Can the Delhi Blast result in Sindhoor 2? Response Options of India and Calculations of Pakistan. By Dr Shabir Choudhry, 11 November 25

 Can the Delhi Blast result in Sindhoor 2?

Response Options of India and Calculations of Pakistan

 

By Dr Shabir Choudhry, 11 November 25

 

The Indian Prime Minister, who is on a visit to Bhutan, while talking about the Delhi blast, said:

‘Conspirators behind this will not be spared, {and} those responsible for the deadly blast will be brought to justice’, reported Aljazeera.com.

The Indian Home Minister Amit Shah, who chaired a high-level security review meeting at his residence, said:

‘Those behind the tragedy will be brought to justice.’ He said,

“The findings of the investigation will soon be made public.” He assured that ‘those responsible for this tragedy will be brought to justice and will not be spared under any circumstances,” reported the BBC.

 

1. Delhi’s Red Fort Explosion and response options for India.

 

On 10 November 2025, a powerful explosion near Delhi’s Red Fort metro station killed at least thirteen people and injured twenty-four more. As expected, the Indian authorities tied the blast to a terror network allegedly linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives, and even implicated cross-border launchpads in Bangladesh, reported India’s The Economic Times.

 

The timing and location of the attack, in India’s national capital, have inflicted an acute political and security shock. Indeed, it is a very serious matter; innocent lives have been lost, but what can India do when there is no conclusive evidence of who is behind this terrorist act?

 

Solid evidence, or not, the Indian government would be under huge pressure to show its resolve to punish those responsible. But where are the culprits who should be punished? However, India’s immediate calculus:

 

·  Do nothing and risk being blamed for weakness.

 

·  Strike back, like it did in May 2025, and risk escalation with Pakistan.

 

If this had happened before the Bihar elections, which have just finished, and if India had attacked Pakistan, many in India would have thought this was done to win the elections.

 

Now that the elections have finished, the Modi government can flex its muscles and try to take revenge for the setback of Operation Sindhoor.

 

2. From May 2025 to Now: The Template of Crisis

 

The May 2025 clash between India and Pakistan was triggered by a terrorist attack in Kashmir and answered by India’s coded “Operation Sindhoor.” It showed that India had abandoned the old policy of strategic restraint, and the new template was to strike back at targets in Pakistan and in POK, the area of Jammu and Kashmir occupied by Pakistan.

 

One wonders, after what happened in May 2025, is this a sensible policy or an actionable roadmap? If India attacks again, which many analysts would consider part two of Operation Sindhoor, Pakistan’s response would also be appropriate and damaging.

 

It must be remembered that India’s conclusion post-May 2025 was clear: deterrence must be maintained through capability and credibility. Prime Minister Narendra Modi later asserted India had merely “paused military action” and retained the option to act again.

 

In this framing, the Delhi blast sets the stage for a possible second round—but with important differences.

 

3. Why India May Strike Now — And Pakistan’s Dilemma

•  Domestic outrage in India gives little space for inaction.

•  Having just completed elections in Bihar, India can claim the response is not electoral theatre but national defence.

•  Demonstrating capability after May 2025 now matters more for credibility and deterrence.

 

Pakistan’s dilemma:

•  Publicly, Islamabad labels any pretext for Indian retaliation as “false-flag” operations, aiming to delegitimise Indian claims.

•  Militarily, Pakistan is on high alert; government statements hint at readiness to retaliate if hit.

•  Strategically, Pakistan must balance between escalation and preserving nuclear deterrence logic. Excessive escalation threatens its economy and global standing.

 

4. Could This Trigger “Sindoor II”?

 

Yes—it could—but it is not inevitable.

 

If India strikes with scale, Pakistan will retaliate, triggering a rapid tit-for-tat exchange. However, both sides learned from May 2025:

·  Nuclear deterrence,

·  Global diplomatic pressure, and

·  Economic cost limits catastrophic escalation.

 

The real danger lies in brief but sharp crisis cycles, using missiles, drones, and limited cross-border strikes.

 

Role of neighbours in the event of a war

•  Afghanistan: While Kabul opening a direct front is unlikely, proxy activity from Afghan soil is conceivable and would raise Pakistan’s southern flank pressure.

•  China: Beijing’s likely role remains supportive to Pakistan’s defence and diplomatic shielding—but direct Chinese dynamic action against India would carry extraordinary risk and is therefore improbable.

•  Bangladesh: Reports of The Times of India suggest LeT and other groups seek to use Bangladesh as a launchpad against India. In my view, it is highly unlikely that Dhaka can openly join a war. However, it is possible that some covert involvement or militant sanctuary opens a potential third front.

The possible scenario: India strikes Pakistan; Pakistan retaliates; Afghanistan/militants open southern pressure; Bangladesh involvement; China supplies or threatens but avoids direct combat.

Even this scenario can lead to a longer escalation, leading to a full-scale war, which could be disastrous for the region and have serious global implications.

 

5. Key Strategic Variables to Watch

 

•  Nature of Indian strike: Is it limited, precision-based, or broad targeting infrastructure? Larger scale raises escalation risk.

•  Pakistan’s response: Will Pakistan retaliate with missile/drone strikes, launch a limited cross-border raid, or seek diplomatic containment?

•  International intervention: The U.S., GCC and China all moved quickly in May 2025 to mediate and push for a ceasefire. Their role again will shape the outcome.

•  Local civilian casualties / mis-hits: Civilian deaths often force political escalation.

•  Mediation channels open: If military-to-military hotlines and state diplomacy are active, crisis control is more likely.

•  Proxy/front expansions: Activity along the Afghan-Pakistan border, insurgent use of Bangladesh routes, and Chinese intelligence support all raise multi-front risk.

 

6. Policy Recommendations

 

For India: Ensure any response is publicly framed as anti-terrorism (not war with Pakistan), emphasise precision, provide evidence of Pakistani linkage, and keep diplomatic channels open.

 

For Pakistan: Avoid reflexive retaliatory rhetoric, seek to de-escalate publicly, allow independent investigation of the attack and reaffirm its own counter-terrorism credentials to prevent isolation.

 

For both: Institutionalise dialogue—even limited—at military and diplomatic levels to avoid miscalculation. Use third-party mediation as a safety valve.

 

7. Conclusion

 

The Delhi blast is more than a tragic incident—it is a fault line in India-Pakistan relations. India is under pressure to respond; Pakistan is bracing for it. The risk of a second “Operation Sindoor” is real, but a full-scale three-front war remains unlikely—though not impossible. The next few days will test both nations’ capacity for restraint and strategic judgment.

 

Given the stakes—a nuclear-armed region, global energy links, and billions of citizens—the world cannot afford miscalculation. Strategic restraint, diplomatic engagement, and transparent investigation are not signs of weakness—they are today’s only path to preventing another South Asian conflagration. END