Khadim Hussain Rizvi was most vocal person
and he organized various protests in Lahore and finally staged a three weeks
long sit-in at Faizabad interchange Islamabad. Sunni Barelvi organizations such
as; the Tehreek-i-Khatm-i-Nabuwwat, and the Sunni Tehreek Pakistan (ST) also
supported the Rizvi and displayed their power in the capital.
After repeated
abortive attempts to disperse the protestors, finally army intervened and
brokered a deal between Tehreek Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYRA) and federal
government in which authorities accepted all the demands including the sacking
of federal law minister Zahid Hamid and released the detainees captured during
clashes with law enforcement agencies. TLYRA is a religious political party
setup by Rizvi and it proclaimed to counter every move of ruling PML-N.
As earlier explained that
Khadim Hussain Rizvi is fiery preacher and repeatedly using abusive language
while preaching, but numbers of his adherents are increasing day by day,
because he is using religion for political power. Therefore, against this
backdrop the primary objective of this article is to highlight the impacts of
Khadim Hussain Rizvi and Barelvi sect’s rise on Pakistani society and state.
The study intends to investigate that, to what extent Khadim Hussain Rizvi is
radicalizing the youth of Pakistan, and will it be more violent than their
predecessors? It argues that preaching style of Rizvi is more dangerous than
the past religious parties and it is leading Pakistani society towards another
episode of extremism and radicalism. It will give rise to sectarian violence
and will damage the moderate and enlightened character of the country, which
further increase the international pressure on Pakistan for religious
tolerance. But before proceeding to highlight the impacts of Rizvi and Barelvi
sect, it is pertinent to explain the roots of sectarian violence in Pakistan,
which were sown during Zia era.
Afghan Jihad and Religious Extremism 1.0
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on the
eve of December 25, 1979 and subsequent proxy war waged by the United States,
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the name of Jihad (Holy War) transformed the
geopolitical and geostrategic landscape of South Asia in general and for Pakistan in particular. Pakistan was on forefront and
had been playing pivotal role in Afghan resistance war, which not only forced
Soviet forces to retreat from Afghanistan but also brought an end to the cold
war rivalry between two super powers. At the time of Afghan war, Pakistan was
under military rule of General Muhammad Zia ul Haq who was championing the
Jihad in Afghanistan.
Zia devoted special attention to country’s
premier intelligence agency ISI by appointing a Pashtun director Akhtar Abdur
Rahman, better known as General Akhtar, who knew the Afghan
world well. Pakistani ISI, American CIA and Saudi GID developed special
trilateral relationship. The CIA and GID were bound to provide money and
weapons to Afghan mujahedeen and it was channeled through the ISI. Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were turned into training camps where around
85,000 hardcore mujahedeen were trained by 1988. During the Afghan war, ISI
significantly increased its profile and developed close contacts with Islamic
radicals to wage another jihad in Indian Occupied Kashmir. And the mid 1990s
saw increasing role of Pakistan based militant groups such as;
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and later Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JeM).
President Zia
transformed Pakistan and altered the course of its future more than anyone
since Jinnah. He Islamized Pakistani military and society more than ever before
and can be rightfully called the grandfather of global Islamic jihad. One
measure of this transformation was ever growing mushrooming of Islamic schools
or madrassas.
Official numbers multiplied from 900 to 8,000
between 1971 and 1988 and another 25,000 unregistered ones. He aligned himself
with the country’s Islamic Jammat-i-Islami party which not only offered human
capital for Afghan Jihad but also assist Zia to Islamize Pakistan. For the
first time in history of Pakistan, the Islamists occupied important government
positions. Thousands of party activists and sympathizers were appointed in the
judiciary, the civil service and educational institutions. These appointments
strengthened the hold of the Islamists on crucial state apparatuses for many years to come.
The Afghan war and the
simultaneous Islamization process altered the sectarian fault lines in
Pakistan, which alarmed the Shia minority. Meanwhile, Islamic revolution in
neighboring Iran by Shia’s increased the suspicion in Salafi Sheikhs of Saudi
Arabia. The rival schools of thought in Riyadh and Tehran wanted to expand
their monopoly in the Middle East and Pakistan had no escape from this dirty
game, because the ruler Zia was leaned towards Saudi’s who were pouring massive
economic assistance to their adherents in Pakistan.
Therefore, to counter Saudi influence, Iran
had also extended its helping hand to Shia minority in Pakistan which gave
birth to lethal sectarian violence. Similarly, under the stringent pressure of
Sunni groups Zia introduced the strict Sharia laws such as compulsory deduction
of Zakat which sparked anger in Shia minority and
they refused compulsory deduction.
However to fully implement Sunni
interpretation of Islam, armed wings of Sunni organizations used force, which
increased the vulnerability to minority sects and non-believers. This clash of
ideas and interpretation consumed thousands of ordinary lives which is
continued to this day. Though, soon after 9/11 attacks President Pervez
Musharraf made a daring move to end state patronage to these religious armed
groups but the act of president provoked violent anger, and they started to
target state installations including the abortive assassination attempts of
President Pervez Musharraf.
General Zia also introduced new sections into
blasphemy law and introduced imprisonment and fine for an accused. In 1986, he
introduced section 295C which particularly deal blasphemy committed against
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). According to section “Whoever by words, either spoken
or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or
insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or
imprisonment for life, Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.”
Though the section refers to two punishments,
however Mullahs deliberately call for mandatory death to accuser. Since 1987 to
2014, over 1,300 people have been accused for blasphemy and the major incident
took place in April 2017, when an angry mob of Abdul Wali Khan University
Mardan killed a young student Mashal Khan over allegations of posting
blasphemous content online, but none was proved blasphemous after scanning his
social media accounts. Though the legislators made law to prevent blasphemous
acts against the religion and sacred personalities, but it is used by
individuals to settle their old accounts against their rivals.
Religious Extremism 2.0
Pakistan is a victim
of terrorism and religious extremism since the Afghan war and it lost thousands
of innocent civilians. However, in recent years armed forces of Pakistan
successfully managed to dismantle the terror network. And in the ongoing campaign
military killed and captured hundreds of affiliates. But still needs lot of
work to vanish radicalism from society, which need support from society and
religious parties.
Notwithstanding, despite enormous sacrifices
of armed forces and general public, religious extremism has been spreading in
the country and religious clerics are playing dominant role. Similar can be
predicted for future of Pakistan by Khadim Hussain Rizvi and his adherents. In
past, vandalism of Shia led Tahreek-i-Nafaz-Fiqah Jaafria and Sunni group Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. brutally
killed innocent peoples.
Rizvi is a hardliner
Sunni preacher and openly criticize the other school of thoughts. Since October
2017, he has increased his influence and his followers not only come from
religious seminaries but highly educated individuals are also supporting him.
TLYRA is not only employing protests to gain support but they are actively
using social media to spread aberration.
Rizvi represents the rise of a new and more
radical Bralvi sectarian movement. Bralvi represent the majority and generally
considered “moderate” compared to those belonging to the hardline Deobandi and
Wahabi school of Islam. However, radical clerics like Rizvi have turned
militancy publically espousing violence in the name of their narrow view of
religion. The group is now planning to jump into the 2018 general electionsusing the highly sensitive
blasphemy issue to mobilize votes. The trailer of the radicalism has already
been played in October 2017 siege when the protestors blocked twin cities and
attacked law enforcement forces and the civilian government capitulated in
front of these radicals accepting all their demands.
TLYRA leader Khadim Hussain Rizvi and other
participants were booked in total of 27 criminal cases including for
challenging the writ of government, confronting and attacking law enforcement
agencies personnel’s, damaging public property, and the death of
a nine month old child caused by the blockade. The Islamabad High
Court (IHC) and Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) issued the arrest warrants of Rizvi
and others over their continued failure to appear before the courts in hearings
for the sit-in. But till now police is reluctant to arrest the fiery cleric
fearing a repeat of violent protests by armed cadres of the extremist religio-political outfit. Therefore, the
failure expose that individuals like Rizvi are above the state and have no fear
of punishment and state surrender in their hands.
Conclusion
At the end we only say
that this is a beginning of another rise of religious extremism in Pakistan
which will be more violent and destructive in future. Because the Mullahs and
their followers are spreading hatred and animosity through the use of social
media, which is almost ungovernable in the country. Though, every sect have
equal right and freedom to preach their views but they have no authority to
spread abhorrence and intolerance. Therefore, it is dire need of time to
equally suggest the civilian and military leadership to take immediate and
appropriate measures to obstruct the spread of religious extremism which has
already been distorting the state and society. State must put hardliner mullahs
under observation and restrict them to spread extremism. At the same time
political and military leadership stop offering patronage to extremists and
fully implement the National Action Plan (NAP) to curb religious extremism and
terrorism. State also regulate the madrassa system and source of income of
religious clerics. An initial step has already been taken by provincial
government of KP by regulating madrassas and Imam Masjids but it needs to
expand across the country.
*Mehmood Hussain is a final year PhD
fellow in International Relations at School of International & Public
Affairs (SIPA), Jilin University China. He can be reached
through mhussain328@gmail.com. His research focuses on China-Pakistan
Relations, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, War on Terror and Religious Extremism in
South Asia.
http://www.eurasiareview.com/02052018-khadim-hussain-rizvi-and-rise-of-religious-extremism-2-0-in-pakistan-analysis/
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