CPEC to IMEC-Corridors of Power and the Future of South Asia
Dr Shabir Choudhry, 26 May 2026, London.
The proposed India–UAE Growth Corridor, more widely linked to the broader India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), has potentially profound implications for Pakistan, CPEC, Jammu and Kashmir, and the wider geopolitics of South Asia and the Middle East. It is not merely an economic project; it is part of a larger strategic realignment involving India, the Gulf states, Europe, and the United States.
At one level, the corridor is presented as a trade and connectivity initiative linking India with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Europe through railways, ports, shipping routes, digital cables, and energy infrastructure.
However, beneath the economic language lies a significant geopolitical project.
1. Strategic Challenge to CPEC and China
The most immediate implication is that IMEC is widely viewed as a strategic alternative — and in some respects a competitor — to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
CPEC gave Pakistan enormous geopolitical importance because:
- China obtained direct access to the Arabian Sea through Gwadar.
- Pakistan became central to China’s westward trade and energy strategy.
- Gilgit-Baltistan acquired increased strategic value because it connects Xinjiang to Gwadar.
- Pakistan became indispensable in China’s regional calculations.
IMEC potentially reduces that importance by creating:
- An India-to-Europe route bypassing Pakistan entirely.
- Stronger Gulf-India connectivity
- An alternative supply chain less dependent on Chinese-controlled infrastructure.
In simple terms:
- CPEC links China to the Arabian Sea via Pakistan
- IMEC links India to Europe via the Gulf and Israel
This creates a direct strategic competition between two visions of Asian connectivity.
2. Marginalisation of Pakistan
One major concern for Pakistan is strategic exclusion.
For decades, Pakistan believed geography guaranteed permanent importance:
- Gateway to Central Asia,
- Bridge between South Asia and the Middle East,
- Frontline state in great-power politics.
But IMEC attempts to redraw regional trade geography in a way that sidelines Pakistan altogether.
Instead of:
China → Pakistan → Arabian Sea
The alternative route becomes:
India → UAE/Saudi Arabia → Israel → Europe
This weakens Pakistan’s long-term leverage.
If successful, IMEC could:
- Reduce dependence on Pakistani transit routes.
- Weaken Pakistan’s bargaining power internationally.
- Reduce Gwadar’s strategic uniqueness.
- Increase India's economic and diplomatic influence in the Gulf.
3. India’s Rise as a Regional and Global Power
The corridor reflects India's transformation from:
- A South Asian power to
- An Indo-Middle Eastern-European strategic actor.
India is now building:
- Deep relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia,
- Strategic ties with Israel,
- Technology and energy partnerships with Europe,
- Military and maritime cooperation with the United States.
IMEC symbolises the emergence of India as:
- A supply-chain hub,
- A manufacturing centre,
- A geopolitical bridge between East and West.
For Pakistan, this creates psychological and strategic pressure because traditionally:
- Pakistan relied heavily on the Gulf states diplomatically,
- Kashmir diplomacy depended partly on Muslim solidarity,
- India was viewed as regionally constrained.
Now, the Gulf monarchies increasingly prioritise:
- Trade,
- Investment,
- Logistics,
- Ai,
- Energy transition,
- Over ideological alignments.
4. Implications for Kashmir
Indirectly, the corridor also affects the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.
A. Reduced Pakistani leverage
If Pakistan’s geopolitical importance declines, its ability to internationalise Jammu and Kashmir may weaken further.
Historically, Pakistan’s strategic value came from:
- Cold war alliances,
- Afghanistan,
- China connection,
- Geography.
If global powers increasingly see India as economically indispensable, sadly, Jammu and Kashmir may become even less central internationally.
B. Gilgit-Baltistan becomes more strategic
At the same time, CPEC has already increased the importance of Gilgit-Baltistan enormously.
This means:
- Pakistan and China will become even more sensitive about security there.
- India will likely intensify objections to CPEC routes passing through disputed territory.
- Strategic competition over northern Kashmir may deepen.
Thus:
IMEC and CPEC together could make Jammu and Kashmir even more geopolitically sensitive.
5. UAE and Saudi Arabia: Shift from Ideology to Economics
Perhaps the most important long-term change is ideological.
Traditionally, many in Pakistan assumed:
- Muslim countries would naturally align with Pakistan on Jammu and Kashmir.
- Sadly, that did not happen, and there are many reasons for that.
The Gulf states are increasingly acting according to:
- Economic nationalism,
- Logistics strategy,
- Post-oil diversification,
- Global investment priorities.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and some other Gulf states now see India as:
- A huge market,
- A technology partner,
- An investment destination,
- A labour and consumer giant.
That is why both states support IMEC enthusiastically.
This reflects a transition from:
Religious geopolitics to geo-economics.
6. Israeli Factor and Abraham Accords
The project also depends heavily on the normalisation process between Arab states and Israel initiated under the Abraham Accords.
The route linking:
India → UAE → Saudi Arabia → Jordan → Israel → Greece → Europe
would have been unimaginable two decades ago.
Therefore, IMEC also represents:
- Gradual Middle Eastern realignment.
- Tacit Arab-Israeli strategic cooperation.
- Emergence of a new anti-Iran strategic architecture.
Pakistan faces a dilemma here:
- Oppose normalisation and risk isolation,
Or
- Quietly adapt to changing realities.
7. American Strategy Against China
The United States strongly supports IMEC because it serves several strategic purposes:
- Countering China’s BRI,
- Strengthening India as a balancing power against China,
- Integrating Israel into regional economic structures,
- Reducing Chinese influence in Gulf infrastructure.
Thus, IMEC is not only economic:
It is part of the wider US-China competition.
8. Limits and Challenges
Despite the hype, the corridor also faces major obstacles:
A. Gaza War and Arab-Israeli tensions
The Gaza conflict severely disrupted momentum because Israel is central to the route.
B. Enormous infrastructure costs
Rail links across the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant require massive investment.
C. Regional instability
Any conflict involving:
- Iran,
- Israel,
- Red Sea shipping,
- Saudi-Iran rivalry,
- Could disrupt the project.
D. China’s response
China will not passively accept strategic encirclement.
Beijing may:
- Deepen CPEC investment,
- Strengthen ties with Iran,
- Expand Gulf influence,
- Reinforce maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.
9. The Bigger Historical Picture
In many ways, this is a new “Great Game” centred not on territory alone, but on:
- Trade routes,
- Ports,
- Energy,
- Digital infrastructure,
- Supply chains,
- Artificial intelligence,
- Maritime chokepoints.
Three competing corridors are emerging:
Corridor | Main Power | Route |
CPEC/BRI | China | China → Pakistan → Arabian Sea |
IMEC | India-US-Gulf-Europe | India → Gulf → Israel → Europe |
INSTC | Russia-Iran-India | India → Iran → Russia |
Pakistan sits geographically at the intersection of all these rival visions.
That gives Pakistan opportunities — but also risks of becoming an arena of great-power competition once again.
Final Assessment
The India–UAE Growth Corridor/IMEC could:
- Weaken Pakistan’s traditional geopolitical centrality,
- Challenge the long-term strategic value of CPEC,
- Strengthen India’s global position,
- Deepen Gulf-India ties,
- Intensify strategic competition over Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan,
- Reinforce a transition from ideological politics to geo-economics in the Muslim world.
However, much depends on:
- Middle Eastern stability,
- Saudi-Israeli normalisation,
- US-China rivalry,
- And whether IMEC moves beyond announcements into actual implementation.
At present, it remains more a strategic vision than a completed reality — but even as a vision, it is already reshaping regional geopolitics.
