HAS
Pakistan been worth it? In other words, has it yielded the benefits that
Pakistan movement leaders expected from their long struggle? This inquiry could
be interpreted as questioning the validity of Pakistani ideology, which
incidentally is discouraged in Pakistan.
I have no such intentions, especially since questioning it is a
theoretical exercise today. Further, many Pakistanis still lack the confidence
to deliberate that question dispassionately, even theoretically. So, I take the
pursuit of independence as a given and analyse whether its success has
satisfied initial expectations and if not, how future prospects are.
Globally, one sees two
conflicting trends. Some countries pursue politico-economic union to enhance
their development status while some sub-national regions pursue separation to
enhance it. Where developmentally similar countries unite, they could benefit
from the larger market and economies of scale created. Conversely, backward and
neglected but potentially viable economically sub-regions could develop faster
given the proximate government control over policy and resources that
independence provides.
Poor governance has limited the potential we inherited.
Contemporary
Pakistan was arguably among India’s most backward regions in terms of education
and industry. But it possessed potential industrial viability given its sea
access, large population, fertile agriculture and a small but well-educated
class.
So, rather than basing my inquiry on the claim that Indian
Hindus and Muslims constituted distinct civilisations, I base it on the
‘backward sub-region’ thesis to analyse whether separation has helped Pakistan
develop faster economically and politically.
Economically, Pakistan’s
higher (than India’s) economic growth rates and per capita income for around 50
years and its lower poverty rates even today suggest that it did derive an
‘independence dividend’ initially.
One can question
however, whether economic progress was equitable. Clearly, elite landlords,
generals, businesspersons, bureaucrats and mullahs have prospered from
independence. What about the masses? While the lower poverty rates show the
masses have also benefited to some extent income-wise, Pakistan’s poorer health
and education indicators mean that such benefits have not been broad-based.
The second caveat has to
do with the quality of economic progress, for Pakistan has been less successful
in establishing high-tech industries than India. Pakistan’s higher growth has
often been fuelled by undependable US aid and Gulf remittances. While
independence enhanced such external flows, they were not utilised to foster
sustainable development. Essentially, while independence provided some economic
dividends, poor governance reduced their extent and spread.
Now to the question of
whether Pakistan has done better politically. Unlike India’s consistent
commitment to democracy, Pakistan has vacillated between democracy and
dictatorship. Leaders, elected or non-elected, have been far less responsive to
people. Ethnic tensions have been higher. In recent decades, the scourge of
extremism has furthered political instability. This poorer political
performance has undermined economic progress too, and Pakistan’s growth rates
and per capita incomes have now fallen behind India’s.
Why has Pakistan’s
political progress been poorer? It is often attributed to bad luck or the
machinations of a tiny elite class, whose removal by hook or by crook or coup
is expected to yield immediate, large improvements in governance. The reality
is more complex. The quality of governance is as fundamentally linked to
structural societal characteristics, as economic progress is to availability of
natural, technological and human resources. Thus, improving governance is not
about disqualifying certain individuals or families but about overcoming these
structural barriers, which takes time.
Other breakaway
countries (eg Bangladesh, Eritrea, South Sudan) too have failed to obtain the immediate,
large or consistent economic dividends expected from independence due to
similar political constraints. These experiences suggest the need for modifying
the “backward sub-region thesis”. Both economic and political viability must be
analysed to better predict the post-independence prospects of breakaway
sub-regions.
Such analysis may not
deter determined secessionists. Their goals derive less from cold economic
calculations and more from ideological or identity factors (Pakistan) or
extended maltreatment which makes cohabitation unimaginable (Bangladesh).
However, such analysis
may help in providing more realistic post-independence expectations. Thus,
where economic viability but also political constraints are high, the expected
economic dividends may only materialise once the political constraints are
overcome. In Pakistan’s case, these political constraints are reducing
gradually and there is some likelihood that more equitable and durable economic
progress may result as governance improves.
The writer is a political and development economist.
Published in Dawn, October 20th, 2014
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