From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management: What the New India-Pakistan Track Two Dialogue Means for Kashmir
By Dr Shabir Choudhry, June 2026, London.
Reports have emerged that, since the military confrontation between India and Pakistan following Operation Sindoor, representatives from both countries have quietly participated in a series of Track Two and Track 1.5 meetings in different parts of the world. According to media reports, these meetings have taken place in countries including Nepal, Thailand and Sri Lanka, bringing together retired diplomats, former military officers, academics, strategic experts and individuals believed to have access to decision-makers in both capitals.
The agenda of these meetings appears to have included conflict management, terrorism, military communications, the Indus Waters dispute, confidence-building measures and regional stability. Significantly, however, one subject that is close to my heart appears to have been deliberately pushed into the background—the political future of Jammu and Kashmir.
This raises an important question. Have India and Pakistan quietly shifted their objective from resolving the Kashmir dispute to merely managing its consequences?
I believe they have.
A Different Era
More than twenty-five years ago, I had the privilege of participating in what was then described as Track Two Diplomacy. During visits to New Delhi and Islamabad, I attended peace conferences, met diplomats from various countries, spoke with journalists, politicians and academics, and engaged in lengthy discussions with Pakistani officials and advisers on the future of Kashmir and South Asia.
The chapters in my forthcoming book describe many of these meetings in detail. They remind me how different the political atmosphere was at the beginning of the new millennium.
The Cold War had ended. South Asia had witnessed the Lahore Declaration. There was cautious optimism that dialogue, however difficult, might eventually replace confrontation. Although violence continued in Kashmir, there was still widespread belief that unofficial diplomacy could prepare the ground for official negotiations.
Track Two diplomacy was not intended to replace governments. Rather, it sought to create space where difficult questions could be discussed without the political constraints faced by serving officials.
Retired diplomats, former military officers, academics, journalists and politicians could examine ideas that governments were not yet prepared to discuss publicly. They could test proposals, identify areas of agreement and disagreement, and quietly communicate emerging thinking back to policy-makers.
The underlying objective was clear.
The purpose of dialogue was conflict resolution.
The Kashmir dispute itself remained at the centre of every serious discussion.
My Own Experience
During those meetings, I consistently argued that there were three parties to the Kashmir dispute: India, Pakistan and the people of the former princely State of Jammu and Kashmir.
I also maintained that no durable settlement could emerge unless all three parties participated in the process, and the people of Jammu and Kashmir, being the principal party, should have the final say.
While meeting diplomats in Islamabad, I repeatedly emphasised that the dispute was neither purely territorial nor simply a religious conflict. It was fundamentally a political dispute involving the future of a historically distinct state and the aspirations of its people.
I argued that military force alone could not resolve the issue.
Equally, I warned that presenting the Kashmiri struggle primarily in religious terms was strategically damaging. It enabled India to portray what had begun as an indigenous political movement as an extension of international Islamic militancy. I feared that this transformation would gradually erode international sympathy for the Kashmiri cause.
Unfortunately, many of those concerns were later borne out by events.
The Turning Point
The attacks of 11 September 2001 fundamentally changed the international environment.
Before 9/11, armed movements around the world were often viewed through the lens of self-determination and national liberation. Afterwards, virtually every armed conflict became increasingly interpreted through the framework of counter-terrorism.
The global political climate changed dramatically.
Governments became far less willing to distinguish between indigenous resistance movements and internationally connected militant organisations.
India successfully argued that militancy in Kashmir formed part of the wider challenge of international terrorism. Pakistan itself soon found that many of the militant groups it had previously regarded as strategic assets increasingly became a threat to its own security and stability.
As international priorities shifted, so too did the diplomatic agenda.
The emphasis gradually moved away from resolving political disputes towards containing security threats.
A New Purpose
The recent Track Two meetings appear to reflect this new reality.
According to available reports, participants have focused on preventing future military crises, strengthening communication between the armed forces, managing water disputes, addressing terrorism and reducing the risk of escalation between two nuclear-armed neighbours.
These are undoubtedly important objectives.
Indeed, after the recent military confrontation, responsible governments have every reason to improve crisis management mechanisms. Preventing another war serves the interests of both countries and, above all, the millions of ordinary people who would suffer its consequences.
Yet one cannot ignore what appears to be missing.
The Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir forcibly divided no longer seems to be the principal subject of discussion.
Instead, it has become the backdrop against which other strategic issues are managed.
This represents a profound shift.
Conflict Resolution versus Conflict Management
Although the two expressions sound similar, they describe fundamentally different approaches.
Conflict resolution seeks to address the underlying causes of a dispute. Its objective is to achieve a political settlement that removes the source of conflict.
Conflict management, by contrast, accepts that a dispute may remain unresolved for many years, perhaps indefinitely. Rather than attempting to solve it, the objective becomes preventing it from escalating into open warfare, or a nuclear war.
The difference is significant.
One seeks peace through political settlement.
The other seeks stability despite political disagreement.
History offers many examples.
The Korean Peninsula remains divided, yet conflict is carefully managed.
Cyprus has remained politically unresolved for decades while avoiding major warfare.
Many territorial disputes around the world have been stabilised without being settled.
Sadly, South Asia may now be entering a similar phase. This is not good news for the suffering people of Jammu and Kashmir. I strongly feel that the people of Jammu and Kashmir will resist this conspiracy.
Where Do Kashmiris Stand?
This development raises another important question.
If India and Pakistan increasingly conduct bilateral discussions about terrorism, water resources, military communications and regional stability while deliberately avoiding the political future of Jammu and Kashmir, where does that leave the people, whose homeland remains divided?
For decades, successive governments have spoken about Kashmir.
Far less frequently have they spoken with Kashmiris.
This has always been one of the central weaknesses of the peace process.
No solution imposed exclusively by India and Pakistan is likely to command lasting legitimacy among the diverse peoples of the former princely State. Equally, no sustainable settlement can ignore the legitimate security concerns of either country.
The challenge, therefore, remains what it has always been: to reconcile the interests of all three stakeholders.
Is Conflict Management Enough?
This is not an argument against Track Two diplomacy.
On the contrary, I remain convinced that unofficial dialogue serves a valuable purpose.
Governments often cannot publicly explore ideas that independent scholars, retired officials and experienced practitioners can discuss without political cost.
Track Two diplomacy has repeatedly demonstrated its usefulness in opening channels of communication during periods when official dialogue has broken down.
Every avoided war is a success.
Every restored communication channel reduces the risk of miscalculation.
Every confidence-building measure saves lives.
However, conflict management should never become a substitute for conflict resolution.
Managing tensions may postpone conflict.
It cannot eliminate its underlying causes.
Looking Ahead
Reading about today's Track Two meetings has reminded me of conversations I had more than two decades ago in New Delhi and Islamabad.
The methods remain remarkably similar.
The participants are often similar.
The venues are familiar.
What has changed is the objective.
Then, we hoped to create conditions for resolving the Kashmir dispute.
Today, the emphasis appears to be on ensuring that the dispute does not trigger another military confrontation between two nuclear powers.
That is undoubtedly a worthwhile objective.
But history also teaches another lesson.
Political disputes do not disappear simply because governments decide not to discuss them.
Lasting peace in South Asia will ultimately require more than military restraint, confidence-building measures or crisis management. It will require political imagination, courageous leadership and a willingness to address the underlying dispute itself.
The challenge before India, Pakistan and the people of Jammu and Kashmir is therefore not merely to prevent the next crisis.
It is to ensure that crisis management does not become a permanent substitute for conflict resolution.
Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com
