Why did Khalid Bin Waleed eat poison?

  Why did Khalid Bin Waleed eat poison?

Khalid ibn al-Walid was one of the undefeated military commanders in Islamic history. He defeated armies many times larger and stronger than his own in battle.

A 12th-century historian, Ibn Asakir, wrote that on one occasion during a battle, to subdue the enemy, Hazrat Khalid ibn al-Walid (RA) drank poison. By the command of Allah, the poison did not affect him.

According to traditional narrations, the incident occurred as follows:

The Muslim army, under the leadership of Hazrat Khalid ibn al-Walid (RA), had laid siege for several days and nights to a Christian fortress. They had not immediately launched a full assault because there was still hope that the people inside might come to the right path.

Meanwhile, the Christians devised a plan to preserve their hold over the fortress. They sent a clever and elderly priest named Amr ibn Abd al-Masih to negotiate with Hazrat Khalid ibn al-Walid (RA).

The priest cleverly proposed:

“At present, lift the siege of our fortress. If you conquer the other forts, then we will hand over our fortress to you without any battle or resistance.”

Hazrat Khalid ibn al-Walid (RA) replied:

“No, we shall first conquer this fortress, and only then will we turn to another.”

Hearing this, the old priest took out a packet of poison and said:

“If you do not end the siege now, I will consume this poison and commit suicide, and then my blood will be upon your neck.”

Hazrat Khalid ibn al-Walid (RA) replied:

“It is impossible that your appointed death has not yet come, and yet you die.”

The old priest then said:

“If you truly believe that, then take this poison yourself and show me.”

Upon hearing this, Hazrat Khalid ibn al-Walid (RA) took the packet of poison from the priest and recited this supplication:

“Bismillāh alladhī lā yaḍurru ma‘a ismihi shay’un fil-arḍi wa lā fis-samā’, wa huwa as-Samī‘ul-‘Alīm.”

(“In the name of Allah, with whose name nothing on earth or in the heavens can cause harm, and He is the All-Hearing, the All-Knowing.”)

After reciting this, he swallowed the poison and drank water over it.

The old priest was now completely certain that Hazrat Khalid (RA) would soon die from the deadly poison, and thus the siege would be lifted.

He fixed his gaze upon him, waiting for the poison to take effect.

Sweat began to appear on Hazrat Khalid’s body. The priest rejoiced inwardly, thinking the poison was beginning to work.

However, Allah protected Hazrat Khalid (RA) from harm. After a few minutes of sweating, his condition returned completely to normal.

The priest, witnessing this extraordinary strength of faith with his own eyes, was left astonished and bewildered.

Hazrat Khalid ibn al-Walid (RA) then said to him:

“Look! If one’s appointed death has not come, then even poison can do no harm.”

The priest, unable to respond, ran back to the fortress. (Some narrations mention that he immediately accepted Islam.)

He told his people:

“O, people! I have come from a people who, by Allah, do not know how to die—they only know how to kill. The amount of poison one of their men consumed—if all the people of this fortress had mixed it in water and drunk it, we would all surely have died. Yet this man did not even faint, let alone die. Listen to me—hand over the fortress to him and do not fight them.”

Hearing the words of the elderly priest, the Christians surrendered the fortress to Hazrat Khalid ibn al-Walid (RA) without battle.

Thus, the Muslims achieved victory without warfare, purely through the strength of Hazrat Khalid’s faith.

Because of his unmatched military successes, Prophet Muhammad gave him the title Saifullah (The Sword of Allah).

Throughout his life, Hazrat Khalid ibn al-Walid (RA) longed for martyrdom and fought in many battles. There was hardly any part of his body that was not marked by wounds from arrows, swords, spears, or other weapons—yet he was never granted martyrdom.

Scholars explain that because he had been given the title “The Sword of Allah,” he could not be defeated in battle, for no one could overcome the Sword of Allah.

Throughout his life, the handle of the sword remained in his hand, and he continued striving in the path of Allah, achieving victory after victory.

SubhanAllah.

Who could defeat the one who was called the Sword of Allah?

Would that our country, too, had such a man—someone who could rescue the poor from hardship.

This incident has been mentioned by:

·       Ibn Abi Shaybah in Al-Musannaf

·       Ahmad ibn Hanbal in Fada’il al-Sahabah

·       Abu Ya’la al-Mawsili in his Musnad

·       Al-Bayhaqi in Dala’il al-Nubuwwah

·       Ibn Asakir in Tarikh Dimashq

·       Al-Dhahabi in Tarikh al-Islam and Siyar A‘lam al-Nubala’

·       Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani in Al-Isabah fi Tamyiz al-Sahabah

Sorry, Keir Starmer, the Middle East does not listen to Britain any more. By Ahmed Najar. Palestinian political analyst and playwright.

 

Sorry, Keir Starmer, the Middle East does not listen to Britain any more. By Ahmed Najar. Palestinian political analyst and playwright.

Published On 10 Apr 2026

 

The UK PM visited the Gulf and said many of the right things. But when you do the wrong things, words don’t matter.

 

When UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer arrived in the Gulf this week, the message was clear: Britain was back, ready to play a stabilising diplomatic role in a region once again on the brink. Meetings were held, statements issued, alliances reaffirmed.

The choreography of diplomacy was all there.

We need a regional agreement for the Strait of Hormuz

New tensions emerge before US-Iran war ceasefire talks in Pakistan

end of list. But the reality unfolding around him told a different story.

 

As Starmer moved between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar, the decisions that actually mattered were happening elsewhere. The fragile ceasefire between the United States and Iran was being shaped in Washington and Tehran.

Israel continued its strikes on Lebanon, threatening to derail the entire process. Regional powers were recalibrating their positions in real time.

Britain, despite its presence, was not driving any of it. This is not a temporary misstep. It is the clearest demonstration yet of a longer decline: the United Kingdom is no longer a decisive actor in the Middle East. It is, at best, a supporting voice in a conversation led by others.

The British government insists this is a moment for diplomacy, not military escalation. Starmer has been careful to distance the UK from direct involvement in the conflict, emphasising legality, restraint and the need for long-term stability. On the surface, this appears measured — perhaps even wise.

But diplomacy without influence is performance. The uncomfortable truth is that Britain is not being ignored by accident. It is being bypassed because it no longer carries the weight it once did.

The centre of gravity has shifted. Washington still dominates Western engagement, however inconsistently. Regional powers — from Iran to the Gulf states — are increasingly assertive, shaping outcomes on their own terms. Even within Europe, other actors occasionally project more clarity and purpose.

Britain, by contrast, appears uncertain of its role.

This did not happen overnight. The erosion has been gradual, but deliberate. The Iraq war shattered trust across the region, embedding a perception of Britain as a follower rather than a leader. Brexit diminished its diplomatic reach, narrowing its influence without replacing it with a coherent global strategy.

But if there is one issue that has crystallised this decline, it is Gaza.

Since the start of Israel’s war on Gaza — widely described by legal scholars, human rights organisations, and growing parts of the international community as a genocide — Britain has aligned itself closely with Israeli policy, while struggling to respond meaningfully to the scale of destruction.

It hesitated to call for a ceasefire as civilian casualties mounted. It maintained political and military support at moments when international pressure might have altered the trajectory. As humanitarian catastrophe unfolded, Britain’s voice was cautious, conditional, and, to many in the region, complicit.

Credibility in the Middle East is not abstract. It is earned—and lost—through actions. A country that is seen as selectively applying international law cannot convincingly position itself as a mediator. A government that speaks of restraint while enabling excess cannot expect to be trusted to de-escalate conflict.

This is the context in which Starmer arrived. Critics have already warned that Starmer’s visit risks appearing as diplomacy without consequence — words without action. Amnesty International has cautioned that without meaningful policy shifts, particularly on Israel, Britain’s calls for stability will carry little weight. Across the region, the UK is increasingly seen not as an independent actor, but as a partisan one. These are not ideological critiques. They reflect how Britain is now perceived.

And perception, in diplomacy, is reality.

The events of the past week have made this unmistakably clear. While Britain talks about securing shipping routes and supporting ceasefires, others are determining whether those ceasefires hold at all. While Starmer calls for de-escalation, Israel escalates. While the UK positions itself as a bridge, it is increasingly absent from the conversations taking place on either side.

Even its closest ally appears to view it differently. The United States, under Donald Trump, has not only sidelined Britain but openly mocked its hesitation. That public dismissal, once unthinkable, now passes almost without surprise.

Starmer’s strategy seems to rest on the belief that a more serious, professional tone can restore Britain’s standing. That competence can substitute for influence. But diplomacy is not branding. It cannot be rebuilt through posture alone. It requires consistency, independence, and a willingness to take positions that carry consequences.

Britain has not done that. Instead, it has attempted to balance alignment with relevance — and ended up with neither.

There is a deeper shift underway. The Middle East is no longer a region where Western powers can assume centrality. Regional actors are asserting themselves, forming new alignments, and, increasingly, bypassing traditional intermediaries. In this landscape, relevance is not inherited. It must be earned.

Britain has yet to adjust. For now, Starmer’s visit stands as a revealing moment — not because of what it achieved, but because of what it exposed. A country that once claimed a central role now finds itself navigating the edges, speaking into a conversation that is no longer shaped by its voice.

Britain did not lose its place in the Middle East overnight. It traded it — slowly, deliberately — for alignment, silence, and convenience.

And now, when it tries to speak, it finds that no one is listening.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

​
• ​

Ahmed Najar

Palestinian political analyst and playwright

Ahmed Najar is a Palestinian political analyst and a playw

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/4/10/sorry-keir-starmer-the-middle-east-does-not-listen-to-britain-any-more

Could the Iran War Trigger a Nuclear Arms Race? Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 15 April 2026.

 Could the Iran War Trigger a Nuclear Arms Race?

Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 15 April 2026.

The escalating tensions surrounding Iran have revived a fundamental and deeply troubling question in international politics: could a war involving Iran trigger a nuclear arms race, particularly in the Middle East? While the answer is not straightforward, the dynamics of deterrence, double standards, and regional insecurity suggest that such an outcome is not only possible but increasingly plausible.

Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of Deterrence

Modern history demonstrates a stark reality: countries possessing nuclear weapons are far less likely to be directly attacked. The case of North Korea is often cited as a clear example. Despite its isolation, system of government, record on human rights, rhetoric, and internal system, no one has dared to launch a military invasion—largely because it possesses nuclear weapons and delivery systems capable of retaliation, and teaching a lesson to the invaders.

Similarly, the relationship between India and Pakistan has fundamentally changed since both acquired nuclear capabilities. While the two states fought a full-scale war in 1971, which resulted in the separation of East Pakistan and the humiliating surrender of the Pakistan army. Such a scenario is far less likely today. Nuclear deterrence has imposed limits on escalation, even during serious crises.

From this perspective, nuclear weapons are not merely instruments of destruction; they are also seen as tools of survival and a tool of deterrence.

The Middle East Equation

In the Middle East, the situation is even more complex. Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, although it maintains a policy of ambiguity. This has created a strategic imbalance in the region.

However, even if other countries in the region were to acquire nuclear weapons, their use would be highly constrained. Any nuclear strike against Israel would almost certainly result in catastrophic retaliation, not only devastating Israel but also causing immense destruction to neighbouring regions—including Palestinian territories and Islamic holy sites. Such an outcome would be politically, morally, and religiously unacceptable for Muslim-majority countries.

Moreover, Israel’s military doctrine—like that of the United States—is widely perceived as one that would not hesitate to use overwhelming force if its existence were threatened.

Perceptions of Double Standards

A central issue driving nuclear proliferation concerns is the perception of double standards in international politics. Nuclear weapons in the hands of some states are often described as “responsible” or “stabilising,” while the same weapons in the hands of others are labelled dangerous and unacceptable.

The President of America can attack a country that poses no threat to America, kill people and kidnap its President and take him to America. Take control of their natural resources, including oil reserves. This behaviour is condemnable because it’s an act of an ‘International Terrorist’.

If that does not explain what America, people need to understand that this ‘great’ country remains the only country to have used two nuclear weapons that completely destroyed two cities and innumerable innocent citizens who were not armed or engaged in a war.

Critics argue that despite this history, and its invasion of several countries, which resulted in death and destruction of innocent and unarmed civilians, and loot and plunder, President Trump’s threats to Iran like “the end of Iranian civilisation”,  which clearly indicated the use of nukes to wipe out Iran and its nuclear arsenal, are still framed as a force for stability.

By contrast, Iran is frequently portrayed as a threat, even though it has not initiated war since the Iranian Revolution. The Iran-Iraq War, often cited in this context, began with Iraq’s invasion of Iran, making it, from Iran’s perspective, a defensive war.

This raises an important question: if nuclear weapons are justified as deterrents for some states, why are they considered inherently destabilising for others?

Power, Intervention, and Global Order

Another argument frequently raised is the asymmetry of power in global politics. The United States and its allies have, at times, intervened militarily in smaller countries, justified under various doctrines such as security, democracy promotion, or counterterrorism. Critics argue that such actions—ranging from regime change to targeted killings—are often carried out with limited accountability.

In contrast, actions by states like Iran—even within their own territorial waters—are often framed as threats to global peace. For instance, disputes over maritime security highlight contrasting narratives: actions taken by Western powers are often described as enforcing international law. In contrast, similar or lesser actions by regional powers are portrayed as destabilising.

These perceptions, whether fully accurate or not, contribute to a growing sense of injustice and insecurity among states that feel excluded from the global power structure.

Does Iran Pose a Direct Threat?

This leads to a critical question: what direct threat does Iran pose to countries such as the United States, Britain, or Europe? While concerns about regional influence, missile development, and alliances are often cited, the absence of direct military aggression against these powers complicates the narrative.

For Iran, the pursuit of advanced military capability—nuclear or otherwise—may be driven less by expansionist ambition and more by a desire to deter external threats and ensure regime survival.

The Risk of a Nuclear Arms Race

Most Western experts, who are generally concerned about the future of Israel and the Jews, promote this view that if Iran were to move closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, the consequences would likely extend beyond its borders. Regional rivals could feel compelled to follow suit, leading to a multi-state nuclear competition in an already volatile region.

Such a development, they argue, would not only increase the risk of conflict but also weaken global non-proliferation efforts. The message received by many states would be clear: nuclear capability guarantees security, while its absence invites vulnerability.

One may ask, even an ordinary Tom, Dick, and Harry knows that Israel has more than 100 nukes, so why has it not resulted in a nuclear-armed race in the region? The bitter fact is that under the ‘imperial command’ of America and allies like Britain, under different pretexts attack Muslim countries and some other weak countries which are important for their imperial, economic and strategic interests.

Conclusion

The possibility of an Iran war triggering a nuclear arms race is rooted in deeper structural issues—deterrence logic, regional rivalries, and perceived global double standards. While nuclear weapons may prevent direct wars between powerful states, they also encourage their spread by reinforcing the idea that security ultimately depends on possessing them.

Unless these underlying contradictions are addressed through fair and consistent international policies, the risk of nuclear proliferation will remain—not just in the Middle East, but across the world.

The war has also proved without a shadow of any doubt that a determined country with appropriate planning can humiliate a Superpower and a state like Israel that you will not be allowed to challenge the sovereignty of Iran in future, else face the consequences. One Iranian scholar sealed it by saying:

Iran shows that sovereignty is not a gift, but the result of military self-reliance and anti-colonialist spirit”. END.

If conflict in West Asia continues, what might the US and Israel do? United States strategy. Dr Shabir Choudhry, London. 2 April 2026

 If conflict in West Asia continues, what might the US and Israel do?

United States strategy. Dr Shabir Choudhry, London. 2 April 2026

The US typically pursues these parallel objectives in West Asian conflicts:

A. Prevent a full-scale regional war

Washington generally seeks to:

• Protect Israel and ensure Israel’s dominance in the region
• Give free hand to Israel to attack neighbours, destroy their infrastructure, occupy their land and terrorise them
• Safeguard American strategic, political and economic interests
• Avoid direct large-scale war with Iran
• Protect Gulf allies
• Keep energy routes open, especially the Strait of Hormuz
• Maintain global economic stability

Even when tensions rise, US doctrine tends to favour:

• naval deterrence
• air defence deployments
• limited targeted strikes rather than a full invasion

B. Protect Israel’s qualitative military edge

Israel remains a key strategic partner.

Possible US measures:

• missile defence support
• intelligence sharing
• diplomatic cover in international forums
• deterrence messaging to regional actors

C. Prevent nuclear escalation

The US priority is to avoid:

• regional nuclear proliferation, but let Israel develop and improve their nuclear arsenal
• collapse of non-proliferation frameworks
• wider multi-front war involving proxy actors

Israel’s likely approach

Israel’s security doctrine traditionally emphasises:

• Keep on attacking the neighbours and occupy their land,
• Continue with the old policy of killing the Palestinian people and destroying their infrastructure.
• Keep increasing Israel’s geography by attacking neighbours and call it self-defence,
• Pre-emptive disruption of perceived threats,
• Maintaining deterrence credibility,
• Preventing strategic encirclement.

Likely actions if conflict continues:

• targeted strikes on military, economic and educational infrastructure,
• cyber operations
• intelligence operations
• diplomatic engagement with Western allies

Israel usually avoids a prolonged multi-front war unless an existential threat is perceived. This means Israel and America need a ceasefire to prepare for a new wave of attacks to intimidate neighbours and expand their military and strategic objectives.

2. Impact on India and Pakistan

India

India is highly sensitive to Gulf instability because:

• A large share of oil imports comes from the Gulf region
• Millions of Indian workers live in Gulf countries
• Remittances are economically significant

Possible impacts

• Higher oil prices → inflation pressure
• Shipping insurance costs rise
• Pressure on foreign exchange reserves
• Strategic diversification toward:
• Russia
• Africa
• United States energy supplies

India also needs to revisit the wisdom of its policies of the recent past, which have harmed its international standing. A new strategy must be employed to balance relations with:

• China,
• Russia
• US
• Israel
• Gulf states
• Iran

India generally avoids direct military involvement.

Pakistan

Pakistan faces:

• energy import vulnerability
• foreign exchange constraints
• domestic economic pressure
• diplomatic balancing between:
• China
• Gulf countries
• United States
• Russia

However, Pakistan has played its diplomatic cards extremely well and has enhanced its standing at the international level.

Pakistan often promotes mediation diplomacy in regional tensions.

Could India and Pakistan clash militarily?

Direct military confrontation between India and Pakistan over a West Asia conflict is unlikely but not impossible.

Reasons:

Why unlikely

• Both face economic pressures
• Nuclear deterrence creates restraint
• International actors discourage escalation
• Both militaries avoid multi-front risk

Possible indirect tensions

• naval presence competition in the Arabian Sea
• intelligence rivalry
• diplomatic positioning
• influence competition in the Gulf states

However, if somehow Pakistan is dragged into the West Asian conflict, or Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan further deteriorate, India may take advantage of the situation and try to settle the score with arch-rival Pakistan.

3. Impact on CPEC and BRI

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

CPEC is part of the wider:

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Belt and Road Initiative

Risks from prolonged conflict

• Maritime insurance costs rise
• Investor caution increases
• Regional instability affects timelines
• Security costs increase in the Gwadar region
• Energy price volatility affects project economics

Strategic advantages for CPEC

If Gulf instability persists:

Gwadar may gain importance as an alternative logistics node linking:

China → Pakistan → Arabian Sea

Long-term, strategic corridors become more valuable when chokepoints are unstable.

4. If the West Asian conflict continues, will China continue its current policies?

China generally follows long-term strategic continuity.

China’s likely priorities:

A. Energy security diversification

China imports energy from:

• Middle East
• Russia
• Central Asia
• Africa

China prefers:

multiple supply routes to reduce dependence on any single chokepoint.

B. Stability preference

China typically supports:

• diplomatic resolution
• non-interference principle
• negotiated settlements

Instability disrupts trade flows critical to China’s growth model.

However, in my view, Beijing will not stand as a spectator and let a close ally like Pakistan and Iran sink because it will have a serious impact on their economic and strategic agenda.

C. Gradual geopolitical expansion through economics

BRI strategy is based on:

• infrastructure
• trade connectivity
• financial integration

China often avoids direct military involvement unless core interests are threatened.

5. Big picture scenario outlook

If conflict remains limited:

• Oil prices volatile but manageable
• Shipping routes adapt
• Diplomacy intensifies
• Proxy tensions continue

If conflict expands regionally:

• global energy markets disrupted
• Inflation rises worldwide
• Shipping security becomes a major concern
• Alternative corridors gain importance
• Geopolitical blocs become more defined

6. Key strategic takeaway

Short-term:

Hormuz stability remains critical.

Medium-term:

Countries diversify supply routes.

Long-term:

Connectivity projects like CPEC and BRI gain strategic relevance but require stability to succeed. END.

 

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Dr Shabir Choudhry

 Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) said: "Say what is true, although it may be bitter and displeasing to people."