India’s
anti ballistic missile defence shield, Dr Qaiser Rashid
Daily
Times, Pakistan. 18 May 2016
The anti-ballistic missile defence shield has not only shifted the
initiative of launching a nuclear strike into India's hand but it has also
brought the initiative of introducing a conventional war into India’s hand
As if the list of trials for Pakistan was
already not long enough, another challenge has popped up. On May 15, India
successfully test fired its acclaimed, indigenous supersonic interceptor
missile as Advance Air Defence, which is a product of the missile interception
technology, to destroy an incoming hostile inter-continental ballistic missile
in mid-air in an endo-atmospheric (short range) altitude (i.e. below 100
kilometres, within the earth’s atmosphere). After 11 failures, this was the
12th test that finally yielded fruit for India. With that, in South Asia, India
heralded the era of constructing an anti-ballistic missile defence shield to
protect its air from the entry of any nuclear-armed ballistic missile.
It
was the Kargil war of 1999 that afforded India with an opportunity to make the
US rethink its policies towards South Asia, the region where two nuclear
giants, India and Pakistan, had locked horns with each other over the issue of
Kashmir. Reportedly, during the war, both India and Pakistan deployed their
nuclear-armed ballistic missiles (titled under various local names) against
each other in case a full-fledged war erupted. India became able to convince
the world, and especially the US that this time India was not only the victim
but also it was exposed to a military nuclear foray from Pakistan into its
controlled area. At that time, the preference of the world was to obviate a
nuclear war between the two embattled neighbours.
The US asked India to exercise restraint from
launching any counter-offensive on Pakistan across the Line of Control (LoC) or
the international border, as India’s retaliation could have spiralled the
situation into a nuclear conflict with Pakistan not desired by the US. India
submitted to the request. In the post-war phase, when Pakistan was celebrating
its perceived victory over India, the US had been offering India a 10-year
defence pact called the New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship
(NFDR). The pact was concluded between India and the US in July 2005.
The pact offered India the facility to
acquire an anti-ballistic missile defence system. The pact was not only an
expression of strong US-India bilateral ties — which were already in the
process of consolidation in the post-Cold War era — but it was also a signal
for ending the practice of offering Pakistan parity with India. With that, in
South Asia, the balance of power tilted in favour of India. Similarly, through
taking the first step towards developing the defence shield, India has enhanced
its self-defence ability. With that the balance in South Asia is disturbed.
The
history of South Asia depicts that here peace is enforced through the fear of
nuclear strike. Pakistan used nuclear deterrence to strike a balance with its
nuclear neighbour in South Asia. Nevertheless, for the time being — and though
this method is pregnant with self-destruction — Pakistan can value its
doctrine of using tactical nuclear weapons to be used on its own land (for a
limited nuclear strike) in case Pakistan’s any area is invaded by Indian army
under the Cold-Start Doctrine, which India adopted in 2004 to counter
Pakistan’s asymmetric wars through non-state actors from across the border.
Reportedly, F-16 fighter planes bought and flown by Pakistan are incapable of
carrying a nuclear weapon to drop in case war breaks out with India. The
ballistic missiles Pakistan developed somehow over the years are no doubt
capable of carrying nuclear warheads, but these missiles have now become
useless against India, which is on the itinerary of developing an
anti-ballistic missile defence shield along its border.
In
this way, there are certain implications for Pakistan regarding India’s
anti-ballistic missile defence shield. First, the defence shield has rendered
the concept of minimum credible nuclear deterrence — which Pakistan imposed on
South Asia through developing and testing its strategic nuclear weapons —
insignificant. Secondly, the defence shield has undermined Pakistan’s first
nuclear strike competency or option and instead, the defence shield has boosted
or even restored India’s second nuclear strike capability. Thirdly, the defence
shield has relegated Pakistan to taking refuge once again in its near-abandoned
idea of looking for strategic depth in Afghanistan. Fourth, the defence shield
gives India some space to maneouvre whenever Pakistan launches its alleged
asymmetric war against India. Fifth, the defence shield reinforces the
numerical strength of the Indian army and affects the future of Kashmir.
India’s
anti-ballistic missile defence shield poses another dimension of implications
for Pakistan. It is that Pakistan has to look for buying its own anti-ballistic
missile defence shield from the countries ready to sell it. The two nearest
options to buy any such technology could be China and Russia, though their
quality of missile interception technology may not be a match for that of the
US. The third option could be the US itself; however, prospects for this option
are bleak because the same US-India pact, the NFDR, allowed India
to enter into a nuclear energy deal with the US.
The energy deal later matured in 2008 as the
123 Agreement. Pakistan kept on agitating against the nuclear energy deal and
requesting the US to have one such deal with it too but to no avail. When the
US has not paid any heed to Pakistan’s requests on nuclear energy deal, it is
obvious that the US will not listen to Pakistan’s entreaties for providing it
with the anti-ballistic missile technology. Lately, the US has refused to
subsidise eight F-16 planes that Pakistan wanted to buy. Collectively, these
points show that Pakistan is currently not on the preference radar of the US.
In
short, the anti-ballistic missile defence shield has not only shifted the
initiative of launching a nuclear strike into India’s hand but it has also
brought the initiative of introducing a conventional war into India’s hand.
Similarly, the defence shield has not only reduced the options with Pakistan to
launch an asymmetric war with India but it has also brought Pakistan back to
square one where Pakistan has to fortify its defence afresh.
The writer is a freelance columnist
and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com
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