Islamic NATO or a New Regional Military Alliance? Who Is It Really Designed to Defend?

 Islamic NATO or a New Regional Military Alliance?

Who Is It Really Designed to Defend?

By Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 9 August 2026

For more than a decade, there has been talk of creating a Muslim military alliance—an "Islamic NATO"—that would supposedly unite Muslim countries against external aggression and provide collective security to the Muslim world.

The idea received considerable attention in 2015–16, when Saudi Arabia announced the creation of a broad Islamic military alliance. Pakistan became an important component of this initiative, and former Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif subsequently became commander of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition.

The announcement created enormous expectations. Many ordinary Muslims naturally asked a simple question:

If Muslim countries are being attacked, who will defend them? That question remains relevant today.

What happened to the Islamic NATO?

The stated purpose of the Saudi-led initiative was to strengthen cooperation among Muslim countries against terrorism and security threats. But more than a decade later, what has this arrangement actually achieved?

·      Have these Muslim military alliances protected Syria?

·      Have they protected Lebanon?

·      Have they protected Palestine?

·      Have they protected Yemen?

·      Have they protected other Muslim populations suffering from war, occupation or foreign intervention?

·      The answer is difficult to identify in any meaningful sense.

This raises a fundamental question:

Was the objective really to defend Muslim countries?

Or was the objective narrower—to protect the security interests of particular governments and regimes? There is an important difference between the two.

A military alliance established in the name of the Muslim world should logically be concerned with the security and dignity of Muslim peoples generally. But if it is primarily designed to protect the strategic interests of particular states, then calling it an "Islamic NATO" can create expectations that the alliance may never fulfil.

General Raheel Sharif and the Islamic military alliance

Pakistan's former Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif, became commander of the Saudi-based Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. This was presented by many Pakistanis as a matter of great pride.

·      Pakistan had produced the commander of a major multinational Muslim military organisation.

·      But what was the organisation actually intended to do?

·      Was it designed to confront Israel?

·      Was it designed to protect Palestinians?

·      Was it designed to protect Syria and Lebanon?

·      Was it intended to confront Iran?

·      Or was its primary purpose counter-terrorism and the protection of the participating governments?

·      These questions deserve honest answers.

·      Military alliances should be judged not by their names but by their actions.

The Saudi-Pakistan Defence Agreement

A major development occurred on 17 September 2025, when Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement.

The agreement stated that aggression against one country would be regarded as aggression against both. Reuters reported that the pact represented a significant strengthening of the two countries' longstanding military relationship and potentially brought Pakistan's nuclear deterrent into the wider strategic calculations of the Gulf, although Pakistani officials stressed that nuclear weapons were not part of the agreement.

This immediately raised another question:

Who was this agreement intended to deter?

·      It was certainly not presented as an agreement against Israel.

·      Nor was it explicitly directed against Iran.

·      Yet both Israel and Iran are central to the strategic calculations of the Middle East.

Pakistan was attacked. Where was Saudi Arabia?

There is an even more interesting question. Since the Saudi-Pakistan defence agreement was signed in September 2025, Pakistan has experienced further security attacks.

Did Saudi Arabia send its army to fight alongside Pakistan?

The answer, so far, is no.

This does not necessarily mean that the agreement is meaningless. Mutual-defence treaties do not always require immediate deployment of troops whenever one member experiences an attack. Their precise obligations depend upon the circumstances and the interpretation of the agreement.

But it does demonstrate something important:

A defence pact on paper and an operational military alliance are not necessarily the same thing.

The real test of such an alliance comes when one member actually faces a serious external military threat.

And then came the Makkah Agreement

Now, in August 2026, we have a new and potentially more significant development.

On 7 August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement.

The agreement states that an armed attack against one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all three. Turkey's Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan subsequently described the arrangement as technically comparable to NATO's Article 5 principle.

However, he also stressed that the agreement was not directed against Iran or any other particular country. The agreement is described as defensive, and its operational details are still to be worked out.

This is an important qualification. We should therefore not prematurely declare that the alliance has been created to fight Iran, Israel or the Houthis. But we are entitled to ask:

Who is most likely to be affected by this new security arrangement?

Iran? Iran is an obvious possibility.

The regional security environment has deteriorated dramatically. Saudi Arabia has serious security concerns regarding Iranian military capabilities and the activities of Iranian-aligned forces.

In 2026, Iran has also launched attacks affecting Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, making the question of collective regional defence much more immediate than it was when the Saudi-Pakistan agreement was signed in 2025.

Yet Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have been careful not to describe the new alliance as an anti-Iran alliance. That may be true. It may also be strategic diplomacy.

There is a considerable difference between saying publicly that an alliance is "not directed against Iran" and designing an alliance whose principal strategic concern happens to be the Iranian military threat.

The Houthis?

The second possibility is Yemen's Houthi movement.

The Houthis have developed into an important regional military actor. Since 2023, they have launched attacks against Israel and ships in the Red Sea, presenting their actions as support for the Palestinians. They are also closely aligned with Iran, although they retain their own Yemeni political and strategic objectives.

Saudi Arabia has its own long and painful history with the Houthis. The Saudi-led coalition intervened in Yemen in 2015 against the Houthis and their allies. Although Saudi Arabia largely ceased active hostilities in 2022, the Houthi threat has never completely disappeared.

Indeed, the timing of the new Makkah agreement is striking. Only days after the agreement was signed, Houthi forces attacked a Saudi Aramco facility in Jazan with a drone. Reuters reported that the Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack.

The Houthi attack does not prove that the Makkah agreement was established specifically to fight the Houthis. But it demonstrates why the Houthi question cannot be ignored when discussing Saudi Arabia's security calculations.

What about Israel?

This is perhaps the most sensitive question. If the alliance is genuinely a collective Muslim defence arrangement, why is Israel not openly identified as a potential threat?

The answer may lie in political and strategic realities. Turkey and Pakistan have strong political positions concerning Palestine, while Saudi Arabia has its own complicated relationship with Israel and the United States.

An explicit anti-Israel military alliance would have enormous geopolitical consequences. It could also make it much more difficult for Saudi Arabia to maintain its relationships with the United States and other Western powers.

Therefore, it would be premature to conclude that this alliance is designed to fight Israel. But equally, it would be naive to assume that Israel is completely absent from the strategic calculations of the three countries.

NATO Article 5—and the important difference

The comparison with NATO is attractive but must be treated carefully. NATO's Article 5 establishes the principle that an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all.

The new Makkah agreement adopts a similar principle. But NATO has spent decades developing integrated military structures, command arrangements, intelligence cooperation, logistics, planning mechanisms and established procedures for collective defence.

The Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani arrangement is much newer. Its precise operational mechanisms have yet to be developed, and this can take many years before it is fully active.

Turkey's Foreign Minister himself said that the three countries would establish ministerial and institutional mechanisms and determine the operational details later.

Therefore, calling it an "Islamic NATO" may be politically attractive, but it is not yet equivalent to NATO in institutional or military terms.

The real test

The real test will come when one of the members faces a major external attack. Suppose Saudi Arabia is attacked; the major question is:

·      Will Pakistan send combat forces?

·      Will Turkey send its air force or navy?

·      Suppose Pakistan is attacked.

·      Will Saudi Arabia deploy its armed forces?

·      Will Turkey intervene?

·      Suppose Turkey faces a major external attack.

·      Will Pakistan and Saudi Arabia fight alongside Turkey?

They may look like academic questions, but they are the questions that determine whether a defence pact is a genuine security alliance or primarily a political declaration.

Who benefits?

There is another dimension that should not be ignored. Saudi Arabia possesses enormous financial resources.

Pakistan possesses a large, experienced military and is the only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state.

Turkey possesses one of NATO's largest armies and a rapidly expanding defence industry.

That means each country, therefore, brings something different and important to the table, for example:

·      Saudi Arabia brings financial power and strategic geography.

·      Pakistan brings military manpower, experience and nuclear deterrence.

·      Turkey brings military-industrial capacity, NATO experience and a powerful regional military.

Together, these capabilities could create a significant regional security structure. But, still, the question remains:

For what purpose? An Islamic alliance must answer an Islamic question

If these countries wish to call their alliance part of a broader Muslim security project, they should answer a very simple question:

Will the alliance defend Muslims because they are Muslims, or will it defend only the territory and strategic interests of its member governments? What will be the response of the alliance:

·      If a Muslim country outside the alliance is attacked, what happens?

·      If Palestinians are attacked, what happens?

·      If Syria is attacked, what happens?

·      If Lebanon is attacked, what happens?

·      If another Muslim country is threatened, does the alliance intervene?

·      Or does Article 5 stop at the borders of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey?

·      That distinction is fundamental to understanding the nature of the alliance and its effectiveness.

From rhetoric to reality

For decades, Muslim governments have spoken about Muslim unity – unity of the Muslim Ummah, which never witnessed unity after the assassination of the third Caliph Hazrat Uthman, may Allah bless his soul.

There have been conferences, declarations, organisations and military alliances. But Muslim countries remain divided by political interests, competing regional ambitions, sectarian tensions and alliances with major external powers.

Sadly, the creation of another military alliance will not solve these problems by itself. If it is genuinely intended to provide collective security, it should be transparent about its objectives.

It should explain:

1. What constitutes aggression?
2. What military assistance is guaranteed?
3. Who decides to intervene?
4. What happens if members disagree?
5. Is the alliance defensive only?
6. What is its position regarding Israel?
7. What is its position regarding Iran?
8. What is its position regarding the Houthis?
9. Will it defend non-member Muslim countries?
10. What role, if any, will nuclear deterrence play?

Until these questions are answered, we should be cautious about grand descriptions such as Islamic NATO or even a Sunni NATO.

Conclusion

The idea of an Islamic military alliance has been discussed for many years. The first major Saudi-led initiative created enormous expectations. The appointment of a Pakistani general to lead a major Islamic military coalition was celebrated as a historic achievement. Yet history demands that we ask what these institutions actually achieved.

Now a new chapter has begun. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey have created a new mutual-defence framework in Makkah. It is potentially significant. It could develop into an important regional security organisation.

But its future will depend not on its name, religious symbolism or political speeches. It will depend on what happens when the first real test arrives. The crucial question is therefore not:

"Is this an Islamic NATO”.

The crucial question is: "Who will this alliance actually defend—and against whom?"

Only time, and perhaps the next regional crisis, will provide the answer.

Some Historical Facts About Jammu and Kashmir: A Respectful Response to Javed Ahmad Ghamidi Sahib Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 5 August 2026.

 Some Historical Facts About Jammu and Kashmir: A Respectful Response

to Javed Ahmad Ghamidi Sahib

Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 5 August 2026.

A link to your video on Kashmir:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SvunTnQMVhs&t=15s

Assalamu Alaikum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakatuh.

Respected Ghamidi Sahib,

I have followed your lectures and writings for many years and have always

admired your emphasis on reason, justice, and honest scholarship. Like many

others, I have benefited greatly from your work.

With the utmost respect, however, I wish to draw your attention to certain

historical aspects of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute which, in my humble opinion,

are often overlooked or misunderstood. I hope you will consider these

observations with your customary commitment to evidence and fairness. Should

any point appear doubtful, I shall be pleased to provide the relevant historical

documents.

1. The Ruler of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 was Maharaja Hari

Singh, a Hindu Dogra—not a Sikh, as stated in your video. Under the

constitutional arrangements governing the princely states at the time, he

possessed both the constitutional and legal authority to determine the future of

the State following the lapse of British paramountcy.

2. Lord Mountbatten, in his address to the Chamber of Princes on 25 July 1947,

stated:

"Now the Indian Independence Act releases the States from all their obligations

to the Crown. The States will have complete freedom – technically and legally they

become independent."¹

3. However, Lord Mountbatten's personal advice was that the Rulers of the

princely states should accede either to India or Pakistan in matters relating to

defence, external affairs, and communications.

 

4. Similarly, Muhammad Ali Jinnah publicly recognised that the rulers of the

princely states possessed the legal right to determine the future of their respective

states, including the right to remain independent. He made three important

statements concerning Kashmir; I quote only one here.

Speaking on the constitutional position of the princely states on 17 June 1947,

Mr Jinnah declared:

"After the lapse of Paramountcy the Indian States would be constitutionally and

legally sovereign states and free to adopt for themselves any course they wished.

It is open to the States to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly or to decide

to remain independent. In my opinion they are free to remain independent if they

so desire."²

 

5. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, leader of the National Conference—the largest

and most influential political party in the State—did not advocate accession to

Pakistan. His political vision included the possibility of an independent Jammu and

Kashmir.

 

6. The All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, another major political

party, initially advocated accession to Pakistan. However, Chaudhry Hamidullah

Khan, the Acting President of the Muslim Conference, declared at a press

conference:

"Accession to Pakistan would be unpleasant to Hindus, while accession to India

would disturb Muslims. Therefore, we have decided not to enter into any

controversy either with India or Pakistan. The second thing we have decided is

that we should try to acquire independence for the State. The third question now

before us is: what would be the position of the Maharaja? We have never failed to

show loyalty and respect towards him, and it is because of this attachment that

we did not support the Quit Kashmir Movement, although in one sense it was a

natural movement..."³

 

7. In addition, Chaudhry Hamidullah Khan stated:

"I have the support of all important leaders of the Muslim Conference, including

Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas. This solution should be regarded as the official policy of

the Muslim Conference."⁴

 

8. This proposal was not merely the personal opinion of the Acting President. It

was formally endorsed by the Working Committee of the Muslim Conference

on 18 July 1947, thereby becoming the official policy of the party.

 

9. Following this development, the leadership of the Muslim League instructed its

supporters in Jammu and Kashmir to oppose the proposal for independence.

Consequently, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, a prominent religious leader of the Kashmiri

Muslims, convened a meeting on 19 July 1947, later described as a "Convention".

Ordinarily, political conventions are planned well in advance, with formal

invitations sent to selected delegates. In this instance, however, the gathering

was organised at very short notice through a newspaper announcement inviting

the general public rather than accredited delegates.

 

10. The meeting was attended largely by followers of Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, many

of whom were not even members of the Muslim Conference. Approximately one

hundred people attended, and the gathering adopted a resolution favouring

accession to Pakistan.

 

Unlike the earlier decision of the Muslim Conference Working Committee, this

meeting represented only those who happened to attend that hastily arranged

gathering. Nevertheless, over time, its resolution has frequently been portrayed

as though it reflected the unanimous will of all the peoples of the State of Jammu

and Kashmir—including Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Christians, and others.

Historically, that conclusion is unsustainable.

 

11. Liaquat Ali Khan, in a press statement, declared:

"The Indian States will be free to negotiate agreements with Pakistan or Hindustan

as considerations of contiguity or their own self-interest may dictate, or they may

choose to assume complete and separate sovereign status for themselves."⁵

 

12. It should also be noted that Jammu and Kashmir entered into a Standstill

Agreement with Pakistan on 12 August 1947.

 

Within only a few weeks of this agreement, members of Pakistan's ruling

establishment began planning the forcible occupation of the State. Brigadier

Akbar Khan (later promoted to Major General) was sent to Murree, where,

together with certain Kashmiri collaborators, he prepared plans for an armed

invasion of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

13. At the time, Brigadier Akbar Khan was serving as the Director of Weapons

and Equipment at Pakistan's General Headquarters (GHQ). In his military

appreciation entitled "Armed Revolt Inside Kashmir", he explained the

strategic, military, and economic importance of Jammu and Kashmir.

According to Akbar Khan, if Jammu and Kashmir became part of India, India could:

"Establish such stations anywhere within a few miles of the 180 miles long vital

road and rail route between Lahore and Pindi. In the event of war, these stations

would be a dangerous threat to our most important civil and military lines of

communication. If we were to protect this route properly, it would take a major

portion of our army to do so, and we would thereby dangerously weaken our front

at Lahore. If we were to concentrate our strength at the front, we would give India

the chance to cut off Lahore, Sialkot, Gujrat and even Jhelum from our military

base at Pindi."⁶

 

14. Major General Akbar Khan further wrote that, even in peacetime, such a

situation would be unacceptable because Pakistan:

"...would be permanently exposed to a threat of such magnitude that our

independence would never be a reality."⁷

 

15. After discussing the economic importance of Jammu and Kashmir and

Pakistan's heavy dependence upon it, Akbar Khan concluded:

"Kashmir's accession (to Pakistan) is not simply a matter of desirability but of

absolute necessity for our separate existence."⁸

 

16. In accordance with the instructions of Pakistan's political leadership, Brigadier

Akbar Khan emphasised that the involvement of the Government of Pakistan must

remain concealed. The entire operation was to be presented as a spontaneous

uprising by the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir against what was described as a

"cruel Hindu despot".

17. The invasion plan was finalised at a meeting held in Lahore in early

September 1947, presided over by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Those

present included Brigadier Akbar Khan, Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, Sardar Shaukat

Hayat Khan, and Pakistan's Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammad, who later

became Governor-General of Pakistan.

 

18. During this meeting, the operational details were finalised and logistical

arrangements completed. Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan was appointed overall

commander of the operation. Ghulam Mohammad undertook responsibility for

financing it, while Colonel Azam Khanzada of the Ordnance Corps was entrusted

with supplying arms and ammunition. He even agreed to divert weapons secretly

to Kashmir, while officially recording the missing equipment as "faulty stores

dumped into the sea."

 

19. Brigadier Akbar Khan also persuaded Brigadier Sher Khan, Director of

Intelligence at Pakistan's General Headquarters (GHQ), to support the operation

by providing all the intelligence necessary for its success. In addition, several

former officers of the Indian National Army were assigned different

responsibilities. Air Commodore Janjua also agreed to assist by using Pakistan Air

Force aircraft to transport weapons, ammunition, winter clothing, tents and other

essential supplies. ⁹

20. Pakistan also stopped the supply of essential goods to Jammu and Kashmir a

few days before launching its invasion on 22 October 1947. The attack was

directed primarily against areas where Muslims constituted an overwhelming

majority. Therefore, it cannot even be argued that the invasion was undertaken

to protect the Muslim population.

Respected Ghamidi Sahib, as you know better than I do, neither the Holy Qur'an

nor the Hadith can be used to justify such conduct.

 

21. Does such behaviour befit a country that proudly claims it was created to

uphold the principles of Islam and protect the interests of Muslims?

Pakistan unilaterally violated the Standstill Agreement and attacked a weaker

neighbour with the intention of occupying its territory. Those who entered Jammu

and Kashmir were encouraged to loot and plunder everything they could carry

away. Tragically, women and young girls were also treated as spoils of war.

Thousands of innocent Muslims and non-Muslims were killed, women were raped,

abducted, and, according to numerous historical accounts, many were taken into

Pakistan and sold.

All of this was committed in the name of "Jihad."

 

22. It is true that some local collaborators assisted Pakistan. However, every

conflict produces collaborators and traitors, and Jammu and Kashmir was no

exception.

For the sake of historical accuracy, it should also be remembered that many

Muslim soldiers serving in the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces violated the oath

they had taken to defend their State and joined the invading forces. Pakistan

subsequently celebrated many of them as heroes.

 

23. As a direct consequence of this unprovoked invasion, my homeland, the State

of Jammu and Kashmir, was divided.

Unable to defend his State against the invasion, Maharaja Hari Singh requested

military assistance from India. India agreed to provide that assistance only after

the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession.

 

24. On the morning of 27 October 1947, Indian troops landed at Srinagar. This

marked the beginning of the first Indo-Pakistan War.

My homeland has remained divided ever since, and the people on both sides of

the Line of Control continue to suffer the consequences of that division.

 

25. Lord Mountbatten, who had by then become the Governor-General of India,

advised Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan that, instead of continuing the war,

the dispute should be referred to the United Nations Security Council.

 

26. India subsequently approached the United Nations Security Council and

presented several allegations against Pakistan. The Security Council invited

Pakistan to respond, thereby making Pakistan an official party to the dispute.

 

27. This development suited British strategic interests. Had Pakistan not become

a party before the United Nations, the dispute would essentially have remained

one between India, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, and the people of the

State.

 

28. Once Pakistan became an acknowledged party to the dispute through British

diplomacy, the people of Jammu and Kashmir and their ruler were gradually

pushed aside.

From that point onwards, India and Pakistan increasingly pursued policies based

upon their respective national interests and strategic calculations, while the people

of Jammu and Kashmir became little more than pawns in a geopolitical struggle.

 

29. Many historians believe that the British Government wished Pakistan to

remain involved in the dispute because of the immense strategic importance of

Gilgit-Baltistan and the wider region. The dispute was therefore brought before

the Security Council under a chapter of the UN Charter that did not empower the

Council to enforce its recommendations.

 

30. The United Nations Security Council later established the United Nations

Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate the dispute.

The Commission's Resolution of 13 August 1948 laid down a clear sequence of

events.

First, Pakistan was required to withdraw all of its armed forces, together with the

tribesmen and Pakistani nationals who had entered the State for the purpose of

fighting.

Only after Pakistan had fulfilled this obligation was India required to withdraw the bulk of its own forces.

The final stage was to be the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite under UN

supervision.10

 

31. Unfortunately, Pakistan also ensured that the people of Jammu and Kashmir

would be offered only two choices in any future plebiscite: accession to India or

accession to Pakistan.

The option of an independent Jammu and Kashmir was removed at Pakistan's

insistence when the UNCIP adopted its Resolution of 5 January 1949.¹¹

 

32. To this day, Pakistan has never complied with the first and most fundamental

requirement of the UN resolutions—namely, the withdrawal of its military forces

from the territories under its control.

 

Despite this, successive Pakistani governments continue to claim that it was India

alone that failed to implement the United Nations resolutions.

33. Therefore, my concluding words are these:

Thank you, Pakistan.

Since 1947, the people of Jammu and Kashmir have endured suffering because of

your interventionist and expansionist policies.

• Our homeland remains divided.

• Our families remain divided.

• Generations have lived and died without seeing peace.

• On the Day of Judgement, I shall ask Almighty Allah to grant justice to the

people of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

Respected Ghamidi Sahib,

34. I fully recognise that sincere and honest people may reach or desire different

conclusions regarding the political future of Jammu and Kashmir, especially those

who think everything through the prism of religion.

My purpose is not to persuade you to adopt my own political position. Rather, it is to encourage a careful examination of the complete historical record.

 

35. As scholars and students of history, we have a responsibility to distinguish

between political narratives and impartially documented historical evidence.

The tragedy of Jammu and Kashmir has continued for almost eight decades. Its

people deserve an honest, balanced and evidence-based discussion rather than

selective interpretations shaped by political, economic and religious expediency.

I sincerely hope you will consider these observations in the spirit in which they are

offered—with respect, humility and a shared commitment to truth and justice.

May Almighty Allah guide us all towards that which is true and just.

With respect,

Dr Shabir Choudhry

London, United Kingdom

Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com

Reference:

1. Legal Aspects Of The Kashmir Problem, by H S GURURAJ RAO, page 191,

Asia Publishing House, London.

2. Legal Aspects Of The Kashmir Problem, by H S GURURAJ RAO, page 337,

Asia Publishing House, London.

3. ‘Kashmiris Fight For Freedom’, Volume 1, page 679

4. Kashmir and the Partition of India, Page 117

5. Dawn, 22nd April 1947

6. Raiders in Kashmir, author Major General Akbar Khan, page 9

7. Ibid, page 10

8. Ibid, page 10

9. Ibid, page 19

10. The UN Security Council Resolution of 13 August 1948

11. The UN Security Council Resolution of 5 January 1949.