Friday, 27 January 2017

Kalabagh Dam-The Facts, Tariq Mushtaq

Kalabagh Dam-The Facts, Tariq Mushtaq
Allah has blessed Pakistan with numerous resources, water is one of those gifts. To understand its importance it is necessary to have knowledge on the following:
  1. What number of dams and reservoirs are designed on all the rivers and how much work has been done on them.
  2. What is the real picture and what are the facts about Kalabagh Dam. Why it is important, necessary and essential for our country.
  3. What are the objections raised by some political parties against Kalabagh Dam, and what is the factual position?
At the time of independence, our newly formed country had no infrastructure of power generation. There were only small diesel or coal powered generation plants in various cities, but to meet the major requirement we were dependent on India. In 1958 when Field Marshall Ayub Khan took over the government, with all the other important steps, shortage of power was also taken as a very important issue and work on war footing was started.
As already stated we are blessed with many natural resources, especially water. We have five rivers and number of subsidiaries which can give us sufficient power as well as huge water reservoirs for irrigation, if properly planned. Ayub Khan’s Government gave full attention towards this side and started immediate survey for suitable sites for the construction of hydropower projects, water reservoirs/dams, headworks and barrages as soon as he took over the government in 1958. Within a short period of six months a complete study was formed stating the number of places and sites where dams on river Indus and river Jhelum could be constructed as well as sites and places where barrages can be constructed on rivers Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej.
First of all, we will go through the study on river Indus. According to the study, only on river Indus we could construct hydropower projects, water reservoirs/dams and barrages at fifteen (15) different sites. The study also revealed that there were certain sites which were more important and where the development work could be started with immediate effect. Following this study, two sites on river Indus were selected for dams where we could avail power generation facility as well as water reservoirs which would be linked to canals for irrigation purpose. One site was Kalabagh, which was a natural dam and the other was Tarbela. On river Jehlum, Mangla was selected for immediate implementation. The other reason to select these sites was that these were almost in the centre of the country from where the cost of electricity distribution network would cost less and the controls would be easy, secondly, from water reservoirs, water would easily be connected to the canal system used for irrigation. In 1959, immediate work was started at Mangla Dam site.
On the other side Tarbela was preferred over Kalabagh. There were two reasons; one , the cost of Tarbela Dam was higher than the Kalabagh Dam, and financial help from the World Bank was required, whereas cost of Kalabagh was less and could easily be meet with by our own resources. Second reason was political disturbance created by Raja George SikandarZaman who was in opposition of Ayub Khan and had a high influence in Haripur area where some land were to be acquired by the government. It was decided that as Ayub Khan being in power, the people of the area will cooperate, but later on when Ayub Khan may not be in power, this man having high influence in the area may be a hindrance in the construction of this dam, as well as Khanpur Dam (only a reservoir dam), which was also constructed during that time.
So, work on Tarbela and Mangla Dam was immediately started. Mangla was to generate 1100 megawatts with a water reservoir of 5.5 million acre feet and Tarbela was planned to produce 3490 megawatts electricity with a water reservoir of 11.09 million acre feet.
Dear readers, before going into further details, it is important to understand the flow of rivers and the places they fall into each other. Starting with river Swat which flows from Kalam to Nowshera for 12 months with an enormous quantity of water. At Nowshera it falls into river Kabul which is coming from Afghanistan, crossing through Peshawar. From Nowshera these two rivers jointly fall into river Indus at Attock. From Attock bridge, the flow of these two rivers can easily been seen, Indus in blue colour and the other two in mud colour. They go a long way side by side then ultimately merge into each other.
From Attock to Kalabagh, there is no place where this enormous quantity of water flowing from three rivers can be stored. Kalabagh is the only place where this water can be stored.
From Kalabagh reservoir, water can not only be used for generation of electricity but can also be utilised to irrigate the barren areas of KPK, Sindh and Balochistan. The site of Kalabagh is a natural dam, which can be constructed in much less time with less cost than a regular dam. It can store and preserve all that water flowing from rivers Indus, Swat and Kabul, which at present is going waste and falls into the Arabian Sea. It’s a sheer negligence of our governments and leaders that since long we are wasting this gift of the Nature which can be very useful for irrigation and can also generate electricity for the national grid. Practically, it’s “kufran e namet”.
Bashir A Malik, former chief technical advisor to the United Nations and World Bank, said, "Sindh and Pakhtunkhwah would become drought areas in the years to come if Kalabagh Dam was not built." At the same time, former KPK chief minister and former Chairman WAPDA Shamsul Mulk has stated, "Kalabagh Dam would be helpful in erasing poverty from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, as it would irrigate 800,000 acres of cultivable land that is located 100–150 feet above the level of River Indus." The Kalabagh Dam would provide 6.5 million acre feet of water to cultivate seven million acres of currently barren land in addition to the 3,600 megawatts (4,800,000 hp) of electricity it would provide.
Experts who supported the construction of the Kalabagh Dam at the 2012 "Save Water Save Pakistan" forum included Dr Salman Shah, former finance minister Abdul Majeed Khan, TECH Society President ShafqatMasood, former IRSA chairman Qayyum Nizami, former minister of state Prof Abdul Qayyum Qureshi, former vice-chancellor of Islamia University Bahawalpur Dr Muhammad Sadiq, agricultural scientist M Saeed Khan, former GM of Kalabagh Dam Project Engr Mahmudur Rehman Chughtai, Mansoor Ahmed, former MD of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Foundation, Tariq Mushtaq, former KDB project head, M. Zubair Sheikh and Jameel Gishkori, among others. The participants of Save Water Save Pakistan demanded the construction of five dams, including the Munda Dam, Kurram Tangi Dam, Akhori Dam and the Kalabagh Dam, at by 2025 at the latest to store water and generate electricity to meet demand.
Length of Kalabagh dam reservoir will be 80 km. From there the Nowshera city is 110 km far, and if the dam is full to its ends, the height of Nowshera will be 60 feet above that level. So, the story which has been framed by a political party of KPK, that Nowshera will be submerged in water and that too in the case of destruction of the dam , does not hold any truth and reality in it, rather 800,000 acres barren land will be irrigated with the raise in the level of the river. This area is 100-150 feet above river level, when the level of the river is raised, it would be easily irrigated.
Around 1,000,000 acres of land in Sind will be irrigated from the water reservoir of Kalabagh-Dam. The politicians and feudals of Sind also have framed a story for their poor and uneducated people that if Kalabagh Dam is constructed, river Indus will have no water in flow and sea water will enter inside the river bed, damaging the lands. This is just a story to confuse the poor farmers and small land owners, so that they don’t get benefit of water for their fields, which can result them a better living and educating their children. Actually the feudals have a fear that if these people get education and better living, feudals won’t be able to keep them under their thumb, so this sort of stories are spreaded.
In fact, Karachi and Sindh is seven meters above sea level, so there is no question of sea water flowing back into the river. Only at “delta” the sea water flows in at the time of “Mud-O-Jazr”. Secondly, the bed of the river will not get dry, once the dam is filled, water flow will be in routine and will remain as it is flowing now. Same way, huge area of Balochistan will also get water for irrigation through this dam’s reservoir.
Indian Government is spending a huge amount against the Kalabagh Dam. India doesn’t want that Pakistan ever builds this dam and saves that water which at present is totally wasted and which would very badly be required in the coming days. It is very unfortunate that many politicians and feudals are on the Indian pay list just to oppose this dam.
Please note; in addition to irrigation, Kalabagh Dam would also generate 3600 megawatt electricity, which when added in the national grid will bring down the electricity cost. Delay in the construction of this dam is criminal on part of the rulers, politicians and leaders, because it is their utmost duty to look after the National Interest. People had no hope from Asif Ali Zardari or his party, but Zia ul Haq and Pervaiz Musharaf could very easy construct it, but they also became more political than the Rulers. They also lost their national interest only for their lust of power and to remain in seat for a longer time.
Dear readers, Let me explain that from Gilgit to Kalabagh, how many dams can be constructed on river Indus, which have been designed by Wapda and requires immediate attention as well as authoritarian step of the head of the state.
The proposed Project is located on Indus River 83 km from Gilgit. It is planned run of the river hydropower Project. This will generate of 7100 Mega Watt, in two stages. First stage will start generation of 2800 megawatts and in second phase total 7100 megawatt will start generation.
The proposed scheme is along 1 km lower stretch of Basho Lungma, a left tributary of Indus River. The confluence of Basho Lungma with Indus River is located about 40 km downstream of north-west of Skardu town and 704 km north-east of Islamabad. This Hydropower Project can generate 40 MW. Its cost is estimated at Rs.91.243 million.
The proposed project is located on Indus River, about 315 km upstream of Tarbela Dam, 180 km downstream of the Gilgit-Baltistan capital Gilgit city and 40 km downstream of Chilas city. The proposed RCC dam would have a maximum height of 272 m, and impound a reservoir of about 8.1 million acre feet (MAF), with live storage of 6.4 MAF. Mean annual discharge of Indus River at the site is 1977 cusecs. The dam will impound 15% of the annual river flow. The project would cover an area of 110 square kilometres and the reservoir would extend 100 km upstream of the dam site upto Raikot Bridge on Sharah e Rashem. This hydro project can generate 4500 mega wall electricity.
The proposed Dasu Hydropower Project is a run of river project on the Indus River located 7 km upstream of Dasu Town, District Kohistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The site is 74 km downstream of proposed Diamer Basha Dam site and 345 km from Islamabad. Project will generate 5400 MW (15 Units @ 360 MW each) hydroelectric power. It will be completed in two Stages (Stage-I&II). Stage-I will generate 2160 MW (06 Units @ 36 MW each) with annual energy of 12,222 GWh. Stage-I will be completed in five years. The project is being financed by the World Bank.
The proposed Spat Gah is the left bank tributaries of Indus River in Kohistan District, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. The confluence of Spat Gah is located 8 km downstream of Dasu town, 35 km up stream of Patan town. The Project is located 365 km from Islamabad and has the capacity to generate 496 MW hydropower.
The proposed Patan Dam site is located on the Indus River about 4 km upstream of village Patan downstream of Keyal Khwar. The power house is planned on the left bank 4 km downstream of Besham Qila and 305 km from Islamabad. This project will generate 2300 MW electricity. Cost of this project is estimated at Rs. 731.233 million (2013).
This proposed hydro project is located in a narrow section of Indus river, about 3 km downstream of Besham. Distance from Islamabad is about 240 Km. It is designed to generate 4,000 MW hydropower electricity. It cost is estimated at Rs. 719.628 Million (2013).
8-TARBELA DAM The project is located at a narrow spot in the Indus River valley, at Tarbela in Haripur, shortly located at the point from where the District Swabi then starts. Here the river formerly split around a large island close to the left bank. The main dam wall, built of earth and rock is the world’s largest earth-filled dam, stretches 2,743 metres (8,999 ft) from the island to river right, standing 148 metres (486 ft) high. A pair of concrete auxiliary dams spans the river from the island to river left. The spillways, located on the auxiliary dams, in turn consist of two parts. The main spillway has a discharge capacity of 18,406 cubic metres per second (650,000 cu ft/s) and the auxiliary spillway, 24,070 cubic metres per second (850,000 cu ft/s).
Hydroelectric power plant on the right side of the main dam houses 14 generators fed with water from outlet tunnels 1, 2, and 3. There are four 175 MW generators on tunnel 1, six 175 MW generators on tunnel 2, and four 432 MW generators on tunnel 3, for a total generating capacity of 3,478 MW. Tarbela Reservoir is 80.5 kilometres (50.0 mi) long, with a surface area of 250 square kilometres (97 sq mi). The reservoir holds 11,600,000 acre feet (14.3 km3) of water, with a live storage of 9,700,000 acre feet (12.0 km3).
It is very important to note an astonishing fact: Tenders of Tarbela Dam were opened in December 1966. The lowest tender was of 259 crore dollars while the others were of 296 crore dollars, 366 crore dollars and 384 crore dollars. Ayub Khan’s government selected the lowest bid, but the World Bank was not agreed to finance that company which basically was from Italy and had collaboration with a German firm. Ayub Khan and the concerned ministers had a meeting in this regard. Ayub Khan asked his finance minster Muhammad Shoaib and a civil servant Ghulam Farooq Khan to confirm two things, one, what is the international standing of the company and secondly, can the Government meet the foreign component from its own resources. The answer came within 48 hours that the company had a good standing in the international market and that the Government of Pakistan can meet the foreign component from its own resources. So, the world Bank was informed that we don’t need their financial help. It was a great achievement, later on the World Bank also joined and provided the financial help, but we started this dam with our own resources.
This, I am talking about those persons who were sincere to the nation and did not know the word “commission”, they used to spend the national exchequer as a CUSTODIAN of the nation, they used to take national exchequer as “amanat” of the people of the country. After Ayub Khan’s regime, especially after 1977, it’s very sad that our Governments right from Zia regime to the present regime, purchased everything by raising the cost by double , triple and sometimes four times. Zardari regime is very notorious in this regard.
Another commendable vision of the then rulers and an admirable fact about Tarbela Dam is that it has five tunnels. Right now generation system is attached only on three tunnels, which generate 3490 megawatts. In 2013, Nawaz Government started installation of turbines and generators on tunnel Number four, which on completion will generate 1450 megawatt electricity, which when added in the national grid, will reduce the cost of electricity which has been terrifically raised because of thermal generation.
Ghazi-Bharota Hydropower Project is a run of the river project. Water from the river Indus enters into a canal from Ghazi and falls backs in river Indus at Bharota after going through the generation of 1450 megawatt electricity. This project was designed by the Wapda engineers without any foreign consultancy.
The Kalabagh Dam is a proposed hydroelectric dam on the Indus River at Kalabagh in the Mianwali District of Punjab Province in Pakistan. The dam would have 3,600 megawatts of electricity generation capacity.
The Kalabagh Dam would provide 6.5 million acre feet of water to cultivate seven million acres of currently barren land in addition to the 3,600 megawatts of electricity it would provide.
Some people say that Basha Dam is a substitute of Kalabagh Dam. It is very important to note that Basha Dam is no substitute for Kalabagh Dam, not because of its altitude, which is high enough, but because no irrigation canals can be taken out from it because of the hilly terrain.
Dear readers, from the above you can easily determine and understand that we can generate 33,350 megawatt electricity only from river Indus, double than our present requirement, which means very cheap electricity and an industrial revolution. More over we can run railway on electricity, which will save a lot of foreign exchange which is spent on the purchase of diesel for railway engines. During Ayub Khan’s regime, an electric train was started between Lahore and Khanewal, which after 1977 stopped working and at present number of its installations have been stolen or disposed of, very sorry, it’s a national loss, , it’s a state of sorrow, what else I can say.
In 17th and 18th Centuries, countries had wars over control of water and rivers, then in 19th Century wars were over territorial controls. In coming days, once again, wars will be over control of water. Allah has gifted us with plenty of water which can beover and above of our needs, if we are able to control it and can make use of it in a proper way.
Dear Readers,
Kalabagh Dam is essential and indispensable for our country, for our development, for our irrigation system and for the future of our country.
It’s the foremost duty of our rulers, leaders, politicians, technocrats, bureaucrats, philosophers, journalists and also the general public to work on it and to tell India that despite their intense interference, they can’t stop us from our development. It is the duty of our politicians and feudals to tell them that they are not purchasable. If we are able to construct Kalabagh Dam, it will be our great achievement and a grand victory over India.
In my next script, I will explain about the Mangla Dam, Neelum-Jhelum hydro project and all other sites where we can construct hydel power generation plants on river Jhelum. I will also bring to the knowledge of the readers about all the barrages and headworks on river Indus, river Jhelum, river Chenab, river Ravi and river Satluj with the linked canal system, which is really appreciable, exemplary and speaks about the vision of our previous rulers specially Field Marshal Ayub Khan and his team, whom we always call a dictator. And those who are unable to give anything to the nation are taken as big followers of Democracy.
Democracy, which has given nothing to the nation as yet. Let’s pray this democracy and people who are always talking about it are able to act positively and give this nation at lease the required water and electricity instead of hollow slogan.

The writer is a technocrat and International Affairs Analyst

Thursday, 26 January 2017

Non - General view on land allocation, by Ejaz Haider

Non - General view on land allocation, by Ejaz Haider
0 COMMENJAN 25 2017  

Islamabad must revisit and revise its current policy on land allocations to senior military officials.
In recent days, there has been much debate about the 90 acres of prime real estate allocated to former Pakistan Army chief General (retd.) Raheel Sharif. The gist of the issue is already known:
1.    Roughly half of the 90 acres, we are told, he got as a four-star general, the rest as Army chief.
2.    We are also told that this is not unprecedented, i.e., every Army chief is entitled to get this post-retirement perk. [NB: this means that if we were to have regular, 3-year retirements of Army chiefs, which some of us have always advocated, we would be worse off in acreage terms.]
3.    On the basis of the calculation for land, one can safely assume that all chairmen joint chiefs of staff would also get nearly 45 acres as four-stars and possibly the same acreage—or more—for holding the CJCS office, technically the senior-most.

4.    The provincial government(s) have no say in gifting such lands. There’s a Border Area Committee that earmarks these large swathes in collaboration with General Headquarters and the provincial revenue departments simply record/register the allocation(s). [NB: it should be evident that the procedure is non-transparent and cannot be rationalized or debated since it is embedded in some arcane, undemocratic rule(s) that, presumably (?), cannot be legally challenged.]

5.    Under the circumstances, and since the allocation is legal, everyone must shut up.
That sounds, technically, right. If there’s a rule, or perhaps a law, you must suck it up even if it sucks. The problem is, many states have had bad laws and customs and bad laws have a bad tendency of creating anomalies and distortions. In other words, bad laws need to go. The only way to overturn them is to debate them and challenge them on certain rational principles and to strive to create transparent procedures and equitable norms.

But, wait, there’s another slight problem here: as the rule goes, a former lieutenant general and Corps Commander tells me, “Every officer is authorized land if he meets the criteria. 
The maximum allocation now is 30 acres. Maybe the chief gets a little extra. However, once allotted land, you cannot under any circumstances get additional allotment or a fresh allotment. We all got our quota as lieutenants generals. Thirty acres. You cannot claim any more…nor can you surrender the allotted land and get fresh authorization. No chief has got any such allocation.”

This makes a logical case against land allocation for a rank and then additional allocation for the office. Going by the logic being presented in the case of Gen. Sharif, all general officers should get land allotted for the rank as well as the office they held. That, obviously, is not the case.

But let’s consider where it all began: like much else, with the British Raj.
Two factors contributed to it: creating a class supportive of the Raj, and canal-digging that resulted in colonies and verdant swaths of land which, earlier, lay fallow and, mostly, barren. The British needed more and more soldiers and officers for the British Indian Army and gifting land to people who served the Raj loyally was a good incentive. This also included families that were politically influential and could ensure political stability for the Raj.

With canals came more agricultural land to gift, and the policy became established practice. It also helped improve the socioeconomic status of the soldiers and made military service under the Raj a financially and socially viable option.

Unfortunately, the practice of land-gifts didn’t stop with the British leaving these shores. What’s worse is that the undemocratic arbitrariness that attended such gifts also continued. According to Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, a political scientist who has written extensively on civil-military relations and the Pakistan Army: “Some of Pakistan’s national dailies carried a news item … that the Punjab Board of Revenue informed the Lahore High Court that 62 senior and 56 junior Army officers were allotted agricultural lands in Cholistan and other district[s] of the Punjab under various schemes in 1981, 1982, 1994, 1999 and 2000. These allotments were made under instructions of the Army Headquarters and the details of these allotments could be made public only by the Army Headquarters.”

Rizvi goes on to say that “No detailed data is available on such allotments since the establishment of Pakistan because the military authorities are not willing to release the names of the beneficiaries of this policy and the civilian governments (when in power) do not want to alienate the military by making detailed data available to public. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Punjab Board of Revenue did not provide the list of officers who were allotted agricultural land in Cholistan and other districts of the Punjab in the specified years.”

One of the areas, post-1947, for settling ex-service personnel was Thal. Later, other schemes were developed near the barrages in Sindh and Punjab. Land was also allocated in Attock, Jhelum, Kohat, Rawalpindi and Hazara. Most of this land was developed with the help of the Army and included smaller tracts. Lands were also given for gallantry, though increasingly the Army has resorted to the practice of cash rewards.

In some ways, resettling and rehabilitating soldiers and mid-ranking officers is not a bad policy. Unlike government service in the civilian sectors, the Army doesn’t have 60 years age as superannuation. Most officers and soldiers retire or go on discharge while they are relatively young, mostly in early- to mid- to late-forties. But the policy needs to be rationalized to ensure that land allocations for such schemes consider the sensitivities and economic wellbeing of the local people and are not recklessly extravagant.

Also, the practice increasingly leans heavily in favor of senior ranks, especially general officers. This has not only served to make the hierarchy top-heavy, but also the size of tracts allocated go far beyond the requirements of appreciating meritorious service and rehabilitation. A case can also be made that such economic rehabilitation policies should be more need-based than rank-focused. For now, it’s more about the latter than the former.

A society must honor its brave men. Equally, it must have legal-normative and transparent standards for how that is done. That is a function of constructive social and political debates in parliament and outside it.

Most importantly, as Rizvi writes: “Land allotments to military personnel are not viewed in Pakistani society as an isolated development. These represent a broader phenomenon of the military gradually overwhelming most sectors of state and society.”

That feeling must go and for that the policy needs to be revisited and rationalized.
Postscript: for further reading, see, Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885-1947 (Princeton University Press, 1988); Major-General Fazal Muqeem (retd.), The Story of the Pakistan Army (Oxford University Press, 1963); Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (St Martin’s Press, New York, 2000).
Haider is editor of national-security affairs at Capital TV. He was a Ford Scholar at the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. He tweets @ejazhaider 

Wednesday, 25 January 2017

Crime of extra judicial killing, MUHAMMAD ALI NEKOKARA

 “deaths of suspects in police shoot-outs are an acceptable part of routine life today”.
Let us put it directly: extra-judicial killing is a crime; it is a murder and a cognisable offence under the law of the land. However, the response of society and the state to extra-judicial killings is different to an ordinary murder or crime. The societal response to staged encounters, substantially dictated by fear of crime, roughly borders on a general indifference to or the stated or unspoken approval of such police tactics, with occasional condemnation by some civil society members and media persons.
In official circles, it still largely remains the elephant in the room.
The proponents of due process condemn extra-judicial killings for legal, moral and social reasons. It is a murder pure and simple; the police officers are supposed to arrest criminals and produce them before the court; they should not betray the trust of the state; violence begets violence and leads to the brutalisation of society, and hence is counterproductive.
Advocates of staged encounters maintain that ‘extraordinary times warrant extraordinary measures’. They give examples of the security environment in the country as well as of ruthless criminals and terrorists, involved in hundreds of killings, bailed for lack of evidence. They argue that Lashkar-i-Jhangvi’s Malik Ishaq remained in prison for 12 years and Asif Chotoo for seven, and although it was public knowledge that they were involved in brutal killings of hundreds of people they were bailed out in the courts.
Often lacking willing witnesses of serious, violent crimes, and working under the double burden of poor investigation skills and limited support, the police investigators’ capacity for effective prosecution of ruthless criminals and terrorists remains limited. The disconnect within the criminal justice system (CJS) where its various critical components such as police, prosecutors, lawyers and judges are struggling to have a functional relationship further complicates the prosecution of dangerous criminals.
Within the police, the house is divided on the issue of staged encounters. There are police officers who strictly oppose extra-judicial killings; there are others who support it directly or indirectly. The latter category can be broadly divided into three sub-categories: a) greedy/rogue elements who support the killings for personal gains such as more power, authority and material gains in service (at times they become more potent than their IGs due to their political connections); b) ‘moral righteousness’ — the killings are justified on the basis of their own interpretation of ‘crime control responsibility’, ‘religious edicts’ and ‘morality’; c) passive obedience to authority — Stanley Milgram’s experiment on obedience to authority reasonably explains the ordeal of this category.
How do we respond to the problem of staged encounters? Punish police officers for the crime? Absolutely! Would that be enough though?
In a society like ours where the gap between the powerful and the weak is large, people are habitually reluctant to lodge complaints against the police; it is difficult to produce or sustain witnesses/evidence against the police and quite exacting to pursue the case all the way as they lack the requisite means in a system where the odds are already stacked against the weak. Labelling extra-judicial killing as a crime is also not a firm stance in our society, as popular opinion is divided over the nature and extent of criminal liability in such cases.
Formal controls over the police to check deviant and unlawful tactics are in the hands of the political executive and judiciary and, under Police Order, 2002, need to be supported by police complaint authorities (yet to be constituted). Informal controls include those developed through individual experiences and conditioning in families, schools, socialisation and communities. Controls, both formal and informal, remain weak. Although in a number of cases judicial inquiries into police encounters have resulted in the prosecution of police officers, so far no clear message has been sent to deviant police officers regarding staged encounters.
Indeed, the police are the public face of this problem. However, police alone cannot be blamed for the problem of extra-judicial killings. All the relevant actors need to demonstrate their commitment to addressing the problem. The approach needs to be corrective rather than penalising. Training of investigators, a functional and professional relationship between police and prosecutors, and a leading role for the judiciary would significantly help reduce the use of illegitimate and violent tactics by police to control crime.
The provincial justice committee established by the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan in each province is a useful forum at the provincial level to deliberate and find solutions to such serious problems. The Lahore High Court chief justice recently expressed his resolve to make this important forum functional. His visit to the Central Police Office of Punjab on Jan 20, and meeting with the police leadership along with his fellow honourable judges, is a positive development.
In addition to emphasising the need for building a CJS data warehouse, the chief justice also decided to appoint focal persons in order to improve coordination within the CJS. Moreover, he has offered training to police investigators at the Punjab Judicial Academy. Police must avail themselves of this opportunity to improve the capacity of investigators and to deepen their understanding of judicial needs vis-à-vis investigations.
In the words of Kofi Annan, “leadership arises not from your position but from your actions”. CJS leaders need to exercise such leadership to improve efficiency and fairness in the system and, importantly, to do justice to their own respective roles. Fearful minds throw reason, justice and mercy to the wind. A dysfunctional CJS accentuates fear of crime and lends support to high-handed policing tactics. A functional CJS would help reduce fear of crime, and check deviant and brutal practices such as extra-judicial killings.
The writer is a former police officer.

Published in Dawn, January 25th, 2017

Exploitation of Pakistan in Azad Kashmir in field of Hydel power, Dr Shabir Choudhry

Dr Shabir Choudhry                      25 January 2017

Relationship between Pakistan and so called Azad Kashmir is that of a master and a slave; or perhaps, more appropriately relationship is that of an exploiter and exploited.  Pakistani government and officials systematically exploit both regions of Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Kashmir. However, some mental slaves of Pakistan because of continuous one - sided propaganda and because of excessive use of religion do not have consciousness of being occupied or exploited.

Let me support this view point by a few examples. Upper Jhelum Canal was constructed during the British Raj. The Punjab government under the British Raj generously gave facilities to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir and his subjects, inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir received royalty from the Punjab government up till 1947, because the Canal originates from the River Jhelum and runs through the Jammu and Kashmir territory before it enters Punjab territory near a place called Ali Baig. When the British Raj ended on 15 August 1947, the so called big brother of Kashmiris emerged as an independent country. Since that date we have not received anything as a royalty. After that date we are systematically exploited and looted.

On 22 October 1947, in violation of a written agreement Pakistani government managed a tribal attack which resulted in death of tens of thousands of innocent men, women and children, rapes, kidnapping and plunder. The attackers were told everything which is removable is yours and everything else belonged to Pakistan, meaning land, buildings and natural resources etc belonged to Pakistan.

From that day onwards there has been one way traffic, exploitation, manipulation, looting and plunder of our resources by Pakistan. Billions of Rupees worth property belonging to State of Jammu and Kashmir was takeover by Pakistan, and to date we have not received any rent or proceedings of these properties. In another article I have provided some details of these properties. 1

Exploitation over Mangla Dam is very well documented by many writers, and I have also written a number of articles on this topic. In nutshell, Pakistan did not build Kala Bagh Dam in Pakistan to meet water and energy requirements of Pakistan, but uprooted tens of thousands of people of Mirpur and built Mangla Dam against our wishes. Thousands of families were not paid any compensation and no proper arrangements were made to settle these people. Innocent people were promised free electricity, but in reality we pay more per unit than people of District Jhelum just a few miles away.

The Dam was completed in 1967, and it’s all costs were recovered after 5 years; but Azad Kashmir was not paid anything in the form of royalty. We cannot use the water of the Dam; and we don’t have sufficient drinking water. After the upraising of the Mangla Dam, it has capacity to produce 1400 MW. There are other small and medium size projects which take the current production of electricity to more than 1500 MW. If we generously use electricity in Azad Kashmir, still our requirement is less than 350 MW.

Question arises why do we suffer from long hours of load shedding when we produce five times more than our requirement? All the electricity produced first goes to Pakistan, so called National Grid. From there the Pakistani officials distribute electricity to various places; and we know for sure that we are not on top of their list of priorities, hence up to 14 -16 hours load shedding in our region. If we complain or expose this we are labelled as ‘anti Pakistan’ and in some cases ‘agents of India’ and other countries.

Our just demand: we must have priority in use of our electricity, water and other natural resources. Any surplus, Pakistan should buy from us; and not exploit us like an imperial power.

There are many other means of exploitation and I cannot include all the forms of exploitation in one article.2 Just take example of Neelam Jhelum Project. People of Pakistan did not allow construction of Kala Bagh Dam even though it was to benefit Pakistan. Pakistan is constructing Neelam Jhelum Dam near Muzaffarabad against our wishes. Hundred percent benefits of this dam will go to Pakistan. We will only suffer from environment problems; and to rub salt in our wounds Pakistan is charging each household of Azad Kashmir around 20 Rs per month for the construction of this dam.

If there were 300,000 households in Azad Kashmir, and if we multiply that with 20 Rs per month, call it ‘Jaga tax or ‘Bhata collection’ net income of Pakistan per month is 6.000,000. If this is multiplied that with 12 months, net profit is: 72,000,000 per annum. Pakistan has been looting this for many years. Those who complain against this or expose this day light robbery, they are accused of being anti Pakistan and agents of India. Mental slaves and foot soldiers of Pakistan choose to remain quiet because they don’t want to be in the bad books of Pakistan and their agencies.

A friend who is in a position of some authority has provided me some information and I want to share that readers. I will never let this friend down. He is a true well wisher of the people of Jammu and Kashmir; better than many people with hat of nationalism on their heads.

Below is a list of projects in Azad Kashmir. Some of the projects are completed and producing electricity; and others are under construction. There are only seven projects which have not started and I have put potential against them. If we had no other form of income, and we only relied on our water/ electricity resources we can be many times better off than many countries in the world, including Pakistan, which says Azad Kashmiri people will starve without help of Pakistan.

  1. Tahobat:        5 MW
  2. Janawahi:    5 MW
  3. Shontar:         20 MW
  4. Sharda           3 MW
  5. Gurnot            40 MW potential
  6. Dorain           14 MW potential
  7. Nagdar           5.4 MW
8.    Keel                0.2 MW
  1. Kundal shahi 2 MW
  2. Jagran            30 MW
  3. Jagran 2        45 MW potential
  4. Jagran 4         08 MW
  5. Madar Buldara 10.2 MW
  6. Riali 3              3.7 MW
  7. Jhing 1            14 MW  potential
  8. Jhing 2             03 MW potential
  9. Riali 1              1.6 MW
  10. Riali 2                         4.9 MW
  11. Pattika                        0.2 MW
  12. Patrind                       147 MW
  13. Rara                           35   MW
  14. Neelam Jhelum        968 MW
  15. Harriola                      12 MW
  16. Hoteri                         5.4MW
  17. Kathai                        3.2MW
  18. Kathai 2                     5 MW
  19. Leepa                         1.6 MW
  20. Chammfall:               6.5 MW
  21. Chinari                       0.1MW
  22. Chakothi Hatian       139 MW
  23. Mahl                           590 MW
  24. Hari Ghal                   54 MW potential
  25. Qadirabad                 3 MW

  1. Barar              1MW potential
  2. Rerah             1.5 MW
  3. Baltar              4.8 MW
  4. Azad Patan  650 MW
  5. Hajira              2 MW
  6. Pothi               0.2 MW potential
  7. Shera             130 MW
  8. Dakhari          2.2 MW
  9. Kotli                100 MW
  10. Sarhota          1 MW
  11. Sarsawa        07 MW
  12. Kotli Ban        1 MW
  13. Gulpur Kotli   100 MW
  14. Rajdhni          132 MW
  15. Dhanwan      1.5 MW
  16. Mangla           1400 MW
  17. New Bong     84 MW
  18. Jari                  1 MW
  19. Samahni        1.6 MW
  20. Pathi               0.2 MW 3

Writer is a political analyst, TV anchor and author of many books and booklets. Also he is Chairman South Asia Watch and Director Institute of Kashmir Affairs.



3/Hydel Power Projects Status (Azad Jammu and Kashmir of Pakistan)
Hydel Power Resources of Pakistan– 2011

Tuesday, 24 January 2017


Pakistan continues to burnish its credentials as a state sponsor of terrorism abroad and as a repressive, murderous environment for dissidents at home.  It is a well-known fact that Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies provide a full suite of state support to a deadly menagerie of militant groups proscribed by the United Nations, the United States, and others. Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies fete terrorist organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba/Jamaat-ud-DawaJaish-e-Mohammad, the Afghan Taliban, and the Haqqani Network, among numerous other groups with state protection as well as  financial, diplomatic, political, and military assistance.  The leaders of these groups are free to assemble and address large groups, under the protection of security forces. They are free to disseminate their views on a variety of social media without any restraint. They appear on Pakistan’s various television shows as popular “talking heads.”
While Pakistan disingenuously claims it is waging a war on terrorists with its National Action Plan (known more appropriately as “NAP”) for purposes of receiving assistance from the United State and other partners, Pakistan is waging a real war on its critics at home and abroad.  The United States needs to hold this state accountable. It should apply sanctions, deny security assistance payments, and limit the provision of military equipment and training to those that are narrowly suited for internal security operations while offering Islamabad no advantages in its incessant warmongering towards India.
War on Civil Society
Pakistani civil society has borne the brunt of the state’s predations for decades.  Since 2005, ethnic dissidents have renewed their insurgency in the western province of Balochistan, following the rape of a Baloch doctor by a military man, which the army tried to cover up.  While the rape triggered the current phase of the insurgency, the people of Balochistan have also been disquieted by Pakistan’s efforts to make the province ripe for Chinese exploitation under the guise of the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)Since 2005, the Pakistani state has waged a conventional war against the Baloch and has disappeared, tortured, and murdered Baloch ethnics who oppose the state’s policies. Pakistan claims that these Baloch activists are terrorists who enjoy support from India. While some of the Baloch dissidents do engage in terrorism (i.e. targeting Punjabi teachers and other civilians), Pakistan has not marshalled convincing evidence for its claim that India is behind the unrest in the province. (Pakistan claims that it captured an Indian spy  in Balochistan in March 2016.  Indian intelligence claim that the former naval officer — turned businessman — was abducted from Iran and that he was not actually a spy.)
Pakistan’s army and the intelligence agencies it controls have also targeted civil society activists who report on human rights violations in Balochistan.  In April 2015, Sabeen Mahmud, a prominent Pakistani social and human rights activist, was shot dead after she hosted an event in her Karachi café that discussed Balochistan’s “disappeared people.” Previously, the army pressured LUMS, a prestigious university in Lahore, to cancel a similar event intended to educate students about the state’s actions in Balochistan. The state has also brutalized other foes of CPEC in the northern areas of Gilgit-Baltistan.
In August 2016, Pakistan passed a new law, the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016. This law broadened Pakistan’s ability to crackdown on its critics rather than terrorists and criminals. The law allows the government to “censor online content and to criminalize internet user activity under extremely broad and vague criteria. The law also sanctions government authorities to access data of internet users without judicial review or oversight.” While in principle this is a civilian affair, the government acquiesced to the ISI’s demand for “legal cover for action against those allegedly committing online crimes against the state and undermining the national security and [law makers] had to agree with the proposal.” Consistent with Pakistan’s war on civil society, this law is not being used to restrict the myriad Pakistani terrorists who avidly use social media to spread their messages of “jihad” and other violent fatuity.
The first victims of this law were, in fact, civil society activists who were well-known for their reformist views exposited through social media.  Pakistan’s security agencies disappeared Waqas Goraya and Asim Saeed on January 4,  Salman Haider on January 6, and Ahmed Raza Naseer on January 7. Their “crimes” included promoting progressive, inclusive, and secular views that undermined the state-sponsored narrative of exclusivist definitions of Sunni Islam, support for Islamist terrorism and insurgency as tools of state policy, while also decrying the lack of protection for religious minorities and members of Muslim sects in Pakistan.  To make matters worse, Pakistan’s religious fanatics have filed charges of blasphemy against these men. This effectively ensures that when these men are released, they will face a serious death threat. Persons in Pakistan accused of blasphemy are frequently murdered by vigilantes who are never punished for their bloody crimes.
This is surely an underestimate of the numbers of persons taken by Pakistan’s agencies. Naseer was taken along with a friend who recently came from Holland.  In August 2015, Pakistan disappeared Zeenat Shahzadi, a 24-year-old female reporter who had been investigating the case of Hamid Ansari, an Indian citizen who disappeared while in Pakistan in November 2012. In May 2011, Saleem Shahzad, a journalist who exposed security lapses as well as infiltration of the armed forces by the Islamists, was murdered by Pakistani intelligence. After these attacks, as well as an attack on a popular television host, Hamid Mir, dozens of journalists told Amnesty International about the threats they endured. According to Amnesty International:
[J]ournalists are particularly at risk when exposing security lapses by the military, or the army’s alleged links to banned military groups such as the Taliban. Also highly sensitive are stories about abuses committed by security forces fighting separatist rebels in the province of Balochistan.
Not only has Pakistan’s premiere intelligence agency waged a war on critics at home, they have also waged a war on critics abroad. In addition to threatening me with gang rape by an entire regiment in 2011 because they were unhappy with the research I was doing on the Pakistan Army, the ISI has waged a sustained information operations campaign against me, including this recent video.  In February 2016, they placed an article in The News, accusing me of supporting militants in Balochistan.  Also in February 2016, a known ISI-writer planted a story about me and my colleagues in the Pakistan Observer after Georgetown hosted Ambassador Husain Haqqani to discuss his most recent bookAfter I wrote about the ISI’s war on scholars, the Pakistan Observer removed the noxious and slanderous article.  In addition, the Pakistan Embassy has insisted that neither Husain Haqqani nor myself be invited to the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington when Pakistan military delegations visit. Shockingly, the NDU acquiesced. These ruses are examples of the myriad efforts by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies to manipulate Pakistan’s print, radio, and televised media as a part of the state’s discourse construction and efforts to manage information produced about Pakistan abroad. In fact, the ISI, has a media management wing dedicated to such efforts.
What Should the United States Do?
At first blush, one may ask why is this America’s responsibility? The answer is simple:  The United States has aided and abetted the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies through its ample provision of security assistance. It is therefore responsible for how these funds are used. Of the $33 billion spent on Pakistan since 2001, $22 billion went to security assistance and military payments through the lucrative Coalitions Support Fund. In addition, the United States is supposed to deny security assistance to  security forces that engage in human rights abuses per the Leahy Amendment.  According to current American law, the U.S. government is required to impose Leahy Amendment sanctions on any unit engaging in human rights violations. Despite outrageous human rights abuses by Pakistan’s military, the United States has turned a blind eye with one exception in 2010 when a video showing mass execution went viral.  However, the import of this punishment was obviated by the simultaneous announcement of a $2 billion aid package.  The United States has fostered the environment of impunity in which the army and its intelligence organizations currently operate.
Given my belief that the United States has done much to encourage the conditions in which the army operates, it needs to act swiftly to address the immediate crisis of these activists whose lives are in jeopardy. The United States needs to get these men released and arrange for their safe resettlement out of Pakistan. With blasphemy charges hanging over their head, they are unlikely to survive long even if the ISI were to release them.
Next, the United States needs to punish Pakistan’s armed forces and intelligence agencies for these and other crimes such as the unending campaign of violence in Balochistan.
During his confirmation hearing, Secretary of Defense James Mattis questioned the wisdom  of placing conditions on security assistance to Pakistan. Mattis argued that conditionalities have not incentivized positive Pakistani behavioral changes. This is a dangerous conclusion.  The real problem, in fact, is that most of the assistance has not been conditioned. In other words, Pakistan has suffered no significant penalties for its suite of noxious policies most notably Islamist terrorism under its nuclear umbrella that endanger the region and the world. If the past is prologue, the new administration may not learn the drivers of Pakistan’s behavior until it is too late.
In light of Pakistan’s persistent intransigence, the time has long come to cease reimbursing Pakistan for its security operations. Pakistan is obligated under U. N. Security Council resolution 1373 to ensure that terrorists do not act on its soil. Why should the United States reimburse Pakistan for following through on this obligation? Moreover, such payments do not incentivize Pakistan to shut down all terrorists operating on its soil. Rather, these disbursements incentivize Pakistan to continue recruiting new terrorists who will do its bidding in India and Afghanistan, while conducting partial operations against those that oppose the state.
Second, the United States should restrict its security assistance to Pakistan to include only the narrowly selected weapons systems and training programs that are best suited for internal security operations which offer no significant added capability in Pakistan’s perduring interest in fighting India.  Given that the majority of American and allied deaths in Afghanistan are due to the Pakistan’s proxies (i.e. the Taliban, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba), how can the United States continue viewing Pakistan as an ally? The evidence is clear: Pakistan’s army and the intelligence agencies it oversees are enemies of the United States and should be treated as such.
Finally, the United States should apply Leahy Amendment sanctions to those units that have engaged in human rights abuses.  The United States should work through the defense attachés at post to vigorously collect information on those units engaging in these abuses. There is no question that such abuses are ongoing. The only question is which units are doing it. The U.S. government should take its own laws seriously and apply them as required.  It is simply not acceptable to continue ignoring this legal obligation while pandering to Pakistan’s security forces and intelligence agencies whose perfidy is illimitable.
The Pakistan military is waging a war on democracy at home and wars in Afghanistan and India with the subsidy of the United States. So far, Washington has shown nothing but pusillanimity and cupidity in contending with Pakistan even though Pakistan is the root cause of American failures in Afghanistan as well as insecurity throughout South Asia and beyond. Unless the United States stops somnambulating in its management of the threats that Pakistan’s army and ISI pose to itself and to its neighbors, more people will die. And, Washington will bear considerable responsibility for those deaths.
Christine Fair is an associate professor in the Security Studies Program in Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She is the author of Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War and co-editor of Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges.