Militant Abuses, Human Rights report
“These people can
kill anyone at any time. Earlier, the militants were our own people, so if
there was some problem, we could go and sort it out with the family or send a
message. Now, who knows who they are or what they want…. I dare not complain or
my other sons will die too.”
—Human Rights Watch interview with the mother of a man killed by militants461
As India and Pakistan prepared to roll
out a bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad on April 7, 2005, allowing
Kashmiri families separated for nearly six decades by the Line of Control to
meet with each other, Indian troops lined the road to the border.462 The
irony was evident. To protect Kashmiris from militants ostensibly fighting on
their behalf, it was the abusive Indian army that was deployed along the
road––a road whose reopening was welcomed by ordinary Kashmiris. It was Indian
security forces who walked the entire stretch of the route, looking for mines
planted by militants, keeping their eyes and ears open to prevent an ambush. In
Srinagar, as an extra security measure, it was police officers, and not the
passengers themselves, who lined up to pick up and then pass out tickets for
that first bus journey.
Kashmiris had responded with enthusiasm
to the bus and there was a rush to reserve seats.463 However,
in a statement, armed groups threatened to derail the proposal, warning that
the passengers entering the bus would be entering their “coffin.”464 A
statement issued in the name of four little known groups was faxed to
journalists in Jammu and Kashmir.465 The
name of each passenger who had reserved a seat on the bus was included in the
statement, and some of them received threatening telephone calls. A second
statement issued on April 2, 2005, warned:
We are telling the people once more not
to take a pleasure ride on a bus that will be traveling on the bodies of
thousands of martyrs who have died for the cause of Kashmir. Don’t invite
death.466
On April 6, 2005, a day before the bus
service was due to start, militants attacked the Tourist Reception Center in
Srinagar, where the passengers had been put up. Six persons were injured
and one of the gunmen killed, and part of the reception center burned down.467
In defiance of the threats from the
militants, the passengers––and the governments—went ahead with the journey.
Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control lined the streets, waving and
greeting the passengers.468 Both
the Indian and Pakistani governments, as well as many in the media, criticized
the threats and the attack on the tourist center. According to M.J. Akbar, a
Kashmir expert and editor of the Asian Age:
Those who believed that terrorism would
succeed clearly did not think through the consequences. Their guns were trained
on ordinary Kashmiris, the very people they were seeking to “liberate.”469
From the earliest years of the
conflict, militant organizations fighting for Jammu and Kashmir’s independence
or accession to Pakistan have committed grave human rights abuses and
violations of international humanitarian law. Although independent
figures are not available, militant attacks are believed to have resulted in
the loss of thousands of civilian lives.470
In the early years of the conflict,
many Kashmiris refused to believe that the militants were capable of human
rights abuses. That has changed. During our research, villagers often provided
accounts of both militant abuse and abuses by government troops. Even Kashmiri
leaders, who for a long time refused to acknowledge abuses by people they call
“freedom fighters,” are finally admitting to violations by the armed groups.
Said Abdul Ghani Bhat, a leader of one faction of the All Parties Hurriyat
Conference, now admits that his brother was killed by a militant group and not
by security forces as he had claimed for years:
My message to these people is that when
you are fighting for a cause that you believe is noble, you cannot do such
ignoble things. It does not serve the cause.471
Armed opposition groups, as well as
government forces, are obliged to abide by international humanitarian
law. While attacks by armed groups on military targets violate domestic
law, they are normally not violations of international law. Prohibited
are attacks against civilians and civilian objects, attacks that do not
discriminate between military targets and civilians, and attacks on military
targets that cause disproportionate loss of civilian life. Killings of
government officials, politicians, and civilians assisting the authorities, and
who are not directly participating in the hostilities, are thus unlawful.
Captured combatants and detained civilians must be treated humanely at all
times.
*
* *
Militants have been responsible for a
long string of massacres, attacks on minority Hindus and Sikhs, bombings,
killings and attacks on schools. The most recent massacre was in May 2006, when
thirty-five Hindus were killed in remote hamlets of Doda and Udhampur districts;
police blamed the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba.472
Despite their scale and frequency,
abuses by militants in Jammu and Kashmir are seldom carefully documented. One
reason for this is that militant groups are not state actors. Even the State
Human Rights Commission says that it concentrates on abuses by state agencies.473 Another
reason is that Pakistan seems beyond the reach of Kashmiri NGOs and victim
groups.
Another explanation is that within
Jammu and Kashmir there is greater political sympathy for the militants’ cause
than for the government. Violations by armed groups are rarely opposed as
vociferously as those committed by Indian security forces.
But a key reason for the lack of
attention is less widely discussed: people are afraid that they too will be
targeted. In interviews with Human Rights Watch, ordinary Kashmiris, as well as
journalists and human rights defenders, said that there was deep fear in Jammu
and Kashmir of the militants. Militant abuses have been brutal, plentiful, and
continuous against anyone seen to be opposed to their agenda. To give one
example, in July 2004 militants barged into the home of fifty-five-year-old
Mohammed Shafi and decapitated him because they thought he was a police
informer. They also beheaded his twenty-two-year-old son and fifteen-year-old
daughter.474 In
August 2004, Ghulam Hussain, his two sons and a daughter were shot dead.
According to police, militants had targeted the family because a third son, who
was not at home during the attack, was with the state police.475
Kashmiris who help the armed forces,
particularly special police officers (SPOs)476 and
members of Village Defense Committees (VDCs),477 have
been particularly targeted. On August 13, 2005, alleged militants killed five
people and wounded nine others when they attacked families of VDC members.478
On August 9, 2005, the body of SPO Zubai Ahmad was found hanging from a tree
near his home after he had been abducted.479 On
April 25, 2004, alleged militants beheaded the wife and eight-year-old daughter
of SPO Ghulam Hassan Qureshi in Baramulla.480
As militant groups lost ground to
security forces, they have increasingly made indiscriminate use of bombs,
grenades, landmines, and other explosive devices, with predictable civilian
casualties. According to Landmine Monitor, at least five militant groups
have used such devices.481 For
instance, on November 3, 2005, six people including four civilians were killed,
and over twenty injured, in a car bomb explosion by the Jaish-e-Mohammad
militant group in Srinagar.482
Two weeks later, a grenade attack during a public meeting of PDP leader Ghulam
Hassan Mir in Baramulla killed four people.483 In
an effort to disrupt a conflict resolution conference organized by Prime
Minister Singh in May 2006, militants launched a number of grenade attacks,
injuring twenty-three, most of them civilians.484 On
May 22, 2006, two militants opened fire at a Congress party rally in Srinagar,
killing six, including three civilians, and injuring thirty-five; the militants
were also killed. Two militant groups, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Al Mansoorian,
claimed responsibility.485
Indian paramilitary soldiers check the
ID of local Kashmiri men trying to gain access to their offices the day after
an attack by suspected Pakistani Islamist militants in the center of Srinagar's
business district, July 30, 2005. Militants opened fire on nearby Indian
security positions, stopping afternoon rush hour traffic and pinning down
hundreds of soldiers and police. Five security men were killed and six other
people were wounded, including local journalists caught in the crossfire. Two
of the suspected militants were killed.
© 2005 Robert Nickelsberg
Some of the most egregious militant
abuses have been carried out against members of Kashmir’s religious and ethnic
minorities. This risks turning what has been primarily a political conflict
into a religious one, something that many Kashmiri Muslims say they are worried
about. Since the conflict began, there have been at least twenty massacres of
minority groups in which militant gunmen have specifically targeted and then
indiscriminately fired upon groups of unarmed civilians, usually in the middle
of the night when they were asleep.486 A
day after the October 2005 earthquake that killed over seventy thousand people,
most of them in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, militants murdered ten Hindus in
Rajouri district.487In
July 2005, five Hindu men were separated from their Muslim neighbors by alleged
militants, and their throats slit.488 In
2003, after militants killed twenty-four Hindu pandits in
Nadimarg near Srinagar, including eleven women and two children, many pandits fled
to Hindu-majority Jammu.489 They
joined the nearly sixty thousand Hindu families who have been internally
displaced from Muslim majority areas by the threats and attacks of militant
groups.490 Recent
attempts by moderate separatist leaders to bring them back home have been
opposed by militants, who issued a statement in July 2005 saying: “We impose a
ban on the return of Kashmiri pandit migrants to the Valley.”491
Militants have targeted Kashmiri
Muslims in large numbers because of their suspected support for the Indian
government, or because they otherwise opposed the policies or practices of one
or another of the militant groups. According to the Mumbai-based International
Center for Peace Initiatives, nearly 85 percent of those killed by militants
have been Kashmiri Muslims.492
Militants say they are in favor of self-determination,
which can only be determined by a vote, yet they target individuals who
participate in elections. Alleged militants have killed at least 571
political party workers, election candidates, and elected leaders between 1989
and March 2005.493 Many
more have come under attack. Officials conducting polls have also been cruelly
treated.494 While
militant groups seldom claim responsibility for such attacks, or do so under
previously unknown names, most families of victims interviewed by Human Rights
Watch placed responsibility with the militant groups. In some cases the victims
had received anonymous warnings before they were killed.
Some armed groups have threatened and
attacked journalists, broadly undermining free expression and the media in
Kashmir. On February 9, 2006, activists from one faction of the Jammu Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF) ransacked the Srinagar office of the daily Greater
Kashmir and assaulted its employees, demanding that the group’s press
releases be published.495 Journalists
interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they had received anonymous
threatening phone calls from alleged militants demanding coverage of their
statements or disagreeing with the description of events in their news reports.496 Often,
they end up reporting unsubstantiated claims by so-called militant groups. As
one journalist explained:
We can never be sure if these callers
are legitimate, nor can we afford to ignore them because that would mean risking
annoying the militant groups.497
Some women have also been punished for
not adopting Islamic dress codes as demanded by some militant groups.498 Cable
television operators, beauty salons, and Internet centers have been targeted
for promoting “immorality.” In May 2006, cable operators were once again asked
not to broadcast some channels.499 Recently,
the Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Jihadi-Islami has asked women to stop using mobile
phones or to visit public parks.500
Although the rebellion in Jammu and
Kashmir began as an indigenous movement, from the outset the armed response was
actively supported and fueled by Pakistan.501
The earliest efforts to oppose Indian
rule were started by the pro-independence Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front in
1988. It found enormous support in Jammu and Kashmir. The JKLF was responsible
for some acts of violence, including the 1989 abduction of the daughter of Home
Minister (later Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister) Mufti Mohammad Sayeed and
attacks on some Hindu Kashmiri pandits, but it also led a largely
peaceful people’s movement. As described in Section II, above, heavy-handed
counter-insurgency efforts by the Indian government followed, with brutal
crackdowns and firing on unarmed protesters. At the same time, hundreds of
young Kashmiris began to cross the Line of Control for arms and training in
Pakistan. One former militant described that time to Human Rights Watch:
I was about fifteen. Still in school. I
decided to go too…. Why? Well, everyone was going and they would laugh if you
did not. And also, everyone had a gun and it seemed important that I should
have one too, just in case.502
When this man arrived at the training
camp, he met his elder brother there, who forced him to go back:
He said that our mother would be very
upset if both her sons disappeared like this. I did the training and brought
the gun back. But I did not take part in any operations. Later, I was scared
that the police would come looking for weapons, so I gave away the gun and went
back to school.503
Like this man, in the early days the
militants were overwhelmingly Kashmiris from the central valley, many from
Srinagar. Later, Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) began
promoting another Kashmiri group, the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin which supported
accession to Pakistan and was opposed to the JKLF’s pro-independence stance.
By the end of 1990, many members of the
JKLF had begun to come under attack from the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin. But even if
they joined organizations such as Hizb-ul Mujahideen, most Kashmiri militants
were essentially secular nationalists seeking the liberation of Jammu and
Kashmir from Indian rule. Kashmiri-speaking, they were also culturally and
linguistically distinct from the peoples of Azad Kashmir. Most had little or no
idea what Azad Kashmir was beyond a vague awareness that it was “Azad” (free)
under Pakistani control and would be the logical base from which to take on the
Indian state. At the time, Kashmiris held Pakistan in higher regard than India.504
In 1994, the JKLF, the engine of the
Kashmiri nationalist movement, declared a unilateral ceasefire which has
remained in effect ever since. The JKLF no longer has any military
capacity, but it has a large political presence and a great deal of public
support, particularly in Srinagar.
The withdrawal of the JKLF from armed
opposition opened the way for Pakistan-based groups to dominate the insurgency.
The situation transformed dramatically in 1994 when the ISI organized thirteen
groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir into the United Jihad Council (also known
as the Muttahida Jihad Council). Apart from the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, the other
members included the Harkat-ul-Ansar, Jamiat-ul-Mujahedin, and Al-Jihad.
Kashmiris were largely replaced by Pakistani members of these groups.505 Many
villagers from the higher forested areas in the mountains told Human Rights
Watch that the armed gunmen operating in their areas were Urdu-speakers—that
is, from Pakistan.506
By early 1999, there were only four or
five groups within the United Jihad Council that were considered militarily
effective, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, Al Badr, and
Harkat-ul-Mujahedin. In a special report by the United States Institute of
Peace, a Kashmiri civil servant, Wajahat Habibullah, wrote:
[The insurgents] were financed,
supplied, and trained by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate
(ISI), which was still relishing its success in assisting the Afghans in their
resistance against the Soviet occupation…. The insurgency quickly dissipated
into a struggle for domination among different insurgent groups, and what had
begun as an ethnic conflict was given a religious color by the ISI, which
promoted religiously oriented outfits.507
Islamabad had always denied that
militant groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir were based in Pakistan.508 Since
Pakistan joined the U.S.-led “war on terror” in 2001, however, the United Jihad
Council has ceased to operate publicly. Several groups have changed their names
and operate independently or through clandestine underground networks.509 Previously,
militant groups would sometimes admit to killings. Since September 11, 2001,
statements are now often issued in the names of previously unknown groups,
bringing into question whether these groups genuinely exist or are just front
organizations. For example, in Jammu and Kashmir a spokesman claiming to
represent the “Save Kashmir Movement” has recently been calling journalists and
faxing statements.510 Journalists
and Indian intelligence agencies believe that the group is a front for the
banned Lashkar-e-Toiba. After a series of bomb blasts in New Delhi on October
29, 2005, that killed over fifty civilians, a little-known group called Islami
Inqilabi Mahaz claimed responsibility. Police later arrested a Kashmiri man
called Tariq Ahmed Dar in Srinagar, who is suspected to be a member of
Lashkar-e-Toiba. In March 2006, a series of bomb blasts in Varanasi killed
twenty people. While an unknown group called Lashkar-e-Qahar had called
journalists in Jammu and Kashmir to claim responsibility and threaten more
attacks, the police later claimed to have killed the main militant responsible
in an armed encounter in Jammu and Kashmir. The man was reportedly an Indian
citizen and a member of the Harkat-ul-Jihadi-Islami, an organization with links
to the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad.511
Indian intelligence agencies now claim
that most of the operations are carried out by the three or four primary groups
operating in Jammu and Kashmir: Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Al Badr and
Hizb-ul-Mujahedin.512 Of
the primarily Kashmiri armed groups, only the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin is still
considered influential. Its leader, Syed Salauddin, has been resident in
Pakistan since the late 1980s and, until the “war on terror,” used to meet
openly with journalists.
It is difficult to estimate the number
of militants actually operating in Jammu and Kashmir. More than twenty thousand
alleged militants have reportedly been killed since the conflict first began in
1988.513 At
least 4,500 alleged militants are presently in detention in Jammu and Kashmir,
while over three thousand have surrendered. According to Jane’s Defense Weekly:
The number of militant Kashmiri and
Pakistani fighters in Kashmir varies according to the intensity of operations
and climate. Usually there are between 2,500 and 5,000 guerrillas, many of whom
rotate between operational tours in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Central Asia, as well
as training and periods of rest in Pakistan.514
While infiltration has decreased, the
United Jihad Council still has machine guns, assault rifles, mortars,
explosives, mines, rockets, and some sophisticated military equipment supplied
by the Pakistani military, including night-vision equipment. Indian analysts
say that the ISI spends up to U.S.$45 million every year to fund the militancy.515 Pakistani
media reports and Human Rights Watch research in Azad Kashmir shows that
weapons and training continue to be provided to the militants by Pakistan.516
*
* *
The influx of militants from Pakistan
has transformed a conflict over identity and independence into an even more
dangerous fight driven by religion. Most Kashmiris resent religious extremism
that tends to focus more on Islamic religious rights instead of Kashmiri
rights.517 After
a fatal attack by militants on his uncle, separatist leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq
complained about the religious extremists:
From the day one, these forces have
tried their best… to sabotage our sacred movement, and with the mask of Islam…
have infiltrated into the rank and file of the movement for their trivial
interests.”518
Some Pakistani militants have admitted
to journalists that occasionally “innocents” have died during the Kashmir jihad,
but they explained that any Muslim should be honored to die for the cause.519 Kashmiris
increasingly seem to disagree. In a 2002 poll by MORI, 69 percent of
respondents in Jammu and Kashmir said they opposed the foreign militant groups
and 84 percent felt that Pakistan’s involvement was based on religious
affinity.520
There is resentment even in
Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Sardar Abdul Qayoom, president of
Pakistan-administered Kashmir and an influential pro-Pakistan voice, said
recently that the extremists who believe that Kashmir’s is a religious war have
done great damage: “Jihad has become a business now. In fact, the worst damage
to the Kashmir cause has been caused by jihadis.”521
Human Rights Watch takes no position on
state support, such as providing weapons and training, for armed opposition
groups in other countries. However, whenever such support is provided,
the state assumes certain responsibilities that can make it complicit in abuses
committed. Governments that provide support should take all necessary measures
to ensure that opposition forces abide by international humanitarian and human
rights law, and sever all support to groups that persistently violate
international legal standards.
While many Kashmiris say that without
the armed groups there would not have been international pressure on India and
Pakistan to resolve the problem, they also blame the militants for putting
civilians at risk through bomb and grenade attacks in crowded places and by
demanding food and shelter. Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, a leader of the All Party
Hurriyat Conference, whose father and uncle were killed by militants, has
consistently advocated a peaceful settlement to the Kashmir issue that
accommodates the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. “The gun has played a very
important role in the movement,” he says, “but militancy has to play a more
supportive role rather than the dominant role.”522
He, along with several other Kashmiri
rebel leaders, traveled to Pakistan several times to talk to Pakistani
political leaders and meet with the militant groups based in Pakistan.523 After
one such meeting, however, Syed Salauddin of Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, who also leads
the United Jihad Council, stated: “The need for an organized and massive armed
struggle has increased today more than ever and the Kashmiri youth need to
prepare themselves for fighting in maximum numbers”524
A day after an attack in the center of
Srinagar's business district on July 29, 2005, Indian paramilitary soldiers
inspect a room where a suspected Pakistani Islamist militant was killed. © 2005
Robert Nickelsberg
According to Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the
movement in Jammu and Kashmir has become divided, with some insisting that a
ceasefire and dialogue is the only option and others arguing for continuation
of the armed struggle:
There are some agencies who don’t want
a solution to the problem. These are hard-core organizations that see any
movement forward on Kashmir as a compromise on their ideology. There is now a
visible gap between those people who talk about a realistic approach and
flexibility and others that believe flexibility is treason….We have to talk to
these people. The gunmen have to be addressed….The Kashmiri leadership has to
take responsibility because scores of people are getting killed.525
Separatist leaders in Jammu and Kashmir
say that a settlement will be impossible unless it includes the Pakistan-based
militant groups. Yasin Malik of the JKLF told Human Rights Watch that in a
meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in February 2006 he proposed a
dialogue with militant leaders, to be held in a third country.
The Indian government is meeting Naga
leaders [from north-east India] in a third country. Something similar could be
arranged to talk to the militant leaders of Kashmir as well. But for this the
Indian government has to be serious about working out a settlement. What is the
use of talking peace if there is no serious effort by New Delhi to pursue a
peace process with the Kashmiris.526
In the meantime, militant abuses
continue, with no one in Pakistan or within the militant community holding
perpetrators accountable.
Political killings in Jammu and Kashmir
by militants are frequent. According to data compiled by the South Asia
Terrorism Portal , since the conflict began in 1989 and up to 2005 an estimated
571 political activists had been killed in Jammu and Kashmir.527 Militant
groups have strongly opposed any election processes in Jammu and Kashmir, and
many killings by militants take place in election periods. While the Indian
government has always portrayed elections as evidence that Kashmiris support
incorporation with India, militant groups as well as the All Party Hurriyat
Conference and other rebel political leaders have always called for poll
boycotts.
Militant groups have vigorously opposed
political parties that contest elections in Jammu and Kashmir, calling them
“Indian agents.” They call for poll boycotts in every election, bomb polling
stations, attack election agents and kill party activists. During the 2002
state assembly elections, at least forty-eight political workers and leaders
were killed and at least fifty polling stations were attacked.528 Saiful
Islam, a leader of the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, issued a threat: “Those participating
in the elections are traitors and action against them will be taken after the
elections are over.”529
During the May 2004 Indian
parliamentary election campaign, several groups, many of them Pakistan-based
ones like Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba, issued warnings, and cadres on
the ground were instructed to intimidate political workers and target campaign
rallies and meetings. An anonymous handwritten poster stuck on mosque walls,
for instance, carried a warning from the Jaish-e-Mohammad, telling People’s
Democratic Party workers “not to participate in the elections, or else face
consequences.”530 Once
again, there were a number of attacks and killings. Mukhtar Ahmad Bhat of
Janata Dal (U) was killed on March 18, 2004, and two days later Communist Party
of India (Marxist) leader Mohammad Yusuf Tarigami came under attack, as did PDP
leader Ghulam Hassan.531 Several
members of the National Conference have also been killed. In Malas village,
Udhampur district, a village leader named Misruddin and another man, Haji
Amkala, were punished for helping the government prepare for the elections:
their ears were chopped off.532
Former PDP Chief Minister Mufti
Mohammad Sayeed and his daughter, PDP President Mehbooba Mufti, have both
escaped several assassination attempts. On January 24, 2004, a hand grenade was
thrown at Mehbooba Mufti’s convoy. On April 8, 2004, a grenade explosion during
an election rally she was leading in Uri claimed eleven lives. The Save Kashmir
Movement claimed responsibility for the attack.533 Mehbooba
Mufti told Human Rights Watch:
So many of our workers have been
killed. And not only that, children have died because of grenade attacks at our
meetings. We have no control over these groups. We can only provide them with
alternatives and tell them that there is progress… India and Pakistan are
talking and dialogue has been offered to the militants as well. We have to
convince these groups that the Kashmir issue is being sorted out and that they
should not continue with the gun.534
In January-February 2005, elections
were held for urban civic bodies in Jammu and Kashmir. Many Kashmiris
participated because these elections gave them the opportunity to elect people
who would deal with local issues. Militant groups once again called for a
boycott. There were anonymous posters pasted on mosque walls and some
candidates received anonymous threatening telephone calls. After the election,
several elected council members have come under attack.535 Several
have resigned in fear, even asking pardon from militant groups in local
newspapers.536 For
instance, Gulam Rasool Khan, a PDP councilor who was elected unopposed to the
Beerwah municipal committee, said: “I will have no relation whatsoever with any
political party.”537 Others
are threatening to resign.538 One
council member told Human Rights Watch:
I did not participate in these
elections to show my support to India. I participated because my neighbors said
I would be able to solve our problems of water supply and cleanliness. But
these militants—who knows who they are?—are determined to punish us. There is
not even a scope for discussion because the decision to kill us is made in
Pakistan…. I try and take precautions when I go out of the house, but we are
all very scared. In my neighborhood, I have many supporters who will protect
me. But many others are in hiding. They are certain the militants will kill
them.539
Militants have also summarily executed
the children of persons targeted for attack. Two such cases—involving the
eight-year-old daughter of a special police officer in Baramulla, and the
fifteen-year-old daughter of an alleged police informer—have already been
described above, and in the Chak Dara case, discussed below, alleged militants
beheaded a twelve-year-old boy. Among those killed in the massacre of Hindus at
Nadimarg were two children.
The following are some individual cases
of politically motivated attacks, allegedly by militant groups. As with the
cases of those killed by Indian government forces, this list is intended to be
illustrative, not exhaustive.
Killing of Ghulam
Ahmad Ganai, November 11, 2005
As Ghulam Ahmad Ganai walked to the
mosque with his wife and daughters for Friday prayers, they saw six young men
lurking outside. According to daughter Nahida Chaman, “They must have been in
their early twenties. They were all in firans [long woolen shirts worn in
Kashmir]. My father asked them who they were, and invited them to prayers at
our mosque. But they refused and said they were waiting for someone.”540
Finishing his prayers early, Ghulam
Ahmad stepped out of the mosque. Two of the six men waiting outside opened fire.
Ghulam Ahmad was shot in the legs, arms and chest and fell to the ground. Other
people at the mosque rushed out. Some picked up the injured man, while others
tried to chase his attackers. But all six escaped, shouting, “We killed him
because he is like a dangerous bear.”541
Ghulam Ahmad had previously been a
militant, but surrendered and, in 1997, joined talks with the Indian
government. He also became a member of the National Conference, later switching
to the PDP and, in 2005, to the Congress party. According to Nahida Chaman,
We think it was a political killing.
The militants did not like that he was promoting peace in Kashmir. So they
killed him.542
No militant group has claimed
responsibility for the murder.543
Killing of Ghulam
Rasool Andrabi, also known as “Gayoor,” October 22, 2005
Shopkeepers in Pulwama had been
wondering about the young stranger, about age eighteen, who was walking up and
down in front of Ghulam Rasool Andrabi’s house. When Ghulam Rasool, a poet who
wrote under the penname “Gayoor,” stepped out of his gate to buy some sugar,
the shopkeepers saw the young man talk briefly into his cell phone. As Ghulam
Rasool returned to his house, he walked past the man, who then opened fire,
first hitting him on the leg. As Ghulam Rasool bent down to clutch his wound, another
shot was fired into the back of his head, killing him instantly. His killer ran
away.
Ghulam Rasool was a member of the
National Conference and a well known politician in the area. The army and the
police arrived immediately on the scene. Eyewitnesses in the bazaar said that
the shooting had happened so quickly that that they could not identify the
killer. A police complaint was lodged. The investigation has made little
progress, said his son Syed Wajahat Rasool Andrabi:
We know that the killer was a militant.
Two militants had come to our house a month before my father’s death. They did
not say anything to us. But now we think they had come to check out the area.
One-and-a-half months after my father was killed, both my brother and I
received an anonymous call on our cell phone. A man told us that we must leave
Pulwama within twenty-four hours, or we would meet the same fate as our father.
I told the caller that I thought it was a crank call. So he offered to meet me.
I refused. Then he said that I should check the number that had flashed on my
phone when he called. “Everyone knows that number,” he said. I said I had no
one to ask about all this and that we had nowhere to go, so we would not leave
our home. Then I heard shots being fired near the phone. The man said, now that
I had heard the firing, I should take the warning seriously and leave.544
The caller said to Wajahat Rasool that
he belonged to the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin. Wajahat Rasool and his brother
complained to the police about the threats, but they were told not to worry. No
additional security was provided. After the initial telephone call to the two
sons, there were several other threatening calls. In some of them, the
anonymous callers asked the family to go to the mosque and publicly beg
forgiveness. Syed Wajahat Rasool said their life is constantly at risk.
I said [to the callers], ‘what should
we apologize for? Tell us our mistake? You did not warn my father, you just
killed him.’ I refused to leave. But my mother is so scared, she does not let
us go out of the house. She has insisted that we disconnect our phones because
she does not want any more threats.”545
Wajahat Rasool also went to the mobile
phone company to check on the number from which the threats were made. The
number is listed under a resident of Shopian in Pulwama. The name and address
was also provided to the police, but according to Wajahat Rasool, there has
been no further investigation.
Killing of three men
and a boy in Chak Dara, July 17, 2005
Ghulam Qadar Uswal, a
forty-five-year-old hotelier, was a member of the National Conference. On July
17, 2005, a man came to call him from his hotel. According to his nephew:
My uncle was called away in the
evening. He did not return all night. We went looking for him in the morning
and eventually someone found him in an orchard near the forest. His throat had
been slit. While we were there, one of the villagers found another body a
little further away. And then we found two others. All of their throats were
slit.546
The three other dead were local
villagers who had gone out to the forest to gather herbs. Two were brothers,
Mukhtar Ahmad, age twelve, and Mohammad Ahwan, age thirty while the third was
their brother-in-law Mohammad Aslam. All four were Gujjars, tribal people who
live high in the mountains. Their families had repeatedly come under attack
from militants because they are suspected to be government informers.
The Gujjar and Bakarwal communities
often live in the upper mountains in the summer and come down to lower areas in
winter, when snow makes the heights uninhabitable. As they are familiar with
the mountain paths and passes, they often spot militants as they cross the
border into Jammu and Kashmir. These communities are ethnically different from
Kashmiris. It is believed that they often inform the security forces of
militant movements, particularly when they are hiding in the forested
mountains. As a result they have been coming under increasing attacks by
militants. Four Gujjars were killed in the Dachigam area near Srinagar in July
2005. Four others were killed in the same area in June 2005. On June 27, 2004,
twelve Gujjars were killed for allegedly helping the army to block a strategic
route in the Poonch sector.547
The Gujjars and Bakarwals have been
feeling increasingly threatened. Said one Gujjar man in Chak Dara:
We have a terrible time. We cannot step
out after dark. The militants are always roaming about and they attack us if we
see them.548
Killing of Mohammad
Ramzan Mian, May 3, 2005
A member of the Congress party,
fifty-two-year-old Mohammad Ramzan Mian, was very active during the 2002 state
assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir. According to his sister Wazira:
We used to receive threatening calls
from militants all the time. But he refused to stop. There was a bomb blast
right outside our house, but he still did not stop.549
In February 2005, Mohammad Ramzan
decided to contest the municipal elections. He won. Because of the threats from
militants, three armed policemen were assigned to provide security for him. On
May 3, 2005, when he was walking through the market barely a few hundred meters
from his house, gunmen opened fire. He and his personal security officer died
on the spot, while two security guards died later in hospital from gunshot
wounds.550 No
group has claimed responsibility for the killings.
Killing of Peer
Mohammad Maqbool Shah, February 9, 2005
Peer Mohammad Maqbool Shah was a member
of the National Conference. The seventy-year-old was very active in his
neighborhood. When the 2005 municipal elections were announced in Srinagar he
became the party candidate and was elected. Said his daughter-in-law:
We were against the decision. We
thought there was too much risk. One of my brothers-in-law had already been
killed by militants [Mohammad Maqbool’s son Peer Abdul Majid Shah, also a
National Conference member, had been shot dead in 1995]. We feared that the
militants would strike at us again. But my father-in-law was a very brave man.
He said that the militants were also his sons. They had just lost their way.
They would not hurt him.551
On February 9, 2005, Mohammad Maqbool
went for evening prayers to the neighborhood mosque. He was killed by a single
shot as he walked back home. No one saw the killer and no group has admitted to
the killing. However, his family says that they know he was killed by
militants. Said his daughter-in-law: “The militants had already warned people
against contesting. But he [Mohammad Maqbool] would not listen. So they killed
him.”552
Killing of Farooq
Ahmad Zargar, December 29, 2004
Farooq Ahmad Zargar had been a member
of the National Conference since he was a student. In 2002, when he was
actively campaigning for the party during the state elections, he came under
attack. An unknown gunman opened fire, wounding him in the leg. Although he
knew he was being targeted by militants, according to his brother Javed Ahmad
Zargar, he insisted on continuing to work for the party. He was planning to
contest the municipal elections in 2005.
On December 29, 2004, Farooq Ahmad went
to attend the funeral service of a relative. His brother was with him. It was
about 7:30 in the evening. His brother recounted:
Outside the graveyard, there are two
streets. There were two men waiting, one on each street. They were wearing
firans (long woolen shirts usually worn in Kashmir). They were holding guns
that had been hidden inside their sleeves. They both opened fire. My brother
fell down and they both ran away.553
Farooq Ahmad was rushed to hospital,
but did not survive his injuries. No group has claimed responsibility for the
killing.
Attacks on the
National Conference’s Dr. Farooq Abdullah and Omar Abdullah, and killing of
Safdar Ali Baig
The National Conference, the main
opposition party after its defeat in the 2002 Jammu and Kashmir state elections,
has long been a target of militants because of its participation in electoral
politics and its enormous clout in the state. Historically, it has remained the
state’s largest political party and its founder, Sheikh Abdullah, is still
highly respected. While the National Conference has always campaigned for
greater autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir, it does not support either independence
or accession to Pakistan. Although discredited because of rigged elections and
widespread corruption during the rule of Sheikh Abdullah’s son, Dr. Farooq
Abdullah, who remains the leader of the National Conference, the party is still
regarded as one of the greatest challenges to the separatist ideology of the
militants. It has now effectively led by Farooq Abdullah’s son, Omar Abdullah.
Several hundred National Conference
workers and leaders have been killed since 1989, with Safdar Ali Baig one of
the most prominent victims. A former minister and senior leader of the party,
Safdar Ali Baig was shot by masked gunmen as he came out of a mosque after
prayers on October 21, 2004. He was killed in Anantnag town.554 The
police said they suspected separatist militants of the killing. The National
Conference responded by demanding more security for party leaders and
activists.555
Yet on October 24, 2004, when Omar Abdullah, and several others were on their
way to attend the funeral ceremonies of Safdar Ali Baig, an improvised
explosive device was triggered just as they reached Sarnal graveyard in
Anantnag district, where the prayers were being held. Omar Abdullah’s car was
barely ten feet away. Although he escaped unhurt, seven people were injured in
the blast, one of them fatally. The attack followed an attack on October 9,
2004, when militants had opened fire on Omar Abdullah’s convoy as he traveled
from Srinagar to Jammu.
Killing of eleven PDP
supporters
On April 8, 2004, eleven people were
killed and nearly seventy injured in a grenade attack during an election rally
in Uri. Sardar Kabir Ahmad Khan, a local PDP supporter present at the rally,
said that the blast was enormous:
Mehbooba Mufti was about to address the
rally. The militants must have been waiting for her. Suddenly there were
several explosions. Many people were injured. So many died. My son was hurt in
the leg so badly, he had to be in hospital. But the doctors could not take out
all the shrapnel.556
The PDP president, Mehbooba Mufti, who
may have been the target, escaped unhurt, but several party officials were
killed. The state’s finance minister, Muzaffar Hussain Baig, and tourism minister,
Ghulam Hassan Mir, were among the injured. Responsibility for the attack was
later claimed by the Save Kashmir Movement. Earlier, the same group had claimed
responsibility for the killing of Abdul Aziz Mir, a PDP legislator, and the
deaths of party supporters Ghulam Mohammad Dar and Ali Mohammad Bhat.557
Noora Sofi holds photographs of her
husband Abdul Rahim Sofi and son, Gawar Ali Sofi. Both were shot dead by
militants inside their home. Abdul Rahim, a police constable, had earlier
refused to shelter a Pakistani militant.
© 2005 Robert Nickelsberg
Attacks on Mangat Ram
Sharma
The Congress party deputy chief
minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Mangat Ram Sharma, has escaped several attacks
on his life. In one, on July 13, 2004, alleged militants threw a grenade at his
car in Srinagar, injuring several persons. On July 20, 2004, Mangat Ram Sharma,
power minister Mohammed Sharief Niaz, and other government functionaries were
visiting a medical camp in Kapran. It was a crowded event with cultural
performances and a check distribution ceremony. Just as the minister finished
delivering his speech, a grenade hit the right side of the podium and exploded,
killing four persons and injuring twenty-two. Mangat Ram Sharma and other
Congress leaders and district administration officials were wounded. No
one claimed responsibility for the attacks, but the police suspect militant
groups, pointing out that Duru, the area where the attack occurred, has long
been a militant stronghold.558
Killing of Abdul
Rahim Sofi and Gawar Ali Sofi, October 14, 2004
Eighteen-year-old Gawar Ali Sofi had
gone out and bought a VCD home to watch. The family locked their front gate and
sat down to watch the movie. Suddenly they heard voices outside. According to
his mother Noora:
We had a guest and we heard him greet
someone. Then we heard a stranger respond. We were surprised because the gates
were locked. How could someone come inside? Then the door opened and a man came
inside. He was carrying a gun. My husband asked who he was. But the man opened
fire. He killed my husband and my son. I was injured. The man ran away.559
The neighbors later said that the
assailant had jumped over the wall. Another man had waited outside. The family
suspects that the killers were militants. Noora continued:
A few weeks earlier, two men had come
to the house. One was Pakistani and the other said he was from Pakistani
Kashmir. They wanted us to give them a room to stay in. My husband was a police
officer. He refused to let them stay. I think those men were angry and they
came back to kill him.560
No group has claimed responsibility for
the killings. The family has received compensation from the government. 561
Attack on Mohammad
Yakub Chaat, September 30, 2004
During the 2002 state elections,
eighteen-year-old Mohammad Yakub Chaat’s family had campaigned openly for the
local PDP candidate, Zahoor Mir, who was related to the family. On September
30, 2004, unidentified gunmen entered Mohammad Yakub’s home in Namblabal,
Pampore, and opened fire. Mohammad Yakub had just returned from working on his
farm and was in the family sitting room with his parents and eight-year-old
nephew. The gunmen opened fire from behind a curtain. Chaat, who was shot in
his arm, leg and shoulder, survived. Mohammad Yakub’s relatives believe that
the attack was in retaliation for the family’s participation in the election.
Said his father, Ghulam Hasan Chaat, “We are not interested in politics. But
since a relative was the candidate, it was our obligation to help him. I
suppose the militants decided to punish us.”562
The family had lost an older son,
Farooq Ahmad Chaat, in 1996, when he was abducted and killed by unidentified
gunmen. The family is now extremely frightened. They keep their doors locked at
all times. The little boy who witnessed the shooting even stopped speaking for
awhile from the shock.
Killing of Habibullah
Sheikh, June 18, 2004
Fifty-eight-year-old Habibullah Sheikh
was a long-time supporter of the National Conference party. On June 18, 2004,
he went to the market in Beerwah, Budgam, to purchase the morning paper. At
around 10 a.m., as he returned, two unidentified gunmen were waiting for him
just outside his home. They opened fire at close range, killing him instantly.
According to his son, Javed Ahmad Sheikh, his father had held a party meeting
in his house just three days before his death. Javed Sheikh says that this
might have provoked the militants.
My father has openly supported the
National Conference all these years. Why did they choose to kill him now? Who
knows what these people want…But I have no doubt that he was killed by
militants.563
The family has received compensation
from the government. No group admitted responsibility for the killing.564
Killing of Maulvi
Mushtaq Ahmed and other attacks on his family
Maulvi Mushtaq Ahmed, a retired civil
servant, was killed while offering midday prayers at a mosque at Rajwari Kadal
in Srinagar. Maulvi Mushtaq was not active politically, although he was part of
the Hurriyat Conference led by his nephew Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, which had been
advocating dialogue with the Indian government. When Maulvi Mushtaq went to
pray at the mosque, his assassins were already inside waiting for him. As he
knelt and bent down, he was shot from behind. He was rushed to hospital, where
he died from his wounds on June 7, 2004. Wrote Amy Waldman of the New
York Times:
Even by the violent standards of the
conflict here… the killing of an unarmed 61-year-old man at prayer seemed to
set a new standard of venality…. No one, as far as anyone knows, had ever been
killed while offering prayers to God.565
On May 29, 2004, even as the family was
at the hospital waiting for news, there was a grenade attack on Mirwaiz Umar
Farooq’s house. The rifle grenade, fired from a distance, exploded in an alley
outside the house. Although no one was hurt, there was some damage to the
property.
The Save Kashmir Movement claimed
responsibility for the attack. Its spokesperson, Sheikh Tajamul, told a local
news agency by telephone:
This should serve as the writing on the
wall for those who have entered into dialogue…that no individual or party, howsoever
important they might be, can be above the mujahedin and the jihad.566
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq told Human Rights
Watch:
These attacks were definitely in the
context of the dialogue process. This appears to be a message from the
hardliners. These people are targeting political leaders. These are groups that
do not owe their allegiance to anybody. That is something that we feel is very
difficult to handle. But they are being funded and so someone is certainly
responsible for these actions.567
Killing of Mohammad
Sultan Sheikh, December 9, 2003
In April 2003, an armed gunman had
hidden in the home of Mohammad Sultan Sheikh, a poor carpet weaver, in Chewpora
village, Beerwah, Budgam. The militant was being chased by soldiers when he ran
into the hut. The troops then surrounded it. According to Mohammad Sultan’s
wife Ayesha Sheikh, there was an exchange of fire and the militant managed to
escape.568
On December 9, 2003, unidentified
gunmen claiming to be with the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin came to the home of Mohmmad
Sultan Sheikh. They called him outside, accused him of being an informer, and
summarily executed him. Ayesha Sheikh says the accusations were not true:
My husband did not know anything about
militants. After the militant escaped, the security forces used to come
regularly and take him away for interrogation. He was tortured a lot. Then the
militants killed him. We have no one to protect us. I have four small children
and they have been orphaned by these people.569
Killing of Bashir
Ahmed Tantray, February 15, 2003
Bashir Ahmed Tantray was a carpet
weaver and lived with his family in Pattan. He often went to the local army
camp and had some friends there. On February 15, 2003, the twenty-year-old had
gone to the mosque for afternoon prayers. According to his uncle, Ghulam
Mohammad Tantray, he had previously been threatened by militants who thought he
was an informer:
He was killed about 4:30 in the
afternoon. There were other people near the mosque. But no one recognized the
killer. He just walked up and opened fire. There were four or five bullets.
Everyone ran away.570
The family was paid compensation by the
government.
As militant groups have lost ground to
the security forces, they have increasingly made use of bombs, grenades,
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), landmines, and other explosive devices.571 While
many were directed against the security forces, others were used directly
against civilians, or indiscriminately, with predictable civilian
casualties. International humanitarian law prohibits direct attacks on
civilians. 572 Additionally, methods of attack that are not directed
or cannot be directed at a specific military target, and consequently, are of a
nature to strike military targets and civilians without distinction, are
prohibited.573
According to data compiled from press
accounts by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, there were nearly 200 such attacks
in 2005 that claimed at least 120 lives.574 In
2004, there were over 200 bombings, killing nearly 150 people.575 Kashmiri
groups have also been blamed for blasts outside Jammu and Kashmir, such as the
October 2005 attacks in New Delhi and the March 2006 attack in Varanasi.576
According to a 2005 report by the
Landmine Monitor, established by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines:
There were numerous reports of new
antipersonnel mine casualties in this region in this reporting period, but it
was usually not possible to determine which group laid the mines. A review of
media reports in 2004 and 2005 by Landmine Monitor found reports every month of
military and civilian casualties from landmine and IED explosions in Jammu and
Kashmir. In almost every case, Islamic militants were blamed for the incidents.577
Car bomb at Central
Secondary School, killing fourteen, Pulwama, June 13, 2005
On June 13, 2005, students had just
come in from the morning assembly. Manzoor Ahmed was teaching his class when an
apparently parked car packed with explosives was detonated outside the school.
Says Manzoor Ahmed:
I heard a loud noise. Then I felt a
sharp pain and looked down. There was blood on my shirt. I realized I had been
hurt. The windows were all broken. My students had fallen down. I was badly
injured. There was a hole through my stomach. I spent weeks in hospital and
have only just [six weeks later] returned to work.578
Fourteen people were killed, including
three children and three soldiers. Over 100 people were injured.579 According
to school authorities, the damage could have been worse:
Just half an hour earlier, the students
were on drill outside. If they had still been there, they would all have been
hurt. One student, who was there drinking water, was killed…. The students at
the school are still very disturbed. Recently there was an explosion at an
electric pole and three children fainted with fear.580
It is unclear whether the school was
the intended target, and no militant group admitted responsibility for the
attack, which was condemned by all political parties and non-violent separatist
groups.581
Landmine blast
killing Aasia Jeelani and Ghulam Nabi Sheikh, April 20, 2004
Aasia Jeelani, along with other members
of the Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, were monitoring the
parliamentary elections in April 2004. On April 20, the seven member team was
on its way to monitor the Baramulla and Kupwara districts. At Sogam, in Kupwara
district, their vehicle was blown up in a blast by an IED. Two persons
including Aasia Jeelani and the driver, Ghulam Nabi Sheikh, were killed and
four others injured.582 Lashkar-e-Toiba
militants reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack.583
Grenade attack
killing Samrina Iqbal Bandey, February 27, 2004
A student at the local high school,
fifteen-year-old Samrina Iqbal Bandey attended a rally held by Chief Minister
Mufti Mohammad Sayeed in Syedpora, Beerwah, Budgam, on February 27 , 2004.
Alleged militants fired two rifle grenades into the crowd and she was killed on
the spot.584 The
family received cash compensation from the government and the local college has
been named after her.
Death of Mohammad
Ayub Khoro, Abdul Shamsher and eight others, September 6, 2003
On the morning of September 6, 2003,
Mohammad Ayub, a twenty-nine-year-old blacksmith, and Abdul Shamsher, a
traveling salesman, were waiting at a crowded bus stop near their homes. Most
of the people at the bus stand were residents of a displaced persons colony in
Pareempura, where they had moved because of violence in the countryside.
Without warning, at about 9:45 a.m., alleged militants triggered a landmine by
the bus stop. Eight people were killed, including Mohammad Ayub and Abdul
Shamsher, and several others were injured. Hasina Ayub, Mohammad Ayub’s
twenty-four-year-old widow, said she is destitute: “They have destroyed our
lives. I have two small children. Don’t these people care about women and
children?585
Militants in Kashmir have long been
responsible for attacks on schools and for recruiting children into their
forces. International humanitarian law prohibits attacks directed at
civilians and civilian objects. Schools are protected as civilian objects,
while teachers and students fall under the protection granted to civilians
unless they are taking a direct part in hostilities.586 International
law also prohibits the recruitment and use of children as soldiers and in other
combat-related roles.587 The
prohibition on the recruitment and use of children below the age of fifteen is
now considered customary international law, and is binding on all parties to
armed conflict.588 This
standard is also reflected in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
India ratified in December 1992.589
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
involvement of children in armed conflict, which India ratified in November
2005, prohibits state armed forces and rebel groups from recruiting or using in
hostilities persons under the age of eighteen years.590
Laborers work on the reconstruction of
the renowned Islamia High School in downtown Srinagar, August 2, 2005. The
school suffered an arson attack in early 2005 by Pakistani-supported Islamist
militants as a warning to the Kashmiri owner and religious leader of the school
not to negotiate with the Indian Government over Kashmir's independence.
© 2005 Robert Nickelsberg
According to the International Center
for Peace Initiatives, militants have carried out attacks damaging at least 650
schools since the conflict began.591 Causing
particular outrage was an attack on July 5, 2004, when militants burned down
the 105-year-old Islamia Higher Secondary School run by a religious and
education trust led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq.592
In some of these attacks on schools,
children have been killed or injured.593 On
August 15, 2004, two students were injured when a grenade fired by alleged
militants exploded during Independence Day celebrations at a school in
Baramulla.594 In
March 2005, an eight-year-old was killed and six other students injured in a
blast inside the compound of the Nadihal high school.595 (For
the death of a student in a car bomb blast that struck a school in Pulwama, an
incident in which it is unclear whether the school was specifically targeted,
see above.)
Teachers say that students have become
traumatized. One teacher described the situation after there was an explosion
outside the Kamala Nehru School in Srinagar when the students had gathered in
the courtyard for morning-prayer:
The children of Kashmir live in a
constant state of terror. As soon as there was a blast, the children began to
run. It was a stampede. They pushed at the teachers and at each other. Several
children fell down. Some managed to stumble outside the gate, and many fell as
they ran. They were picked up by the shopkeepers. That is the situation in
Kashmir today. Everyone lives in fear. We don’t know who is responsible for the
blast.596
Militant groups have drafted children
in Jammu and Kashmir, Azad Kashmir, and Pakistan. Recruits may be
volunteers or abductees. The militants have engaged in active recruitment of
children into their forces.597 Although
Human Rights Watch did not interview any child soldiers, some former militants
said that they had joined the armed groups when they were children. For
instance, one former militant described how he and several of his friends had
joined the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin in 1996. He was sixteen at that time:
I was still in school. Many boys from
our village, who had crossed to Pakistan in 1989 or soon after, were senior
commanders. They used to come back for visits with their guns and tell us that
it was our duty to join the fight…. It was not the gun that tempted me, but the
shoes that they used to wear. They had those nice jogging shoes. They told me I
would get a pair too, if I joined. So I did.598
Parents in some villages visited by
Human Rights Watch complained that they are always fearful that their children
will be indoctrinated and then recruited from schools or mosques, or by
militants operating in the area.599
According to the South Asia Terrorism
Portal, nearly three thousand boys have been abducted by alleged militants
since the conflict began.600 For
example, in Chootwaliwar, Gandherbal, villagers told Human Rights Watch that at
least three people had been abducted by militants in 2003, one of them a
schoolboy; none of them have returned.601
Children are put to work in various
roles by militant groups after receiving rudimentary arms training.602 With
children being used as messengers or to ferry weapons, security forces have
started checking them as well,603 and
several have reportedly been arrested while crossing the border.604 Members
of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association say there are several child
soldiers in custody in various jails.605
This fact that children serve with the
militants places many other children at the risk of aggressive questioning by
troops at check posts. The use of children by militants may have led to abuses
by security forces, such as the killing of four boys playing cricket in Handwara
in 2006 (see above). Troops say that they opened fire because they believed a
militant was hiding among the boys.606
461 Human Rights
Watch interview, name withheld, Srinagar, July 2005.
464Yusuf Jameel,
“Indo-Pak Bus Is A Coffin: Militants,” The Asian Age, March 31,
2005.
465The statement was
signed by Al Nasireen, Al Arifeen, Save Kashmir Movement and
Farzandan-i-Millat, all of them suspected to be fronts for or associated with
the Lashkar-e-Toiba.
466 M. Saleem Pandit,
‘“We are Calling UP Passengers,’ Warn J & K Militant Groups,” The
Times of India, April 3, 2005.
467“Guerrillas Attack
Kashmir Bus Yard,” Indo Asian News Service, April 6, 2005, [online] http://in.news.yahoo.com/050406/43/2kl96.html (retrieved
August 15, 2005); “Kashmir Tourist Center Attacked,” CNN, April 7, 2005,
[online]http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/04/06/kashmir.violence/index.html (retrieved
August 15, 2005).
469 M.J. Akbar,
“The Next Moment,” The Asian Age, April 10, 2005.
470 The
Indian government reports that there were 61,935 militant attacks from 1990 to
January 31, 2005, claiming 12,542 civilian lives. Ministry of Home Affairs,
Annual Report 2004-2005. Annexure-II p. 164. The New Delhi based
South Asia Terrorism Portal, which collects data on insurgencies in South Asia,
says that news accounts reported that nearly 14,000 civilians in Jammu and
Kashmir had been killed in terrorist violence up to April 2006. Nearly 5,500
security forces personnel and over 20,500 alleged militants have also been
killed. See “Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence 1988-2006,” [online]
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm
(retrieved April 14, 2006).
471 Human Rights
Watch interview with Abdul Ghani Bhat, a leader of the All Parties Hurriyat
Conference, Srinagar, October 12, 2004.
472Ashok Pahalwan,
“Thirty Five Hindus Massacred In Kashmir Ahead Of Talks,” Reuters, May 1, 2006,
[online] http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/DEL343092.htm (retrieved May
20, 2006).
473 Human Rights
Watch interview with Justice A.M. Mir, chairperson of the State Human Rights
Commission, Srinagar, October 15, 2004.
475 “Five Killed in
Kashmir Violence,” BBC News, August 18, 2004, [online]
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/3576458.stm (retrieved April
14, 2006).
476 Special Police
Officers (SPOs) are Kashmiris hired on fixed-term contracts to work in and
around the areas they belong to. As such, they not only act as conventional
troopers, but liaise between the community and the police force. As previously
noted, many militants, after they surrendered, have been hired as SPOs.
477 Indian security
agencies have organized groups of villagers, many of them minority Hindus, in
remote areas of Jammu and Kashmir into village defense committees and provided
them arms and training to protect themselves against militant attacks.
479“SPO Hanged to Death
by Militants,” Press Trust of India, August 10, 2005, [online] http://www.expressindia.com/kashmir/full_story.php?content_id=52490&type=ei (retrieved
August 16, 2005); “Five Ultras Among Nine Killed in J&K,” Press Trust of
India, August 3, 2005, [online] http://www.expressindia.com/kashmir/full_story.php?content_id=52052&type=ei (retrieved
August 16, 2005).
480“Militants Behead
J&K Cop’s Wife, Daughter,” Press Trust of India, April 25, 2004, [online]
http://www.rediff.com//news/2004/apr/25jk.htm (retrieved April 13, 2006).
481 The Landmine
Monitor Report 2005 said that at least five militant groups including the
Lashkar-e-Toiba Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami, Jaish-e-Mohammad
and Harkat-ul-Ansar, have used antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines or IEDs.
See [online] http://www.icbl.org/lm/country/India (retrieved March 13, 2006).
482 Shujaat
Bukhari, “6 Killed, 20 Injured As Car Bomb Explodes Near Srinagar,” The
Hindu, November 3, 2005, [online] http://www.thehindu.com/2005/11/03/stories/2005110312070100.htm
(retrieved April 14, 2006).
483“Strike 3 in 3 days:
Srinagar Bomb Kills 4, injures 40,” The Indian Express, November
17, 2005, [online]
http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/full_story.php?content_id=82103
(retrieved April 13, 2006).
484Mukhtar Ahmed, “5
Terror Strikes During PM visit,” Rediff.com, May 24, 2006, [online]
http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/may/24jk1.htm (retrieved May 29, 2006).
485Shujaat Bukhari,
“Militants Target Srinagar Rally, 6 Killed,” The Hindu, May 22,
2006, [online] http://www.hindu.com/2006/05/22/stories/2006052214410100.htm
(retrieved May 29, 2006).
486South Asia Terrorism
Portal, “Major Terrorist Attacks on Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir since 1997,”
[online] http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/India/states/jandk/data_sheets
attack_hindu.htm (retrieved March 13, 2006).
487Praveen Swami,
“Terror Amidst Death,” Frontline, October 22-November 4, 2005, [online]
http://www.flonet.com/fl2222/stories/20051104003902000.htm (retrieved March 13,
2006).
488“Militants Slit
Hindus Throats,” BBC News, July 29, 2005, [online]
http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2005/kashmir20050729d.html
(retrieved March 13, 2006).
490Ministry of Home
Affairs, Annual Report, 2004-2005, p. 27.
492 International
Center for Peace Initiatives, “Cost of Conflict Between India and Pakistan,”
2004, p. 65.
493 South Asia
Terrorism Portal, “Political Activists Killed by Terrorists in Jammu and
Kashmir, 1989-2005,” [online]
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/political_assination.htm
(retrieved April 13, 2006).
494 “Militants Chop
Off Ears of Two on Election Duty,” The Indian Express, April 21,
2004, [online]
http://www.jammu_kashmir.com/archives/archives2004/kashmir20040421d.html (retrieved
March 13, 2006).
495 “Newspaper
Office Ransacked in Srinagar,” Press Trust of India, February 9, 2006, [online]
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060210/j&k.htm#2 (retrieved March 13,
2006).
496 Human Rights
Watch interviews with two journalists in Srinagar, names withheld, July 2005
and March 2006.
497Human Rights Watch
interview with journalist, name withheld, Srinagar, October 13, 2004.
498Sudha Ramachandran,
“Where Beheadings Also Strike Fear,” Asia Times Online, June 29, 2004, [online]
http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2004/kashmir20040629c.html
(retrieved May 29, 2006).
499“Terrorist Threats
Switch Off Kashmir Cable TV,” Indo Asian News Service, May 12, 2006, [online]
http://in.news.yahoo.com/060512/43/647e2.html (retrieved May 29, 2006).
500 “Kashmir
Militant Group Prohibits Women From Using Mobiles,” The Indian Express,
May 29, 2006.
501See Background for
details.
502Human Rights Watch
interview, name withheld, Srinagar, March 2, 2006.
504 Human Rights
Watch, India: Arms and Abuses in Indian Punjab and Kashmir, (New York: Human
Rights Watch, 1994), [online] http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/kashmir/1994/.
505 According to
Indian analysts, this is proved by the increasing number of foreign militants,
most of them Pakistani, who have been arrested or killed in Jammu and Kashmir.
506 Human Rights
Watch interviews with Kashmiris from Anantnag and Kupwara districts, October
2004 and July 2005.
507 Wajahat
Habibullah, “The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict; Opportunities for
Economic Peacebuilding and for U.S. policy,” United States Institute of Peace,
Special Report 121, June 2004, [online]http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr121.html (retrieved
August 18, 2004).
508Time magazine
reported in February 2001: “Despite a decade of denials—Islamabad insists it
only provides moral and political support, not training or tangible
aid—Pakistan is fueling militant activity in Kashmir. Of the five main militant
groups operating in Kashmir, four are based in Pakistan, where open recruiting
and fundraising are commonplace. Training of militants is also done on
Pakistani soil. The Pakistani military is deeply involved, especially in the
smuggling of anti-Indian militants across the Line of Control. Ghulam Hasnain,
“Inside Jihad,” Time, February 5, 2001, Vol. 157 No. 5, [online] http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/2001/0205_kashmirsb1.html (retrieved July
20, 2005).
510 The same group,
with three others, issued warnings to passengers on the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad
bus in April 2005.
511 “Police Kill
Varanasi Militant,” BBC News, May 9, 2006, [online]
http:///news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4753143.stm (retrieved May 21,
2006).
512Interviews with
Indian officials, names withheld, New Delhi, November 2005. The
Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, Harkat-ul-Mujahedin,
Jammu & Kashmir Islamic Front, Al Badr, Jamiat-ul-Mujahedin and
Dukhtaran-e-Millat have been banned by the Indian government as “terrorist
organizations.”
513 South Asia
Terrorism Portal, “Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence 1988-2006,” [online]
http://www.satp.org/satporg/countries/India/states/jandk/data_sheet/annual_casualties.htm
(retrieved March 13, 2006).
515 K. Santhanam et
al, Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses,
(New Delhi: Sage Publications India Ltd, 2003), p. 35. According to the
authors, ISI directly contributes about 25 percent of the estimated U.S.$45
million it spends annually to fund the militant groups. Another forty
percent is channeled through contributions received from worldwide Islamic
groups. The money is used for incentive payments, training, salaries, arms and
ammunition. The funds are sent into India through religious trusts, welfare
organizations and through the underground cash networks called hawala.
517 Both
pro-independence and pro-Pakistan Kashmiri leaders told Human Rights Watch that
they do not believe in religious communalism, and in fact insist that they want
displaced Kashmiri Hindus to return to their homes. They admit, however, that
they cannot guarantee their safety from the militant Islamist groups based in
Pakistan.
520MORI, Detailed Poll
Results, [online] http://www.mori.com/polls/2002/Kashmir.shtml (retrieved March
13, 2006).
522 Human Rights
Watch interview with Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Srinagar, October 13, 2004.
524 “Hizb Rejects
Calls For Ceasefire With India,” AFP, June 22, 2005, [online] http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_22-6-2005_pg7_30 (retrieved
August 16, 2005); “HM Not to Join Temporary Peace Process,” The Pakistan
Tribune, July 11, 2005, [online] http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2005/kashmir20050711c.html (retrieved
August 16, 2005).
525Human Rights Watch
interview with Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Srinagar, October 14, 2004
526 Human Rights
Watch interview with Yasin Malik, Srinagar, March 4, 2006.
527South Asia Terrorism
Portal, “Political Activists Killed by Terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir,
1989-2005,” [online]
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/political_assination.htm
(retrieved April 13, 2006).
528 International
Center For Peace Initiatives, “Cost of Conflict Between India and Pakistan,”
2004, p. 69.
529‘“We’ll punish those
who participated in elections’: Hizb,” Press Trust of India, October 5, 2002.
530Praveen Swami, “A
Campaign of Guns,” Frontline, Volume 21, April 24-May 7, 2004, [online]
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2109/stories/20040507003803600.htm (retrieved
April 13, 2006).
531 Praveen Swami,
“Forces Brace For Elections, At Gunpoint,” The Hindu, March 21,
2004, [online]
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2004/03/21/stories/2004032100491300.htm (retrieved
April 13, 2006).
533 Praveen Swami,
“A Campaign of Guns,” Frontline, April 24-May 07, 2004.
534 Human Rights
Watch interview with Mehbooba Mufti, Srinagar, October 17, 2004.
539 Human Rights
Watch interview with municipal council member, name withheld, July 30, 2005.
540Human Rights Watch
interview with Nahida Chaman, victim’s daughter, Lajoora, Pulwama, March 1,
2006.
541 Human Rights
Watch interview with Zaiba Chaman, victim’s wife, Lajoora, Pulwama, March 1,
2006.
542 Human Rights
interview with Nahida Chaman, victim’s daughter, March 1, 2006.
543 “Cong Activist
Gunned Down,” The Daily Excelsior, November 11, 2005, [online]
http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2005/kashmir20051111c.html
(retrieved April 13, 2006).
544 Human Rights
Watch interview with Syed Wajahat Rasool Andrabi, Ratnipora, Pulwama, March 1,
2006.
546 Human Rights
Watch interview with Mohammad Rafiq, Chak Dara, July 31, 2005.
548Human Rights Watch interview,
name withheld, July 31, 2005.
549 Human Rights
Watch interview with Wazira, victim’s sister, Pattan, August 4, 2005.
551 Human Rights
Watch interview with Mrs. Farooq, daughter-in-law of Pir Mohammad Maqbool Shah,
Srinagar, July 31, 2005.
553 Human Rights
Watch interview with Javed Ahmad Zargar, victim’s brother, Srinagar, July 30,
2005.
555 “NC Shell
Shocked Over Baig Killing, Seeks More Security,” The Times of India,
October 23, 2004, [online]
http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2004/kashmir20041023b.html
(retrieved April 13, 2006).
556 Human Rights
Watch interview with Sardar Kabir Ahmad Khan, Galibagh village, Baramulla,
February 28, 2006. His son Zulfiqar Khan was later killed in a faked armed
encounter. Please see Section V, p. 83.
557 “Terrorists Gun
Down PDP MLA Abdul Aziz Mir,” Press Trust of India, December 20, 2002, [online]
http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2002/kashmir20021220c.html
(retrieved April 13, 2006).
558 “Kashmir Rebel
Leader Escapes Second Rebel Attack In A Week,” Reuters, July 19, 2004, [online]
http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2004/kashmir20040719d.html
(retrieved April 13, 2006).
559Human Rights Watch
interview with Noora, wife of Abdul Rahim Sofi, Theer, July 31, 2005.
560 Human Rights
Watch interview with Noora, Theer, July 31, 2005.
561 A simple way to
determine that the state concluded that a person killed was not an alleged
militant is whether the government offered compensation to the family of the
deceased. The government makes a distinction between pro-state and anti-state
casualties. Victims injured or killed in cross-fire or in militant attacks are
given monetary compensations, which is usually Rs. 100,000 rupees (U.S. $2,300)
for deaths, Rs 75,000 (U.S. $1700) for permanent disability, Rs 5,000
(U.S. $116) for grievous injury and Rs 1,000 (U.S. $ 20) for minor injuries.
Compensation up to Rs. 200,000 (U.S. $4,500) is paid in compensation for
property damaged in militancy. Annual Report of the Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India, 2003-2004, p. 27.
562 Human Rights
Watch interview with Ghulam Hasan Chaat, Pampore, October 14, 2004.
563Human Rights Watch
interview, Javed Ahmad Sheikh, victim’s son, Beerwah, October 15, 2004.
567 Human Rights
Watch interview with Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Srinagar, October 13, 2004.
568Human Rights Watch
interview with Ayesha Sheikh, victim’s wife, Chewpora, Budgam, October 15,
2004.
569Human Rights Watch
interview with Ayesha Begum, Budgam, October 15, 2004.
570 Human Rights
Watch interview with Ghulam Mohammad Tantray, uncle of victim, Baramulla,
August 4, 2005.
571 Ministry of
Home Affairs, Government of India, “Recovery of explosive materials from
terrorists/militants in J & K,” Annual Report 2003-2004, Annexure IV, p.
144.
572 ICRC, Customary
International Humanitarian Law, rule 1, citing Protocol II, Art. 13(2).
573 ICRC, Customary
International Humanitarian Law, rules 11 & 12, citing Protocol II, Art.
13(2) and other sources.
574 South Asia
Terrorism Portal, “Explosions in Jammu and Kashmir, 2005,” [online]
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/India/states/jandk/data_sheet/explosions2005.htm
(retrieved March 13, 2006).
575 South Asia
Terrorism, “Explosions in Jammu and Kashmir, 2004,” [online] http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/explosions2004.htm (retrieved
March 13, 2006). According to the Indian army, as of March 2006, 6,214
antipersonnel and antitank mines, 36,900 kilograms of explosives, and 62,945
grenades had been recovered during operations. See “Captured Weapons as of
August 16, 2005,” Indian Army, [online]http://www.armyinkashmir.org/v2/statistical_facts/cw_actual_data_assault_riflies.shtml (retrieved
March 13, 2006).
576 “Police Kill
‘Varanasi Militant,’” BBC News, May 9, 2006, [online] https://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/
4753143.stm (retrieved May 16, 2006); “New Delhi Bomb Mastermind Arrested,”
CNN, November 13, 2005, [online]
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/11/13/india.bombs/index.html (retrieved
May 16, 2006).
577 Landmine
Monitor 2005, [online] http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/India.html#fn17 (retrieved
March 13, 2006).
578 Human Rights
Watch interview with Manzoor Ahmed, Pulwama, July 30, 2005.
580Human Rights Watch
interview with Abdul Salam Thour, Pulwama, July 30, 2005.
581 In September
2005, the police claimed that Adil Pathan, a Pakistani national belonging to
the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin whom they alleged was the mastermind of the Pulwama
attack, was killed in an armed encounter in Pulwama. See “SPO, 2 Hizb Militants
Shot,” The Tribune (Chandigarh), September 4, 2005,
[online] http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050904/j&k.htm#1 (retrieved
April 13, 2006).
582 See also
Informative Missive, April 2004. Aasia Jeelani worked closely with the Public
Commission on Human Rights and the Association of Parents of Disappeared
Persons. She also started Voices Unheard, a quarterly report on the effect of
the conflict on women in Jammu and Kashmir state.
583See Landmine Monitor
2005, [online] http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/India.html#fn17 (retrieved March 13,
2006).
584 “Mufti Sayeed
Escapes Grenade Attack,” The Tribune (Chandigarh), February
27, 2004, [online] http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040228/main1.htm
(retrieved April 13, 2006).
585 Human Rights
Watch interview with Hasina Ayub, Budam, October 13, 2004. According to
the International Center for Peace Initiatives, at least 14,000 women have been
widowed and 17,500 children orphaned in Kashmir due to the violence.
International Center for Peace Initiatives, “Cost of Conflict Between India and
Pakistan,” 2004, p. 62.
586 Protocol II,
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, Art.
13(3).
587 Protocol II to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which applies during non-international armed
conflicts, prohibits states and non-state armed groups from recruiting or using
children under the age of fifteen in armed conflict.
588 ICRC, Customary
International Humanitarian Law, rule 136, and discussion at pp. 484-85.
589Convention on the
Rights of the Child, General Assembly Resolution 44/25, November 20, 1989,
[online] http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/crc.htm (retrieved
April 20, 2006).
590CRC Optional Protocol
on children and armed conflict, A/RES/54/262, entered into force February 12,
2002, [online] http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/protocolchild.htm (retrieved
April 12, 2006). India ratified the Protocol on November 30, 2005.
591International Center
for Peace Initiatives, “Cost of Conflict Between India and Pakistan,” p. 68.
592 “105-Year-Old
Kashmir School Burns Down,” The Associated Press, July 5, 2004, [online]
http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2004/kashmir20040705d.html
(retrieved April 13, 2006).
593 Human Rights
Watch considers a child to be any human being below the age of eighteen years.
594 “14 Hurt As
Militants Target School On I-day In Kashmir,” The Deccan Herald,
August 16, 2004, [online]
http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/aug162004/i8.asp (retrieved April 13,
2006).
595 “8-Year-Old
Killed In School Blast,” The Times of India, March 18, 2005,
[online] http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1056209.cms (retrieved
April 13, 2006).
596 Human Rights
Watch interview, name withheld, Srinagar, July 29, 2005.
598 Human Rights
Watch interview, details withheld.
599 During
interviews with Human Rights Watch, parents repeatedly said that they feared
that their teenage sons would run away to join the militants. With education
systems troubled because of the violence, this is particularly true of students
who fail examinations and decide to take up militancy as a career option.
Parents also complained of indoctrination in mosques and by older militants.
600South Asia Terrorism
Portal, “Abductions by Terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir,” [online]
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/yearwise_data_of_abductions.htm
(retrieved April12, 2006).
601 Human Rights Watch
interview, names withheld, Gandherbal, October 12, 2004.
603 Prakriiti
Gupta, “Child Warriors of Kashmir,” Women’s Feature Service, November 20, 2005,
[online] http://www.boloji.com/wfs4/wfs495.htm (retrieved April 13, 2006).
605 Human Rights
Watch interview with Mohammad Abdullah Khanday, lawyer, Srinagar, October 11,
2004.
606 Mir Ehsan and
Majid Jahangir, “Four Shot in Kupwara, Village Blames Army,” The Indian
Express, February 23, 2006, [online]
http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/full_story.php?content_id=88448
(retrieved April 13, 2006).
