A message from Tehsil Bhimber: How many more people are you going to torture and kill? Release Mohammed Saif.
Stop oppression in AJK. Enough is enough. Don’t force people to pick up guns. Resolve all the issues by a process of dialogue.
https://youtu.be/jbNyuaYgfF4
India–Pakistan War? Serious Escalation in Azad Kashmir — Why Are People Resisting Pakistani Attack?
Pakistan must abandon gun diplomacy and resolve disputes through meaningful dialogue — force can prove counterproductive, and may invite other powers.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X0aDgGEUXW8
Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, August 2026.
We like to believe that we are free and liberated human beings. But are we really? It is worth asking ourselves an uncomfortable question: Are we truly independent, or are we living under systems of control that shape almost every aspect of our lives?
Think about our daily lives. If we lose our internet connection, we suddenly feel helpless. We lose contact with the outside world. We cannot easily communicate with our friends, relatives, or even our wife, husband, and children. A single interruption in technology can isolate us within minutes.
But control goes much deeper than technology.
Our thoughts and opinions are constantly influenced by others. What we read, what we watch, what we believe, and even what we buy are shaped by media, advertising, governments, corporations, and social networks. Our preferences are studied, predicted, and often manipulated.
The way we behave, the way we dress, the way we drive, the language we use, and even how we present ourselves to society are influenced by social norms and institutions that we rarely question. We often think we are making our own choices, while many of those choices have already been shaped for us.
We believe we are independent individuals, yet our lives are regulated by laws, financial systems, digital platforms, economic forces, political structures, and international power relations. Those who control information, trade, technology, economics, and politics exercise enormous influence over the lives of ordinary people.
This does not mean we are slaves without free will. We still make choices, but many of those choices exist within boundaries created by others. Freedom is often more limited than we imagine.
Despite all this, it is comforting to believe that we are independent and free to do whatever we like. Perhaps the greatest form of control is convincing people that they are completely free while their choices, attitudes, and behaviour are quietly being shaped behind the scenes.
The real challenge is not simply to claim that we are free; it is to recognise the forces that influence us and to think critically before accepting them as our own.
The struggle is between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Salam to the people of Rawalakot. It is our struggle.
Zahid Mughal says Pakistan must stop oppression and resolve this through talks. The use of guns will only create more problems.
Is Pakistan Preparing to Change the Constitutional Status of Azad Kashmir? Analyses and Implications, by Dr Shabir Choudhry.
London, August 2026.
At last, Pakistan may be preparing to do what India did in 2019: change the constitutional and administrative status of the part of Jammu and Kashmir under its control.
India changed the status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, when it revoked the territory's special constitutional arrangements and reorganised the former state into the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. Pakistan has consistently condemned that action as unilateral and illegal, arguing that India cannot alter the status of a disputed territory through its domestic constitutional arrangements.
Pakistan has repeatedly maintained that Jammu and Kashmir remains an internationally recognised disputed territory whose final status must be determined in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and the will of its people. Indeed, as recently as August 2026, Pakistan's Foreign Office reiterated that position and described Jammu and Kashmir as an internationally recognised disputed territory.
Yet there is now an intriguing possibility that Pakistan itself is considering a major constitutional transformation of the territory it administers as Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
I have received a document circulating through journalistic and political sources which proposes the creation of a “Province of Jammu and Kashmir.” I have not been able independently to establish the authenticity or official status of this document. It may be a working paper, an internal proposal, a political draft, or simply a proposal being circulated by interested individuals.
Nevertheless, it deserves serious examination because several of the ideas contained in it are consistent with a wider constitutional debate that is now taking place in Pakistan.
A changing political environment
There is already a publicly documented discussion about changing the constitutional relationship between Pakistan and the territories it administers in Jammu and Kashmir.
In July 2026, Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari argued in the National Assembly for direct representation of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan's federal Parliament. He has also advocated provisional provincial status for Gilgit-Baltistan while maintaining Pakistan's stated position on the Kashmir dispute.
On 17 July, the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly unanimously passed a resolution calling for provisional provincial status, representation in the National Assembly and Senate, and other federal constitutional institutions. Importantly, the resolution stated that such provisional status would be without prejudice to Pakistan's position on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute and relevant UN resolutions.
This is significant.
The debate is therefore no longer hypothetical. There is an active political movement towards greater constitutional integration of Gilgit-Baltistan, while serious voices are also discussing a new constitutional relationship between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir.
A Dawn editorial/commentary published in July went further, suggesting that Pakistan may need to consider de facto provincial status for AJK and GB on an interim basis, provided this did not prejudice Pakistan's position on the Kashmir dispute.
It is against this background that the alleged proposal for a “Province of Jammu and Kashmir” needs to be examined.
1. The biggest change: from a disputed or special territory to a province
At present, Azad Jammu and Kashmir has its own constitutional and institutional framework. The alleged proposal would replace that arrangement with a conventional Pakistani provincial model:
Governor → Chief Minister → Provincial Assembly → High Court → Supreme Court of Pakistan
That would represent a fundamental constitutional transformation. The proposed name is particularly significant:
“Province of Jammu and Kashmir.”
It is not simply “Province of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.” Why does the terminology matter?
Because Pakistan has historically maintained that the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is disputed and that its final disposition remains unresolved.
If the territory administered by Pakistan were formally designated the Province of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan would be integrating the territory into its constitutional structure while simultaneously maintaining its claim over the remainder of the State.
This would create an unusual constitutional arrangement.
2. The 65-seat Assembly
According to the document circulating, the proposed Jammu and Kashmir Provincial Assembly would have 65 seats.
Of these:
The document proposes that only 41 seats would initially be active, with elections taking place for those seats.
The 24 remaining seats would apparently be kept vacant until what the document describes as independence and reunification, after which elections would be held for them.
This is perhaps the most politically intriguing element of the entire proposal.
It appears to attempt to achieve two objectives simultaneously:
First: constitutionally integrate the territory currently administered by Pakistan.
Second: preserve Pakistan's claim over the remaining territory of Jammu and Kashmir.
The 24 vacant seats would symbolically represent the part of Jammu and Kashmir that Pakistan claims but does not administer.
3. What would happen to the AJK Supreme Court?
The proposed judicial changes are even more consequential.
According to the document, the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir would be abolished.
The proposed High Court of Jammu and Kashmir would become the highest court within the province, but appeals against its decisions would go to the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
That would effectively bring the judicial system of the territory directly under Pakistan's federal judicial structure.
This would be a major constitutional change.
It would also raise an obvious question:
If Azad Kashmir is still regarded as a disputed territory, why should its highest judicial authority become an institution of Pakistan?
Conversely, proponents of integration would argue that if the people of AJK are to enjoy the same constitutional rights as citizens of Pakistan's provinces, they should also have access to the same federal judicial institutions.
This is precisely why the issue cannot be dismissed as merely administrative because it concerns the fundamental constitutional identity of the territory.
4. Representation in Pakistan's Parliament
The proposal provides eight seats for the new Province of Jammu and Kashmir in the National Assembly of Pakistan.
Senate will have 12 seats for the new Prrovince
The stated purpose is to provide AJK with representation equal to that enjoyed by Pakistan's other provinces. This would be a major change.
At present, one of the principal grievances in AJK is that decisions taken by important federal institutions affect the territory without its people having corresponding representation in those institutions.
That concern has become increasingly prominent.
A recent Dawn analysis specifically noted that AJK lacks representation in important constitutional forums such as the Council of Common Interests, National Economic Council, National Finance Commission and Indus River System Authority, and suggested that the question of interim representation in Pakistan's federal structure needs serious consideration.
Thus, the demand for representation has a genuine constitutional basis. The important question is what form that representation should take.
5. The refugee seats
The proposed reduction of refugee seats from the existing arrangement is also significant.
The issue of the refugee seats has already become one of the most contentious constitutional questions in AJK.
The 12 seats reserved for refugees from Jammu and the Kashmir Valley residing in Pakistan were a major issue during the recent political agitation. Any change to the existing arrangement requires constitutional amendment, and the issue has generated serious political controversy.
The alleged proposal would apparently replace the existing arrangement with six refugee seats, while creating 24 vacant seats for the rest of Jammu and Kashmir.
That is not simply an adjustment to electoral representation. It appears to be an attempt to redesign the political meaning of representation itself.
6. What about Gilgit-Baltistan?
The developments in Gilgit-Baltistan are relevant because they appear to form part of the same broader constitutional debate.
The Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly has unanimously demanded provisional provincial status, including representation in the National Assembly and Senate. It specifically stated that such status should not prejudice Pakistan's position on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.
The All Parties Hurriyat Conference's AJK chapter has also supported provisional provincial status for Gilgit-Baltistan, provided that such a change does not prejudice the Kashmir dispute or the relevant United Nations resolutions.
On 19 July 2026, Dawn reported that the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC-AJK), the Azad Jammu and Kashmir chapter, publicly supported granting provisional provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan, provided that it did not prejudice the Kashmir dispute. The statement was made at a press conference at the Gilgit Press Club by APHC-AJK Convener Ghulam Muhammad Safi and General Secretary Parvaiz Shah.
More specifically, Dawn reports that Parvaiz Shah said the APHC had examined the GB Assembly's resolution and was reassured by its wording that the proposed status would be “without prejudice to the United Nations resolutions on the Kashmir issue.” He said the APHC therefore endorsed the demand.
This position is particularly noteworthy because the individuals who publicly endorsed the proposal have long been regarded by sections of the Kashmiri political movement as closely aligned with Pakistan's security establishment. Their personal political histories and affiliations therefore merit scrutiny when assessing the significance of this statement.
Reference:
Jamil Nagri, “APHC backs GB provincial status,” Dawn,
19 July 2026. Dawn article
This is important because it shows that the concept of provisional constitutional integration is increasingly being discussed as a way of reconciling two apparently conflicting objectives:
Giving people political and constitutional rights within Pakistan, while maintaining Pakistan's international position on the Kashmir dispute. Whether that contradiction can actually be resolved is another question.
7. Can a disputed territory become a province?
This is the central constitutional and political question.
Pakistan's official position is that Jammu and Kashmir remains disputed and that its final disposition must be determined in accordance with relevant UN resolutions and the will of the Kashmiri people. Pakistan reaffirmed exactly this position in August 2026.
But if Pakistan incorporates the territory it administers into its constitutional structure as a province, critics will inevitably ask:
How can a state claim that a territory is disputed while simultaneously treating that territory as an ordinary province?
The answer offered by supporters of provisional integration is likely to be that the status would be temporary and without prejudice to the final settlement.
That is precisely the argument being made in relation to Gilgit-Baltistan. But it must be noted that temporary arrangements tend to become permanent; and many analysts regard this as a first step towards a permanent occupation.
Once a population is given representation in the National Assembly and Senate, once federal laws apply directly, once the Supreme Court of Pakistan becomes the final judicial authority, and once the territory is treated administratively as a province, reversing that arrangement would become politically extremely difficult.
Therefore, the word “provisional” may have considerable political significance, but it does not necessarily eliminate the long-term consequences.
8. India did something similar in 2019—but not identical
There is an important distinction that must not be lost.
India's 2019 reorganisation was a unilateral constitutional and administrative decision affecting the territory under Indian control. Pakistan condemned it vigorously.
Pakistan's alleged proposal would concern territory under Pakistani administration and would be presented by Pakistan as an internal constitutional reform.
The two situations are therefore not identical. However, there is a broader similarity:
Both involve changing the constitutional and administrative arrangements of a territory whose international status remains disputed.
That is why Pakistan needs to consider very carefully the argument it has itself repeatedly made about India's 2019 actions.
If unilateral constitutional changes cannot alter the international status of Jammu and Kashmir on the Indian side, Pakistan may also face questions about the consequences of unilateral constitutional changes on the territory under its control.
9. The people of Azad Kashmir must not become pawns again
The most important question, however, is not whether Pakistan can technically amend its Constitution. It is:
What do the people of Azad Kashmir want?
For decades, the people of Jammu and Kashmir have been treated as objects of policy by larger powers.
· India has its Kashmir policy.
· Pakistan has its Kashmir policy.
· The international community has its Kashmir policy.
But the people whose lives have been divided, whose families have been separated and whose political future has remained uncertain for generations are often treated as secondary to these competing national interests.
The recent unrest in AJK demonstrated the depth of public dissatisfaction with the existing political and economic arrangements. The government has itself acknowledged the disruption caused by the protests and the need to address public grievances.
The subsequent elections have brought a new political configuration, with the PML-N securing a large majority according to official Pakistani statements.
But an election does not automatically settle the deeper constitutional question. A large number of the local people believe that the elections were rigged and that both political parties that won the seats are Pakistani parties. They only care for Pakistani interests and do not represent the aspirations of the vast majority who do not want to join Pakistan, and who are practically denied participation in any fair elections.
10. Is this really about good governance?
Supporters of provincial integration will undoubtedly argue that the existing system has failed and that AJK needs:
These are legitimate demands, and people who propose these demands MUST NOT be perceived as traitors and agents of some foreign country.
But there is another possibility.
Could constitutional integration also be designed to strengthen Islamabad's political, administrative, economic and security control over AJK?
That question must be asked. There is a profound difference between:
Giving the people of AJK greater democratic rights, and absorbing AJK into Pakistan's constitutional structure without allowing its people to determine the political future of their territory.
The former could strengthen democracy. The latter could simply strengthen central control.
11. The most dangerous possibility
The most dangerous outcome would be for the people of Azad Kashmir to discover that their recent suffering and political agitation had been used as a justification for a constitutional settlement designed somewhere else.
If the purpose of constitutional reform is genuinely to empower the people, then they must be consulted.
If the purpose is merely to change the administrative label while retaining the same political, military and economic control, then changing the name from Azad Jammu and Kashmir to Province of Jammu and Kashmir would accomplish very little for ordinary people.
1. A Governor instead of an existing constitutional head does not automatically create democracy.
2. A Chief Minister does not automatically create autonomy.
3. Members of the National Assembly do not automatically create self-determination.
4. And a provincial flag, legislature or administrative structure cannot by itself resolve the fundamental political question of Jammu and Kashmir.
12. The constitutional irony
There is also an extraordinary irony here.
For decades, Pakistan has accused India of attempting to “integrate” Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir into India.
Now, if this alleged proposal is implemented, Pakistan could find itself explaining why its own constitutional integration of the territory under its administration is fundamentally different.
Perhaps there are legitimate constitutional arguments for the distinction. But those arguments must be presented openly and consistently.
Otherwise, Pakistan risks being accused of applying one principle to India and another to itself.
Conclusion: What is really being proposed?
At present, we should be careful.
I cannot confirm that the 65-seat “Province of Jammu and Kashmir” document is an official Pakistani government proposal.
But it would be equally wrong to dismiss the broader issue as mere fantasy, because there is now substantial evidence of a serious and growing debate over the constitutional future of both AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan.
Gilgit-Baltistan's elected Assembly has formally demanded provisional provincial status. Pakistan's political leadership has publicly discussed direct federal representation for AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan. Also, commentators have openly raised the possibility of de facto provincial status for AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan.
And Pakistan's military spokesperson has said that structural changes should not automatically be ruled out if required for better governance, provided they are undertaken through constitutional, legal and political processes.
All this clearly indicates that something has changed in the political atmosphere. The question is no longer simply whether AJK needs reform. The real question is:
Is Pakistan preparing to redefine its constitutional relationship with Azad Kashmir fundamentally?
If the answer is yes, then the consequences will extend far beyond the structure of a provincial assembly.
They will affect the constitutional identity of Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's position on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, India's response, the United Nations dimension, and—most importantly—the political rights and future of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.
The people of Jammu and Kashmir have suffered for nearly eight decades because others have repeatedly made decisions about their future.
Whatever constitutional arrangement is now contemplated, it must not become another decision made about Kashmir without the meaningful participation of the Kashmiri people; and that is the central issue.
Not whether the territory is called a province. Not whether it has a Governor or a President. Not whether it has 41 seats or 65. The fundamental question is:
Who has the right to decide the political future of Jammu and Kashmir? And that question cannot be answered merely by changing a constitutional label.
Azadi, Kis ki azadi? Are judges Azad? Are journalists Azad? Is the National Assembly of Pakistan Azad?
Collaborators have damaged the agenda of the Action Committee. Collaborators are advancing the Pakistani agenda in the UK as well. https://youtu.be/nUGnKVUnG44
Islamic NATO or a New Regional Military Alliance?
Who Is It Really Designed to Defend?
By Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 9 August 2026
For more than a decade, there has been talk of creating a Muslim military alliance—an "Islamic NATO"—that would supposedly unite Muslim countries against external aggression and provide collective security to the Muslim world.
The idea received considerable attention in 2015–16, when Saudi Arabia announced the creation of a broad Islamic military alliance. Pakistan became an important component of this initiative, and former Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif subsequently became commander of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition.
The announcement created enormous expectations. Many ordinary Muslims naturally asked a simple question:
If Muslim countries are being attacked, who will defend them? That question remains relevant today.
What happened to the Islamic NATO?
The stated purpose of the Saudi-led initiative was to strengthen cooperation among Muslim countries against terrorism and security threats. But more than a decade later, what has this arrangement actually achieved?
· Have these Muslim military alliances protected Syria?
· Have they protected Lebanon?
· Have they protected Palestine?
· Have they protected Yemen?
· Have they protected other Muslim populations suffering from war, occupation or foreign intervention?
· The answer is difficult to identify in any meaningful sense.
This raises a fundamental question:
Was the objective really to defend Muslim countries?
Or was the objective narrower—to protect the security interests of particular governments and regimes? There is an important difference between the two.
A military alliance established in the name of the Muslim world should logically be concerned with the security and dignity of Muslim peoples generally. But if it is primarily designed to protect the strategic interests of particular states, then calling it an "Islamic NATO" can create expectations that the alliance may never fulfil.
General Raheel Sharif and the Islamic military alliance
Pakistan's former Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif, became commander of the Saudi-based Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. This was presented by many Pakistanis as a matter of great pride.
· Pakistan had produced the commander of a major multinational Muslim military organisation.
· But what was the organisation actually intended to do?
· Was it designed to confront Israel?
· Was it designed to protect Palestinians?
· Was it designed to protect Syria and Lebanon?
· Was it intended to confront Iran?
· Or was its primary purpose counter-terrorism and the protection of the participating governments?
· These questions deserve honest answers.
· Military alliances should be judged not by their names but by their actions.
The Saudi-Pakistan Defence Agreement
A major development occurred on 17 September 2025, when Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement.
The agreement stated that aggression against one country would be regarded as aggression against both. Reuters reported that the pact represented a significant strengthening of the two countries' longstanding military relationship and potentially brought Pakistan's nuclear deterrent into the wider strategic calculations of the Gulf, although Pakistani officials stressed that nuclear weapons were not part of the agreement.
This immediately raised another question:
Who was this agreement intended to deter?
· It was certainly not presented as an agreement against Israel.
· Nor was it explicitly directed against Iran.
· Yet both Israel and Iran are central to the strategic calculations of the Middle East.
Pakistan was attacked. Where was Saudi Arabia?
There is an even more interesting question. Since the Saudi-Pakistan defence agreement was signed in September 2025, Pakistan has experienced further security attacks.
Did Saudi Arabia send its army to fight alongside Pakistan?
The answer, so far, is no.
This does not necessarily mean that the agreement is meaningless. Mutual-defence treaties do not always require immediate deployment of troops whenever one member experiences an attack. Their precise obligations depend upon the circumstances and the interpretation of the agreement.
But it does demonstrate something important:
A defence pact on paper and an operational military alliance are not necessarily the same thing.
The real test of such an alliance comes when one member actually faces a serious external military threat.
And then came the Makkah Agreement
Now, in August 2026, we have a new and potentially more significant development.
On 7 August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement.
The agreement states that an armed attack against one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all three. Turkey's Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan subsequently described the arrangement as technically comparable to NATO's Article 5 principle.
However, he also stressed that the agreement was not directed against Iran or any other particular country. The agreement is described as defensive, and its operational details are still to be worked out.
This is an important qualification. We should therefore not prematurely declare that the alliance has been created to fight Iran, Israel or the Houthis. But we are entitled to ask:
Who is most likely to be affected by this new security arrangement?
Iran? Iran is an obvious possibility.
The regional security environment has deteriorated dramatically. Saudi Arabia has serious security concerns regarding Iranian military capabilities and the activities of Iranian-aligned forces.
In 2026, Iran has also launched attacks affecting Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, making the question of collective regional defence much more immediate than it was when the Saudi-Pakistan agreement was signed in 2025.
Yet Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have been careful not to describe the new alliance as an anti-Iran alliance. That may be true. It may also be strategic diplomacy.
There is a considerable difference between saying publicly that an alliance is "not directed against Iran" and designing an alliance whose principal strategic concern happens to be the Iranian military threat.
The Houthis?
The second possibility is Yemen's Houthi movement.
The Houthis have developed into an important regional military actor. Since 2023, they have launched attacks against Israel and ships in the Red Sea, presenting their actions as support for the Palestinians. They are also closely aligned with Iran, although they retain their own Yemeni political and strategic objectives.
Saudi Arabia has its own long and painful history with the Houthis. The Saudi-led coalition intervened in Yemen in 2015 against the Houthis and their allies. Although Saudi Arabia largely ceased active hostilities in 2022, the Houthi threat has never completely disappeared.
Indeed, the timing of the new Makkah agreement is striking. Only days after the agreement was signed, Houthi forces attacked a Saudi Aramco facility in Jazan with a drone. Reuters reported that the Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack.
The Houthi attack does not prove that the Makkah agreement was established specifically to fight the Houthis. But it demonstrates why the Houthi question cannot be ignored when discussing Saudi Arabia's security calculations.
What about Israel?
This is perhaps the most sensitive question. If the alliance is genuinely a collective Muslim defence arrangement, why is Israel not openly identified as a potential threat?
The answer may lie in political and strategic realities. Turkey and Pakistan have strong political positions concerning Palestine, while Saudi Arabia has its own complicated relationship with Israel and the United States.
An explicit anti-Israel military alliance would have enormous geopolitical consequences. It could also make it much more difficult for Saudi Arabia to maintain its relationships with the United States and other Western powers.
Therefore, it would be premature to conclude that this alliance is designed to fight Israel. But equally, it would be naive to assume that Israel is completely absent from the strategic calculations of the three countries.
NATO Article 5—and the important difference
The comparison with NATO is attractive but must be treated carefully. NATO's Article 5 establishes the principle that an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all.
The new Makkah agreement adopts a similar principle. But NATO has spent decades developing integrated military structures, command arrangements, intelligence cooperation, logistics, planning mechanisms and established procedures for collective defence.
The Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani arrangement is much newer. Its precise operational mechanisms have yet to be developed, and this can take many years before it is fully active.
Turkey's Foreign Minister himself said that the three countries would establish ministerial and institutional mechanisms and determine the operational details later.
Therefore, calling it an "Islamic NATO" may be politically attractive, but it is not yet equivalent to NATO in institutional or military terms.
The real test
The real test will come when one of the members faces a major external attack. Suppose Saudi Arabia is attacked; the major question is:
· Will Pakistan send combat forces?
· Will Turkey send its air force or navy?
· Suppose Pakistan is attacked.
· Will Saudi Arabia deploy its armed forces?
· Will Turkey intervene?
· Suppose Turkey faces a major external attack.
· Will Pakistan and Saudi Arabia fight alongside Turkey?
They may look like academic questions, but they are the questions that determine whether a defence pact is a genuine security alliance or primarily a political declaration.
Who benefits?
There is another dimension that should not be ignored. Saudi Arabia possesses enormous financial resources.
Pakistan possesses a large, experienced military and is the only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state.
Turkey possesses one of NATO's largest armies and a rapidly expanding defence industry.
That means each country, therefore, brings something different and important to the table, for example:
· Saudi Arabia brings financial power and strategic geography.
· Pakistan brings military manpower, experience and nuclear deterrence.
· Turkey brings military-industrial capacity, NATO experience and a powerful regional military.
Together, these capabilities could create a significant regional security structure. But, still, the question remains:
For what purpose? An Islamic alliance must answer an Islamic question
If these countries wish to call their alliance part of a broader Muslim security project, they should answer a very simple question:
Will the alliance defend Muslims because they are Muslims, or will it defend only the territory and strategic interests of its member governments? What will be the response of the alliance:
· If a Muslim country outside the alliance is attacked, what happens?
· If Palestinians are attacked, what happens?
· If Syria is attacked, what happens?
· If Lebanon is attacked, what happens?
· If another Muslim country is threatened, does the alliance intervene?
· Or does Article 5 stop at the borders of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey?
· That distinction is fundamental to understanding the nature of the alliance and its effectiveness.
From rhetoric to reality
For decades, Muslim governments have spoken about Muslim unity – unity of the Muslim Ummah, which never witnessed unity after the assassination of the third Caliph Hazrat Uthman, may Allah bless his soul.
There have been conferences, declarations, organisations and military alliances. But Muslim countries remain divided by political interests, competing regional ambitions, sectarian tensions and alliances with major external powers.
Sadly, the creation of another military alliance will not solve these problems by itself. If it is genuinely intended to provide collective security, it should be transparent about its objectives.
It should explain:
Until these questions are answered, we should be cautious about grand descriptions such as Islamic NATO or even a Sunni NATO.
Conclusion
The idea of an Islamic military alliance has been discussed for many years. The first major Saudi-led initiative created enormous expectations. The appointment of a Pakistani general to lead a major Islamic military coalition was celebrated as a historic achievement. Yet history demands that we ask what these institutions actually achieved.
Now a new chapter has begun. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey have created a new mutual-defence framework in Makkah. It is potentially significant. It could develop into an important regional security organisation.
But its future will depend not on its name, religious symbolism or political speeches. It will depend on what happens when the first real test arrives. The crucial question is therefore not:
"Is this an Islamic NATO”.
The crucial question is: "Who will this alliance actually defend—and against whom?"
Only time, and perhaps the next regional crisis, will provide the answer.
