Monday, 6 July 2026

Who Is a Kashmiri? Ethnicity, Statehood and the Evolution of a Shared Political Identity A Response to Manzoor Gilani

 Who Is a Kashmiri? Ethnicity, Statehood and the Evolution of a Shared Political Identity

A Response to Manzoor Gilani

By Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 6 July 2026.


The recent article by Manzoor Gilani entitled What is Kashmir? Who are Kashmiris? deserves careful reading. At a time when political slogans often replace historical facts, he has made a valuable contribution by encouraging a serious discussion about identity, history and the evolution of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir.


I agree with many of the historical facts he presents. Before 1846, there was no political entity known as the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Various regions—including Jammu, Kashmir, Poonch, Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, Gilgit, Baltistan and Ladakh—possessed their own distinct histories, cultures and identities. These facts are beyond dispute.


However, I respectfully believe the discussion can be taken a step further. The central issue is not whether these regional identities existed—they certainly did. The real question is whether, over nearly two centuries, they also developed a shared political identity.

In my view, the answer is yes.

Four Different Meanings of "Kashmir"

Much of the confusion surrounding this debate arises because people use the word Kashmir without explaining which Kashmir they mean. In reality, the word has at least four distinct meanings.

First, Kashmir may refer to the Kashmir Valley, the geographical region stretching roughly from Baramulla to Anantnag.

Second, Kashmir may refer to ethnic Kashmiris—people whose ancestral origins lie in the Valley and whose traditional language is Kashmiri.

Third, Kashmir may refer to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the princely state established in 1846 under Maharaja Gulab Singh, which brought together diverse peoples under one political administration.

Fourth, Kashmir refers to the international dispute over the former princely State, recognised by the United Nations since 1948. This dispute concerns the entire State—not merely the Valley—including Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, Gilgit-Baltistan and the territories administered by Pakistan.

Many disagreements arise simply because people move from one meaning of "Kashmir" to another without realising they have changed the subject.

Ethnicity Is Not the Same as Political Identity

One of the most common mistakes in discussions of identity is assuming that ethnicity and political identity are identical. They are not.

For example, a Scot may be ethnically Scottish and politically British.

Similarly, a person who lives in Bavaria could be called a Bavarian, that is, his distinct regional identity while being a German.

Also, a person belonging to Catalonia may speak Catalan and possess a strong cultural identity while remaining legally Spanish.

Likewise, a resident of Baltistan may be ethnically Balti, a resident of Poonch may be Poonchi. The point which most people do not understand is that none of these regional identities disappears merely because another political identity also exists. It must be understood that modern societies routinely accommodate multiple identities simultaneously.

The Birth of a Civic Identity

The creation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1846 did more than unite territories under one ruler. It gradually created a common political community.

This process accelerated through common institutions, common administration, common taxation, common courts and, most importantly, the State Subject Laws, culminating in the State Subject Notification of 1927.

For the first time, all permanent residents of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of religion, language or ethnicity, possessed common legal rights and a common constitutional status.

In modern political science, this is known as civic nationalism, which differs fundamentally from ethnic nationalism.

Ethnic nationalism is based upon ancestry. But civic nationalism is based upon common citizenship, common institutions and shared political experience.

The former State of Jammu and Kashmir gradually developed precisely such a civic identity. In other words, one person could be a Mirpuri and have a regional identity, but he will be a Kashmiri as well; and for that he doesn’t have to speak the Kashmiri language.

International Law Recognises the Entire State

This distinction became even more important after 1947, when the United Nations did not recognise separate disputes over the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, Ladakh or Gilgit-Baltistan.

It recognised one dispute concerning all the regions of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Every United Nations Security Council Resolution refers to the people of the State as a whole.

International law makes no distinction between Dogras, Kashmiris, Baltis, Ladakhis, Gujjars or Paharis when discussing the principle of self-determination.

The recognised political unit has always been the former princely State. That fact alone demonstrates that there is a political identity that extends beyond ethnicity.

Identities Are Layered

Identity is rarely singular. Most people possess several identities simultaneously. For example, a resident of Rawalakot living in the United Kingdom may truthfully say:

I am a Sudhan by tribe, a Pahari by language, a Poonchi by region, a Kashmiri by political identity and a British citizen by nationality.

None of these identities contradicts another.

Similarly, a Kashmiri Pandit born in Srinagar may be ethnically Kashmiri, politically Kashmiri, and he may regard himself legally as an Indian citizen.

In other words, identity is layered, and it is not exclusive.

Why the Whole State Came to Be Known as Kashmir

Mr Gilani correctly points out that the Valley originally possessed the historical name "Kashmir." However, with the passage of time, the entire princely State came to be known internationally by that name.

History provides many similar examples. England gave its name to the English language, although millions who speak English are not English.

Look at the following examples:

·       The Netherlands is often referred to as Holland, even though Holland is only one part of the country.

·       The United Kingdom is frequently called Britain, despite Britain being only one of its islands.

·       Likewise, the prominence of the Kashmir Valley gradually resulted in the entire State becoming known simply as "Kashmir."

Whether historians and ordinary people like it or not, that has become the accepted diplomatic and political reality.

History Did Not Stop in 1846

One point deserves particular emphasis. History did not end with the creation of the State. Nor did it end in 1947. Nearly 180 years have passed since the State came into existence.

During that period its inhabitants experienced common institutions, shared administration, common laws, political struggles, partition, war, United Nations involvement and international diplomacy.

History transformed what had originally been separate regions into a recognised political community. Ignoring this evolution risks freezing history at a single moment while overlooking everything that followed.

The Danger of Narrow Definitions

Restricting the word Kashmiri solely to people of Kashmiri ethnicity may unintentionally deepen divisions within a society that has already suffered enough fragmentation.

The people of Jammu and Kashmir have been divided by ceasefire lines, constitutions, administrative boundaries, religions and competing nationalisms.

They should not now be divided further by denying the existence of a shared political identity. The former princely State was never homogeneous. Its richness lay precisely in its diversity. It contained Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Christians and Buddhists.

It spoke Kashmiri, Dogri, Pahari, Gojri, Balti, Ladakhi, Shina and many other languages. Its diversity was not a weakness. It is regarded as a strength. It was its defining characteristic. It reflected tolerance and ability to live together, and respect for other religions and cultures.

A Civic Nation, Not an Ethnic Nation

For decades I have consistently argued that the people of the former princely State constitute a civic nation rather than an ethnic nation.

They are united not because they all speak one language or belong to one ethnic group, but because they inherited a common political history, a common constitutional tradition and a common international status. This understanding provides an inclusive identity.

·       It allows a Dogra to remain proudly Dogra.

·       A Balti remains proudly Balti.

·       A Gujjar remains proudly Gujjar.

·       A Kashmiri remains proudly Kashmiri.

·       Yet all may simultaneously identify themselves as members of the wider political community of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Conclusion

Manzoor Gilani has done an important service by encouraging a historical discussion rather than an emotional one. However, the debate should not stop at ethnicity. History teaches us that political identities evolve.

The people of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir are not merely a collection of ethnic communities living side by side.

Over nearly two centuries, they have also become a political community, recognised both by history and by international law.

For that reason, I believe it is entirely legitimate for every permanent inhabitant of the former princely State—and their descendants—to describe themselves as Kashmiris in the civic and political sense, while proudly preserving their own regional, linguistic, cultural and ethnic identities.

The future of Jammu and Kashmir, whatever constitutional form it may ultimately take, will only be secure if it embraces this inclusive understanding of identity.

A united political identity does not erase diversity. It protects it.

People also need to remember these historical developments, for example:

  • The Treaty of Amritsar (1846) created one political entity.
  • The State Subject laws created one civic community.
  • The Indian Independence Act 1947 recognised the princely State as one constitutional unit.
  • Mountbatten's statement to the Chamber of Princes acknowledged that rulers could choose independence (even if political realities later constrained that option).
  • Jinnah publicly stated that Jammu and Kashmir could join India, join Pakistan, or remain independent.
  • The UN Security Council resolutions dealt with the entire State as one disputed territory.
  • Article 257 of Pakistan's Constitution recognises that the relationship with Pakistan is to be determined by the wishes of the people if they accede.
  • Yet the AJK Interim Constitution Act 1974 restricts advocacy of any constitutional future other than accession to Pakistan. END.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com

PTI tried to hijack the biggest protest in London. We are united against injustice and oppression.

 PTI tried to hijack the biggest protest in London. We are united against injustice and oppression.

 

Why is Home Minister Shabana Mahmood quiet on the indiscriminate killings of Azad Kashmiri people? I hope she knows the difference between azadi and Ghulami. https://youtu.be/fc82NlDXZhI

Sunday, 5 July 2026

Who Is the Traitor? By Dr Shabir Choudhry, 5 July 2026.

 Who Is the Traitor?

By Dr Shabir Choudhry, 5 July 2026.

Who disobeyed Jinnah's orders?
A General.

Who abrogated Pakistan's Constitution?
A General.

Who imposed Martial Law in Pakistan?
A General.

Who proposed a Joint Defence Pact to India?
A General.

Who ceded thousands of square miles of Gilgit territory to China?
A General.

Who launched the military operation in East Pakistan?
A General.

Who ordered the surrender of the Pakistan Army?
A General.

Who sold Pakistanis for dollars?
A General.

Who gave refuge to international terrorists in Pakistan?
A General.

Who created and nurtured terrorist groups?
A General.

Who hanged one Prime Minister?
A General.

Who exiled another Prime Minister?
A General.

Who imprisoned yet another Prime Minister?
A General.

Who killed the Baloch people?
A General.

Who killed the Pashtuns?
A General.

Who complicated the Jammu and Kashmir dispute?
A General.

Who mercilessly shed the blood of innocent people in Jammu and Kashmir?
A General.

Who called the people of Azad Kashmir traitors?
A General.

Who is responsible for the current problems faced by the people of Azad Kashmir?
A General.

Who secured the release of Pakistani prisoners of war from India?
A Civilian.

Who made Gwadar part of Pakistan?
A Civilian.

Who gave Pakistan its Constitution?
A Civilian.

After reading this brief account of history, a reasonable person can only conclude that the Army's role has been as glorious as that of Khalid bin Walid's army, and that all the blame lies with the "bloody civilians."

Saturday, 4 July 2026

 From Self-Determination to Administrative Control: Is Democratic Space Disappearing in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir?

From Public Servants to Silent Servants: The New Restrictions in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

By Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 4 June 2026.


For decades, Pakistan has argued before the international community that the people of Jammu and Kashmir must be allowed to determine their own future. This has been the cornerstone of Pakistan's diplomatic position on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute since 1947.

That position is reflected in Article 257 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which states:

"When the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State."


On paper, this is an important democratic commitment. It recognises that the people of the former princely State are not merely subjects of policy but possess the right to determine their own constitutional future.

Unfortunately, the reality on the ground increasingly appears to be moving in the opposite direction.

A New Government Circular

On 29 June 2026, the Deputy Commissioner of Mirpur issued an official circular directing all serving and retired government employees not to participate in any activity connected with the Joint Public Action Committee, which the authorities have declared a proscribed organisation.

The circular goes much further than prohibiting attendance at public meetings.

It directs employees and pensioners not to:

  • Share material on Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram or other social media platforms;
  • Upload or circulate information relating to the organisation;
  • Encourage others to do so; or
  • Attend its meetings or gatherings.


The circular further warns that anyone violating these instructions may face disciplinary proceedings, criminal prosecution and even suspension of salary or pension.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the political objectives of the Joint Public Action Committee is beside the point.

The larger question is whether a democratic society should criminalise peaceful political association and expression in this manner.


A Broader Pattern

This circular does not stand in isolation.

Recent months have witnessed the arrest of prominent leaders of the rights movement, reports of political activists being placed on Pakistan's Fourth Schedule under anti-terrorism legislation and increasing restrictions on political activity within Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the democratic space available for peaceful political dissent is shrinking.

If this trend continues, the consequences may extend far beyond the immediate political controversy.

Democracy Requires More Than Elections

Governments often point to elections as evidence of democracy. China, Russia and many other undemocratic regimes also hold elections. It must be noted that democracy consists of much more than the right to vote every few years.

It also requires:

  • Freedom of expression;
  • Freedom of association;
  • Freedom to travel;
  • Peaceful political opposition;
  • An independent judiciary;
  • Equality before the law; and
  • Protection of fundamental rights.

A right to dissent is also important, and government confident of its public support does not normally fear peaceful criticism.

Indeed, democratic governments are strengthened—not weakened—by open debate.

The Constitutional Contradiction

Perhaps the greatest contradiction lies within Pakistan's own constitutional framework.

Article 257 suggests that the people of Jammu and Kashmir possess the right to determine their future.

Yet the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, allows political participation only for those who support the ideology which subscribes to accession to Pakistan.

Advocating independence or other constitutional alternatives is effectively excluded from the political process.

If, in addition, peaceful political activists are subjected to anti-terrorism legislation or administrative restrictions, one must ask:

How can people exercise free choice when only one constitutional option may be openly advocated?

This is not merely a political question. It is a constitutional one.

Extending Restrictions to Pensioners

One particularly striking aspect of the recent circular is that it applies not only to serving government employees but also to retired officials.

A pension is generally regarded as a legal entitlement earned through years of public service.

Threatening to suspend pensions because of peaceful political activity raises serious legal and ethical questions.

It also risks creating an atmosphere in which retired citizens feel unable to express their political opinions freely.

Lessons from History

History offers many examples of governments attempting to suppress political dissent through administrative measures.

Such policies may produce temporary silence, but they rarely resolve underlying political grievances.

The British Empire relied upon restrictive laws, preventive detention and censorship to maintain control over India. Yet it eventually discovered that durable political stability cannot be achieved through coercion alone. The lesson remains relevant today.

Political disputes are resolved through dialogue, constitutional reform and public confidence—not through fear and oppression.

Pakistan's International Credibility

Pakistan has consistently criticised India for restrictions on political freedoms in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Those criticisms deserve to be examined on their own merits.

However, Pakistan's international position will inevitably be weakened if similar concerns arise in the territory under its own administration. A state's moral authority depends not only upon what it says but also upon what it does.

If Pakistan advocates democratic freedoms internationally, it must demonstrate the same commitment within the territory it administers.

The Way Forward

Peaceful political disagreement should never be mistaken for violence and terrorism.

Governments have both the right and the responsibility to act against those who advocate or commit violence and terrorism.

But peaceful criticism, constitutional debate and political activism belong to the normal functioning of a democratic society.

The people of Jammu and Kashmir have endured decades of conflict, uncertainty and competing national and regional narratives. They deserve something better than shrinking political space.

If Pakistan genuinely believes that the future of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined according to the wishes of its people, then it should create an environment in which those wishes can be expressed freely, peacefully and without fear.

The true test of democracy is not how a government treats those who agree with it. It is how it treats those who peacefully disagree.

History will judge governments not by the powers they exercised but by the freedoms they protected.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com

Thursday, 2 July 2026

Real face of Pakistan and our options. Dr Shabir Choudhry, 02 July 2026.

 Real face of Pakistan and our options.

Dr Shabir Choudhry, 02 July 2026.

 

Imperialists torture the natives, starve them, intimidate them, and dehumanise them in front of their families, mothers, wives and children and their tribe so that those witnessing this ordeal dare not challenge them.

 

The pain, shame, and starvation traumatise the women and children into submission. Those who accept slavery and express loyalty to foreign masters are rewarded, so that other natives follow in their footsteps and, in a way, join the race to become a favourite slave.

 

Sadly, Pakistan was a product of imperialism, and the ruling elite are grandchildren of those who wholeheartedly served the British Raj. One cannot expect anything from them. They are not even sincere with their own people, let alone the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

My people, the people of Jammu and Kashmir, have endured the same pain, intimidation, blackmailing and intolerable suffering that the native Indians suffered at the hands of the British. Following the footsteps of Israel and Yazid, Pakistan has strictly blocked the supply of food and medicine to the people of Azad Kashmir to force them into submission.

 

Pakistan’s real face is revealed. The rulers of Pakistan regard Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan as their colonies. The people of these two regions reject this status. They want to live in peace and dignity. They want control over their resources and to enjoy fundamental rights.

 

Pakistan, on the other hand, want their submission. The ruling elite of Pakistan have revealed their cards and their intentions. Now it is for the people of these two regions to decide.

 

They don’t have many options. They have only two options:

·       Fight for their fundamental rights and live with dignity and honour,

·        Or surrender and live your lives in pain, suffering and slavery.

Tuesday, 30 June 2026

AJK has become a police state- no rule of law. IG Police and the Brigadier must be removed for peace in AJK.

 AJK has become a police state- no rule of law. IG Police and the Brigadier must be removed for peace in AJK.


Shaukat Nawaz Mir was arrested after an exchange of fire. How will this affect the rights movement? https://youtu.be/sotVV-TF4Vw

Monday, 29 June 2026

From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management: What the New India-Pakistan Track Two Dialogue Means for Kashmir. By Dr Shabir Choudhry,

 From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management: What the New India-Pakistan Track Two Dialogue Means for Kashmir

By Dr Shabir Choudhry, June 2026, London.

Reports have emerged that, since the military confrontation between India and Pakistan following Operation Sindoor, representatives from both countries have quietly participated in a series of Track Two and Track 1.5 meetings in different parts of the world. According to media reports, these meetings have taken place in countries including Nepal, Thailand and Sri Lanka, bringing together retired diplomats, former military officers, academics, strategic experts and individuals believed to have access to decision-makers in both capitals.

The agenda of these meetings appears to have included conflict management, terrorism, military communications, the Indus Waters dispute, confidence-building measures and regional stability. Significantly, however, one subject that is close to my heart appears to have been deliberately pushed into the background—the political future of Jammu and Kashmir.

This raises an important question. Have India and Pakistan quietly shifted their objective from resolving the Kashmir dispute to merely managing its consequences?

I believe they have.

A Different Era

More than twenty-five years ago, I had the privilege of participating in what was then described as Track Two Diplomacy. During visits to New Delhi and Islamabad, I attended peace conferences, met diplomats from various countries, spoke with journalists, politicians and academics, and engaged in lengthy discussions with Pakistani officials and advisers on the future of Kashmir and South Asia.

The chapters in my forthcoming book describe many of these meetings in detail. They remind me how different the political atmosphere was at the beginning of the new millennium.

The Cold War had ended. South Asia had witnessed the Lahore Declaration. There was cautious optimism that dialogue, however difficult, might eventually replace confrontation. Although violence continued in Kashmir, there was still widespread belief that unofficial diplomacy could prepare the ground for official negotiations.

Track Two diplomacy was not intended to replace governments. Rather, it sought to create space where difficult questions could be discussed without the political constraints faced by serving officials.

Retired diplomats, former military officers, academics, journalists and politicians could examine ideas that governments were not yet prepared to discuss publicly. They could test proposals, identify areas of agreement and disagreement, and quietly communicate emerging thinking back to policy-makers.

The underlying objective was clear.

The purpose of dialogue was conflict resolution.

The Kashmir dispute itself remained at the centre of every serious discussion.

My Own Experience

During those meetings, I consistently argued that there were three parties to the Kashmir dispute: India, Pakistan and the people of the former princely State of Jammu and Kashmir.

I also maintained that no durable settlement could emerge unless all three parties participated in the process, and the people of Jammu and Kashmir, being the principal party, should have the final say.

While meeting diplomats in Islamabad, I repeatedly emphasised that the dispute was neither purely territorial nor simply a religious conflict. It was fundamentally a political dispute involving the future of a historically distinct state and the aspirations of its people.

I argued that military force alone could not resolve the issue.

Equally, I warned that presenting the Kashmiri struggle primarily in religious terms was strategically damaging. It enabled India to portray what had begun as an indigenous political movement as an extension of international Islamic militancy. I feared that this transformation would gradually erode international sympathy for the Kashmiri cause.

Unfortunately, many of those concerns were later borne out by events.

The Turning Point

The attacks of 11 September 2001 fundamentally changed the international environment.

Before 9/11, armed movements around the world were often viewed through the lens of self-determination and national liberation. Afterwards, virtually every armed conflict became increasingly interpreted through the framework of counter-terrorism.

The global political climate changed dramatically.

Governments became far less willing to distinguish between indigenous resistance movements and internationally connected militant organisations.

India successfully argued that militancy in Kashmir formed part of the wider challenge of international terrorism. Pakistan itself soon found that many of the militant groups it had previously regarded as strategic assets increasingly became a threat to its own security and stability.

As international priorities shifted, so too did the diplomatic agenda.

The emphasis gradually moved away from resolving political disputes towards containing security threats.

A New Purpose

The recent Track Two meetings appear to reflect this new reality.

According to available reports, participants have focused on preventing future military crises, strengthening communication between the armed forces, managing water disputes, addressing terrorism and reducing the risk of escalation between two nuclear-armed neighbours.

These are undoubtedly important objectives.

Indeed, after the recent military confrontation, responsible governments have every reason to improve crisis management mechanisms. Preventing another war serves the interests of both countries and, above all, the millions of ordinary people who would suffer its consequences.

Yet one cannot ignore what appears to be missing.

The Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir forcibly divided no longer seems to be the principal subject of discussion.

Instead, it has become the backdrop against which other strategic issues are managed.

This represents a profound shift.

Conflict Resolution versus Conflict Management

Although the two expressions sound similar, they describe fundamentally different approaches.

Conflict resolution seeks to address the underlying causes of a dispute. Its objective is to achieve a political settlement that removes the source of conflict.

Conflict management, by contrast, accepts that a dispute may remain unresolved for many years, perhaps indefinitely. Rather than attempting to solve it, the objective becomes preventing it from escalating into open warfare, or a nuclear war.

The difference is significant.

One seeks peace through political settlement.

The other seeks stability despite political disagreement.

History offers many examples.

The Korean Peninsula remains divided, yet conflict is carefully managed.

Cyprus has remained politically unresolved for decades while avoiding major warfare.

Many territorial disputes around the world have been stabilised without being settled.

Sadly, South Asia may now be entering a similar phase. This is not good news for the suffering people of Jammu and Kashmir. I strongly feel that the people of Jammu and Kashmir will resist this conspiracy.

Where Do Kashmiris Stand?

This development raises another important question.

If India and Pakistan increasingly conduct bilateral discussions about terrorism, water resources, military communications and regional stability while deliberately avoiding the political future of Jammu and Kashmir, where does that leave the people, whose homeland remains divided?

For decades, successive governments have spoken about Kashmir.

Far less frequently have they spoken with Kashmiris.

This has always been one of the central weaknesses of the peace process.

No solution imposed exclusively by India and Pakistan is likely to command lasting legitimacy among the diverse peoples of the former princely State. Equally, no sustainable settlement can ignore the legitimate security concerns of either country.

The challenge, therefore, remains what it has always been: to reconcile the interests of all three stakeholders.

Is Conflict Management Enough?

This is not an argument against Track Two diplomacy.

On the contrary, I remain convinced that unofficial dialogue serves a valuable purpose.

Governments often cannot publicly explore ideas that independent scholars, retired officials and experienced practitioners can discuss without political cost.

Track Two diplomacy has repeatedly demonstrated its usefulness in opening channels of communication during periods when official dialogue has broken down.

Every avoided war is a success.

Every restored communication channel reduces the risk of miscalculation.

Every confidence-building measure saves lives.

However, conflict management should never become a substitute for conflict resolution.

Managing tensions may postpone conflict.

It cannot eliminate its underlying causes.

Looking Ahead

Reading about today's Track Two meetings has reminded me of conversations I had more than two decades ago in New Delhi and Islamabad.

The methods remain remarkably similar.

The participants are often similar.

The venues are familiar.

What has changed is the objective.

Then, we hoped to create conditions for resolving the Kashmir dispute.

Today, the emphasis appears to be on ensuring that the dispute does not trigger another military confrontation between two nuclear powers.

That is undoubtedly a worthwhile objective.

But history also teaches another lesson.

Political disputes do not disappear simply because governments decide not to discuss them.

Lasting peace in South Asia will ultimately require more than military restraint, confidence-building measures or crisis management. It will require political imagination, courageous leadership and a willingness to address the underlying dispute itself.

The challenge before India, Pakistan and the people of Jammu and Kashmir is therefore not merely to prevent the next crisis.

It is to ensure that crisis management does not become a permanent substitute for conflict resolution.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com