Pakistan polls Forget fair elections in Balochistan; CPEC, insurgency
will make Rawalpindi tighten its grip, Tara Kartha, 23 July 2018
It's time for the Pakistan security forces to take a
well-deserved bow in Balochistan. According to media reports, a dreaded
terrorist of the Islamic State's Balochistan chapter has been killed. Mufti
Hidayatullah was reported killed in Kalat, once the capital of an independent
state that was swallowed whole by Pakistan after Partition.
If this report is true, then it is a just ending for a leader of a group
that claimed a heinous attack on an election rally that killed more than
140. The trouble is no one can really say if the man killed was actually a
terrorist, or another of the Baloch insurgents who have been fighting Pakistan
security forces for the past four decades. After all, police earlier
identified the attack as being carried out by a member of the banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and that he was sheltered
by some locals. The now re-run story of the bomber being apparently dropped to
the attack site by the head of the Islamic State chapter sounds perfidious to
say the least.
As Pakistan goes to elections, resentment in
Balochistan is high. Some of that resentment led to demands for outright
independence from the Pakistani State, which is the basis for continued
insurgent attacks. Others want more autonomy. And a majority of those now
fighting for a share of the vote, want a better say in governance of their own
affairs. However, none of this is likely to come to pass.
The seriousness of the security situation in Balochistan was apparent
when the government announced that all internet services had been suspended
in six districts of the province and would remain so until
the elections on 25 July. Unsurprisingly, all of the districts are areas of
strong insurgent activity. Also three of those districts—Kalat, Keech and
Awaran—haven’t had internet since February 2017. It can be argued that this
denial is only the latest in a history of poor governance and high-handedness
that the province has had to face.
An example of this was when Chief Minister Sanaullah
Zehri was toppled by his own party just months before completing his term. That
the scion of a powerful political family was then replaced by a virtual
unknown, Abdul Qudoos Bizenjo, and that the whole exercise was initiated after
the sacking of home minister Mir Sarfaraz Ahmed Bugti, is an example of the
strange happenings in Balochistan of late.
Unsurprisingly, he is now part of a new political party
(Balochistan Awami Party) made up of the very dissidents who engineered the
coup, and who blame ‘neighbours’ for violence in the province. This kind
of open political back stabbing is unusual, even for Balochistan. It is
not surprising therefore, that polls show low political activity. In addition,
news on the little election activity in Balochistan is extremely difficult to
get. Barring a few stalwarts, Pakistan media virtually ignores the province,
forcing Baloch politicians to take to social media and the radio to spread
their message.
Unsurprisingly, a major issue at the centre of
campaigning is the issue of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
All the parties fielding candidates promise greater participation for the
Baloch in the project, an issue that has been a major sore point in the
province. How this is to be done is tricky, and probably difficult given the
low educational levels prevalent in Balochistan. A second promise is
therefore, to increase the number of educational institutions, which is also
difficult, given problems in staffing at higher levels. But then political
parties are in the business of handing out promises.
A third issue is that of safety and an end to violence. This is not the
usual “terrorism talk” that is apparent in mainland Pakistan, where politicians
are quoting various statistics to show decreased terrorism, and crediting the
army thereafter. The reference here is about ensuring that Baloch citizens
don’t get picked up and tortured by the Pakistani security forces to become
part of a statistic under the head of “Enforced Disappearances”: A nomenclature
that has become emblematic of the colonial relationship between Pakistan (which
generally means Punjab) and Balochistan. No one really known how many hundreds
have been picked up and tortured. The only ones who write about
this are safely abroad.
Despite all these negatives, there are several parties in the fray,
apart from the major players. With severe infighting in its ranks, the Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz had trouble fielding candidates. It finally announced its
candidates only on 28 June. Polls indicate the sudden downfall of its government has
cost the PML-N dearly. It is no longer one of the top three in terms of
preferred parties. Instead, the Pakistan Peoples Party has emerged as the
preferred choice with 36 percent of respondents, which is a huge climb from the
5 percent polled last year.
The popularity of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)
seems to have dropped, probably because the party has not been giving the
province as much attention as it has to Punjab and Sindh. Its party
functionaries are clearly not happy. The Pakistan Muslim League (Q)—the
quisling group formed under the reign of General Pervez Musharraf—and the party
to which the new Chief Minister Quddus belonged, has also fielded an impressive
number of candidates— 65 provincial seats and 14 national—despite a barely to
be seen representation in the earlier provincial Parliament.
Baloch parties of various hues such as the Balochistan
National Party (BNP) and the Balochistan National Movement (BNM) of Dr Abdul
Hayee Baloch are seen campaigning, but barely. The Jamhoori Watan Party has
fallen from the heady days when Nawab Akbar Bugti was its head. Instead,
Nawabzada Shazhain Bugti who now heads the party, is busy praising the army to
anyone who will listen.
The Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) and the
National Party (NP), both of whom had the ruling hand in the previous
government, seem to be fielding fewer candidates. Apart from these, a raft of
the religious Right which includes the Jamaat Ulema Islam-Nazryati of firebrand
Maulana Khalil Ahmed, the redoubtable grouping of the religious Right under
the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, and the final surprise, the re-energised
highly sectarian Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat which is back on the electoral scene.
All of this can be summed up simply in terms of
conclusions. Forget fairness of elections in Balochistan. It's not going to
happen, and the province is simply far too important for the Pakistan Army is
more ways than one. CPEC aside, security forces cannot afford to have a
government that will loosen the lid on insurgency that it has been able to
clamp down so effectively, even if brutally. The combination of parties
that will come to power will certainly include the newly formed Balochistan
Awami Party, the PTI, the PML-Q and a few representatives from parties that
once espoused autonomy.
Another coalition appears to be in sight, but one that
is far more manageable from Rawalpindi’s point of view. The insurgency will
continue, but without the strength to dislodge or alter Rawalpindi’s plans for
Balochistan. If that plan includes Beijing’s virtual takeover of parts of the
province, it will continue whichever motley group of parties come to
power. The more things change, the more they stay the same. That adage
might have been written for Balochistan.
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