The Emerging ‘New Tan’: Geopolitical Fault Lines and the Reconfiguration of South Asia By Dr Shabir Choudhry

 The Emerging ‘New Tan’: Geopolitical Fault Lines and the Reconfiguration of South Asia

 

By Dr Shabir Choudhry

Introduction

 

About fourteen years ago, at a small meeting in London, I remarked that I could visualise another “Tan” emerging in the region. The term “Tan” was a reference to the suffix shared by many Central and South Asian states — Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and others — signifying territorial and often ethnic-political entities that were shaped or reshaped by imperial powers.

 

At the time, some thought my remark was speculative. But today, as tensions intensify between India and Pakistan, and as Afghanistan’s instability once again becomes a catalyst for regional turmoil, that prediction seems increasingly prescient. The possibility of another “Tan” — a newly defined territorial entity in or around Pakistan’s western belt — appears more plausible now than ever before.

 

Colonial Engineering and the Politics of Partition

 

To understand the logic behind a potential “new Tan,” we must revisit the imperial legacy of divide and rule. When the British left the subcontinent in 1947, they did not leave behind a united, peaceful South Asia. Instead, they left behind a fractured political geography — an India and a Pakistan divided not just by borders but by narratives of religious and civilizational opposition.

 

The creation of Pakistan, in this reading, was not merely an accident of communal politics but part of a deliberate imperial strategy: to prevent the emergence of a unified, resource-rich, and militarily capable power that could challenge Western strategic interests in Asia. Pakistan was to serve as both a buffer state and a proxy, containing India to the east and influencing Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia to the west.

 

For decades, Pakistan played this role effectively — as a Western ally during the Cold War, a partner during the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s, and a frontline state in the so-called War on Terror after 2001. But this usefulness has steadily diminished as Pakistan’s internal weaknesses have multiplied.

 

Pakistan’s Strategic Decline

 

Today, Pakistan faces multiple and simultaneous crises:

•  Economic collapse driven by debt, corruption, and mismanagement.

•  Political fragmentation with deep civil-military divides.

•  Ethnic and regional discontent in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Sindh, and Punjab.

•  Erosion of international credibility, as the country’s traditional allies — particularly the US and Gulf monarchies — reassess its strategic worth.

In geopolitical terms, Pakistan has become a problem rather than a solution for Western interests. It can no longer be relied upon to maintain regional balance or to act as a stabilising partner in Afghanistan or Central Asia.

Thus, from a strategic standpoint, the logic that created Pakistan may now favour the reconfiguration of Pakistan itself.

 

The Idea of a ‘New Tan’

 

The term “New Tan” refers not to a specific map but to an emerging geopolitical concept — the potential carving out of another entity from Pakistan’s northwestern and western territories to serve as a new buffer zone between global powers.

 

The territories that could form this “Tan” — parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the former FATA region, parts of Balochistan, and perhaps adjoining areas of eastern Afghanistan — are already zones of chronic instability. They are ethnically connected (predominantly Pashtun and Baloch), politically alienated from Islamabad, and strategically valuable because they sit on the fault line between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

 

In essence, a new “Pashtunistan” or “AfPak Tan” could emerge under the following conditions:

1.  A major war between India and Pakistan weakens the Pakistani state apparatus.

2.  Western or regional powers intervene to “stabilise” the border regions.

3.  Local militias and ethnic movements exploit the chaos to assert autonomy.

4.  The international community, citing “security and governance” concerns, recognises a new de facto arrangement.

This process would not be entirely new — it would echo the imperial restructuring of borders that created Pakistan itself in 1947.

 

In essence, a new “Pashtunistan” or “AfPak Tan” could emerge under the following conditions:

1.  A major war between India and Pakistan weakens the Pakistani state apparatus.

2.  Western or regional powers intervene to “stabilise” the border regions.

3.  Local militias and ethnic movements exploit the chaos to assert autonomy.

4.  The international community, citing “security and governance” concerns, recognises a new de facto arrangement.

This process would not be entirely new — it would echo the imperial restructuring of borders that created Pakistan itself in 1947.

 

Historical Parallels: The Durand Line and the British Frontier Policy

 

The Durand Line, drawn by the British in 1893 to divide Afghanistan from British India, remains one of the most contentious borders in the world. It split Pashtun tribes and sowed the seeds for a century of cross-border tensions. When Pakistan inherited this line, it also inherited the Pashtun question — a persistent challenge to its national unity.

 

Similarly, the British also manipulated the Baloch frontier, separating it from Iran and Afghanistan to create a controllable buffer. These policies were part of the “Great Game” — the 19th-century contest between Britain and Russia for influence in Central Asia. Today’s geopolitical dynamics — involving the US, China, Russia, and regional actors like India and Iran — mirror that old contest in many ways.

 

Just as the British once created Pakistan to serve their interests, the current configuration of global power could lead to another artificial construct to serve new strategic goals — such as containing Chinese influence or managing transnational militancy.

 

Contemporary Catalysts: War, Militancy, and Realignment

 

Several developments now point toward a possible reconfiguration of Pakistan’s borders or internal structure:

1.  India–Pakistan Escalation

A military conflict between India and Pakistan could trigger internal fractures in Pakistan, especially if the army is stretched across multiple fronts — the eastern border with India, western border with Afghanistan, and internal insurgencies in Balochistan and KPK.

2.  Afghan Factor

The Taliban regime in Kabul, facing its own legitimacy crisis, may exploit Pakistan’s vulnerabilities to assert territorial claims or expand influence into the former FATA region. A resurgent cross-border Pashtun movement could align with this momentum.

3.  Western Strategic Shifts

The US and its allies, seeking to counterbalance both China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia’s outreach in Central Asia, may view a restructured “buffer zone” as a means to reassert control — without the liabilities of direct occupation.

4.  Internal Ethnic Pressures

Movements like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) and the ongoing Baloch insurgency indicate deep-rooted alienation. These could form the grassroots justification for an externally encouraged redrawing of the map.

 

Can Pakistan Control the Situation?

 

Theoretically, Pakistan’s military establishment remains powerful. However, control is not stability. Islamabad can impose short-term order but cannot eliminate the structural causes of disintegration — economic dependency, ethnic suppression, and geopolitical manipulation.

 

Pakistan’s strategic geography, once its greatest asset, has become its Achilles’ heel: every external actor — from Washington to Beijing, from Tehran to Delhi — views Pakistan not as a partner but as a piece on the chessboard.

 

Unless Pakistan embarks on genuine internal reform — political federalism, economic transparency, and regional reconciliation — it may not be able to prevent further fragmentation.

 

The Strategic Logic Behind the ‘New Tan’

 

From a geopolitical lens, a new “Tan” would serve multiple objectives for external powers:

•  For the West: A manageable buffer state replacing an unreliable Pakistan.

•  For India: The neutralisation of Pakistan’s western threat and the weakening of its military establishment.

•  For Afghanistan: Potential realisation of Pashtun irredentist claims.

•  For China: A complication — but also an opportunity to consolidate its CPEC routes through secure zones.

 

In essence, the emergence of another “Tan” would reflect the rebalancing of global interests — a new round of the “Great Game” where borders are redrawn not for the people, but for strategic utility.

 

Conclusion: The Future of the ‘Tans’

 

When I spoke of another “Tan” more than a decade ago, it was not a prophecy but an observation of historical patterns — the way empires engineer states to serve their agendas. The British once created Pakistan to secure their imperial interests; today, the decline of Pakistan’s strategic value makes it vulnerable to the same logic that brought it into being.

 

The potential emergence of a new “Tan” — whether in the form of a Pashtun corridor, a semi-autonomous frontier zone, or a Western-managed security belt — would not be a surprise but a continuation of the unfinished colonial project.

 

The tragedy, however, is that once again, the people of the region — Pashtuns, Baloch, Punjabis, and others — may bear the human cost of geopolitical games waged in distant capitals.

 

Unless Pakistan redefines its purpose — not as a proxy for others, but as a sovereign, inclusive, and just state — it risks becoming, once again, the object rather than the author of history. End

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.

Operation Sindhoor II, escalation, Dynamics in South Asia: Afghanistan’s Role and the Prospect of a Three-Front War. By Dr Shabir Choudhry

Operation Sindhoor II, escalation, Dynamics in South Asia: Afghanistan’s Role and the Prospect of a Three-Front War

 

An analysis by Dr Shabir Choudhry

 

Introduction: The Tinderbox of South Asia

 

South Asia today stands at the edge of another dangerous military confrontation. The first half of 2025 witnessed a limited but intense clash between India and Pakistan—what came to be called Operation Sindhoor.

 

It tested both militaries’ readiness, political nerve, and diplomatic insulation. Now, as the second half of the year unfolds, the region is once again being pushed towards conflict. A series of coordinated terrorist attacks — in Delhi, Islamabad, and Wana — has reignited the blame game, heightened military alert levels, and created a volatile triangle involving India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, with China observing and calculating its moves quietly in the background.

 

The situation is no longer about isolated terror incidents or localised insurgencies; it is about strategic manipulation, intelligence warfare, and the reshaping of regional alignments. Each side is reading the same events through its own security lens — and all interpretations lead to confrontation.

 

The Immediate Triggers: Wana, Islamabad, and Delhi

 

The first major shock came with the attack on Wana Cadet College, a well-known educational institution in South Waziristan, where over 525 students and 25 staff members were present. It was not just an act of terrorism; it was a psychological strike against the very idea of Pakistan’s military youth development and morale. Early reports suggest the attack was carried out by a suicide squad trained and dispatched from across the Afghan border.

 

Pakistan’s initial reaction was to accuse New Delhi of being behind the attack — not directly, but through Afghanistan as an operational conduit. Islamabad’s military spokesmen argued that Indian intelligence had been cultivating anti-Pakistan militant groups in Afghan territory since the fall of Kabul, and that such attacks were part of a broader hybrid strategy to destabilise Pakistan internally before an external confrontation.

 

The situation turned more complex when a powerful explosion in Delhi killed dozens and injured many more. India immediately blamed Pakistan-based militant networks, describing it as yet another “cross-border terror act.”

 

Pakistan, in turn, called it a false flag operation—a planned act designed to justify an Indian offensive. The political timing of the attack—coming just after the Bihar elections—is crucial. With the electoral pressure gone, the Indian government now has room for a decisive military response without appearing to manipulate public sentiment for votes.

 

Within 48 hours, a suicide bombing in Islamabad further inflamed tensions. The Pakistani narrative again pointed to Afghan territory as the launchpad for these operations. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) hinted at an “external hand” working through Kabul, implying coordination between Indian and Afghan intelligence networks.

 

The Afghan Factor: Proxy Strategy or Strategic Diversion?

 

Afghanistan, in this context, is both a pawn and a player. Since the Taliban regained power, Pakistan has expected Kabul to be its strategic partner. However, the relationship has deteriorated dramatically. Cross-border attacks have become routine, and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) continues to enjoy safe havens inside Afghan territory.

 

Now, analysts in Islamabad argue that the Afghans have a new motive: to divert Pakistan’s attention and military assets away from their western border. If Pakistan is dragged into a major confrontation with India, the Afghan regime can consolidate power internally and expand its influence along the border regions of Khost, Paktika, and Nangarhar.

 

Moreover, Afghan intelligence networks have inherited both Taliban and former Northern Alliance capabilities—meaning they can operate flexibly, switching between ideological and strategic goals. Attacks like those in Wana or Islamabad could therefore serve two purposes: undermine Pakistan’s internal security and provoke India-Pakistan escalation that relieves Kabul of Pakistani military pressure.

 

From a purely strategic perspective, it would be in Kabul’s interest to see India and Pakistan preoccupied with each other. A two-front war for Pakistan would cripple its capacity to impose any conditions on the Afghan regime.

 

But the question remains: are the Afghans capable of such complex coordination?

 

The answer lies in the evolving structure of the Taliban’s internal factions. The Haqqani Network, the Kandahari core, and the Intelligence Directorate (GDI) are no longer fully aligned. The Haqqanis — historically closer to Pakistan — now feel betrayed by Islamabad’s harsh stance on cross-border militancy. The Kandahari faction, on the other hand, wants to project Afghan autonomy by demonstrating the ability to hit Pakistan through proxies. Intelligence reports suggest that ‘rogue’ Taliban commanders are indeed collaborating with TTP and other splinter groups, some of which may be receiving logistical assistance from Indian operatives in Iran or Central Asia.

 

India’s Calculus: Strategic Restraint or Operation Sindhoor II?

 

The Indian leadership faces a dilemma. After the Delhi blast, there is enormous public and political pressure to retaliate. The security establishment believes that strategic deterrence must be reasserted. The argument is simple: every time India shows restraint, Pakistan’s deep state interprets it as weakness.

 

However, the Indian response will be carefully calibrated. New Delhi has already mobilised its northern and western commands, increased surveillance flights over the Line of Control (LoC), and reinforced its air defence network around Punjab, Rajasthan, and Jammu sectors.

 

The pattern is eerily similar to the prelude of Operation Sindhoor I, though this time, the operational objective may be broader—targeting not just militant infrastructure, but also military logistics in PoJK (Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir) and southern Punjab.

 

If India chooses to strike, it is unlikely to limit itself to a single retaliatory raid. The security environment, the nature of the attacks, and the growing confidence of the Indian Air Force suggest that a sustained limited war—lasting 7–10 days—could be envisaged under the umbrella of conventional deterrence.

 

The risk, however, is that Pakistan may interpret even a limited Indian strike as an existential threat, compelling a nuclear signalling response. Islamabad could mobilise its Nasr (tactical nuclear) systems as it did during the February 2019 crisis.

 

Pakistan’s Dilemma: Two or Three Fronts at Once?

 

Pakistan is under severe pressure. Its economy is struggling, its currency is weak, and its politics are paralysed. The last thing it can afford is a multi-front confrontation. Yet the facts on the ground point precisely in that direction.

1.  Eastern front: Possible Indian retaliation, including cross-LoC air or missile strikes.

2.  Western front: Constant cross-border attacks from Afghan territory and TTP infiltration.

3.  Internal front: Political instability, terrorism, and sectarian unrest.

There are credible reports that 152 suicide bombers with Pakistani ID cards have recently entered the country from Afghan territory. Whether these individuals are part of the TTP, Daesh-Khorasan, or an independent proxy force is unclear. But the psychological impact is severe. Pakistan is in a permanent state of high alert.

If war breaks out with India, the TTP and other anti-state groups could launch coordinated domestic attacks to paralyse internal mobility. The goal would be to create chaos behind the front lines, forcing the army to divide its forces. In that sense, a conventional war with India could trigger Pakistan’s internal unravelling.

 

The Chinese Dimension: Strategic Patron or Silent Partner?

 

China’s position is nuanced. Beijing has deep investments in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), but it has no appetite for an all-out South Asian war. However, China’s strategic interest is clear: a weakened, distracted India suits its regional objectives.

 

If hostilities escalate, China could support Pakistan indirectly—by:

•  Supplying advanced munitions and spare parts through fast logistics routes in Gilgit-Baltistan.

•  Conducting high-intensity patrols in Eastern Ladakh, to pressure India militarily.

•  Launching cyber and electronic warfare operations to disrupt Indian communication systems.

But China will avoid open involvement unless India attacks CPEC assets or crosses a red line in Gilgit-Baltistan. In such a case, Beijing might open a limited second front—not a full-scale invasion, but tactical pressure through airspace violations and PLA movement near Depsang and Pangong sectors.

 

Bangladesh: The Subtle Eastern Factor

 

While Bangladesh is not a military threat, it remains a political wildcard. Dhaka’s relations with Islamabad have, over the past months, improved, and both countries have good working relations, including matters related to trade, economy, defence, intelligence and security. If a major India-Pakistan conflict erupts, Bangladesh may not join the conflict but could facilitate certain actions.

 

Global Context: The Great Powers’ Shadow

 

In Washington, London, and Brussels, the response will be ambivalent. Western powers would prefer regional stability, but they also see value in India asserting itself as a strategic counterweight to China. Any escalation between India and Pakistan would complicate this, but it would also stretch China’s attention across multiple theatres.

 

Russia, meanwhile, continues to maintain quiet but important ties with both India and Pakistan. Moscow’s goal is to prevent total regional chaos that might endanger its own Central Asian security belt.

 

If hostilities erupt, the United States and the European Union will call for restraint, while quietly backing India’s right to self-defence. China will call for dialogue, but its logistical support for Pakistan will continue.

 

War Scenarios: Operation Sindhoor II

 

If the second round of conflict — “Operation Sindhoor II” — begins, the most likely sequence would be:

1.  Indian pre-emptive air or missile strike on selected targets in PoJK and Pakistan.

2.  Pakistan’s counter-strike, possibly including drone or artillery shelling across the LoC and in India.

3.  TTP and allied militants could launch attacks inside Pakistan, targeting military bases and infrastructure.

4.  Afghan border escalation, as Pakistan retaliates against alleged TTP camps inside Afghanistan.

5.  China may increase military activities in Ladakh, forcing India to stretch its forces.

In this configuration, Pakistan would face not just India but a three-front crisis — military, internal, and geopolitical.

 

Conclusion: The Road Ahead

 

The current situation in South Asia resembles a chessboard where every move carries existential risk. Afghanistan’s role, though often underestimated, may prove decisive. Whether acting on its own or in coordination with others, Kabul has demonstrated the ability to influence regional security calculations.

 

India’s patience is wearing thin. Its domestic political freedom after the Bihar elections gives it space for assertive military action. Pakistan, already fragile, stands on the edge of both military confrontation and internal implosion. China will not ignite the fire, but it will ensure the flames do not burn its interests.

 

In the coming weeks, diplomacy may yet prevail — but only if back-channel communications between New Delhi, Islamabad, and Beijing can interrupt the momentum of escalation. If that fails, Operation Sindhoor II may begin not as a planned war but as an unstoppable chain reaction — ignited by miscalculation, fuelled by mistrust, and sustained by the geopolitics of revenge.

 

South Asia has seen many wars. Another one will not bring victory; it will only deepen the region’s collective wounds. But for now, all actors seem to be preparing for the inevitable. The peace of the subcontinent, once again, hangs by a thread.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.

 

Can the Delhi Blast result in Sindhoor 2? Response Options of India and Calculations of Pakistan. By Dr Shabir Choudhry, 11 November 25

 Can the Delhi Blast result in Sindhoor 2?

Response Options of India and Calculations of Pakistan

 

By Dr Shabir Choudhry, 11 November 25

 

The Indian Prime Minister, who is on a visit to Bhutan, while talking about the Delhi blast, said:

‘Conspirators behind this will not be spared, {and} those responsible for the deadly blast will be brought to justice’, reported Aljazeera.com.

The Indian Home Minister Amit Shah, who chaired a high-level security review meeting at his residence, said:

‘Those behind the tragedy will be brought to justice.’ He said,

“The findings of the investigation will soon be made public.” He assured that ‘those responsible for this tragedy will be brought to justice and will not be spared under any circumstances,” reported the BBC.

 

1. Delhi’s Red Fort Explosion and response options for India.

 

On 10 November 2025, a powerful explosion near Delhi’s Red Fort metro station killed at least thirteen people and injured twenty-four more. As expected, the Indian authorities tied the blast to a terror network allegedly linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives, and even implicated cross-border launchpads in Bangladesh, reported India’s The Economic Times.

 

The timing and location of the attack, in India’s national capital, have inflicted an acute political and security shock. Indeed, it is a very serious matter; innocent lives have been lost, but what can India do when there is no conclusive evidence of who is behind this terrorist act?

 

Solid evidence, or not, the Indian government would be under huge pressure to show its resolve to punish those responsible. But where are the culprits who should be punished? However, India’s immediate calculus:

 

·  Do nothing and risk being blamed for weakness.

 

·  Strike back, like it did in May 2025, and risk escalation with Pakistan.

 

If this had happened before the Bihar elections, which have just finished, and if India had attacked Pakistan, many in India would have thought this was done to win the elections.

 

Now that the elections have finished, the Modi government can flex its muscles and try to take revenge for the setback of Operation Sindhoor.

 

2. From May 2025 to Now: The Template of Crisis

 

The May 2025 clash between India and Pakistan was triggered by a terrorist attack in Kashmir and answered by India’s coded “Operation Sindhoor.” It showed that India had abandoned the old policy of strategic restraint, and the new template was to strike back at targets in Pakistan and in POK, the area of Jammu and Kashmir occupied by Pakistan.

 

One wonders, after what happened in May 2025, is this a sensible policy or an actionable roadmap? If India attacks again, which many analysts would consider part two of Operation Sindhoor, Pakistan’s response would also be appropriate and damaging.

 

It must be remembered that India’s conclusion post-May 2025 was clear: deterrence must be maintained through capability and credibility. Prime Minister Narendra Modi later asserted India had merely “paused military action” and retained the option to act again.

 

In this framing, the Delhi blast sets the stage for a possible second round—but with important differences.

 

3. Why India May Strike Now — And Pakistan’s Dilemma

•  Domestic outrage in India gives little space for inaction.

•  Having just completed elections in Bihar, India can claim the response is not electoral theatre but national defence.

•  Demonstrating capability after May 2025 now matters more for credibility and deterrence.

 

Pakistan’s dilemma:

•  Publicly, Islamabad labels any pretext for Indian retaliation as “false-flag” operations, aiming to delegitimise Indian claims.

•  Militarily, Pakistan is on high alert; government statements hint at readiness to retaliate if hit.

•  Strategically, Pakistan must balance between escalation and preserving nuclear deterrence logic. Excessive escalation threatens its economy and global standing.

 

4. Could This Trigger “Sindoor II”?

 

Yes—it could—but it is not inevitable.

 

If India strikes with scale, Pakistan will retaliate, triggering a rapid tit-for-tat exchange. However, both sides learned from May 2025:

·  Nuclear deterrence,

·  Global diplomatic pressure, and

·  Economic cost limits catastrophic escalation.

 

The real danger lies in brief but sharp crisis cycles, using missiles, drones, and limited cross-border strikes.

 

Role of neighbours in the event of a war

•  Afghanistan: While Kabul opening a direct front is unlikely, proxy activity from Afghan soil is conceivable and would raise Pakistan’s southern flank pressure.

•  China: Beijing’s likely role remains supportive to Pakistan’s defence and diplomatic shielding—but direct Chinese dynamic action against India would carry extraordinary risk and is therefore improbable.

•  Bangladesh: Reports of The Times of India suggest LeT and other groups seek to use Bangladesh as a launchpad against India. In my view, it is highly unlikely that Dhaka can openly join a war. However, it is possible that some covert involvement or militant sanctuary opens a potential third front.

The possible scenario: India strikes Pakistan; Pakistan retaliates; Afghanistan/militants open southern pressure; Bangladesh involvement; China supplies or threatens but avoids direct combat.

Even this scenario can lead to a longer escalation, leading to a full-scale war, which could be disastrous for the region and have serious global implications.

 

5. Key Strategic Variables to Watch

 

•  Nature of Indian strike: Is it limited, precision-based, or broad targeting infrastructure? Larger scale raises escalation risk.

•  Pakistan’s response: Will Pakistan retaliate with missile/drone strikes, launch a limited cross-border raid, or seek diplomatic containment?

•  International intervention: The U.S., GCC and China all moved quickly in May 2025 to mediate and push for a ceasefire. Their role again will shape the outcome.

•  Local civilian casualties / mis-hits: Civilian deaths often force political escalation.

•  Mediation channels open: If military-to-military hotlines and state diplomacy are active, crisis control is more likely.

•  Proxy/front expansions: Activity along the Afghan-Pakistan border, insurgent use of Bangladesh routes, and Chinese intelligence support all raise multi-front risk.

 

6. Policy Recommendations

 

For India: Ensure any response is publicly framed as anti-terrorism (not war with Pakistan), emphasise precision, provide evidence of Pakistani linkage, and keep diplomatic channels open.

 

For Pakistan: Avoid reflexive retaliatory rhetoric, seek to de-escalate publicly, allow independent investigation of the attack and reaffirm its own counter-terrorism credentials to prevent isolation.

 

For both: Institutionalise dialogue—even limited—at military and diplomatic levels to avoid miscalculation. Use third-party mediation as a safety valve.

 

7. Conclusion

 

The Delhi blast is more than a tragic incident—it is a fault line in India-Pakistan relations. India is under pressure to respond; Pakistan is bracing for it. The risk of a second “Operation Sindoor” is real, but a full-scale three-front war remains unlikely—though not impossible. The next few days will test both nations’ capacity for restraint and strategic judgment.

 

Given the stakes—a nuclear-armed region, global energy links, and billions of citizens—the world cannot afford miscalculation. Strategic restraint, diplomatic engagement, and transparent investigation are not signs of weakness—they are today’s only path to preventing another South Asian conflagration. END