Do You Want to Be a “Nice Guy”? Dr Shabir Choudhry

 

Do You Want to Be a “Nice Guy”? Dr Shabir Choudhry

A “nice guy” is often perceived as someone who is:

·       predictable

·       an approval-seeker

·       overly compromising

·       conflict-avoidant

·       emotionally flat

·       quiet and unassertive

·       boring

·       hesitant to take initiative

·       unwilling to challenge wrongdoing

·       not a change-maker

·       living within parameters set by others

·       decent, but not respected or desired

·       reluctant to act because he worries too much about what others might say

Above all, such a “nice guy” is often not taken seriously, and many women may not find this kind of personality attractive.

So, do you still want to be a “nice guy”?

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Dr Shabir Choudhry

 Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) said: "Say what is true, although it may be bitter and displeasing to people."

A New Great Game? Emerging Strategic Realignments in and around Pakistan. Dr Shabir Choudhry, 28 December, London

 

A New Great Game? Emerging Strategic Realignments in and around Pakistan

Dr Shabir Choudhry, 28 December, London

Note: This article is based on information circulating in strategic and diplomatic circles. Some elements remain unverified. The purpose here is not to assert facts, but to analyse possible implications should these developments prove accurate.

Introduction

South and Central Asia appear to be entering yet another phase of the “Great Game,” this time involving not only regional powers but also global actors operating through proxies, covert arrangements, and strategic deployments. Recent reports—some classified, others semi-official—suggest a rapid reshaping of alliances and military footprints around Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, and China. If even partially accurate, these developments raise serious questions about Pakistan’s strategic environment, sovereignty, and future stability.

1. Israel, Afghan Relocation, and the Iran Factor

Reports indicate that Israel may be developing a secret settlement for selected Afghans—individuals who proved their loyalty to the United States during the Afghan war. If true, this would not be a humanitarian project but a strategic relocation, similar to previous proxy deployments seen in Cold War conflicts.

These Afghans are reportedly being used—or prepared for use—against Iran. Historically, displaced and ideologically primed groups have often been redeployed to destabilise neighbouring states. This raises concerns not only for Iran but for the wider region.

The reference to Fitna al-Khawarij is significant. The Prophet Muhammad ﷺ warned that such groups would emerge repeatedly violent, absolutist, and destructive, harming Muslims more than none-Muslims. If militant elements are being reorganised under new patrons, this is not a minor threat but a long-term destabilising force.

Implications:

• Increased pressure on Iran through indirect means
• Expansion of proxy warfare
• Further militarisation of sectarian and ideological conflicts
• Spillover risks for Pakistan and Central Asia

2. Bagram Airbase: India, Russia, and the Afghan Sky

In light of former President Trump’s repeated statements about the strategic importance of Bagram Airbase, reports suggest that India may now have operational control of the facility, with Russian and Indian experts installing air defence systems.

If correct, this would represent a dramatic shift in the balance of power in Afghanistan.

Key questions arise:

• Does this mean an end to US-style air strikes, or merely a transfer of aerial control?
• Will the Afghan Taliban tolerate such an arrangement?
• Can the TTP continue its operations inside Pakistan if Afghan airspace becomes monitored or restricted?
• More importantly, how will this affect Pakistan’s ability to hit targets inside Afghanistan by using its jet fighters?

For Pakistan, the most pressing concern is whether hostile elements operating from Afghan soil will continue to enjoy strategic depth.

3. CENTCOM, Pakistan, and US Troops in Balochistan

Perhaps the most consequential report concerns near-finalised discussions between CENTCOM and Pakistan, involving the deployment of 5,000 to 7,000 US troops in Balochistan.

The stated purpose: protection of US interests, particularly rare earth minerals, their extraction, and secure transportation.

This development has profound implications.

China currently dominates the global supply chain of rare earth elements—minerals essential for advanced technology, defence systems, and green energy. Any alternative source weakens China’s leverage.

Implications:

• Strategic challenge to China’s monopoly
• Increased US footprint in Pakistan
• Potential friction with Russia and Iran
• Pakistan is becoming a frontline state in great-power competition

A critical question follows:

Will China retaliate—politically, economically, or otherwise—to protect its interests?

4. China’s “Friendly Countries” List — Pakistan Missing

Recent reports claim that Pakistan is not included in China’s list of 20 “friendly countries.”

This omission is striking, especially given decades of rhetoric describing Sino-Pak relations as “higher than mountains and sweeter than honey.”

If accurate, it suggests:

• Growing Chinese distrust
• Disappointment over Pakistan’s strategic ambiguity
• Reassessment of long-term commitments, including CPEC

Symbolism matters in diplomacy, and exclusion often speaks louder than statements.

5. Technology Restrictions and Rare Minerals

Further straining relations is the reported Chinese ban on supplying Pakistan with:

• Technology required for rare mineral exploration
• Certain critical materials are necessary for extraction

This suggests China wants control, not competition, even from traditional partners.

Implications:

• Pakistan’s dependence deepens
• Strategic autonomy weakens
• Economic leverage shifts decisively toward Beijing
• 
  

6. Pakistan: A Strategic Encirclement?

When viewed geographically, the situation becomes alarming:

• South: Balochistan — US boots
• South-West: Chabahar (Iran) — Indian presence
• North-West: Afghanistan — Indian and Russian influence
• West: Iran — tense regional environment

Pakistan increasingly appears surrounded by competing powers, each pursuing its own agenda, often at Pakistan’s expense.

Conclusion: Is Pakistan Becoming a Battlefield?

The emerging picture suggests Pakistan risks becoming a battleground for competing global interests, much like Afghanistan was for decades.

History teaches us that:

• External powers extract value
• Local populations pay the price
• Sovereignty erodes gradually, not suddenly

Pakistan’s leadership must ask hard questions:

• Who defines national interest?
• How many “strategic partners” can a weak state afford?
• Can Pakistan balance China, the US, and regional rivals without becoming expendable?

Unless Pakistan adopts a clear, independent, and transparent foreign policy, it may once again find itself used—not respected—in another round of the Great Game.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.

Email: Drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com

 

 

Dubai meeting-other side of the story Dr Shabir Choudhry, London

 Dubai meeting-other side of the story

Dr Shabir Choudhry, London

Dr Nazir Gilani needs to break free from the illusion that he is the brain behind Kashmiri politics; that he has a monopoly on wisdom and the use of the pen; and that only he knows the ‘jurisprudence’ of the Kashmir dispute. Many are much wiser than him, and know better how to make use of the pen. However, they might not have an army of fake IDs at their command to ridicule others.

Like many others in Kashmiri politics, I also make a deliberate effort to avoid confrontation with him, as I believe I can make a positive contribution without pulling someone’s leg and without belittling anyone. Also, matters which he was highlighting in his own name by telling half-truths and by taking things out of context, it also concerned four other individuals and the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front as an organisation. I thought someone would show him a mirror.

 

For reasons best known to the other four individuals, namely Raja Muzaffar, Barrister Majid Tramboo, Usman Rahim and Farooq Papa, have decided to remain quiet; and as the JKLF is still in more than one group and perhaps not sure what to say on the issue; I decided to tell other side of the story related to the Dubai meeting, which Dr Nazir Gilani has deliberately avoided.

After a long time, when he deliberately presented a statement of the JKLF Central Diplomatic Bureau related to the Dubai meeting in a negative way, I asked him to explain: who convened this meeting? What was its agenda? And above all, who else participated in the meeting apart from the names he had given out?

He went quiet on this, as he knew that a reply to those questions would not only expose him but also many other things. However, after two weeks of silence, he produced a press cutting of the JKLF CDB statement published in the Kashmir Times on 28 April 2002. To advance his agenda, he took things out of context and said:

‘It is relevant to point out that A.G. Lone was killed within a month on 21 May 2002 on his return to Srinagar’.

A few days after that, he wrote a lengthy article titled ‘Time please’ which was published on 16 April in ‘Rising Kashmir’. He is making desperate efforts to implicate the JKLF statement with the callous murder of Abdul Ghani Lone. After reading that, despite my recent health problems, I said to myself that the man needs to be shown a mirror and set historical records straight.

After this introduction now let us analyse the events. Dr Nazir Gilani, in his article mentioned above, writes:

‘The first serious and transparent move to debate the various aspects of the Kashmir situation began with the Dubai Meeting of mid-April 2002. Khawaja Abdul Gani Lone, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq (APHC), Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, chairman National Kashmir Committee of Pakistan, Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai (KAC), Mushtaq Jeelani (KCC) and Syed Nazir Gilani (JKCHR) met in Dubai to discuss the interests of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.’

He claims it was a ‘transparent move to debate the various aspects of the Kashmir situation’, yet he is too afraid to tell who organised that meeting. What was its agenda? And above all, who else was present? Why is he not speaking the whole truth? The fact is that those who arranged the meeting and paid for its expenses were also present in the meeting to tell them what should be done in the name of the Kashmir dispute inside the Valley of Kashmir and around the world.

 

Every citizen of Jammu and Kashmir knows that Dr Nazir Gilani’s JKCHR doesn’t have a second member, same is the case with KAC and KCC. All three organisations can fit in a Toyota saloon, and still there will be some space for another such organisation. So, with that kind of power behind them, who gave them the right to represent Kashmir?

Dr Nazir Gilani has worked hard over the past few years to establish that Dr Fai, Mirwaiz Umer Farooq and APHC work for the Pakistani establishment to advance their agenda on Kashmir. The other participant, Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, openly says he works for Pakistan and that he is an ‘unpaid soldier’ of Pakistan. Dr Nazir Gilani, at that time, was also reported to be a senior stalwart of the Pakistani establishment, and he proudly claimed that before he landed in Islamabad, his meetings with the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan were scheduled.

So, one can safely guess who arranged the meeting and for what purpose. I can agree that people of the Valley have suffered immensely because of the militant struggle; and, from time to time, we all claimed that it is ‘our struggle’, fact however, is that we only suffered, struggle was in control of those who planned it and provided resources for it to ensure that the Kashmir pot keeps on boiling to suit their agenda.

Those who called the Dubai meeting and paid for its expenses, like always, came out with a list of demands – one can call it a ‘do more’ list. This very senior officer of the Pakistani establishment, after giving his briefing to a mainly subservient audience, promised them new rewards and urged them to implement the agenda.

News filtered from the meeting was that Abdul Ghani Lone spoke out against this dictation. He reportedly said, ‘Enough is enough, we have lost a generation by following your instructions, and we are nowhere near our destination. Your policies have only added to our problems and miseries; and from now on, we will do what we think is in our interest. There was a heated exchange of views between him and the big man from Islamabad.

Docile and subservient minds felt very uncomfortable with the courageous stand of Abdul Ghani Lone. They had no guts to oppose the boss, but didn’t want to fall out with Lone Sahib either. They tried to cool down the matter, but Lone Sahib stood his ground. His view was that the interest of Kashmir is paramount to the Pakistani interest; and the meeting ended with a bitter taste in mouths, and some were subdued like frightened rabbits. Some felt that the bold stand might cost Abdul Ghani Lone his life, and he was advised not to go to Srinagar until the dust settles down. Abdul Ghani Lone went to the United States and spent some time meeting the Americans and the Kashmiri Diaspora.

The news cutting which Dr Nazir Gilani has produced to implicate the JKLF reads:
‘JKLF joins Geelani in criticising Dubai conclave’. The title of the news clearly shows that before the JKLF statement, a senior Kashmiri leader, Ali Shah Geelani, also criticised the Dubai meeting, and the JKLF only joined those who criticised that conclave. So, why is Dr Nazir Gilani’s gun pointing towards the JKLF statement? Does he have some personal agenda or an axe to grind? Is he advancing someone else’s agenda?

When Abdul Ghani Lone was shot dead in a public meeting held to commemorate the death of Mirwaiz Mohlvee Farooq in Srinagar, his politician son, Sajad Lone, openly said that the Pakistani ISI had killed his father. Some tried to shift blame to India; however, Professor Ghani Bhat, another senior leader of APHC, last year declared that it was wrong to accuse India of the deaths of Mirwaiz Mohlvee Farooq and Abdul Ghani Lone; they were killed by our own people.

So, it is clear that the JKLF statement had no impact whatsoever on the life of Abdul Ghani Lone; however, Kashmir watchers assert that what transpired in the Dubai meeting ultimately sealed the future of Abdul Ghani Lone. Perhaps some of the participants have a guilty conscience over this issue; maybe they have not, as tens of thousands of other innocent Kashmiris have also lost their lives, and no one is prepared to acknowledge culpability over this. Alas, it has become a business for some.

It might be interesting for readers to know that one of the participants of the Dubai meeting was also having secret meetings with the Indians and passing on the information. Pakistani scoops may have formulated wrong policies, especially about the Kashmir dispute, but they are not fools.

 

They soon found out the mole and sacked him from his post. The poor guy, out of favour with the Pakistani establishment, has been running from pillar to post since that date to get his job back. During his last meeting with them, he once again begged them for his old job or any job with reduced perks, but alas, to date, he has had no luck, hence his frustration and anger. May Allah put him on a right path?

The writer is a political analyst and author of many books and booklets. Also, he is the Director Institute of Kashmir Affairs.

Email:drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com View: 

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Dr Shabir Choudhry

 Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) said: "Say what is true, although it may be bitter and displeasing to people."

Pakistan in Gaza-Jihad on Steroids, Kashmir Revisited, and Strategic Myopia. Dr Shabir Choudhry,

Pakistan in Gaza-Jihad on Steroids, Kashmir Revisited, and Strategic Myopia

Dr Shabir Choudhry, 23 December 2025, London

Pakistan’s categorical refusal to support any international effort aimed at disarming Hamas has once again revealed a familiar pattern in its foreign policy: ideological absolutism overriding strategic realism. While framed as principled solidarity with Palestinians, Islamabad’s position increasingly mirrors the very contradictions that have plagued its own Kashmir policy for decades—maximalist rhetoric, reliance on non-state actors, and diplomatic isolation disguised as moral clarity.

Gaza and Kashmir: Parallel Causes, Divergent Lessons

Pakistan frequently draws explicit parallels between Gaza and Jammu and Kashmir, presenting both as cases of occupation and denied self-determination. At a rhetorical level, the comparison resonates. In both cases, civilian populations live under heavy militarisation, political rights are constrained, and international law is selectively invoked or ignored.

Yet Pakistan’s policy response to these two conflicts exposes a deep inconsistency. In Kashmir, Islamabad insists that the dispute must be resolved politically, through dialogue, demilitarisation, and the will of the people. In Gaza, however, Pakistan refuses to even countenance the disarmament of Hamas, an armed non-state actor whose military strategy has repeatedly triggered devastating retaliation from Israel, in which ultimately civilians suffer immensely.

Critics question, if armed struggle is not a viable or acceptable solution for Kashmir and for Balochistan today, as Pakistan openly advocates, then why is it treated as sacrosanct in Gaza?

It must be pointed out that disarming Hamas is not a joke. Despite the destruction and massive human rights violations Israel has committed in Gaza, they have not been able to accomplish their mission of destroying Hamas and its infrastructure. The Pakistani and Turkish army chiefs are not stupid that they take on the task of eliminating Hamas and destroying all the infrastructure Hamas has built on the ground or underground.

If somehow, they agree to take the challenge, both Turkey and Pakistan will suffer badly, and hundreds of body bags would travel in the direction of Turkey and Pakistan, resulting in public anger and frustration.

Also, the Muslims of many countries, including Muslims of Turkey and Pakistan, will protest because this policy would be taken as helping Israel and America to kill and destroy the people of Palestine and helping Israel, a country that violated all the UN Resolutions and mercilessly killed civilians, destroyed their houses, starved them of food and deprived them of drinking water.

Militancy as Policy: A Recycled Strategy

The legacy of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy looms large over its Gaza posture. From the late 1980s onwards, Pakistan’s reliance on irregular forces in Kashmir internationalised the conflict briefly but ultimately backfired. It allowed India to recast a political dispute as a security problem, weakened Pakistan’s diplomatic case, and militarised Kashmiri society.

The outcome is instructive. Kashmir did not move closer to self-determination; instead, it became more tightly controlled, more securitised, and more internationally marginalised.

Gaza risks a similar fate. Hamas’s armed strategy, whatever its original rationale, has entrenched Israeli siege, devastated civilian life, and crowded out Palestinian political pluralism. By refusing to acknowledge this parallel, Pakistan appears trapped in an outdated strategic mindset—one it has already tested and failed with, in Kashmir.

Israel, Iran, and the Expansion of Proxy Conflict

Israel’s recent attack on Iranian targets further complicates this picture. The Middle East is now defined less by the Israel–Palestine binary and more by a regional confrontation between Israel and Iran, fought through proxies. Critics point out that Hamas is no longer merely a Palestinian actor fighting Israel, but it is part of a wider Iranian strategic network.

Here, the Kashmir analogy becomes even more uncomfortable. Pakistan has long rejected India’s claim that Kashmir is merely a theatre of proxy warfare. Yet by aligning rhetorically with Hamas without acknowledging its regional entanglements, Pakistan weakens its own argument that Kashmir is fundamentally different.

Selective outrage erodes credibility.

The American Factor and Lessons Unlearned

The Pakistani Field Marshal’s visit to Washington must be understood through this prism. The United States has little patience left for ambiguity regarding militancy—whether in South Asia or the Middle East. Washington’s Kashmir policy since 9/11 has steadily shifted toward “conflict management,” largely because Pakistan’s past strategies made a clean political narrative harder to defend.

There is a cautionary lesson here. Pakistan’s unqualified Gaza stance risks reproducing the same outcome: loud moral posturing, diminishing diplomatic leverage, and eventual exclusion from decision-making forums.

Just as Kashmir was effectively buried at Tashkent and Simla under the language of stability and bilateralism, Gaza risks being reshaped without Pakistan’s input—despite Islamabad’s vocal support.

Choices Before Pakistan: Kashmir as a Warning, not a Template

Pakistan now faces three strategic paths, each illuminated by its Kashmir experience:

1. Repeat the Kashmir Mistake

Persist with ideological maximalism and implicit endorsement of armed struggle. This may energise domestic constituencies but will further marginalise Pakistan internationally, just as it did on Kashmir.

2. Selective Learning

Continue rhetorical solidarity while privately recognising that militarisation undermines political causes. This mirrors Pakistan’s current de facto Kashmir posture—support without escalation.

3. Principled Consistency

Critics of the current ruling elite, even within Pakistan, strongly oppose the Pakistani army going to Gaza to disarm Hamas or Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, other critics expect to apply the same standards to Gaza that Pakistan demands for Kashmir: civilian protection, political process, international mediation, and rejection of non-state militancy as a substitute for diplomacy.

Only the third option offers coherence.

Conclusion: Kashmir’s Ghost in Gaza

Before any decision is taken, the ruler of Pakistan must understand that they already have too much on their plate. There is a conflict with India. There is uncontrolled militancy going on in various parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. There is strong militancy going on in Balochistan, and there is internal instability, and the economy is still in a mess. Taking on another very messy task may enhance their standing in some quarters, but this will soon prove to be counterproductive.

Pakistan’s Gaza policy is haunted by the unresolved legacy of Kashmir. The belief that armed resistance keeps a cause alive has already been tested—and found wanting—in South Asia. Yet instead of drawing hard lessons, Pakistan risks exporting a failed template to another tragedy.

Supporting Palestinian rights does not require sanctifying militancy, just as advocating for Kashmir does not require perpetual conflict. True solidarity lies in learning from history, not repeating its most costly errors.

If Pakistan continues to treat Gaza as a stage for ideological performance rather than strategic reflection, it may once again find itself morally vocal, strategically irrelevant, and absent when the future is decided—just as it was after 1965, after 1971, and after Kashmir slipped from the centre of global concern.

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Gaza and the Security Subcontractors: Why Pakistan Is Being Courted Again. Dr Shabir Choudhry,

 Gaza and the Security Subcontractors: Why Pakistan Is Being Courted Again.

Dr Shabir Choudhry, 20 December 2025, London.

The reported statement by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, thanking Pakistan for its “openness” to considering a role in a proposed International Stabilisation Force for Gaza, reveals far more about Washington’s geopolitical instincts than about any genuine concern for Palestinian welfare.

This is not diplomacy rooted in history, morality, or justice. It is diplomacy driven by expediency.

Gaza today is not a neutral conflict zone in need of peacekeepers. It is a devastated, besieged territory emerging from a campaign that has destroyed homes, hospitals, universities, and tens of thousands of civilian lives. Any so-called stabilisation force will not be entering a post-conflict environment shaped by consent, but an occupied landscape defined by trauma, anger, and unresolved injustice.

In this context, Pakistan’s name surfaces not because of its moral standing on Palestine, but because of its long-established role as a security subcontractor for great powers.

A troubled historical memory

For Palestinians, history matters. And Pakistan’s historical record is not neutral.

During the events of Black September in Jordan in 1970, thousands of Palestinians were killed by Jordanian forces. People have not forgotten that on Jordon’s request, Pakistani troops were sent under the command of Brigadier Zia-ul-Haq, later Pakistan’s military ruler, to deal with the unrest.

I am sure that episode remains deeply etched in Palestinian and Arab memory as a moment when Muslim solidarity gave way to regime survival and geopolitical alignment.

This history alone should caution against presenting Pakistan as a benevolent stabilising force in Gaza.

Proxy wars and the credibility problem

Pakistan’s foreign and security policy since independence has a history of relying on:

• proxy warfare,
• ideological mobilisation,
• and the instrumental use of non-state actors.
• 
  

From Kashmir to Afghanistan, this approach has left behind instability rather than peace. A state that has struggled to disentangle itself from militancy at home and abroad lacks the credibility to act as a neutral guarantor of civilian protection in one of the most politically charged conflicts on earth.

Gaza is not a UN peacekeeping mission in a post-colonial state. It is a theatre of occupation, resistance, and international hypocrisy. In view of that, Pakistan should stay out of this hotspot, as it will not add to the credibility of Pakistan; if anything, it can cause some serious problems for the country that is surrounded by many problems.

Why Washington still looks to Islamabad

If Pakistan’s record is so problematic, why does Washington still court it?

The answer is simple: control.

Pakistan offers:

• a disciplined military,
• economic dependency,
• diplomatic pliability,
• and long experience in executing externally designed security agendas.

From the Cold War to the “War on Terror,” Pakistan has repeatedly been positioned as a frontline state — not because its causes were just, but because its leadership was compliant.

Gaza now risks becoming the next chapter in this long and storied tale.

Policing the victims

Any international force that enters Gaza without Palestinian consent will inevitably be perceived not as a protector, but as an enforcer — tasked less with safeguarding civilians and more with containing resistance and stabilising Israel’s security environment.

If Pakistan participates, it will not be seen as defending Palestinian rights, but as policing Palestinian suffering.

This would fatally undermine Pakistan’s own moral claims on Kashmir, where it insists on the ‘right of self-determination’ while potentially helping suppress it elsewhere.

The larger pattern

Marco Rubio’s statement is therefore not an endorsement of Pakistan; it is a reminder of how Muslim states are selectively engaged to manage Muslim crises — not to resolve them.

Palestine does not need another stabilisation force imposed from above. It needs:

• an end to occupation,
• accountability for war crimes,
• and recognition of Palestinian political agency.

Anything less is not peacekeeping — it is damage control.

And Pakistan, once again, is being invited not to stand with the oppressed, but to serve the architects of an unjust order. END.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.