Gurdaspur Strike is a Pakistani Tactical Shift from J and K to Punjab, Syed Ata Hasnain July 27, 2015, 12:07 pm
Pakistan’s Continuing Perfidy
·
Gurdaspur attack a tactical ploy by Pakistan to
divert attention
·
Since 2014 Pakistan’s focus shifted from the LoC to
rather easily accessible Jammu-Pathankot International Border
·
Deliberate move to draw the Indian Army and drain
its potential in counter-insurgency operations
·
Attack not unexpected as it falls in sync with
earlier pattern of violence being followed by high-profile diplomatic activity
It is a
day after Kargil Vijay Diwas. Just a few hours ago India was in celebration
mode on the hard-won victory of its armed forces. Obviously, the mood across
the border and LoC was one of seething anger. Nations hate being reminded of
military defeats and in the context of India and Pakistan, the latter has to
work hard to create an information hype to convince its people about its own
perceived military capability.
In moments
of anger nations do irrational things and Pakistan has a history of this; never
viewing the larger picture, the end result and the final pay off. The terror
strike in Gurdaspur appears to smack once again of a futile attempt by
Pakistan’s nexus of agencies and organisations to remind India of the ‘war by a
thousand cuts’.
Why do I
say this? Take a good look at the ground situation. Militancy in J&K is
almost down and out although its potential of revival is always live; the new
local cadres are not capable of high profile acts, there is no leadership and
the LoC dragnet against infiltration is so effective that adding to numbers and
bringing in leaders is proving near impossible.
From LoC
to IB
The
positives in one area negatively impact another; that is a basic lesson in
tactics. In 2014, Pakistan’s nexus shifted the emphasis from the LoC to the
Jammu-Pathankot International Border (IB); Pakistan calls it the Working
Boundary. Instead of Srinagar, Anantnag and Rajouri, it was Kathua and Samba
that became the objectives. Here it is simpler to infiltrate. The dense and
well-coordinated counter-infiltration grid of the LoC does not exist, the fence
is porous and the objectives are just a few kms away.
The
National Highway proves to be an asset; infiltrate from one point, hijack a
truck and strike at a target 10-15 (or more) kms away. Targets are many:
schools, police stations, military camps, deputy commissioner’s office etc;
fail at one and redeploy to another in a matter of minutes unlike in the LoC
sector where the army will react within minutes and block all egress.
The
reason for shifting the area of strikes further south of Pathankot is that the
army’s 9 Corps and Western Command have been getting their acts together and
strengthening their preparedness against such terrorist activity. In fact, Lt
Gen K J Singh, the GOC-in-C Western Command, has been frequently visiting the
Jammu IB sector and gingering up his commanders and troops. When effectiveness
improves, the focus of the Pakistan nexus shifts and objectives in Punjab
obviously have their own significance.
Army Not
in CI Role
It is not
for tactical and operational reasons alone that we have witnessed the
‘migration’ of terrorist activity from the LoC sector towards areas between
Jammu and Pathankot and now into the northern part of Punjab. The army is not
in counter-insurgency (CI) operational mode here; unlike 9 Corps north of
Pathankot which partially is. While there is considerable army deployment in
Gurdaspur and Amritsar sectors it is in peace and training mode.
Pakistani
Objectives
By
striking in Gurdaspur, the Pakistan nexus is attempting three things. First,
expanding the arc of militancy/terror to draw in the army; it has successfully
done so in the Jammu to Pathankot sector. Greater the deployment of the Indian
army in CI duties, less its availability for training and more the fatigue on
its men.
Secondly,
the entry of terror in Punjab forces the expansion of the gaze of Indian
intelligence agencies, thereby diluting their focus on J&K. Thirdly, it is
the psychological messaging which must not be missed. The nexus is attempting
to convey our vulnerability and its strength, its ability to pick and choose
its targets.
Punjab
has had its share of problems over 20 years ago and a remnant of separatist
terrorist leadership still exists abroad, especially in Pakistan. Punjab’s current
administrative woes and the social turbulence brought on by the culture of drug
abuse makes it extremely vulnerable. No one is saying that we are likely to
witness a return to the days of extreme terror in Punjab. Yet, Punjab is a rim
land (border) state and its strategic significance is also its physical connect
with J&K.
Arc of
Terror
Expanding
the arc of turbulence and terror into its geographical region can only be a
worrisome threat to India’s security community. The failure to blow the railway
tracks has been providential. We cannot push our luck too far.
After
Ufa, were we awaiting such a strike? The IB sector and portions of the LoC did
go live with exchange of firing but it stopped at that. It was an excellent
ruse; grant it to our adversary. Low level activity and then ceasefire, before
hitting hard. This fits in well with established patterns of the past when
violence of some form was always timed with high profile diplomatic activity to
convey a message.
However,
the proliferating terrorist activity spreading from Jammu into India’s
hinterland is definitely worrisome. Knee jerk reactions of deploying the army
must be avoided. The Punjab and J&K police have to coordinate intelligence
and the BSF needs a larger footprint along the IB. The IB fence has to be made
high-tech with induction of better surveillance systems.
All these
need to be done almost overnight. More such attempts can be expected and the
parleys that are set up for the next few months have to address this with
Pakistan before sentiments in the street demands more proactive action across.
(The
writer is a former General Officer Commanding of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps
and now associated with the Vivekananda International Foundation and the Delhi
Policy Group)
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