Pakistan’s oppression has made us true Kashmiris. Pakistan’s intention is to crush our movement.

 Pakistan’s oppression has made us true Kashmiris. Pakistan’s intention is to crush our movement.

 

The Bodies of Killed Pakistanis from Balochistan to Azad Kashmir: An Attempt to Discredit a Peaceful Movement. https://youtu.be/Hq9hgyesrPw

New trap for AJK people- We reject the agreement concluded with JI as they are against the interests of J&K

 New trap for AJK people- We reject the agreement concluded with JI as they are against the interests of J&K

 

Pak establishment has a track record of fooling people and discrediting agreements. May Allah give them wisdom to honour pledges. https://youtu.be/hBOiYlLncwA

Article 257 and the Fourth Schedule: A Constitutional Contradiction in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir

 Article 257 and the Fourth Schedule: A Constitutional Contradiction in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir

Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 9 July 2026.

Despite many twists and turns in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, Pakistan has publicly maintained before the international community that the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory whose future is yet to be determined. Successive governments have repeated this position, and it forms the basis of Pakistan's diplomatic campaign on Kashmir.

This policy also finds expression in Article 257 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which states:

"When the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State."

On the face of it, this appears to recognise an important democratic principle: that the people of Jammu and Kashmir possess the right to determine both whether they wish to accede to Pakistan and, if they do, the nature of their constitutional relationship with Pakistan.

However, the constitutional and political reality in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir presents a striking contradiction.

Freedom to Choose—or Only One Choice?

The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, places severe restrictions on political activity.

No political party may legally advocate a constitutional future other than accession to Pakistan. Candidates contesting elections must affirm their commitment to the ideology of accession to Pakistan. Likewise, holders of public office are required to take an oath supporting that objective.

This raises an obvious constitutional question. If the people of Jammu and Kashmir are genuinely free to determine their future, why are they prevented from peacefully advocating alternative constitutional options?

A democratic choice cannot be meaningful if only one outcome is legally permissible before the choice has even been made.

The Fourth Schedule

For the past several days, a list has been circulating that reportedly claims that these people have been included in the Fourth Schedule. Many people talk of the Fourth Schedule, but they don’t know what it is, and how seriously it affects the lives of the people.

Many people mistakenly believe that the Fourth Schedule is a criminal conviction. It is not true.

The Anti-Terrorism Act contains several schedules dealing with different matters.

• The First Schedule lists proscribed organisations.
• The Second Schedule identifies organisations under observation.
• The Third Schedule lists offences triable under the Anti-Terrorism Act.
• The Fourth Schedule contains the names of individuals whom the authorities consider present a security concern.

A person placed on the Fourth Schedule may not have been convicted of any offence. The designation is administrative rather than judicial.

Nevertheless, inclusion on the Fourth Schedule can have serious consequences.

These may include:

• Regular reporting to police authorities;
• Restrictions on movement and travel. The person cannot leave the city without the permission of the authorities;
• Enhanced surveillance;
• Limitations on obtaining passports – general practise is to cancel the passport and ID card, and that can very seriously affect the everyday life of the people concerned;
• Restrictions affecting financial transactions; general practise is to freeze all accounts, and the person concerned cannot obtain loans or do business, or obtain employment;
• Damage to reputation in society and a very serious impact on the family life; and
• Limitations on political activity.

Although not formally a punishment, these restrictions can significantly affect an individual's personal, social, professional and political life.

This contradiction has become even more significant with the increasing use of Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, particularly the Fourth Schedule.

Counter-Terrorism or Political Management?

No responsible person would dispute that every state has both the right and the duty to protect its citizens against terrorism.

The question is whether anti-terrorism legislation should also be used against peaceful political activists; and against those seeking fundamental rights?

In recent years, a growing number of political activists, lawyers, journalists and leaders of rights movements in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir have reportedly been subjected to anti-terrorism measures, including placement on the Fourth Schedule or prosecution under anti-terrorism laws.

If individuals advocate violence or religious hatred, they should be prosecuted in accordance with the law.

However, if their activities consist primarily of peaceful political advocacy, constitutional reform or demands for greater democratic rights, then treating them as security threats raises profound legal and constitutional questions.

A Democratic Paradox

Pakistan argues internationally that the people of Jammu and Kashmir must be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination, which in practise is not a right of self-determination, but a right of accession to either India or Pakistan. This right to accession was proposed by Pakistan, and was not opposed by India and became a part of the UNCIP Resolution.

Even though this right of accession was proposed by Pakistan, still if any citizen of Jammu and Kashmir expresses his desire to be part of India, immediately that person is declared a traitor, an Indian agent and anti-Pakistan.

That practically means Pakistan is only prepared to give the people of the divided Jammu and Kashmir one option – and that is to join Pakistan or be prepared to face the consequences.

This means within Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, the space for debating constitutional alternatives appears increasingly restricted. This produces an uncomfortable paradox.

On one hand, Article 257 appears to acknowledge the right of the people to determine their constitutional future.

On the other, political laws and administrative practices often permit discussion of only one constitutional outcome – joining Pakistan.

Whether the Pakistani policymakers, and their puppets, acknowledge the bitter facts or not, such contradictions weaken Pakistan's constitutional and diplomatic position. There are big contradictions in Pakistan’s declared Kashmir policy and the practise.

A state that argues for democratic choice internationally must also demonstrate democratic confidence domestically.

Colonial Methods in a Post-Colonial State

History teaches us that colonial administrations often governed through a combination of coercion and patronage.

Those who challenge or criticise the wrong policies of the government are systematically monitored, harassed, pressured, imprisoned or economically marginalised.

Those who demonstrate loyalty are handsomely rewarded financially, politically and with awards.

The objective was not merely to suppress resistance but to shape political behaviour through fear and dependency.

One of the disappointments of South Asian politics has been the persistence of some of these methods long after the end of colonial rule; and in the case of Pakistan and to some extent India, these methods are still regularly applied to silence dissent and control political and economic behaviour.

Instead of relying primarily upon democratic persuasion, governments have too often relied upon surveillance, preventive detention, restrictive legislation and administrative control.

The colonisers have gone, but their colonial legacy remains visible in different forms across the region; hence the suffering of the oppressed and occupied people continues.

The Way Forward

The people of Jammu and Kashmir deserve more than competing national narratives. They do not ask for the sky or moon. They seek fundamental human rights; and they deserve genuine political freedom.

If Pakistan sincerely believes that the future of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined by its people, then it should create conditions in which all peaceful political opinions may be expressed without fear.

The answer to political disagreement is not administrative restriction but democratic debate. Counter-terrorism laws should remain directed against those who advocate extremism, religious hatred or commit violence.

These laws should not become instruments for regulating peaceful political opinion, and control the lives of the people.

History demonstrates that durable political settlements are achieved not through coercion but through dialogue, constitutionalism and respect for fundamental freedoms.

If Pakistan wishes to strengthen both its democratic credentials and its international case on the Kashmir dispute, there could be no better place to begin than by ensuring that the people living under its own administration enjoy the very freedoms that it seeks for Kashmiris elsewhere.

Fourth Schedule extended to the UK and other countries.

According to recent reports and a widely circulated post which claimed that Imran Hussain MP, Chair of the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on Jammu and Kashmir, has been placed on Pakistan's Fourth Schedule, if it is true, then it raises some serious questions about the expanding use of anti-terrorism legislation. It would be unusual for a serving Member of the British Parliament, whose involvement has consisted of political advocacy and parliamentary engagement, to be subjected to such measures. Whatever reasons the authorities may advance, such action risks creating unnecessary diplomatic friction and may discourage constructive international engagement in the discourse on Jammu and Kashmir. It also raises broader questions about whether security legislation is being extended beyond its original purpose of countering terrorism into the sphere of peaceful political activity.

A serving British Member of Parliament is not an underground militant or a clandestine political activist. He is an elected representative in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. If Pakistan has formally placed him on the Fourth Schedule, then the issue is no longer merely domestic—it acquires an international and diplomatic dimension.

As Chairman of the APPG on Jammu and Kashmir, his role has been to engage with the issue politically and parliamentarily. To subject such a figure to anti-terrorism monitoring is likely to raise questions in Westminster and beyond.

The Pakistani ruling elite need to revisit the wisdom of their policies. Pakistan has traditionally sought support from British parliamentarians on the Kashmir dispute. Listing a serving British Member of Parliament as a person requiring monitoring under anti-terrorism legislation is likely to be interpreted in the United Kingdom as an unfriendly and disproportionate measure.

Furthermore, it risks undermining Pakistan's diplomatic narrative. Pakistan has consistently argued that it supports democratic rights and political freedoms in Jammu and Kashmir. If a foreign parliamentarian engaged in peaceful political advocacy is subjected to security restrictions, critics will inevitably question whether Pakistan is applying the same democratic standards that it advocates internationally.

In addition, it could discourage parliamentary engagement. Members of the British Parliament, the European Parliament and other legislatures may become reluctant to visit Pakistan or Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir if they believe they could face legal or administrative restrictions because of their political views.

Finally, it risks damaging Pakistan's relationships with long-standing friends. The APPG has historically included MPs from different political parties who have taken an interest in the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Subjecting one of its Chairs to security measures may be viewed as counterproductive.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com

 

 

 

 “I am a victim of police brutality”, claims Dr Masood Khalid from Azam Kashmir.

On the night of 7 July 2026, at approximately 12:30 a.m., my life changed forever.

My name is Dr Masood Khalid, and I am a victim of police brutality.

That night, I was asleep with my wife, my seven-year-old son, and my two young daughters, aged approximately five years and eight months, when around 35 to 40 police officers, most of whom had their faces covered, climbed the walls of my home and forcibly entered.

They came directly to my bedroom, woke me from my sleep, and without asking a single question, began assaulting me. They punched me, slapped me, kicked me, and beat me with batons. Throughout the ordeal, I repeatedly asked only one question:

"I am Dr Masood. What is my crime? What offence have I committed?"

Instead of answering, they continued to abuse me verbally, insulted my late parents, dragged me from my bed, forced me outside, threw me into a police vehicle, and continued beating me there.

Although most of the officers had covered their faces, I recognised SHO Mehtab Aslam and ASI Zohaib Shah of the Sehnsa Police Station.

The officers also pushed my wife and children, verbally abused them, pointed firearms at us, and threatened to kill us.

They vandalised my home, smashing furniture, damaging our solar power system, destroying the refrigerator, and even breaking my innocent children's toys.

What exactly was my crime?

What offence had my innocent children committed that they should be subjected to such cruelty?

Today, my entire family is suffering from severe physical and psychological trauma. Fear is now visible in the innocent eyes of my children, and our lives have been changed forever.

Throughout my life, I have respected the law. Not only have I never been charged with any criminal offence, but I have not even been issued a traffic violation.

I demand justice for this brutal, inhumane, and unlawful conduct by the Sehnsa Police.

I appeal to the Prime Minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Chaudhry Faisal Mumtaz Rathore, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Shehbaz Sharif, and all other relevant authorities to order an independent and impartial investigation into this incident, ensure that those responsible are held accountable in accordance with the law, and provide justice to me and my family.

My name is Dr Masood Khalid, and I am a victim of police brutality. Justice is my right.

#RightsMovementAJK #Kashmir

 

Dialogue in Azad Kashmir has started; the use of guns is not the way forward. Role of charities?

 Dialogue in Azad Kashmir has started; the use of guns is not the way forward. Role of charities?

Yazid stopped for ten days; Pakistan has stopped food and medicine for the past 5 weeks. Who is better?  https://youtu.be/11atqwfshz0

From Protesters to Criminals: When Criminal Law Becomes a Political Weapon. By Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 8 July 2026.

 From Protesters to Criminals: When Criminal Law Becomes a Political Weapon

By Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 8 July 2026.

The arrest of political activists in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir raises an important question that extends beyond the fate of any individual. How should a democratic society deal with peaceful political dissent?

Recent months have witnessed a growing number of arrests of young political activists and participants in rights movements. In many cases, police reports invoke numerous provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code, and sometimes anti-terrorism legislation, against individuals whose supporters insist were engaged in peaceful political activity.

Whether each allegation is true is ultimately for the courts to determine. No responsible observer should prejudge individual criminal cases. However, the broader pattern deserves careful public scrutiny.

The Power of an FIR

Some women and female students held a demonstration on 27 June 2026 in support of fundamental rights of the people of Azad Kashmir. They chanted slogans which, in the eyes of the puppet government of this region, were against the interests of Pakistan and did not correspond with the ideology of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.

This act was perceived as so serious that the City Muzaffarabad police station registered an FIR against these ladies on the same day at 6.30 PM. The reference number for this FIR is: 285/20. They were arrested under Azad Kashmir Penal Code: 109, A 124/A, 123/A, 120/B.

Unfortunately, these respectable women were treated inhumanely, and their families have to face very serious social and legal challenges.

 

In Pakistan and areas of Jammu and Kashmir under the control of Pakistan, an FIR is often treated by the public as evidence of guilt. Legally, it is nothing more than the police's version of events—a starting point for an investigation rather than proof of a crime.

Unfortunately, once serious offences are included in an FIR, the consequences are immediate. For example, the following generally follows:

·       The accused may be arrested,

·       The family of the accused is harassed and intimidated,

·       Bail becomes difficult,

·       Employment opportunities disappear,

·       Families suffer social stigma.

Even if the accused is eventually acquitted years later, the damage to reputation, education and employment may already have been done.

Justice delayed often becomes justice denied.

Criminalising Political Activity

No one disputes that every democratic state has both the right and the duty to prosecute genuine acts of violence. The difficulty arises when criminal law is perceived as being used against peaceful protesters, political organisers or civil society activists.

When this occurs, criminal law risks becoming an instrument of political management rather than public justice. That undermines confidence not only in the police but also in the rule of law itself.

Young People Pay the Highest Price

Perhaps the greatest victims are young people. Many become involved in demonstrations because they believe they are defending the rights of their communities.

If they are met with criminal prosecutions carrying serious charges, an entire generation begins to lose faith in peaceful political participation; and that, at times, leads to extremism, violence and terrorism, making the society more vulnerable and unstable.

History demonstrates that societies become less stable—not more stable—when peaceful avenues of protest are closed, but sadly, in countries like Pakistan, political dissent is perceived as treachery and peaceful protestors are treated like criminals.

Rule of Law Requires Equal Standards

·       The rule of law demands that criminal charges be supported by credible evidence.

·       It also requires independent investigations, impartial prosecutors and fair courts.

·       If political affiliation determines who is arrested and who is ignored, public confidence inevitably suffers.

·       The law must protect citizens from crime.

·       It must never become a substitute for political dialogue.

The Need for Transparency

Where serious allegations are made, governments should welcome independent scrutiny. Transparent investigations strengthen public confidence, and promote justice, rule of law and stability.

They also protect innocent individuals from wrongful prosecution while ensuring genuine offenders are held accountable. This is in everyone's interest—including the state itself and the system which governs society.

Democracy Is Strong Enough to Tolerate Criticism

Pakistan has consistently argued before the international community that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should enjoy democratic freedoms and determine their own future.

Those principles carry greater weight when they are fully respected within the territory under Pakistan's own administration. A confident government does not fear peaceful criticism.

It answers criticism with evidence, debate and constitutional process—not by expanding the list of criminal defendants.

Conclusion

Every citizen deserves equal protection under the law, and every accused person deserves the presumption of innocence.

Every government has the responsibility to maintain public order. Those principles are not contradictory—they are the foundations of constitutional democracy.

The true test of justice is not how a state treats those who support it. It is how it treats those who peacefully disagree.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com

Who Is a Kashmiri? Ethnicity, Statehood and the Evolution of a Shared Political Identity A Response to Manzoor Gilani

 Who Is a Kashmiri? Ethnicity, Statehood and the Evolution of a Shared Political Identity

A Response to Manzoor Gilani

By Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 6 July 2026.

The recent article by Manzoor Gilani entitled What is Kashmir? Who are Kashmiris? deserves careful reading. At a time when political slogans often replace historical facts, he has made a valuable contribution by encouraging a serious discussion about identity, history and the evolution of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir.

I agree with many of the historical facts he presents. Before 1846, there was no political entity known as the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Various regions—including Jammu, Kashmir, Poonch, Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, Gilgit, Baltistan and Ladakh—possessed their own distinct histories, cultures and identities. These facts are beyond dispute.

However, I respectfully believe the discussion can be taken a step further. The central issue is not whether these regional identities existed—they certainly did. The real question is whether, over nearly two centuries, they also developed a shared political identity.

In my view, the answer is yes.

Four Different Meanings of "Kashmir"

Much of the confusion surrounding this debate arises because people use the word Kashmir without explaining which Kashmir they mean. In reality, the word has at least four distinct meanings.

First, Kashmir may refer to the Kashmir Valley, the geographical region stretching roughly from Baramulla to Anantnag.

Second, Kashmir may refer to ethnic Kashmiris—people whose ancestral origins lie in the Valley and whose traditional language is Kashmiri.

Third, Kashmir may refer to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the princely state established in 1846 under Maharaja Gulab Singh, which brought together diverse peoples under one political administration.

Fourth, Kashmir refers to the international dispute over the former princely State, recognised by the United Nations since 1948. This dispute concerns the entire State—not merely the Valley—including Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, Gilgit-Baltistan and the territories administered by Pakistan.

Many disagreements arise simply because people move from one meaning of "Kashmir" to another without realising they have changed the subject.

Ethnicity Is Not the Same as Political Identity

One of the most common mistakes in discussions of identity is assuming that ethnicity and political identity are identical. They are not.

For example, a Scot may be ethnically Scottish and politically British.

Similarly, a person who lives in Bavaria could be called a Bavarian, that is, his distinct regional identity while being a German.

Also, a person belonging to Catalonia may speak Catalan and possess a strong cultural identity while remaining legally Spanish.

Likewise, a resident of Baltistan may be ethnically Balti, a resident of Poonch may be Poonchi. The point which most people do not understand is that none of these regional identities disappears merely because another political identity also exists. It must be understood that modern societies routinely accommodate multiple identities simultaneously.

The Birth of a Civic Identity

The creation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1846 did more than unite territories under one ruler. It gradually created a common political community.

This process accelerated through common institutions, common administration, common taxation, common courts and, most importantly, the State Subject Laws, culminating in the State Subject Notification of 1927.

For the first time, all permanent residents of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of religion, language or ethnicity, possessed common legal rights and a common constitutional status.

In modern political science, this is known as civic nationalism, which differs fundamentally from ethnic nationalism.

Ethnic nationalism is based upon ancestry. But civic nationalism is based upon common citizenship, common institutions and shared political experience.

The former State of Jammu and Kashmir gradually developed precisely such a civic identity. In other words, one person could be a Mirpuri and have a regional identity, but he will be a Kashmiri as well; and for that he doesn’t have to speak the Kashmiri language.

International Law Recognises the Entire State

This distinction became even more important after 1947, when the United Nations did not recognise separate disputes over the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, Ladakh or Gilgit-Baltistan.

It recognised one dispute concerning all the regions of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Every United Nations Security Council Resolution refers to the people of the State as a whole.

International law makes no distinction between Dogras, Kashmiris, Baltis, Ladakhis, Gujjars or Paharis when discussing the principle of self-determination.

The recognised political unit has always been the former princely State. That fact alone demonstrates that there is a political identity that extends beyond ethnicity.

Identities Are Layered

Identity is rarely singular. Most people possess several identities simultaneously. For example, a resident of Rawalakot living in the United Kingdom may truthfully say:

I am a Sudhan by tribe, a Pahari by language, a Poonchi by region, a Kashmiri by political identity and a British citizen by nationality.

None of these identities contradicts another.

Similarly, a Kashmiri Pandit born in Srinagar may be ethnically Kashmiri, politically Kashmiri, and he may regard himself legally as an Indian citizen.

In other words, identity is layered, and it is not exclusive.

Why the Whole State Came to Be Known as Kashmir

Mr Gilani correctly points out that the Valley originally possessed the historical name "Kashmir." However, with the passage of time, the entire princely State came to be known internationally by that name.

History provides many similar examples. England gave its name to the English language, although millions who speak English are not English.

Look at the following examples:

·       The Netherlands is often referred to as Holland, even though Holland is only one part of the country.

·       The United Kingdom is frequently called Britain, despite Britain being only one of its islands.

·       Likewise, the prominence of the Kashmir Valley gradually resulted in the entire State becoming known simply as "Kashmir."

Whether historians and ordinary people like it or not, that has become the accepted diplomatic and political reality.

History Did Not Stop in 1846

One point deserves particular emphasis. History did not end with the creation of the State. Nor did it end in 1947. Nearly 180 years have passed since the State came into existence.

During that period its inhabitants experienced common institutions, shared administration, common laws, political struggles, partition, war, United Nations involvement and international diplomacy.

History transformed what had originally been separate regions into a recognised political community. Ignoring this evolution risks freezing history at a single moment while overlooking everything that followed.

The Danger of Narrow Definitions

Restricting the word Kashmiri solely to people of Kashmiri ethnicity may unintentionally deepen divisions within a society that has already suffered enough fragmentation.

The people of Jammu and Kashmir have been divided by ceasefire lines, constitutions, administrative boundaries, religions and competing nationalisms.

They should not now be divided further by denying the existence of a shared political identity. The former princely State was never homogeneous. Its richness lay precisely in its diversity. It contained Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Christians and Buddhists.

It spoke Kashmiri, Dogri, Pahari, Gojri, Balti, Ladakhi, Shina and many other languages. Its diversity was not a weakness. It is regarded as a strength. It was its defining characteristic. It reflected tolerance and ability to live together, and respect for other religions and cultures.

A Civic Nation, Not an Ethnic Nation

For decades I have consistently argued that the people of the former princely State constitute a civic nation rather than an ethnic nation.

They are united not because they all speak one language or belong to one ethnic group, but because they inherited a common political history, a common constitutional tradition and a common international status. This understanding provides an inclusive identity.

·       It allows a Dogra to remain proudly Dogra.

·       A Balti remains proudly Balti.

·       A Gujjar remains proudly Gujjar.

·       A Kashmiri remains proudly Kashmiri.

·       Yet all may simultaneously identify themselves as members of the wider political community of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Conclusion

Manzoor Gilani has done an important service by encouraging a historical discussion rather than an emotional one. However, the debate should not stop at ethnicity. History teaches us that political identities evolve.

The people of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir are not merely a collection of ethnic communities living side by side.

Over nearly two centuries, they have also become a political community, recognised both by history and by international law.

For that reason, I believe it is entirely legitimate for every permanent inhabitant of the former princely State—and their descendants—to describe themselves as Kashmiris in the civic and political sense, while proudly preserving their own regional, linguistic, cultural and ethnic identities.

The future of Jammu and Kashmir, whatever constitutional form it may ultimately take, will only be secure if it embraces this inclusive understanding of identity.

A united political identity does not erase diversity. It protects it.

People also need to remember these historical developments, for example:

• The Treaty of Amritsar (1846) created one political entity.
• The State Subject laws created one civic community.
• The Indian Independence Act 1947 recognised the princely State as one constitutional unit.
• Mountbatten's statement to the Chamber of Princes acknowledged that rulers could choose independence (even if political realities later constrained that option).
• Jinnah publicly stated that Jammu and Kashmir could join India, join Pakistan, or remain independent.
• The UN Security Council resolutions dealt with the entire State as one disputed territory.
• Article 257 of Pakistan's Constitution recognises that the relationship with Pakistan is to be determined by the wishes of the people if they accede.
• Yet the AJK Interim Constitution Act 1974 restricts advocacy of any constitutional future other than accession to Pakistan. END.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com