'Pakistani military fears
ethno - linguistic identities, Husain Haqqani
Husain
Haqqani, Pakistan's former ambassador to the US, is a fierce critic of his
country's military establishment. In a DW interview, Haqqani calls for a
"reimagining" of Pakistan's Islamic state ideology.
Husain Haqqani: The idea of my latest book was born in a
conversation many years ago, when Salman Rushdie [novelist] said, "If
nations are imagined communities, Pakistan is poorly imagined." There were
some valid criticisms about how Pakistan was created in a hurry. The generation
before us had to suddenly stop being Indian and start being Pakistani; they
needed an ideology. I am a Pakistani by birth, so I don't need it.
In my book, I thought how I could contribute to the
process of reimagining Pakistan. The good thing about imagination is that what
is poorly imagined can be reimagined. That is why I wrote this book.
70 years of ideological orientation cannot be reversed
overnight. Any attempt to phase out the invoking of religion as ideology would
have to be gradual. Pakistan's civilian and military leaders would have to work
together to ensure over time that Pakistanis realize the pitfalls of their
contrived national narrative. The first step in that direction would be to
trigger a debate over alternative paths for the country, something that
has almost been shut down since former military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq's
era.
There are those who would argue that the state ideology
has helped Pakistan survive against the threat of disintegration, especially
after the loss of Bangladesh. But that suggests that Pakistan, as a nation and
as a state, cannot sustain itself except through ideological rhetoric, which,
in turn, must be sustained through issues that mean little for most people in
the 21st century. If that is the case, Pakistan has no choice but to stay mired
in conceptual argumentation as Islamization has proved to be a recipe for
unceasing internal conflict.
The alternative is for Pakistan to evolve as a functional,
territorial nation state and a working federation of its various component
ethnicities and nationalities. For that to happen, its leaders must take a stand
against the unidimensional preoccupation with ideology.
Read more:
It seems that many Pakistanis are challenging
the state ideology these days. A number of mass movements have taken on the
country's powerful military, which many analysts say is the custodian of
Pakistan's Islamic ideology. Should the military establishment be worried about
these developments?
The Pakistani military has always feared ethno-linguistic
identities and believed they would result in a break up of Pakistan. Any
demands for more autonomy or creation of states based on ethnic or linguistic
bases are perceived as anti-national and other countries (especially India and
Afghanistan) are accused of helping these demands. The separation of Pakistan's
eastern wing in 1971 only reinforced these fears.
Pakistan's ideological national identity has always been
seen as the glue that will tie disparate ethnicities together and will over
time reduce the ethnic-linguistic bonds. The truth is justice, fair
treatment and a genuine federalism is the real way to keep Pakistan
together and to make it stronger.
At independence, the Pakistani state feared Pashtun
irredentist demands. This led to the policy of encouraging Islamization in the
northwestern regions of the country as a counter to nationalist Pashtun
sentiments. The Pakistani "deep state" is unable to view any peaceful
movement as genuine because this runs counter to their narrative about
Pakistan. Just as the Baluch uprising is treated as anti-national so is the
Pashtun awakening seen as against Pakistani interests. But the Pashtun Tahafuz
Movement is a genuine popular movement seeking human rights and protection of
the Pashtun peoples' lives and dignity. There is no evidence that the thousands
of young people joining it are foreign supported or externally inspired.
Read more:
Pakistan's Manzoor Pashteen: 'Pashtuns are fed up with
war' Pashtuns rise up against war, Taliban and Pakistani
military
Nawaz Sharif's ouster only reinforces what can best be
described as Pakistan's viceregal tradition. Elected politicians are subject to
the whims and "superior judgment" of appointed generals, judges, and
civil servants, just as they were during the British colonial era. One need not
be convinced of Sharif's innocence to note that in the last 70 years, all
elected Pakistani prime ministers have either been assassinated, dismissed or
forced to resign by heads of state with military backing, or deposed in coups
d'état. Sharif was himself a protégé of the military establishment once but now
that he challenges them, he is being targeted through courts that once gave him
carte blanche.
Read more:
The Trump administration has taken a tough
stance against Pakistan in relation to Islamabad's alleged support to
Islamists. What should Pakistan do to allay US concerns?
The Trump administration's policies reflect the deep
mistrust that has characterized the US-Pakistan relationship. At the heart of
that dysfunction is the divergence of core interests in South Asia. Even at the
height of the alliance, the United States never shared Pakistan's views about
its co-leadership in the region and its envisioning of India as a major threat
to its neighbors.
The Americans doled out military assistance and economic
support in return for favors such as intelligence bases against the Soviet
Union and China during the 1950s and 60s as well as for using Pakistan as the
staging ground for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s.
Pakistan, on the other hand, single-mindedly defined its
national interest in terms of rivalry with India. The Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan was not the end of jihad for Pakistan but the beginning of an
opportunity to expand jihad to Kashmir and even India. Turning Afghanistan into
a satellite with the help of obscurantist proxies like the Taliban and the
Haqqani Network became an obsession for the all-powerful Pakistani military and
intelligence services. Even blowback in the form of extremist attacks inside
Pakistan did not alter that calculus.
The US understood that Pakistan was not on board with its
vision for Afghanistan as well as the entire region. But there were NATO
transshipments and intelligence sharing to consider. Presidents George W. Bush and
Barack Obama also hoped that incentives, and occasional threats, would
eventually lead Pakistan to change its strategic calculus. For that reason they
put up with a situation in which American troops died in Afghanistan at the
hands of fighters who received assistance and protection across the border, in
the territory of an ostensible ally who received economic and military
assistance from the US.
Meanwhile, Pakistan's military believed that the policies
it was pursuing are in the country's "national interest" as the
generals define it. They would not change their definition of national interest
until the cost of pursuing it became higher than what they are willing to bear.
American and Pakistani interests can converge only when
one of the two countries changes its definition of its interests in
Afghanistan, in relation to terrorism, and about China's primacy in the
Indo-Pacific region.
Husain Haqqani is a leading South Asia expert
and former ambassador of Pakistan to the United States. He is currently a
Senior Fellow and Director for South and Central Asia at the Hudson
Institute in Washington, DC.
The interview was conducted by Atif Tauqeer.
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