‘Pakistan is isolated and has fewer friends in the
international community’
Husain Haqqani,
Pakistan's former ambassador to the US and now a director of the US-based
Hudson Institute, says Islamabad must sever its links to terrorism
By KUNWAR KHULDUNE SHAHID MARCH 19, 2018 2:18 PM (UTC+8)
Court of Pakistan issued an arrest warrant for the former
ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, after he failed to appear in
court for a hearing on “Memogate.” The “memo” in question had allegedly been
sent by Haqqani to a high-ranking US official in May 2011 – days after the
operation that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan – exposing
clashes between the civilian government then led by the Pakistan
Peoples Party and the army.
Haqqani has denied
those allegations, and he expressed his disappointment with the Supreme Court
warrant, saying that “it is sad that some judges of the highest court of
Pakistan persist with such antics for local TV news coverage.
Haqqani, who is now a
prominent analyst on South Asia, author of the books Pakistan between Mosque and Military and Magnificent Delusions, and a regional director for the
Hudson Institute in Washington, spoke with Asia Times. Excerpts from an
exclusive interview follow.
Pakistan will be put on
the Financial Action Task Force (on Money Laundering) gray list in
June. Is this owing to US pressure?
Pakistan’s policy of
tolerating and supporting some jihadi terrorist groups and treating terrorist
financing lightly is the real reason.
It has been 16 years
since 2001, when in the aftermath of 9/11 [terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001], Pakistan promised to comply with international sanctions relating to
terrorist financing laid down in UN [Security Council] Resolution 1267 of 1999.
Pakistan has yet to act against groups and individuals like Lashkar-e-Taiba and
Hafiz Saeed. Groups are banned, only to re-emerge with new names. Hafiz Saeed
was listed as a terrorist by the UN in December 2008 but remains free and
operational. Close ties with the United States have so far helped Pakistan
[avoid] tough international sanctions.
This time, the
prospect of it being put on the “black list” also exists because the United
States is not alone in its view that Pakistan only acts against terrorists
under international pressure.
For some time now,
Pakistan has been able to take one step forward to get relief from
international pressure, followed by two steps back once the pressure is off and
another step forward, when the pressure resumes. The fundamental change in
attitude has not been forthcoming.
Pakistan recently
issued another ordinance and announced restrictions on the finances of
terrorist groups, including charities linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba, but these
measures are aimed not at permanently shutting down favored jihadi groups but
at evading the immediate pressure.
How do you view China and Saudi
Arabia backing away from supporting Pakistan during the US-summoned second vote
at the FATF meeting, and Turkey being the sole supporter?
Pakistan has always presumed that if a country is its ally, that country must support Pakistan in all that it does – from ignoring Pakistani support for terror groups to standing firm behind Pakistan against India.
China and Saudi Arabia
are seen as strong allies, and Pakistan presumed that their close ties with
Pakistan would lead them to automatically vote in Pakistan’s favor. But countries
have their own interests, and in this case neither Saudi Arabia nor China saw
it in their interest to support Pakistan beyond the initial phase. These
countries probably also wanted to send a message to Pakistan about the need to
crack down on terror financing. China and Saudi Arabia both face their own
terrorism threats.
Other factors were at
play, too. Saudi Arabia had to weigh in its close ties with the US and even
India; China wanted to secure its position as head of the FATF board, for which
it needs American and Indian support in future. Above all, Pakistan simply did
not fulfill the FATF criteria, and it came down to whether others wanted to do
it an out-of-the-way favor.
Turkey, under
President [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan, has its own agenda of forming alliances, and
its support for Pakistan was to make Pakistanis feel good while knowing its
stand alone won’t really make a difference.
What do you make of the Trump
regime blatantly calling out Pakistan for providing safe havens to jihadist
groups throughout the past year? Does it stem from President Trump’s own
stance, and that of his team, or is this reflective of US foreign policy of
recent years?
Mr [Donald] Trump may be the first American president to openly and unreservedly speak out against Pakistan publicly, but US frustrations with Pakistan go back many years. As far back as 1992, the United States warned Pakistan that it would be declared a state sponsor of terrorism if it did not crack down on jihadis who, at that time, had kidnapped Western tourists, including Americans, in Jammu and Kashmir.
President Trump’s South
Asia policy speech last August, his New Year’s Day tweet, and his
administration’s policy towards Pakistan are not random comments by an
instinctive American leader. They reflect the deep mistrust that has
characterized the US-Pakistan relationship and has only grown since 9/11 within
the US foreign-policy community, especially after the discovery of Osama bin
Laden in Abbottabad.
The divergence in the
goals and interests of both countries has expanded over the decades. The US
wants to eliminate global terrorism; Pakistan prefers to selectively use
terrorists as an instrument of regional influence. America has invested blood
and treasure to build a modern multi-ethnic Afghanistan; Pakistan wants a
government in Kabul dominated by ethnic-Pashtun Islamists, such as the Afghan
Taliban and members of the Haqqani Network. The US sees India as a friend,
while Pakistan’s establishment views India as an eternal enemy.
Pakistanis want the US
to ignore that divergence and continue to assist Pakistan on the promise of
small cooperative steps. But recognition of that divergence of interests is at
the heart of President Trump’s unwillingness to revert to the old pattern of
praising Pakistan in the hope that it will eventually change its policies to
match America’s interests.
How do you see Indian
involvement in Baluchistan as confessed by Research & Analysis Wing
[India’s foreign intelligence agency] spy Kulbhushan Jadhav?
That India and Pakistan spy on each other is not much of a secret, nor is the claim by both sides that the other supports insurgencies inside its territory.
That India and Pakistan spy on each other is not much of a secret, nor is the claim by both sides that the other supports insurgencies inside its territory.
Many Pakistanis
believe there is Indian involvement in Baluchistan. The question is whether
that belief can translate into evidence that is accepted by the international
community. Pakistan has delivered multiple dossiers to India and the
international community but the Pakistani side has also grudgingly acknowledged
that these do not contain “material evidence.” Sartaj Aziz [deputy chairman of
the Planning Commission of Pakistan] once remarked that the primary purpose of
these dossiers is to “help build a narrative about India’s patronage of
subversive activities in Pakistan.”
On the Jadhav case,
too, Pakistan has succeeded in convincing Pakistanis of his being a spy but his
confessions have had little effect outside Pakistan. Pakistanis must think
about why their case is believed less and less on the international level. It
is almost as if there are two parallel narratives, one that finds resonance
among Pakistanis and one that resonates with the rest of the world.
How do you see Indian
involvement in Afghanistan, concerns regarding which were shared by the
civil-military leadership during [then-US secretary of state] Rex Tillerson’s
visit to Pakistan in October?
Again, the concerns shared by Pakistan’s leaders and officials on Afghanistan are deemed less convincing by their foreign interlocutors, notwithstanding the passion with which these are repeated. Pakistan’s fears of close relations between India and Afghanistan are not new and date back to the years immediately after independence. But the rest of the world asks for specifics of how India threatens Pakistan through Afghanistan without having any troops or other military presence there.
Again, the concerns shared by Pakistan’s leaders and officials on Afghanistan are deemed less convincing by their foreign interlocutors, notwithstanding the passion with which these are repeated. Pakistan’s fears of close relations between India and Afghanistan are not new and date back to the years immediately after independence. But the rest of the world asks for specifics of how India threatens Pakistan through Afghanistan without having any troops or other military presence there.
The view outside
Pakistan is that if Pakistan felt threatened by an Indian military presence in
Afghanistan, that would be legitimate. Concern about covert operations across
the Durand Line would also be considered seriously. But if Afghans studying in
India or Indians building roads in Afghanistan are cited as threats to
Pakistan’s security, then others see it as a psychological rather than a
political or military issue.
In the last two
decades Pakistan has justified its support for the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani
Network, and other jihadi groups on grounds of security concerns from India.
When Americans say, “So far as we know India has no offensive military presence
in Afghanistan and there is no evidence that the Afghans are willing to be part
of India’s alleged plan for a two-front war with Pakistan,” Pakistanis seldom
offer a convincing response. Pakistan’s leaders only question Afghanistan’s
acceptance of economic assistance from India even though Pakistan does not have
the capacity to provide such aid itself.
Is Pakistan’s support for
jihadist factions the single common factor negatively impacting Islamabad
relations with other countries? Do you see that being addressed?
Pakistan today is more isolated and has fewer friends in the international community. That clearly has primarily to do with Pakistan’s support for jihadi groups and its reluctance to change its policy despite the impact on other countries and itself.
Pakistan today is more isolated and has fewer friends in the international community. That clearly has primarily to do with Pakistan’s support for jihadi groups and its reluctance to change its policy despite the impact on other countries and itself.
There are fewer
countries willing to accept Pakistan’s point of view on Kashmir, fewer
countries where a Pakistani can travel without a visa, and fewer friends in
multilateral fora.
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