JKIPA Resolutions passed in London Conference – 26 November 2017

JKIPA Resolutions passed in London Conference – 26 November 2017

This London conference attended by politicians, writers, thinkers and members of civil society from both sides of the Line of Control and Pakistan and India unanimously:

1.   Declare that former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir is one political entity; and it is home of all citizens of Jammu and Kashmir irrespective of their religious, regional and tribal affiliations;

2.   Assert that the entire Jammu and Kashmir is disputed; and no country has a right to decide our future, as this right is bestowed with people of Jammu and Kashmir;

3.   Clarify that China, India and Pakistan occupy various parts of Jammu and Kashmir State. Interests of the occupier and the occupied cannot be same; and no occupier should be considered as a friend, a well-wisher or an advocate of our sentiments;

4.   Condemn Prime Minister of Pakistan’s statement made in London School of Economics about concept of an independent Jammu and Kashmir. It is sad that it is an official policy of Pakistan to oppose and sabotage the concept of an independent Kashmir; and Shahid Khaqan Abbasi has merely reiterated the policy which his predecessors have pursued since October 1947. Real policy of Pakistan on Jammu and Kashmir is to annex the former Princely State under the garb of right of self-determination;

5.   Note with regret that many Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir have been manipulated by Islamabad in name of religion to advance imperialist policy of Pakistan. We need to understand that Pakistani policy on Jammu and Kashmir is also imperialist in nature; and words like Islamic brotherhood, friendship and advocate are only used to camouflage real intentions of Islamabad;

6.   Urge freedom loving nationalists of Jammu and Kashmir to formulate practical policies against all occupiers of Jammu and Kashmir, because previous policy of liberating Kashmir Valley is no longer relevant and practical. Liberation of all regions is not possible with a redundant policy against one occupier, namely India. We must have practical policies against all three occupiers;

7.   Call upon all freedom loving citizens of Jammu and Kashmir State to unite on common minimum programme for unification and independence of their forcibly divided homeland;

8.   Support struggle of fellow citizens in their respective regions, it is imperative that freedom loving people of each region should struggle against the country that occupies them;

9.   Demand both India and Pakistan to respect life, liberty and honour of people of Jammu and Kashmir living under their control; and honour their obligations assumed under the UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948;

10.                 Request both India and Pakistan to release all political prisoners; and control those forces which promote extremism, intolerance and hatred;

11.                 Pronounce that under garb of CPEC, China and Pakistan must not try to change legal status of Gilgit Baltistan, which are legally part of the former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir;

12.                 Emphasis that while completing various projects related to the CPEC, China and Pakistan must give priority to the fundamental rights and needs of people of Gilgit Baltistan; and take appropriate steps to ensure that there is no danger to environment.

13.                 Demand that Pakistan must immediately stop plundering our resources; and handover control of hydel dams and projects to Azad Kashmir Government. Furthermore, ask Pakistan to give us control of all the property of Jammu and Kashmir situated in Pakistan; and give us back what they owe us since 1947.

14.                 Express serious concern about current situation of Gilgit Baltistan; and demand that local people must be given their fundamental rights and charter of demand of the peoples right movement must be honoured;

15.                 Restore powers of Azad Kashmir government by abolishing Karachi Pact of 1949; and reopen all traditional routes which linked various parts of the former Princely State that people can interact and socialise with each other;

16.                 Stress that both India and Pakistan must stop LOC firing, as that increases our suffering on both sides of the divide. If some people want to test their weapons and satisfy their urge to fight that they can do on the international border;

17.                 Distraught that killers of Arif Shahid are still not apprehended; and it strengthens this view that secret agencies had a role in eliminating a loyal Kashmiri leader. We demand a full enquiry to find out facts about this killing.

Issued by Dr Shabir Choudhry on behalf of Jammu Kashmir International Peoples Alliance.

Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com

Kashmiris are the real stakeholders, Moonis Ahmar

Kashmiris are the real stakeholders, Moonis Ahmar

The identity of Jammu & Kashmir requires that it should have a separate state managed fairly by the representatives of the five regions of J&K while having peaceful relations with their neighbours — India, Pakistan and China.

On October 23 this year the Indian government appointed Dineshwar Sharma, who was Director Intelligence Bureau, as an interlocutor for Jammu & Kashmir. His appointment was immediately rejected by the All-Party Hurriyat Conference (IPHC), Farooq Abdullah of National Conference and Pakistan. In 2010 also, the Indian government had appointed a group of three interlocutors to hold dialogue with all stakeholders of J&K for peace in the region. Termed as a non-starter in 2010, in 2017 also, the so-called initiative taken by New Delhi to start the process of dialogue in the turbulent Valley of Kashmir albeit its repressive policies, is termed as a futile attempt.

Dineshwar Sharma, who served in J&K around 25 years ago called his appointment as a ‘home coming” with a resolve to engage all the stakeholders including pro-independence groups for a purposeful dialogue on resolving issues confronting J&K. Yet the ground realities militate against the October initiative of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as the Muslim majority Valley has risen against the occupation of Indian military and serious human rights violations against peaceful demonstrators striving for independence from New Delhi continue unabated.

Situation in the Indian controlled J&K got from bad to worse when the National Security Adviser Ajit Kumar Doval came up with his own set of ideas named as ‘Doval doctrine’ which gave free hand to the Indian military and para-military forces to crush any popular expression by the Kashmiris for independence. Far from the reality and devoid of any objective assessment of situation on the ground, New Delhi is committing a series of blunders to deal with an issue which is not confined to law and order problem but has a conglomeration of political, economic, religious, cultural and territorial dynamics.

Predictably, Sharma’s appointment as an interlocutor to unleash the process of dialogue with all the stakeholders in the Kashmir conflict failed to take off. Pakistan’s reaction to his appointment was also understandable as the issue of J&K without the involvement of Pakistan cannot be resolved. In the meantime, the Muslim Kashmiris of the Valley are protesting on daily basis against the Indian occupation military; are facing pallet guns; killings, injuries, detention, torture and other serious violation of human rights against the women population.

Without promoting inter- and intra-Kashmiri dialogue; softening of line of control, withdrawal of forces of India and Pakistan, and the deployment of UN peacekeepers conditions for peace cannot be created in that volatile region

Since 1990 when popular uprising or Kashmiri Intifada began till now more than 100,000 Kashmiris have given their lives for freedom; thousands have been injured including those who lost their eyes because of the use of pallet guns; thousands have been detained and displaced. Yet, the Indian government is confident that it can control the situation and prevent the secession of Valley from India.

It is true that the conflict of Jammu & Kashmir is very complicated because of the parties involved in that conflict with rigid positions and the issues which deepen the level of violence in that once Valley of Paradise. India and Pakistan, apart from China, are the main players but the real stakeholders of conflict in J&K are the people of that region. When the real stakeholders are not on board one cannot expect any plausible resolution of such an intractable conflict like Jammu & Kashmir. By appointing interlocutor the situation on the ground in J&K cannot improve because those who are the real stakeholders, particularly living in turbulent Valley of Kashmir, have rejected any move of New Delhi which doesn’t address the main issue, i.e. independence from the oppressive rule of India. Since August 1947, the people of Jammu & Kashmir are part of a human tragedy which struck them when J&K got divided along the ceasefire line following 1948 Indo-Pak war. Divided families on both sides of the line became a victim of the British manipulation of drawing borders between the emerging states of India and Pakistan.

Kashmiris are the real stakeholders in the age-old conflict between India and Pakistan because of the two main reasons. First, millions of Kashmiris on both sides of the fence have enormously suffered in the last seven decades because of armed conflict between India and Pakistan and the ruthlessness of the Indian security forces particularly since 1990. Since they are the sufferers of the conflict, it is their legitimate right to be included in any process which aims to seek normalcy and restore peace in the region of J&K. It will make no difference if Dineshwar Sharma, as the interlocutor embarks on holding dialogue with different Kashmiri groups because a vast majority of them do not recognise the legitimacy of the Indian government and will not talk to him. It would have been better had New Delhi, instead of appointing a former Director of Intelligence Bureau appointed a respectable and influential personality to act as a bridge between the Indian government and the Kashmiri groups.

Second, without the involvement of Kashmiri groups both moderate and hardliners, no peace initiative on J&K can reach its logical conclusion. Therefore, the initiative which was launched by the then President General Pervez Musharraf in October 2004 in which he talked about ‘out of box’ solution by providing a road map in which as a first step the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces from their respective areas; holding of inter and intra-Kashmiri dialogue; softening of the line of control; election of the parliament of Kashmir and subsequent handing over power to Kashmiris representing the parliament composed of all the five regions of Jammu & Kashmir like Jammu, Valley, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan, will create conditions for peace in J&K pending its final solution.

Unfortunately, the government of Atal Vehari Vajpapae failed to positively respond to Musharraf’s proposal for peace in J&K and that opportunity was missed. Therefore, without promoting inter and intra-Kashmiri dialogue; softening of line of control, withdrawal of forces of India and Pakistan and the deployment of UN peacekeepers conditions for peace cannot be created in that volatile region.

If Kashmiris are the real stakeholders for any resolution of the Kashmir conflict, two major requirements should be met by them. First, they should, regardless of ethnic, lingual, religious and sectarian contradictions must seek unity among themselves. Unless, Kashmiris are united on both sides of the line of control, the vision for an independent Kashmir would remain unrealistic.

Second, Kashmiri diaspora living in different parts of the world also needs to develop consensus along with their counterparts in the Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of J&K to seek a united stance for an independent Kashmir because a future state of J&K, if partitioned along religious lines, can deepen the state of conflict in the region.

The identity of Jammu & Kashmir requires that it should have a separate state managed fairly by the representatives of the five regions of J&K while having peaceful relations with their neighbours, India, Pakistan and China. Although, it will be a landlocked state yet its viability will depend on the leadership of J&K that how successful it is to unite the people and concentrate on the process of human and social development.

The writer is Meritorious Professor of International Relations at the University of Karachi. E. Mail: amoonis@hotmail.com

Published in Daily Times, November 24^th 2017.

Stephen Cohens Idea of Pakistan

Stephen Cohens Idea of Pakistan

Cohen presents three conflicting visions for the future of Pakistan: a state for Muslims of South Asia, an Islamic state, and a democratic state

Ahmad Faruqui

NOVEMBER 19, 2017

Cohen is America’s leading expert on South Asia. What he says in this book, which came out in 2004, is still relevant to the quandary facing Pakistan today.

Stating that early on Pakistan fell into the grip of an oligarchy comprising the army, the civil service, and the feudal lords, Cohen reminds us that Aristotle regarded oligarchy as the evil twin of aristocracy.

While Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan was that of a secular state, Iqbal’s vision was suffused with religious overtones. Over time, the tension between these two visions was exploited by various groups to push their own agenda.

Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, a former civil servant, deposed the democratically-elected prime minister in 1953, striking the first of many mortal blows on democracy. He acted in connivance with the army chief General Ayub Khan. The US looked the other way, anxious to enlist Pakistan into the Cold War.

In 1954, the US provided Pakistan hardware and munitions to raise five-and-a-half army divisions and ten air force squadrons. This strengthened the position of the army-dominated military in the political establishment, and led to Ayub’s coup in 1958. Three more coups would occur as history unfolded.

Cohen presents three conflicting visions for the future of Pakistan: a state for the Muslims of South Asia, an Islamic state, and a democratic state.

The first vision fell apart in 1971 with the secession of East Pakistan. At partition in 1947, Pakistan accounted for two-thirds of the Muslims in South Asia. Now it accounts for only one-thirds, negating the main tenet of the two-nation theory.

Of course, this has not bothered the ideologues from calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir. Cohen rightfully says that the relentless pursuit of Kashmir has done more damage to Pakistan than any other single issue. Elsewhere, he has argued that Kashmir is just a symptom of a bigger problem between the two siblings.

Over time, “Pakistan has adapted to changing strategic circumstances,” Cohen observes, “by ‘renting’ itself out to powerful states,” such as the US, Saudi Arabia and now China. This strategy has not yielded any clear benefits to Pakistan

Recognising the disparity in conventional forces, Pakistan has adopted the strategy of waging a covert war in Kashmir, in addition to building nuclear weapons. It has armed, trained and funded guerillas that operate in Kashmir as ‘freedom fighters.’

Since the Afghan-Soviet war ended in 1989, these groups have embraced the use of terror for political gains and have even attacked targets in India. Cohen traces their terrorist ideology to Maudoodi’s writings, but this appears to be a weak inference since the latter never supported terrorism.

The second vision is that of an Islamic state. There is no unique interpretation of an Islamic state, since there are numerous sects and sub-sects within the Islamic faith. The pursuit of this vision is fraught with danger since any brand of Islam that comes into power would seek to impose itself over the others.

The third vision is that of a democratic state.  Such a state would provide civil and human rights to the citizens. A democratically-elected government would determine national security strategy and defense policy. The army would not determine who would be elected to public office. That would appear to be the ideal end-state. But it is doubtful whether the Pakistani military with its oversized political agenda will ever let this vision come to pass.

Cohen rightfully critiques militarism and describes how it has harmed national security. The army, at 600,000, is 50 percent greater in size than it was during the 1971 war, when half of the country was lost. By diverting resources from social, political and economic development, it has compromised national security, a fact acknowledged by the Abbottabad Commission.

Ironically, the West has often supported militarism in Pakistan. Samuel Huntington of Harvard called Field Marshal Ayub Khan a Solon after the great Athenian lawgiver. Nixon praised General Yahya for giving him the opening to China. Reagan and Thatcher praised General Zia for being a bulwark of freedom against the USSR. Bush praised General Musharraf for his role in the war on terror.

Over time, “Pakistan has adapted to changing strategic circumstances,” Cohen observes, “by ‘renting’ itself out to powerful states,” such as the US, Saudi Arabia and now China. This strategy has not yielded any clear benefits to Pakistan.

Cohen presents six scenarios of the future: (1) continuation of the status quo, which involves rule by the oligarchy, now known as the Establishment, (2) liberal, secular democracy, (3) soft authoritarianism, (4) an Islamist state, (5) divided Pakistan and (6) postwar Pakistan.

These scenarios, while intuitively plausible, represent Cohen’s personal opinions. They lack the rigor that would have come from using cross-impact matrices of driving factors or a Delphi process involving multiple experts. He also seems to assign probabilities to the scenarios but the methodology is unclear.

He notes that American policy toward Pakistan has always given short-term gains priority over long-term concerns. This is no longer feasible, since ignoring the long term could have grave consequences.

While discussing the ebb and flow of the tide in American-Pakistani ties, Cohen does not explore the reasons why the tide has always been at a flood when a Republican administration has been in power in the White House and a military dictatorship in Islamabad and at ebb otherwise.

Currently, terrorism has zoomed to the top of the American agenda but it needs to be given a long- term preventive quality, not just a short-term military quality. He says the US should incent the government of Pakistan to increase the share of its expenditures that go for education, especially primary education, by reducing military aid if a minimum amount is not spent on education.

In Cohen’s view, the army remains the biggest threat to democracy in Pakistan, not corrupt politicians. Elsewhere, he has called it the largest political party. Even when it is not in power, it has unlimited access to the government’s budgetary and foreign exchange resources and dominates the nation’s foreign policy. These points are amplified in Aqil Shah’s book, Army and Democracy, which is also a great read.

The Idea of Pakistan covers a lot of ground. However, by the time one gets to the end, many questions remain unanswered. For example, Cohen says the Pakistani army is long on memory and short on foresight, but he does not discuss why that is the case or whether it will ever change. In addition, by presenting a scenario where the oligarchy continues to rule as the most probable scenario, he seems to be endorsing Pakistan’s recidivist militarism. He says it is improbable that liberal democracy will take hold in Pakistan. Just a couple of decades ago, the same had been said of Latin American and Eastern Europe where democracy is now widespread.

The book’s implicit hypothesis is that Pakistan’s insecurities have led to military rule. But why is that not true of India, since it has security problems with Pakistan and China, and has to contend with numerous separatist movements?

Cohen does not rely on surveys or polls to enrich his analysis, nor does he provide a cross-country comparison. Despite all these limitations, the book is a classic and a must-read.

The writer has written “Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan.” He can be reached at ahmadfaruqui@gmail.com

Published in Daily Times, November 19^th 2017.