Wednesday 24 June 2020

‘Chinese intrusion in Ladakh- Jammu and Kashmir. New Threats and Challenges to Peace and Security in the South Asian Region’.

My presentation in International conference onChinese intrusion in Ladakh- Jammu and Kashmir. New Threats and Challenges to Peace and Security in the South Asian Region’.

The Conference arranged by UNITED KASHMIR PEOPLE`S NATIONAL PARTY (UKPNP) on Wednesday 24 June 2020

Mr Chairman, friends and colleagues Salam to all of you.

Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte once said:

China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world.”
What he meant was to let this giant sleep, because if he wakes up there will be trouble for the region and the world.

Sadly this giant woke up some decades ago, and many of the problems of our region and world can be attributed to policies of this giant.

During this apparent sleep, China suffered humiliation, and degradation of various kinds. However, for some decades the rulers of China have started to assert China at the centre-stage of the world politics.

No country can become great without economic muscle, and many wars in the world are started because of economic reasons. With help of unprecedent economic growth and careful planning, China is emerging as a new Superpower, with intention to play a leading role in the world politics. Slowly, but surely they are asserting themselves in many countries, and especially in Asia and its peripheries.

China is on a mission to build a new kind of empire, which will be different to the empires of the past. China does not use gun boat diplomacy in its zeal to build an empire; rather they use their economic muscle, and stringent conditions attached to loans they provide to vulnerable client countries. Also, they use coercion, cajoling and diplomatic skills to achieve their targets.

It was evident many years ago that China will not be able to sustain its economic growth. When things start going wrong, signs of this become visible not only to the local experts, but also to the international experts.

When I anchored a TV programme in 2014 in London, I pointed out that China will not be able to maintain this economic growth. My guests disagreed with me.

Anyhow, economic slowdown generally result in flight of capital; and international investment stops. The scale of the problem can be judged by this fact that in 2016, an estimated one Trillion US Dollars were taken out of China. At that time China’s GDP was ten Trillion US Dollars.

To counter the economic slowdown and other challenges, China initiated the CPEC and One Belt One Road; which were designed to boost China’s economy. The ruling elite of China decided to use cement and steel production and the Chinese money to build infrastructure in other countries. Many countries got trapped in this debt trap, including our neighbour, Pakistan.

Mr Chairman

With this short background, I want to examine China’s recent intrusion in Ladakh, a region which is legal and constitutional part of the former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir.

After the imperialist attack by Pakistan to capture Kashmir on 22 October 1947, the Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir was forced to seek help from India, which was only provided after he agreed to accede to India.

Many citizens of Jammu and Kashmir regard the entire forcibly divided State of Jammu and Kashmir disputed, however, the fact remains that this region is administered and controlled by India. It is India’s responsibility to protect this region, and drive out all the invaders form Jammu and Kashmir, and ensure that life, liberty, honour and property of all citizens is protected.

Current India and China trade

It is not the first time that China and India are squabbling. To some, it is on - going thing, which erupts from time to time; and for some it is a normal practise in disputed areas. Remember, Ladakh is not the only disputed region between China and India.

Despite their disagreements and stand offs along the Line of Actual Control, their trade continues unhindered. According to CNN, the trade between China and India in 2019 was:

·      87 billion US Dollars;

·      Chinese investment in India is 26 billion US Dollars;

·      In the field of Telecom, China is a big player in India;

·      Four out of five big companies which sell smart phones in India, are Chinese;

·      These companies are: Realtime, Opo, Vivo and Xiomi;

·      In 2019, these four companies have earned 16 billion US dollars;

·      95% of trade of Xiomi is with India.

Main focus of both countries is economic growth, and both want to avoid a disastrous military clash that can ruin their economies. In nutshell, the Chinese intrusion in Ladakh is not related to economic interests.

Mr Chairman, Other possible reasons for the Chinese intrusion

Whenever legitimacy and power of the ruling elite is questioned, or they feel they need to divert attention of the people, they start boosting nationalism to control dissent and muster support of the people.

In this context, some people claim China is facing many domestic and international challenges, and a war like situation can help to divert attention from those problems and muster support by drumming up the Chinese nationalism.

China has serious challenges of international magnitude in the South China Sea. There are serious problems with economy, with Belt and Road Initiative and the CPEC. Also there are serious challenges in Hong Kong and in various parts of China.

India also has a number of domestic and international challenges. Therefore, a war like situation suits both countries, as long as it does not escalate in to a full scale war.

The Chinese experts assert that this war like situation developed because of the Indian foreign policy, and support of America in the New Cold war between China and America.

Global Times, a state owned Chinese daily in its recent report advised India, ‘not to engage and get embroiled in the larger US - China confrontation’, as that could be ‘detrimental for the Indian economy and its interests in the region’.

A section of policymakers in China think the ‘present Sino-Indian standoff is an outcome of India’s willingness to toe the U.S. line on China, rather than one of many border disputes that have emerged between the two countries since the demarcation of territories after the Sino-Indian war in 1962’.

The Chinese experts advise India to formulate their China policy independent of America, that both countries can resolve the issues diplomatically and establish peace in this region.

Mr Chairman, we need to look at the Chines game plan.

In my opinion, China is playing a dangerous game. While there can be some merit in all of the reasons pointed above, I think China has other motives to assert its claim and invade a territory that does not belong to them.

As noted above, Ladakh is part of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Security Council Resolution of 13 August 1948, allowed India to maintain its troops in the areas of Jammu and Kashmir under their control. It means, in the eyes of the international community, the presence of the Indian troops in that region is legal and it is their responsibility to protect these areas.

India was building some roads in Daulat Beg Oldi strategic camp area to strengthen their defences. This was known to the Pakistani and the Chinese intelligence. They thought if the new infrastructure is built as planned, that could help India to attack Siachin and Gilgit Baltistan, and possibly take over this region in future.

That was a nightmare scenario for both Islamabad and Beijing. Surely both of them have economic and strategic interests attached with this region. If India was to take over Gilgit Baltistan that would have been a very serious blow to the interests of Islamabad and Beijing.

The Indian takeover of Gilgit Baltistan could have throttled the CPEC and cut off the land access between China and Pakistan. Fearing this looming threat, the Chinese intrusion was a pre-emptive measure to stop India completing its planned infrastructure.

It should be noted that India was building this infrastructure on their side of the demarcation. China has no right to invade a territory that does not belong to them.

Although India and China under the rules of engagement on the Line of Actual Control, cannot use weapons, still there have been causalities on both sides. It is believed that India has lost twenty soldiers and Chinese causalities is more than thirty.

Despite a number of meetings between Chines and the Indians, the issue has not been resolved yet. China stands by with its claim over the Galwan Valley, and India rejects it. China is determined to establish an observatory post at the side of the Galwan River. The objective of that is to keep an eye on what India is doing or may do in future in this region.

India, for obvious reason, does not agree with that and the disagreement with all its tension and dangers continues. Some people claim that both sides need a face saving. I disagree with that. The territory in question is part of Jammu and Kashmir. It is my territory, and China is not a party to this in any form or shape. They must leave our territory.

It is sad to note that some naïve citizens of Jammu and Kashmir were dancing up and down that China has invaded Ladakh. They were happy that India was punished. These people are anti national, who work against the interests of our motherland – Jammu and Kashmir.

These are the people, who betrayed their oath to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, and helped the neighbouring country to attack and invade Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947. As a result of their treachery, Pakistan occupied so called Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan.

India and Pakistan are recognised parties to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, and in presence of these two countries, we people of Jammu and Kashmir are not represented anywhere at the international level.

With these two countries being a party to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute we have suffered since 1947. Just imagine, how difficult it will become if we, in order to strengthen the Pakistani narrative, also make China party to the dispute.

With addition of China, the Jammu and Kashmir dispute will become more complicated, and more difficult to resolve. Surely, it will add to our miseries and suffering; and it will endanger the peace and security of the region.

Mr Chairman, I thank you.



Monday 15 June 2020

The China - India Standoff and the Myth of a New Cold War

The China - India Standoff and the Myth of a New Cold War
Chinese media are trying to cast the present crisis as a part of the “New Cold War” between the United States and China. Don’t be fooled.
By Sajid Farid Shapoo   June 13, 2020

A recent report in Global Times, a state-owned Chinese daily, while commenting on the ongoing border standoff between China and India, advised India not to engage and get embroiled in the larger U.S.-China confrontation. Baked in the advice was also a subtle warning that becoming a U.S. front in the “New Cold War” could be detrimental for the Indian economy and its interests in the region.
The report is revealing in many ways. It signals that a section of, if not all, Chinese policymakers see the present Sino-Indian standoff as an outcome of India’s willingness to toe the U.S. line on China, rather than one of many border disputes that have emerged between the two countries since the demarcation of territories after the Sino-Indian war in 1962.
More importantly it reiterates the Chinese rhetoric of the heralding of a “New Cold War” era between the United States and China. While most Western experts do not see any merit in the hyperbole of the beginning of a new era of superpower competition, Chinese media, its policymakers, and scholars have audaciously attempted to craft the narrative of the advent of the “New Cold War.”
Such a portrayal comes across as a brazen attempt to present the world with a fait accompli: China as an established superpower and an adversarial second pole in the global distribution of power. This discourse has another immediate implication. While the current standoff between India and China may be resolved with diplomatic efforts, the future of India-China peace, in the Chinese view, depends on India’s ability to pursue its China policy independently and not under the shadow of the growing U.S.-India alliance.
However, viewing the current Sino-Indian stand off as a part of global geopolitical gameplay would be an example of strategic myopia. It is not the first time that India and China have come face to face on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), that came to be the de facto border between the two countries after the 1962 Sino-Indian War.
In last 50 years, both countries have squabbled over territorial demarcations all along the China- Indian border. There are over a dozen places in the Ladakh area, near the Bhutan-China border, and in Arunachal Pradesh where the two countries differ over the on-ground position of the LAC. The 2017 Doklam dispute, in the central sector, was one such dispute. The current crisis has seen Chinese troops build up at Galwan Nala and Pangong lake area in the Ladakh region and at the Nathu La pass near the Bhutan-China border. The simultaneous face off at three different places along the LAC appears not only well coordinated but also part of a plan that could not have been conceived at the local or sub-area level.
Some experts opine that India’s newfound assertiveness along the LAC in terms constructing feeder roads and supportive infrastructure may perhaps be seen as the trigger for the current standoff. The Chinese transgression may therefore be a bid to stop India from building permanent infrastructure, which could potentially give India a strategic advantage.
This argument has baffled some security analysts in India as the troop build-up by China along the LAC started when the most of the Indian roads and feeder roads construction near those points was said to have reached near completion. The chances of China having missed this construction and being caught unaware are slim as China boasts fairly robust reconnaissance (both ground and space-based) capabilities.
Moreover, the road and infrastructure development by both sides along the LAC to shore up their respective strategic positions has continued for many years; these have led to minor skirmishes but rarely triggered a major border transgression, that too at multiple points. As M. Taylor Fravel wrote, the scope, scale, and position of China’s build-up appears unprecedented. Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh acknowledged that a large number of Chinese troops have been stationed on the other side of Galwan Nala, and that Chinese fighters were making sorties within 30 km of their side of the LAC.
Another proffered explanation is that China is trying to signal its strength in a bid to restore its credibility and rebuild its image, both of which have taken a severe beating in the continuing fallout from the global pandemic. Many scholars and China watchers claim that the economic setbacks suffered by China due to COVID-19, along with its already shaky economy, may have prompted Beijing to resort to the latest transgression, with the twin goals of diverting the focus from domestic issues to an external enemy, and at the same time exhibiting China’s strength to the world audience.
Some South Asian experts also allude to a conspiracy theory that sees the current standoff as a possible preemptive move by China to forestall India’s supposed intentions for a military adventure in the northern areas of Pakistan (Gilgit and Baltistan), through which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes.
Both these arguments, however, fall more in the realm of speculation and hypotheticals with no evidence of such moves on the ground. Such views also do not seem to reflect the narrative prevalent in the Chinese domestic space. China has avoided escalating the current border issue by toning down the nationalistic rhetoric and also by not taking a firm stand on the issue. This could be a useful strategy to avoid any audience costs in case of having to back down to the pre-crisis position.
Even an authoritarian regime like China has been seen to be sensitive to domestic audience costs. During the Doklam crisis, many Chinese felt that that China had lost the war of perceptions as it was domestically seen as having backed down from its stated position to end the crisis.
Additionally, Chinese leadership does not believe that the pandemic has dented its international position. In fact, many within the CCP see the current global crisis, particularly the devastating impact of COVID-19 on the U.S. economy, as an opportunity to stake claim to its great power status, ushering in an end to U.S. primacy and a transition toward a bipolar world.
Chinese belligerence should in fact be seen more through the context of its emerging self-narrative of China as the second pole in the new bipolar world. Leader Xi Jinping sees the time as ripe for replacing the “rising China” narrative with the rhetoric of China having arrived as a global superpower.
The “third revolution” of Xi Jinping, as identified by scholar Elizabeth Economy, is predicated on upending the Deng era adage of “hide your strength and bide your time.” For Xi, China must now claim its position in the global distribution of power. The current border standoff is thus being projected more in terms of global geopolitics.
China is trying to portray the crisis as part of superpower gameplay in the so called “New Cold War.” Both Chinese national media and its experts see U.S. support as one of the main drivers behind India’s firmness and aggression in dealing with its border issues with China.
By asking India not to get played by the United States, China attempts to convey that its real competition is with the U.S. and not India. This backdoor attempt to gain entry into the superpower club, by harping on the narrative of “New Cold War” is apparently working. Many Western scholars have also fallen prey to this rhetoric and have started seeing it as a real thing.
India, on its part, has received considerable support from the United States during both the 2017 Doklam standoff and the current crisis. The growing voices in the West that the U.S. should forge a deep strategic alliance, both economic and defense oriented, with India also gels with the emerging view of India being a natural ally of the United States and thus a bulwark against China in Asia. While this may come as a big boost to India’s position in the region, New Delhi must tread this path cautiously.
The “New Cold War,” if it ever becomes a reality, would be completely different from the Cold War of the twentieth century. The U.S. no longer enjoys the same hegemonic status as it did decades ago. Its position as the leader of the liberal international order has long been eroded. Its European partners no longer see the United States as a dependable ally.
Suffice to say that the Cold War doubts over U.S. extended deterrence are far more pertinent today. It may thus not be advisable for India to put all its eggs in one basket. India must, as it is trying to, handle its bilateral issues with China in an independent manner without falling prey to the Chinese narrative.
Handling the current standoff as purely a bilateral issue without linking it to the so called “New Cold War” would not only be strategically beneficial for India but also undermine Chinese efforts to craft the superpower gameplay narrative and thus its bid to elevate itself to the position of a new pole in the international distribution of power.
China’s backdoor machinations of claiming superpower status are predicated on its ability to be accepted first as a regional hegemon. Its lingering disputes with most of its neighbors would make it difficult for regional states to accept or accord such a status to China. India by playing on its own strengths would deny China the strategic space it is trying to grab by casting the present crisis as a part of the “New Cold War” between the United States and China. Instead, it should solely be seen and handled purely as a bilateral dispute between the two neighbors.
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Sajid Farid Shapoo is a highly decorated Indian Police Service officer (two star general) and is currently a PhD scholar at the Princeton University. He also holds a Masters in International Affairs from Columbia University and regularly writes on geopolitical and security related issues.