Saturday, 4 July 2026

 From Self-Determination to Administrative Control: Is Democratic Space Disappearing in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir?

From Public Servants to Silent Servants: The New Restrictions in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

By Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 4 June 2026.


For decades, Pakistan has argued before the international community that the people of Jammu and Kashmir must be allowed to determine their own future. This has been the cornerstone of Pakistan's diplomatic position on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute since 1947.

That position is reflected in Article 257 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which states:

"When the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State."


On paper, this is an important democratic commitment. It recognises that the people of the former princely State are not merely subjects of policy but possess the right to determine their own constitutional future.

Unfortunately, the reality on the ground increasingly appears to be moving in the opposite direction.

A New Government Circular

On 29 June 2026, the Deputy Commissioner of Mirpur issued an official circular directing all serving and retired government employees not to participate in any activity connected with the Joint Public Action Committee, which the authorities have declared a proscribed organisation.

The circular goes much further than prohibiting attendance at public meetings.

It directs employees and pensioners not to:

  • Share material on Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram or other social media platforms;
  • Upload or circulate information relating to the organisation;
  • Encourage others to do so; or
  • Attend its meetings or gatherings.


The circular further warns that anyone violating these instructions may face disciplinary proceedings, criminal prosecution and even suspension of salary or pension.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the political objectives of the Joint Public Action Committee is beside the point.

The larger question is whether a democratic society should criminalise peaceful political association and expression in this manner.


A Broader Pattern

This circular does not stand in isolation.

Recent months have witnessed the arrest of prominent leaders of the rights movement, reports of political activists being placed on Pakistan's Fourth Schedule under anti-terrorism legislation and increasing restrictions on political activity within Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the democratic space available for peaceful political dissent is shrinking.

If this trend continues, the consequences may extend far beyond the immediate political controversy.

Democracy Requires More Than Elections

Governments often point to elections as evidence of democracy. China, Russia and many other undemocratic regimes also hold elections. It must be noted that democracy consists of much more than the right to vote every few years.

It also requires:

  • Freedom of expression;
  • Freedom of association;
  • Freedom to travel;
  • Peaceful political opposition;
  • An independent judiciary;
  • Equality before the law; and
  • Protection of fundamental rights.

A right to dissent is also important, and government confident of its public support does not normally fear peaceful criticism.

Indeed, democratic governments are strengthened—not weakened—by open debate.

The Constitutional Contradiction

Perhaps the greatest contradiction lies within Pakistan's own constitutional framework.

Article 257 suggests that the people of Jammu and Kashmir possess the right to determine their future.

Yet the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, allows political participation only for those who support the ideology which subscribes to accession to Pakistan.

Advocating independence or other constitutional alternatives is effectively excluded from the political process.

If, in addition, peaceful political activists are subjected to anti-terrorism legislation or administrative restrictions, one must ask:

How can people exercise free choice when only one constitutional option may be openly advocated?

This is not merely a political question. It is a constitutional one.

Extending Restrictions to Pensioners

One particularly striking aspect of the recent circular is that it applies not only to serving government employees but also to retired officials.

A pension is generally regarded as a legal entitlement earned through years of public service.

Threatening to suspend pensions because of peaceful political activity raises serious legal and ethical questions.

It also risks creating an atmosphere in which retired citizens feel unable to express their political opinions freely.

Lessons from History

History offers many examples of governments attempting to suppress political dissent through administrative measures.

Such policies may produce temporary silence, but they rarely resolve underlying political grievances.

The British Empire relied upon restrictive laws, preventive detention and censorship to maintain control over India. Yet it eventually discovered that durable political stability cannot be achieved through coercion alone. The lesson remains relevant today.

Political disputes are resolved through dialogue, constitutional reform and public confidence—not through fear and oppression.

Pakistan's International Credibility

Pakistan has consistently criticised India for restrictions on political freedoms in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Those criticisms deserve to be examined on their own merits.

However, Pakistan's international position will inevitably be weakened if similar concerns arise in the territory under its own administration. A state's moral authority depends not only upon what it says but also upon what it does.

If Pakistan advocates democratic freedoms internationally, it must demonstrate the same commitment within the territory it administers.

The Way Forward

Peaceful political disagreement should never be mistaken for violence and terrorism.

Governments have both the right and the responsibility to act against those who advocate or commit violence and terrorism.

But peaceful criticism, constitutional debate and political activism belong to the normal functioning of a democratic society.

The people of Jammu and Kashmir have endured decades of conflict, uncertainty and competing national and regional narratives. They deserve something better than shrinking political space.

If Pakistan genuinely believes that the future of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined according to the wishes of its people, then it should create an environment in which those wishes can be expressed freely, peacefully and without fear.

The true test of democracy is not how a government treats those who agree with it. It is how it treats those who peacefully disagree.

History will judge governments not by the powers they exercised but by the freedoms they protected.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com

Thursday, 2 July 2026

Real face of Pakistan and our options. Dr Shabir Choudhry, 02 July 2026.

 Real face of Pakistan and our options.

Dr Shabir Choudhry, 02 July 2026.

 

Imperialists torture the natives, starve them, intimidate them, and dehumanise them in front of their families, mothers, wives and children and their tribe so that those witnessing this ordeal dare not challenge them.

 

The pain, shame, and starvation traumatise the women and children into submission. Those who accept slavery and express loyalty to foreign masters are rewarded, so that other natives follow in their footsteps and, in a way, join the race to become a favourite slave.

 

Sadly, Pakistan was a product of imperialism, and the ruling elite are grandchildren of those who wholeheartedly served the British Raj. One cannot expect anything from them. They are not even sincere with their own people, let alone the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

My people, the people of Jammu and Kashmir, have endured the same pain, intimidation, blackmailing and intolerable suffering that the native Indians suffered at the hands of the British. Following the footsteps of Israel and Yazid, Pakistan has strictly blocked the supply of food and medicine to the people of Azad Kashmir to force them into submission.

 

Pakistan’s real face is revealed. The rulers of Pakistan regard Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan as their colonies. The people of these two regions reject this status. They want to live in peace and dignity. They want control over their resources and to enjoy fundamental rights.

 

Pakistan, on the other hand, want their submission. The ruling elite of Pakistan have revealed their cards and their intentions. Now it is for the people of these two regions to decide.

 

They don’t have many options. They have only two options:

·       Fight for their fundamental rights and live with dignity and honour,

·        Or surrender and live your lives in pain, suffering and slavery.

Tuesday, 30 June 2026

AJK has become a police state- no rule of law. IG Police and the Brigadier must be removed for peace in AJK.

 AJK has become a police state- no rule of law. IG Police and the Brigadier must be removed for peace in AJK.


Shaukat Nawaz Mir was arrested after an exchange of fire. How will this affect the rights movement? https://youtu.be/sotVV-TF4Vw

Monday, 29 June 2026

From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management: What the New India-Pakistan Track Two Dialogue Means for Kashmir. By Dr Shabir Choudhry,

 From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management: What the New India-Pakistan Track Two Dialogue Means for Kashmir

By Dr Shabir Choudhry, June 2026, London.

Reports have emerged that, since the military confrontation between India and Pakistan following Operation Sindoor, representatives from both countries have quietly participated in a series of Track Two and Track 1.5 meetings in different parts of the world. According to media reports, these meetings have taken place in countries including Nepal, Thailand and Sri Lanka, bringing together retired diplomats, former military officers, academics, strategic experts and individuals believed to have access to decision-makers in both capitals.

The agenda of these meetings appears to have included conflict management, terrorism, military communications, the Indus Waters dispute, confidence-building measures and regional stability. Significantly, however, one subject that is close to my heart appears to have been deliberately pushed into the background—the political future of Jammu and Kashmir.

This raises an important question. Have India and Pakistan quietly shifted their objective from resolving the Kashmir dispute to merely managing its consequences?

I believe they have.

A Different Era

More than twenty-five years ago, I had the privilege of participating in what was then described as Track Two Diplomacy. During visits to New Delhi and Islamabad, I attended peace conferences, met diplomats from various countries, spoke with journalists, politicians and academics, and engaged in lengthy discussions with Pakistani officials and advisers on the future of Kashmir and South Asia.

The chapters in my forthcoming book describe many of these meetings in detail. They remind me how different the political atmosphere was at the beginning of the new millennium.

The Cold War had ended. South Asia had witnessed the Lahore Declaration. There was cautious optimism that dialogue, however difficult, might eventually replace confrontation. Although violence continued in Kashmir, there was still widespread belief that unofficial diplomacy could prepare the ground for official negotiations.

Track Two diplomacy was not intended to replace governments. Rather, it sought to create space where difficult questions could be discussed without the political constraints faced by serving officials.

Retired diplomats, former military officers, academics, journalists and politicians could examine ideas that governments were not yet prepared to discuss publicly. They could test proposals, identify areas of agreement and disagreement, and quietly communicate emerging thinking back to policy-makers.

The underlying objective was clear.

The purpose of dialogue was conflict resolution.

The Kashmir dispute itself remained at the centre of every serious discussion.

My Own Experience

During those meetings, I consistently argued that there were three parties to the Kashmir dispute: India, Pakistan and the people of the former princely State of Jammu and Kashmir.

I also maintained that no durable settlement could emerge unless all three parties participated in the process, and the people of Jammu and Kashmir, being the principal party, should have the final say.

While meeting diplomats in Islamabad, I repeatedly emphasised that the dispute was neither purely territorial nor simply a religious conflict. It was fundamentally a political dispute involving the future of a historically distinct state and the aspirations of its people.

I argued that military force alone could not resolve the issue.

Equally, I warned that presenting the Kashmiri struggle primarily in religious terms was strategically damaging. It enabled India to portray what had begun as an indigenous political movement as an extension of international Islamic militancy. I feared that this transformation would gradually erode international sympathy for the Kashmiri cause.

Unfortunately, many of those concerns were later borne out by events.

The Turning Point

The attacks of 11 September 2001 fundamentally changed the international environment.

Before 9/11, armed movements around the world were often viewed through the lens of self-determination and national liberation. Afterwards, virtually every armed conflict became increasingly interpreted through the framework of counter-terrorism.

The global political climate changed dramatically.

Governments became far less willing to distinguish between indigenous resistance movements and internationally connected militant organisations.

India successfully argued that militancy in Kashmir formed part of the wider challenge of international terrorism. Pakistan itself soon found that many of the militant groups it had previously regarded as strategic assets increasingly became a threat to its own security and stability.

As international priorities shifted, so too did the diplomatic agenda.

The emphasis gradually moved away from resolving political disputes towards containing security threats.

A New Purpose

The recent Track Two meetings appear to reflect this new reality.

According to available reports, participants have focused on preventing future military crises, strengthening communication between the armed forces, managing water disputes, addressing terrorism and reducing the risk of escalation between two nuclear-armed neighbours.

These are undoubtedly important objectives.

Indeed, after the recent military confrontation, responsible governments have every reason to improve crisis management mechanisms. Preventing another war serves the interests of both countries and, above all, the millions of ordinary people who would suffer its consequences.

Yet one cannot ignore what appears to be missing.

The Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir forcibly divided no longer seems to be the principal subject of discussion.

Instead, it has become the backdrop against which other strategic issues are managed.

This represents a profound shift.

Conflict Resolution versus Conflict Management

Although the two expressions sound similar, they describe fundamentally different approaches.

Conflict resolution seeks to address the underlying causes of a dispute. Its objective is to achieve a political settlement that removes the source of conflict.

Conflict management, by contrast, accepts that a dispute may remain unresolved for many years, perhaps indefinitely. Rather than attempting to solve it, the objective becomes preventing it from escalating into open warfare, or a nuclear war.

The difference is significant.

One seeks peace through political settlement.

The other seeks stability despite political disagreement.

History offers many examples.

The Korean Peninsula remains divided, yet conflict is carefully managed.

Cyprus has remained politically unresolved for decades while avoiding major warfare.

Many territorial disputes around the world have been stabilised without being settled.

Sadly, South Asia may now be entering a similar phase. This is not good news for the suffering people of Jammu and Kashmir. I strongly feel that the people of Jammu and Kashmir will resist this conspiracy.

Where Do Kashmiris Stand?

This development raises another important question.

If India and Pakistan increasingly conduct bilateral discussions about terrorism, water resources, military communications and regional stability while deliberately avoiding the political future of Jammu and Kashmir, where does that leave the people, whose homeland remains divided?

For decades, successive governments have spoken about Kashmir.

Far less frequently have they spoken with Kashmiris.

This has always been one of the central weaknesses of the peace process.

No solution imposed exclusively by India and Pakistan is likely to command lasting legitimacy among the diverse peoples of the former princely State. Equally, no sustainable settlement can ignore the legitimate security concerns of either country.

The challenge, therefore, remains what it has always been: to reconcile the interests of all three stakeholders.

Is Conflict Management Enough?

This is not an argument against Track Two diplomacy.

On the contrary, I remain convinced that unofficial dialogue serves a valuable purpose.

Governments often cannot publicly explore ideas that independent scholars, retired officials and experienced practitioners can discuss without political cost.

Track Two diplomacy has repeatedly demonstrated its usefulness in opening channels of communication during periods when official dialogue has broken down.

Every avoided war is a success.

Every restored communication channel reduces the risk of miscalculation.

Every confidence-building measure saves lives.

However, conflict management should never become a substitute for conflict resolution.

Managing tensions may postpone conflict.

It cannot eliminate its underlying causes.

Looking Ahead

Reading about today's Track Two meetings has reminded me of conversations I had more than two decades ago in New Delhi and Islamabad.

The methods remain remarkably similar.

The participants are often similar.

The venues are familiar.

What has changed is the objective.

Then, we hoped to create conditions for resolving the Kashmir dispute.

Today, the emphasis appears to be on ensuring that the dispute does not trigger another military confrontation between two nuclear powers.

That is undoubtedly a worthwhile objective.

But history also teaches another lesson.

Political disputes do not disappear simply because governments decide not to discuss them.

Lasting peace in South Asia will ultimately require more than military restraint, confidence-building measures or crisis management. It will require political imagination, courageous leadership and a willingness to address the underlying dispute itself.

The challenge before India, Pakistan and the people of Jammu and Kashmir is therefore not merely to prevent the next crisis.

It is to ensure that crisis management does not become a permanent substitute for conflict resolution.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com

Sunday, 28 June 2026

Who killed the mastermind of Pehlgam attack? Why is Pakistan humiliating AJK people? JK and track 2 diplomacy.

 Who killed the mastermind of Pehlgam attack? Why is Pakistan humiliating AJK people? JK and track 2 diplomacy.

 

They want to crush the Action Committee and those who demand basic rights.

Operation Sindoor and the Return of Quiet Diplomacy to manage JK dispute.
https://youtu.be/GcQUw306KjE

Friday, 26 June 2026

Khoon ka Badla Khoon & no more talks, Ch.Riasat. Apart from a few, all Pak journalists tell lies about AJK.

 Khoon ka Badla Khoon & no more talks, Ch.Riasat. Apart from a few, all Pak journalists tell lies about AJK.

 
Absar Alam and Lord Nazir. Why does Pakistan want to spill more blood in AJK?

https://youtu.be/6-Xcl5urkao

Wednesday, 24 June 2026

Maulana Fazal Rehman Ka Arshad? Baber Awan supports the demands of the AJK people. AJK is not part of Pakistan.

 Maulana Fazal Rehman Ka Arshad? Baber Awan supports the demands of the AJK people. AJK is not part of Pakistan.


Pakistan has decided to crush this ‘rebellion’. Marching towards the LOC can make Pakistan defensive.
https://youtu.be/ocKkV4uu9EM