Geelani's dilemma
Condemning stone pelting now is pointless
COUNTERPOINT BY FAHEEM ASLAM
Syed Ali Shah Geelani is on a fresh statement spree. This time vehemently condemning stone-pelting as a means of resistance. He goes a step further calling stone-pelting as a “failed defensive measure”, citing “it gives no benefit to the freedom cause and hence the youth in Kashmir should desist from pelting stones” [GK, April 30].
The statement is, if not directly, somewhat close to the assertions of a few writers in Kashmir and elsewhere who have been quite often describing stone-pelting as a “menace” and stone-pelters as “anarchists”—the “menace” and “anarchy” whose architect is none other than Geelani himself, if one were to counter Geelani’s statement in one line by agreeing to the assertions. But then there are more lines of disagreement than agreement to set the records right on the issue, especially in the backdrop of Geelani’s fresh assault on stone-pelting.
When the slain religious leader, Moulana Showkat Ahmad Shah, opposed stone-pelting as a means of resistance last year, it sparked-off a heated debate. And first to hit back at the Moulana was Geelani, who justified stone-pelting saying “those speaking against stone-pelting youth should first study the approach of the armed forces personnel, as there was no comparison between the gun and the stone as the latter could not take human life.” On March 27 last year—after his arrival in Srinagar after a three-month stay in New Delhi— Geelani visited the family of Shahid Ahmad Ahangar in Rainawari who was killed in CRPF firing on protestors in Nauthatta. Speaking at a gathering in Nauthatta where he met the family of detained pro-freedom activist, Aashiq Hussian Rangrez, Geelani said that “the deployment of thousands of armed personnel needlessly in populated areas was a provocation in itself, and it was natural for youth to react with anger and pelt stones.”
That was Geelani of 2010, making it clear that bullet was no answer to the stones and that it was natural for the youth to pelt them in self-defence. The year consumed at least 118 civilians in action by police and paramilitary forces and the killers are yet to be punished. Most of those killed were either the demonstrators or stone-pelters, or bystanders, who were made to understand, of course by Geelani and Co., that “stone pelting is a means of resistance.” And that is why the young demonstrators took to the streets of Kashmir to fight the armed men, caring little about the disproportionate sources of fighting. It was bullets v/s stones for many months. The youth braved bullets, but didn’t enter their homes. They kept fighting. Sacrificed their lives. And those who survived are still facing the onslaught of the state. If stone-pelting was no means of resistance, why didn’t Geelani say it then and save the youth from falling to the bullets of police and CRPF? Why is he doing it now when much blood has been shed? Yes, Geelani did selectively condemn stone-pelting then, but only when we lost a few civilians to stone-pelting, including a 10-day-old boy, Irfan of Baramulla. And to the Indian Express, this is what Geelani once said: “excessive and inexplicable stone-pelting could be the handiwork of the agencies. The death of the infant is appalling. No civilised society would allow it. The youth who were behind the infant’s death are not part of the Azadi struggle.”
That was it when it could have been much more: like support Moulana’s statement, if was required to be supported and clearly state that “stone-pelting is no means of resistance”—if at all that was the case. Didn’t Geelani have moral courage to come clean on the issue? If today he is able to say so, what was the problem yesterday? Whether stone-pelting is a means of resistance or not had to be decided by the leader the very first day when a youth of Kashmir took the stone in hand and was met with bullets? Why did he wait for 118 to fall down? In June last year, a few opinions suggested Geelani not to prolong the agitation and call it a day. Why were they ignored then?
This year, the veteran leader is again into the issue of stone-pelting, God knows why! While the question can only be answered by Geelani himself, his arguments to support that “stone-pelting is a failed strategy” are flawed, to say the least. First the Geelani’s arguments: “Stone pelting proved unsuccessful as a defensive measure; theological debate on stone pelting aside, we have analyzed that it yields no contribution to the cause of freedom. In return we lost 118 youths; The youth were pelting stones as a defensive measure against the bullets but we couldn’t defend ourselves by pelting stones thus losing 118 youths last year.” That “we couldn’t defend ourselves by pelting stones” is a flawed argument and against common sense. Why was Geelani under this impression that stones can fight bullets? Was Geelani expecting armed forces to shower petals in response to the stones? What was Geelani expecting a stone to do? Resistance, Geelani Sahib, you must know is not always about winning and losing. It is about putting a point across which the youth did quite effectively on the streets of Kashmir. And why is now Geelani belittling the sacrifice of the youth of Kashmir by saying that “stone pelting yields no contribution to Kashmir cause.” It may or may not be a means of resistance, but the statement that it “yielded nothing” has the other version as well. For your information Geelani Sahib, if you have been able to get the Dogra Certificate order revoked today, it is only because of that poor man’s taking to streets last year and sacrificing his life. It is that sacrifice of an ordinary boy that made the state to rethink on the Dogra Certificate as it sensed another agitation in the Valley over the controversial issue.
There was no hikmat of Geelani in getting the orders revoked. If my memory supports me, Geelani took the cue from media reports on the issue, 10 days after the Dogra Certificate order was issued! So Geelani Sahib, that is the contribution of those sacrifices to the “cause of freedom” that you are so confused about. The issue of Kashmir is beyond stone-pelting. It is about that honour and dignity of an aam aadmi in Kashmir which has been so brutally mutilated in the past many decades now. And we need not to debate who the doer is!
All said and done. Your ill-timed statements only reflect the moral confusion in the “leadership” on Kashmir. And this is not for the first time Geelani is making an embarrassing statement. Just a few months back, when the Chief Minister Omar Abdullah made the remark that “J&K had acceded and not merged to India”, Geelani’s statement followed. It read: “The Chief Minister’s statement is an endorsement of our stand on Kashmir.” That was October 7. But on October 11, this is what Geelani said in another statement: “Omar’s Assembly speech is scripted in New Delhi to hoodwink Kashmiris and restore credibility of his party.”
This confusion merits an explanation. Because the confusion will only compound the problem and raise a question mark on Geelani’s stature and stand on Kashmir; the similar question marks which continue to exist on Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah even after years of his death.
Tail-piece: A confusing statement on an issue only spoils the stature of a leader. And here Geelani, as a respected teacher and a columnist puts it, is himself spoiling his image.
[Faheem Aslam is Senior Editor, Greater Kashmir]
http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/May/1/geelani-s-dilemma-6.asp
Sunday, 1 May 2011
Saturday, 30 April 2011
Zardari ensures second term!
Zardari ensures second term!
By Aijaz Ahmed
The political landscape of the country is going to be altered soon as the PPP and PML-Q have finally reached a deal with the blessings of the chief of the country’s top spy agency with a Lahore based business tycoon and a top builder of the country being one of the guarantors!
Observers believe that the ‘deal’ will certainly bring political stability in the country, which will ultimately restore the trust of the business and the investors. However, they also believe the deal will make way for change in Punjab’s political landscape as well.
The umpteenth ‘political wonder’ was finalized late Thursday night at presidency where Ch. Shujaat and Pervaiz Elahi along with few colleagues had a formal meeting and dinner with President who also happens to be Co-Chairman of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).
The new element of the meeting whispered by sources at the Pakistan’s Capital Hill was an inventory list from the Presidency side. Sources are ready to bear all burden of the list that is being revealed and according to them the ISI Chief General Ahmed Shuja Pasha was the strongest witness and a wheeler-dealer of the agreement.
Details of the agreement are the same, which Indus Herald has already revealed with one minor addition that Ch. Pervaiz Elahi will be appointed deputy prime minister and an amendment to this affect will be made accordingly. The top builder of the country and Chief of Bahria Town, Malik Riaz was guarantor from the Presidency side while Lahore based business tycoon Ch. Siddique was present as a guarantor from Q league side, sources added.
Although, the deal in itself is being considered as yet another political achievement of Mr. Zardari even in the worst political situation, the real achievement he secured in the deal is second Presidential term for him. PML-Q has agreed to support his candidature in the next presidential elections at completion of the current term and the move is fully backed by present military leadership including the ISI chief, sources added.
‘The situation in the country needs continuity at top level, and also a person who understands army point of view beside having a backing from Europe and also from a strong US lobby is suitable’, sources say adding that he (Zardari) is the one who refuses to completely bow down to US demands in the present situation and that has created and strengthened mutual trust between the Pak Army and President Zardari. Army wants him to stay for another five years and thus the demand was made part of the agreement at the last minute, and was ensured to be agreed by ISI Chief, sources claimed.
Some of the points included in the deal indicate the reason why UK had interest in the alliance, and thus the efforts made by them have succeeded, sources also observed.
In the second round of the political parlays and to further discuss some minor details of the deal, Ch Shujaat had another meeting with President after Jumma Prayers at the Presidency and this time Faisal Saleh Hayat, a former PPP stalwart and presently Parliamentary leader of the party in National Assembly replaced Pervaiz Elahi to discuss his own grievances and reservations with the president.
Confirming the meeting, Farhat Ullah Babar, the presidential spokesman observed that ‘current political situation of the country was discussed during the meeting. The meeting was held in the context of over all political reconciliation in the country and realignment of political forces. Such meetings will also take place in the future’, he added.
Giving the actual context of the meeting, the sources and the witnesses of the meeting observed that the peer from Jhang, a remote and less developed district between the central and southern Punjab had reservations against his former party colleague for certain personal and other reasons. Both former colleagues and rivals had a warm handshake and held detailed discussion on his reservations. Both were at ease and in friendly mood when the meeting ended sources observed. Mr. Hayat was assured that PPP would not field Begum Abida Hussain against him as a candidate, while he will not pursue his case on rental power and other energy issues in return, sources confided.
Although, both the parties have agreed to enter in a marriage of convenience they still harbor mutual mistrust and have formed committees to keep a vigilant eye on each other.
The way, PPP handled Nawaz Sharif and put him in the political isolation has made the PML-Q think twice and Choudhris could not have blind trust in Mr. Zardari. Thus they insisted to sign a formal agreement on the pattern of charter of democracy (CoD) said a PML-Q leader. The charter will be signed in front of the national media, he added
As obvious, PML-N feels heat from the new alliance, as its government in Punjab may become a casualty. The besieged PML-N in its bid to end the political isolation has embarked on a new game plan. The PML-N just before the deal is being signed rushed to the nationalist political parties of Sindh having strong rivalries with the PPP. The PML-N delegation led by Zulfiqar Khosa, a Sardar from Dera Ghazi Khan had political deliberations with Mumtaz Bhutto, the famous talented cousin of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The younger Bhutto left Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto Shaheed alone just few days after ZAB was hanged till death by military dictator Zia.
Ever since, BB was martyred at Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto is trying to become his political and legal heir. He warmly welcomed Punjab’s leadership and assured full support. ‘We will support every political party struggling to make Pakistan stronger and prosperous’, he observed after the meeting.
Political observers are taking PML-N’s move a desperate attempt to teach a strong lesson to former ally and a partner in the Charter of Democracy in its political strong hold and power base, the Sindh province. However, they are not sure that the move will be taken as a wise and a sharp one by Sindhi voters, as they have already discarded Junior Bhutto many times, they believe.
http://indusherald.blogspot.com/
By Aijaz Ahmed
The political landscape of the country is going to be altered soon as the PPP and PML-Q have finally reached a deal with the blessings of the chief of the country’s top spy agency with a Lahore based business tycoon and a top builder of the country being one of the guarantors!
Observers believe that the ‘deal’ will certainly bring political stability in the country, which will ultimately restore the trust of the business and the investors. However, they also believe the deal will make way for change in Punjab’s political landscape as well.
The umpteenth ‘political wonder’ was finalized late Thursday night at presidency where Ch. Shujaat and Pervaiz Elahi along with few colleagues had a formal meeting and dinner with President who also happens to be Co-Chairman of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).
The new element of the meeting whispered by sources at the Pakistan’s Capital Hill was an inventory list from the Presidency side. Sources are ready to bear all burden of the list that is being revealed and according to them the ISI Chief General Ahmed Shuja Pasha was the strongest witness and a wheeler-dealer of the agreement.
Details of the agreement are the same, which Indus Herald has already revealed with one minor addition that Ch. Pervaiz Elahi will be appointed deputy prime minister and an amendment to this affect will be made accordingly. The top builder of the country and Chief of Bahria Town, Malik Riaz was guarantor from the Presidency side while Lahore based business tycoon Ch. Siddique was present as a guarantor from Q league side, sources added.
Although, the deal in itself is being considered as yet another political achievement of Mr. Zardari even in the worst political situation, the real achievement he secured in the deal is second Presidential term for him. PML-Q has agreed to support his candidature in the next presidential elections at completion of the current term and the move is fully backed by present military leadership including the ISI chief, sources added.
‘The situation in the country needs continuity at top level, and also a person who understands army point of view beside having a backing from Europe and also from a strong US lobby is suitable’, sources say adding that he (Zardari) is the one who refuses to completely bow down to US demands in the present situation and that has created and strengthened mutual trust between the Pak Army and President Zardari. Army wants him to stay for another five years and thus the demand was made part of the agreement at the last minute, and was ensured to be agreed by ISI Chief, sources claimed.
Some of the points included in the deal indicate the reason why UK had interest in the alliance, and thus the efforts made by them have succeeded, sources also observed.
In the second round of the political parlays and to further discuss some minor details of the deal, Ch Shujaat had another meeting with President after Jumma Prayers at the Presidency and this time Faisal Saleh Hayat, a former PPP stalwart and presently Parliamentary leader of the party in National Assembly replaced Pervaiz Elahi to discuss his own grievances and reservations with the president.
Confirming the meeting, Farhat Ullah Babar, the presidential spokesman observed that ‘current political situation of the country was discussed during the meeting. The meeting was held in the context of over all political reconciliation in the country and realignment of political forces. Such meetings will also take place in the future’, he added.
Giving the actual context of the meeting, the sources and the witnesses of the meeting observed that the peer from Jhang, a remote and less developed district between the central and southern Punjab had reservations against his former party colleague for certain personal and other reasons. Both former colleagues and rivals had a warm handshake and held detailed discussion on his reservations. Both were at ease and in friendly mood when the meeting ended sources observed. Mr. Hayat was assured that PPP would not field Begum Abida Hussain against him as a candidate, while he will not pursue his case on rental power and other energy issues in return, sources confided.
Although, both the parties have agreed to enter in a marriage of convenience they still harbor mutual mistrust and have formed committees to keep a vigilant eye on each other.
The way, PPP handled Nawaz Sharif and put him in the political isolation has made the PML-Q think twice and Choudhris could not have blind trust in Mr. Zardari. Thus they insisted to sign a formal agreement on the pattern of charter of democracy (CoD) said a PML-Q leader. The charter will be signed in front of the national media, he added
As obvious, PML-N feels heat from the new alliance, as its government in Punjab may become a casualty. The besieged PML-N in its bid to end the political isolation has embarked on a new game plan. The PML-N just before the deal is being signed rushed to the nationalist political parties of Sindh having strong rivalries with the PPP. The PML-N delegation led by Zulfiqar Khosa, a Sardar from Dera Ghazi Khan had political deliberations with Mumtaz Bhutto, the famous talented cousin of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The younger Bhutto left Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto Shaheed alone just few days after ZAB was hanged till death by military dictator Zia.
Ever since, BB was martyred at Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto is trying to become his political and legal heir. He warmly welcomed Punjab’s leadership and assured full support. ‘We will support every political party struggling to make Pakistan stronger and prosperous’, he observed after the meeting.
Political observers are taking PML-N’s move a desperate attempt to teach a strong lesson to former ally and a partner in the Charter of Democracy in its political strong hold and power base, the Sindh province. However, they are not sure that the move will be taken as a wise and a sharp one by Sindhi voters, as they have already discarded Junior Bhutto many times, they believe.
http://indusherald.blogspot.com/
Pakistan accuses US of 'negative propaganda'
Pakistan accuses US of 'negative propaganda'
The Pakistan Army has accused the United States of waging a campaign of "negative propaganda" over its role in the war on al-Qaeda and Taliban militants.
Its claim was made in a military statement criticising comments by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) had maintained a relationship with the Haqqani network – one of the deadliest factions in the Taliban's Afghan insurgency.
During a visit to Pakistan on Wednesday, Admiral Mullen said continuing links between the ISI and the Haqqani network, which attacks Nato troops in Afghanistan from safe havens in North Waziristan, are a cause of "continuing strain" in relations between the two countries.
"Haqqani is supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners. And I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesn't happen," he told a television interviewer.
Relations between the two countries deteriorated significantly earlier this year following the arrest of Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor who shot dead two men he believed were trying to rob him as he drove his car through a Lahore suburb. There has been disagreement too over an increase in missile attacks in North Waziristan by American Predator drones.
In a statement released by Pakistan's military spokesman, its chief of army staff, General Ashfaq Kayani was quoted rejecting criticism of its commitment to fighting militants.
According to the statement, "the Pakistan army's ongoing operations are a testimony of our national resolve to defeat terrorism. He (Kayani) strongly rejected negative propaganda of Pakistan not doing enough and Pakistanarmy's lack of clarity on the way forward."
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8466527/Pakistan-accuses-US-of-negative-propaganda.html
The Pakistan Army has accused the United States of waging a campaign of "negative propaganda" over its role in the war on al-Qaeda and Taliban militants.
Its claim was made in a military statement criticising comments by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) had maintained a relationship with the Haqqani network – one of the deadliest factions in the Taliban's Afghan insurgency.
During a visit to Pakistan on Wednesday, Admiral Mullen said continuing links between the ISI and the Haqqani network, which attacks Nato troops in Afghanistan from safe havens in North Waziristan, are a cause of "continuing strain" in relations between the two countries.
"Haqqani is supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners. And I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesn't happen," he told a television interviewer.
Relations between the two countries deteriorated significantly earlier this year following the arrest of Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor who shot dead two men he believed were trying to rob him as he drove his car through a Lahore suburb. There has been disagreement too over an increase in missile attacks in North Waziristan by American Predator drones.
In a statement released by Pakistan's military spokesman, its chief of army staff, General Ashfaq Kayani was quoted rejecting criticism of its commitment to fighting militants.
According to the statement, "the Pakistan army's ongoing operations are a testimony of our national resolve to defeat terrorism. He (Kayani) strongly rejected negative propaganda of Pakistan not doing enough and Pakistanarmy's lack of clarity on the way forward."
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8466527/Pakistan-accuses-US-of-negative-propaganda.html
Pakistan's Persian Gulf balancing act
Pakistan's Persian Gulf balancing act
BY ARIF RAFIQ, APRIL 28, 2011 Thursday, April 28, 2011 - 9:03 PM Share
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/04/28/pakistans_persian_gulf_balancing_act
As revolutions and counterrevolutions spread across the Middle East, regional heavyweights Iran and Saudi Arabia are troubled by the potential for domestic instability and the survival prospects of their respective allies. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, along the outer perimeter of the greater Middle East, the political class and military-intelligence establishment are comfortably nestled in the verdant foothills of the Himalayas, home to the nation's capital and army headquarters. Despite the seemingly infinite troubles afflicting Pakistan, in the short-to-medium term, political change is only likely to occur within the game of musical chairs among its power elite.
Pakistan's power brokers, however, are watching changes in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf region, with great interest. For the governing coalition leader, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and its adversary-overlord, the military-intelligence establishment, the Persian Gulf is home to major sources of energy and rent, such as remittances and economic aid, as well as critical diplomatic and military allies.
Turmoil in Bahrain and elsewhere has also inflamed the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. And Pakistan -- a Saudi ally, an Iranian partner, and possessor of one of the region's strongest militaries -- is positioned to exploit Iranian and Saudi concerns about threats to the balance of power by extracting concessions from both energy-rich countries.
Earlier this week, Pakistan's de facto foreign minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, met in Riyadh with Saudi heavyweights, including Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, Interior Minister Naif bin Abdul Aziz, and National Security Council Secretary General Bandar bin Sultan. Riyadh is now courting the PPP, after having shunned it since it came to power in 2008. The Saudi foreign minister pledged to expedite the completion of a GCC-Pakistan free trade agreement, which would aid the fledgling Pakistani economy. Earlier in March, Prince Bandar visited Islamabad, met with Pakistan's civilian and military leadership, and offered the PPP-led government oil on deferred payment. He reportedly secured Pakistani pledges to put two army divisions on standby for deployment to Saudi Arabia. This alleged Pakistani commitment - which is likely much less than reported, but has not been denied by the military -- follows a recruitment drive by the Fauji Foundation, a Pakistani military welfare organization, for hundreds of retired security personnel to serve in the Bahrain National Guard.
Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment has also sought a security pact with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Recent short-term security deals with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia could advance the prospects of such an arrangement. Beginning with the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the 1950s and continuing with the Economic Cooperation Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization today, Pakistan has been keen to join regional multilateral organizations to offset the Indian economic and military threat, though these attempts have yielded minimal returns. However, declining Saudi confidence in the ability and willingness of the United States to stand by it could push it further into Pakistani (and Chinese) arms.
Pakistan's increasing alignment with the Saudi-led Sunni bloc has angered Iran. Tehran summoned the Pakistani charge d'affaires to express its unhappiness with the recruitment of retired Pakistani security personnel to serve in Bahrain to quell the revolt. Late last week, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari sent close aide Interior Minister Rehman Malik to Tehran to address Iranian concerns.
While Pakistan's partnership with Saudi Arabia is more robust than its ties with Iran, Islamabad cannot afford to alienate the latter, an increasingly key economic partner. Iran exports electricity to Pakistan -- which currently faces a major energy shortage -- and has provided it with oil on deferred payment. Energy-starved Pakistan also hopes to complete a pipeline importing natural gas (its largest fuel source) from Iran's South Pars field by 2014. Though there are considerable hurdles blocking the completion of an Iran-Pakistan pipeline, Pakistan needs to at least maintain the pretense of an Iranian natural gas option so as to not overleverage itself with the more viable route that crosses over Afghanistan, where the Pakistani military is engaged in a complex fight to muscle its way into the presidential palace. If Pakistan made it clear that its only major natural gas option was the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan pipeline, then the Karzai government and Obama administration could use Pakistani dependency for security along the supply route through Afghanistan to weaken its resolve to support Afghan insurgents.
Tehran and Islamabad have also agreed to work to quadruple bilateral trade to $4 billion by 2016. And the PPP-led government has pushed forward plans to connect Pakistan to Europe through a rail link that will cross Iran into Turkey, an emerging economic powerhouse. Tehran can withhold economic cooperation, but its ability to punish Islamabad is limited. Indeed, Tehran is more likely to match Riyadh's concessions to Islamabad, rather than withhold aid and curb trade. Hit by United Nations-imposed economic sanctions, Iran is keen to export natural gas to Pakistan, giving the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment's considerable maneuverability vis-à-vis security cooperation with the Saudi-led Sunni bloc. Still, the Pakistani military, which is largely agnostic toward partnering with Iran, would benefit from Tehran's endorsement of a political settlement that includes the Taliban, undercutting a potential Iranian-Indian entente over Afghanistan, such as what existed in the 1990s.
For Pakistan to maximally gain from the Saudi-Iranian crisis, it will have to perform a deft balancing act. Islamabad cannot afford a breakdown in relations with Riyadh or Tehran. And if tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia grow, especially in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's eastern al-Sharqiyyah province, pressure on Pakistan to choose between the two powers will also likely increase. Pakistan's optimal risk-reward ratio will come from moderate levels of tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, enough to keep benefits flowing to Pakistan without a high likelihood of having to make a painful choice between the two partnerships.
Arif Rafiq is president of Vizier Consulting, LLC, which provides strategic guidance on Middle East and South Asian political and security issues. He writes at the Pakistan Policy Blog (www.pakistanpolicy.com).
BY ARIF RAFIQ, APRIL 28, 2011 Thursday, April 28, 2011 - 9:03 PM Share
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/04/28/pakistans_persian_gulf_balancing_act
As revolutions and counterrevolutions spread across the Middle East, regional heavyweights Iran and Saudi Arabia are troubled by the potential for domestic instability and the survival prospects of their respective allies. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, along the outer perimeter of the greater Middle East, the political class and military-intelligence establishment are comfortably nestled in the verdant foothills of the Himalayas, home to the nation's capital and army headquarters. Despite the seemingly infinite troubles afflicting Pakistan, in the short-to-medium term, political change is only likely to occur within the game of musical chairs among its power elite.
Pakistan's power brokers, however, are watching changes in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf region, with great interest. For the governing coalition leader, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and its adversary-overlord, the military-intelligence establishment, the Persian Gulf is home to major sources of energy and rent, such as remittances and economic aid, as well as critical diplomatic and military allies.
Turmoil in Bahrain and elsewhere has also inflamed the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. And Pakistan -- a Saudi ally, an Iranian partner, and possessor of one of the region's strongest militaries -- is positioned to exploit Iranian and Saudi concerns about threats to the balance of power by extracting concessions from both energy-rich countries.
Earlier this week, Pakistan's de facto foreign minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, met in Riyadh with Saudi heavyweights, including Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, Interior Minister Naif bin Abdul Aziz, and National Security Council Secretary General Bandar bin Sultan. Riyadh is now courting the PPP, after having shunned it since it came to power in 2008. The Saudi foreign minister pledged to expedite the completion of a GCC-Pakistan free trade agreement, which would aid the fledgling Pakistani economy. Earlier in March, Prince Bandar visited Islamabad, met with Pakistan's civilian and military leadership, and offered the PPP-led government oil on deferred payment. He reportedly secured Pakistani pledges to put two army divisions on standby for deployment to Saudi Arabia. This alleged Pakistani commitment - which is likely much less than reported, but has not been denied by the military -- follows a recruitment drive by the Fauji Foundation, a Pakistani military welfare organization, for hundreds of retired security personnel to serve in the Bahrain National Guard.
Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment has also sought a security pact with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Recent short-term security deals with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia could advance the prospects of such an arrangement. Beginning with the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the 1950s and continuing with the Economic Cooperation Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization today, Pakistan has been keen to join regional multilateral organizations to offset the Indian economic and military threat, though these attempts have yielded minimal returns. However, declining Saudi confidence in the ability and willingness of the United States to stand by it could push it further into Pakistani (and Chinese) arms.
Pakistan's increasing alignment with the Saudi-led Sunni bloc has angered Iran. Tehran summoned the Pakistani charge d'affaires to express its unhappiness with the recruitment of retired Pakistani security personnel to serve in Bahrain to quell the revolt. Late last week, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari sent close aide Interior Minister Rehman Malik to Tehran to address Iranian concerns.
While Pakistan's partnership with Saudi Arabia is more robust than its ties with Iran, Islamabad cannot afford to alienate the latter, an increasingly key economic partner. Iran exports electricity to Pakistan -- which currently faces a major energy shortage -- and has provided it with oil on deferred payment. Energy-starved Pakistan also hopes to complete a pipeline importing natural gas (its largest fuel source) from Iran's South Pars field by 2014. Though there are considerable hurdles blocking the completion of an Iran-Pakistan pipeline, Pakistan needs to at least maintain the pretense of an Iranian natural gas option so as to not overleverage itself with the more viable route that crosses over Afghanistan, where the Pakistani military is engaged in a complex fight to muscle its way into the presidential palace. If Pakistan made it clear that its only major natural gas option was the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan pipeline, then the Karzai government and Obama administration could use Pakistani dependency for security along the supply route through Afghanistan to weaken its resolve to support Afghan insurgents.
Tehran and Islamabad have also agreed to work to quadruple bilateral trade to $4 billion by 2016. And the PPP-led government has pushed forward plans to connect Pakistan to Europe through a rail link that will cross Iran into Turkey, an emerging economic powerhouse. Tehran can withhold economic cooperation, but its ability to punish Islamabad is limited. Indeed, Tehran is more likely to match Riyadh's concessions to Islamabad, rather than withhold aid and curb trade. Hit by United Nations-imposed economic sanctions, Iran is keen to export natural gas to Pakistan, giving the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment's considerable maneuverability vis-à-vis security cooperation with the Saudi-led Sunni bloc. Still, the Pakistani military, which is largely agnostic toward partnering with Iran, would benefit from Tehran's endorsement of a political settlement that includes the Taliban, undercutting a potential Iranian-Indian entente over Afghanistan, such as what existed in the 1990s.
For Pakistan to maximally gain from the Saudi-Iranian crisis, it will have to perform a deft balancing act. Islamabad cannot afford a breakdown in relations with Riyadh or Tehran. And if tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia grow, especially in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's eastern al-Sharqiyyah province, pressure on Pakistan to choose between the two powers will also likely increase. Pakistan's optimal risk-reward ratio will come from moderate levels of tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, enough to keep benefits flowing to Pakistan without a high likelihood of having to make a painful choice between the two partnerships.
Arif Rafiq is president of Vizier Consulting, LLC, which provides strategic guidance on Middle East and South Asian political and security issues. He writes at the Pakistan Policy Blog (www.pakistanpolicy.com).
Petraeus would helm an increasingly militarized CIA
Petraeus would helm an increasingly militarized CIA
By Greg Miller and Greg Jaffe, Published: April 28
Gen. David H. Petraeus has served as commander in two wars launched by the United States after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. If confirmed as the next director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Petraeus would effectively take command of a third — in Pakistan.
Petraeus’s nomination comes at a time when the CIA functions, more than ever in its history, as an extension of the nation’s lethal military force.
CIA teams operate alongside U.S. special operations forces in conflict zones from Afghanistan to Yemen. The agency has also built up a substantial paramilitary capability of its own. But perhaps most significantly, the agency is in the midst of what amounts to a sustained bombing campaign over Pakistan using unmanned Predator and Reaper drones.
Since Obama took office there have been at least 192 drone missile strikes, killing as many as 1,890 militants, suspected terrorists and civilians. Petraeus is seen as a staunch supporter of the drone campaign, even though it has so far failed to eliminate the al-Qaeda threat or turn the tide of the Afghan war.
But if Petraeus is ideally suited to lead an increasingly militarized CIA, it is less clear whether he will be equally adept at managing the political, analytical and even diplomatic dimensions of the job. His nomination coincides with new strains in the CIA’s relationship with its counterpart in Pakistan, and a chaotic reshuffling of the political landscape in the Middle East. If confirmed, he would be the CIA’s fourth director in seven years.
“I think in a lot of ways Gen. Petraeus is the right guy for the agency given the way in which the operational side of the house has really increased” since the Sept. 11 attacks, said Andrew Exum, a military expert at Center for a New American Security, who has also served as an adviser to Petraeus’s staff. “Having said that, I think where Gen. Petraeus will struggle will be looking at the broader global responsibilities of intelligence.”
For Petraeus, Pakistan is likely to be a particularly nettlesome trouble spot. A series of recent ruptures — including the arrest of a CIA contractor in Pakistan — have undermined cooperation against al-Qaeda and prompted threats by Pakistan to place new limits on drone strikes.
Petraeus has been a frequent visitor in Islamabad with key players, including Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani and intelligence director Ahmed Shuja Pasha. But he has engendered the resentment of Pakistani officials because of his demands that they do more against the Afghan Taliban. Many of them believe he is too transparently ambitious — a criticism that he has at times faced among his peers in the United States.
During an interview late last year in Islamabad, a high-ranking Pakistani intelligence official repeatedly referred to the U.S. commander as “Mr. Petraeus,” refusing to acknowledge his military rank.
“I call him Mr. Petraeus because he’s less of a general and more of a politician,” the official said, alluding to rumors that Petraeus might run for president. The Pakistani official spoke on the condition of anonymity because the interview dealt with sensitive intelligence matters between Pakistan and the United States.
Petraeus seems unlikely to encounter significant opposition from Capitol Hill. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), the chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which will consider the nomination, signaled support for Petraeus but stopped short of a formal endorsement.
“He is clearly a very accomplished officer and familiar with the parts of the world where many of the threats to our security originate,” Feinstein said in a statement. But being a military commander “is a different role than leading the top civilian intelligence agency,” Feinstein said, adding that she would “look forward to hearing his vision for the CIA.”
Petraeus’s nomination triggered some grumbling among CIA veterans opposed to putting a career military officer in charge of an agency with a long tradition of civilian leadership.
Others voiced concern that Petraeus is too wedded to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — and the troop-heavy, counterinsurgency strategy he designed — to deliver impartial assessments of those wars as head of the CIA.
Indeed, over the past year the CIA has generally presented a more pessimistic view of the war in Afghanistan than Petraeus has while he has pushed for an extended troop buildup.
“The question is, what does [the administration] want the intelligence service to be?” said a former senior CIA officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “Are they going to have a civilian intelligence service or is it going to be a giant counterterrorism center?”
Obama administration officials said that Petraeus would retire from the military to take the CIA job. Even so, a U.S. official close to the general said he is likely to view running the agency largely through the prism of his experience as a wartime commander.
The official said Petraeus would likely make frequent visits to CIA stations around the world, and defer to the Director of National Intelligence on Washington-based issues such as budgets and big-ticket technology programs.
Petraeus has spent relatively little time in Washington over the past decade and doesn’t have as much experience with managing budgets or running Washington bureaucracies as CIA predecessors Leon E. Panetta and Michael V. Hayden. But Petraeus has quietly lobbied for the CIA post, drawn in part by the chance for a position that would keep him involved in the wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Yemen.
As top commander in Iraq and Afghanistan, Petraeus has relied heavily on CIA and special operations forces to capture and kill mid-level and senior insurgent leaders. But he has insisted that the targeted strikes be a part of a broader and more comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign — putting him at odds with advocates of a more surgical approach, including Vice President Biden.
Petraeus, 58, is intensely organized and has relied on a network of trusted advisers, many with biographies similar to his own, with stints in combat units, graduate school and teaching at West Point. CIA veterans said it would be a mistake for Petraeus to arrive with an entourage. “If you look like you’re coming in to fix us and show us how to do things,” one former official said, “the antibodies start rejecting the transplant.”
Staff writer Walter Pincus contributed to this report.
By Greg Miller and Greg Jaffe, Published: April 28
Gen. David H. Petraeus has served as commander in two wars launched by the United States after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. If confirmed as the next director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Petraeus would effectively take command of a third — in Pakistan.
Petraeus’s nomination comes at a time when the CIA functions, more than ever in its history, as an extension of the nation’s lethal military force.
CIA teams operate alongside U.S. special operations forces in conflict zones from Afghanistan to Yemen. The agency has also built up a substantial paramilitary capability of its own. But perhaps most significantly, the agency is in the midst of what amounts to a sustained bombing campaign over Pakistan using unmanned Predator and Reaper drones.
Since Obama took office there have been at least 192 drone missile strikes, killing as many as 1,890 militants, suspected terrorists and civilians. Petraeus is seen as a staunch supporter of the drone campaign, even though it has so far failed to eliminate the al-Qaeda threat or turn the tide of the Afghan war.
But if Petraeus is ideally suited to lead an increasingly militarized CIA, it is less clear whether he will be equally adept at managing the political, analytical and even diplomatic dimensions of the job. His nomination coincides with new strains in the CIA’s relationship with its counterpart in Pakistan, and a chaotic reshuffling of the political landscape in the Middle East. If confirmed, he would be the CIA’s fourth director in seven years.
“I think in a lot of ways Gen. Petraeus is the right guy for the agency given the way in which the operational side of the house has really increased” since the Sept. 11 attacks, said Andrew Exum, a military expert at Center for a New American Security, who has also served as an adviser to Petraeus’s staff. “Having said that, I think where Gen. Petraeus will struggle will be looking at the broader global responsibilities of intelligence.”
For Petraeus, Pakistan is likely to be a particularly nettlesome trouble spot. A series of recent ruptures — including the arrest of a CIA contractor in Pakistan — have undermined cooperation against al-Qaeda and prompted threats by Pakistan to place new limits on drone strikes.
Petraeus has been a frequent visitor in Islamabad with key players, including Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani and intelligence director Ahmed Shuja Pasha. But he has engendered the resentment of Pakistani officials because of his demands that they do more against the Afghan Taliban. Many of them believe he is too transparently ambitious — a criticism that he has at times faced among his peers in the United States.
During an interview late last year in Islamabad, a high-ranking Pakistani intelligence official repeatedly referred to the U.S. commander as “Mr. Petraeus,” refusing to acknowledge his military rank.
“I call him Mr. Petraeus because he’s less of a general and more of a politician,” the official said, alluding to rumors that Petraeus might run for president. The Pakistani official spoke on the condition of anonymity because the interview dealt with sensitive intelligence matters between Pakistan and the United States.
Petraeus seems unlikely to encounter significant opposition from Capitol Hill. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), the chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which will consider the nomination, signaled support for Petraeus but stopped short of a formal endorsement.
“He is clearly a very accomplished officer and familiar with the parts of the world where many of the threats to our security originate,” Feinstein said in a statement. But being a military commander “is a different role than leading the top civilian intelligence agency,” Feinstein said, adding that she would “look forward to hearing his vision for the CIA.”
Petraeus’s nomination triggered some grumbling among CIA veterans opposed to putting a career military officer in charge of an agency with a long tradition of civilian leadership.
Others voiced concern that Petraeus is too wedded to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — and the troop-heavy, counterinsurgency strategy he designed — to deliver impartial assessments of those wars as head of the CIA.
Indeed, over the past year the CIA has generally presented a more pessimistic view of the war in Afghanistan than Petraeus has while he has pushed for an extended troop buildup.
“The question is, what does [the administration] want the intelligence service to be?” said a former senior CIA officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “Are they going to have a civilian intelligence service or is it going to be a giant counterterrorism center?”
Obama administration officials said that Petraeus would retire from the military to take the CIA job. Even so, a U.S. official close to the general said he is likely to view running the agency largely through the prism of his experience as a wartime commander.
The official said Petraeus would likely make frequent visits to CIA stations around the world, and defer to the Director of National Intelligence on Washington-based issues such as budgets and big-ticket technology programs.
Petraeus has spent relatively little time in Washington over the past decade and doesn’t have as much experience with managing budgets or running Washington bureaucracies as CIA predecessors Leon E. Panetta and Michael V. Hayden. But Petraeus has quietly lobbied for the CIA post, drawn in part by the chance for a position that would keep him involved in the wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Yemen.
As top commander in Iraq and Afghanistan, Petraeus has relied heavily on CIA and special operations forces to capture and kill mid-level and senior insurgent leaders. But he has insisted that the targeted strikes be a part of a broader and more comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign — putting him at odds with advocates of a more surgical approach, including Vice President Biden.
Petraeus, 58, is intensely organized and has relied on a network of trusted advisers, many with biographies similar to his own, with stints in combat units, graduate school and teaching at West Point. CIA veterans said it would be a mistake for Petraeus to arrive with an entourage. “If you look like you’re coming in to fix us and show us how to do things,” one former official said, “the antibodies start rejecting the transplant.”
Staff writer Walter Pincus contributed to this report.
Will Pakistan erupt like Egypt?
Will Pakistan erupt like Egypt?
By David Ignatius, Published: April 30
Think of Pakistan for a moment as the equivalent of Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt. Both countries have strong militaries and weak civilian governments. Both are nominally America’s partners in the war against al-Qaeda, but both chafe at U.S. pressure. In each nation, the street is buzzing with talk of the nation’s shame and humiliation under American hegemony.
In Egypt, this pressure cooker led to a revolution whose loudest slogan was “dignity.” The same upheaval could spread to Pakistan, and given the strength of Islamic extremism there, it would have devastating consequences. Meanwhile, the relationship between Islamabad and Washington becomes more poisonous by the week.
What’s behind this dysfunctional relationship, and what, if anything, can be done to repair it? Is there a way to encourage greater Pakistani independence and confidence without rupturing ties with the United States?
International affairs are sometimes more like a playground fight than a gathering of diplomats in striped pants. Countries feel “disrespected” in the same way as kids on urban streets; they worry about “losing face,” they sometimes place national honor before pragmatic interests. They talk past each other, as was the case for years between Mubarak and a string of U.S. presidents. And then things blow up, and people wonder why it happened.
Here are four recent snapshots of the miscommunication that is the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Each suspects the other of bad faith, as these examples show, but the larger picture is one of persistent misunderstanding. Consider:
l Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, went to Washington last month to see CIA Director Leon Panetta and patch up a feud over the arrest of CIA contractor Raymond Davis and U.S. drone attacks. Pasha lost face at home by coming to Washington, but the meeting seemed to go well. The day he left, the U.S. launched a big drone attack in North Waziristan that a Pakistani intelligence official described as an “FU.”
l Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, traveled to Pakistan two weeks ago to try his hand at mending fences. On the way, he stopped in Afghanistan and got a hair-raising briefing about ISI connections with the Haqqani network — a Taliban faction that is America’s main adversary in eastern Afghanistan. During two news conferences, Mullen unloaded on the Pakistanis. The Pakistanis were miffed at being chastised in public.
l Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, the Pakistani army chief of staff, met last year with Richard Holbrooke, the late special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kiyani was carrying an underlined copy of Bob Woodward’s book “Obama’s Wars,” whose revelations included some sharp criticism of Pakistan by top U.S. officials. “Mr. Ambassador, can you tell me how this happened?” demanded Kiyani.
l And then there are the drone attacks: In its frustration with Pakistan, the administration sharply increased its Predator strikes over North Waziristan last year. But a Pakistani military official says that in the 118 drone attacks they counted last year, only one al-Qaeda “high-value target” was killed. Meanwhile, the Pakistani public seethed at what it saw as a violation of sovereignty.
When you ask administration officials about the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, people just shake their heads in exasperation. They see a country beginning to crumble at the seams.
Maybe Pakistan needs a popular revolution, like Egypt’s, where people demand a stronger role in determining their future. But it’s hard to see this working out to the advantage of anyone at this point, except perhaps Osama bin Laden. And it might put Pakistan’s nuclear weapons up for grabs.
One way to bolster Pakistani sovereignty, short of such an uprising, would be for Pakistan to take a stronger role in ending a Taliban insurgency that is driving Washington and Islamabad nuts. A Pakistani intelligence official outlined to me a “framework for negotiations.” The Pakistanis would demand of Taliban groups with which they have contact — and yes, that includes the Haqqani network — that they meet U.S. requirements for a deal by rejecting al-Qaeda, halting fighting and accepting the Afghan constitution.
For Taliban groups that refuse this peace framework, says the Pakistani intelligence official, there will be “military therapy.”
There’s no way of knowing if the Pakistanis could deliver. But by putting them to the test — and granting their role in the region’s future — the United States might at least speak to the national yearning for dignity and independence. This relationship doesn’t need a divorce but maybe a little separation — to break a potentially ruinous cycle of mutual disrespect.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/will-pakistan-erupt-like-egypt/2011/04/28/AFNjwyGF_story.html?hpid=z6
By David Ignatius, Published: April 30
Think of Pakistan for a moment as the equivalent of Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt. Both countries have strong militaries and weak civilian governments. Both are nominally America’s partners in the war against al-Qaeda, but both chafe at U.S. pressure. In each nation, the street is buzzing with talk of the nation’s shame and humiliation under American hegemony.
In Egypt, this pressure cooker led to a revolution whose loudest slogan was “dignity.” The same upheaval could spread to Pakistan, and given the strength of Islamic extremism there, it would have devastating consequences. Meanwhile, the relationship between Islamabad and Washington becomes more poisonous by the week.
What’s behind this dysfunctional relationship, and what, if anything, can be done to repair it? Is there a way to encourage greater Pakistani independence and confidence without rupturing ties with the United States?
International affairs are sometimes more like a playground fight than a gathering of diplomats in striped pants. Countries feel “disrespected” in the same way as kids on urban streets; they worry about “losing face,” they sometimes place national honor before pragmatic interests. They talk past each other, as was the case for years between Mubarak and a string of U.S. presidents. And then things blow up, and people wonder why it happened.
Here are four recent snapshots of the miscommunication that is the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Each suspects the other of bad faith, as these examples show, but the larger picture is one of persistent misunderstanding. Consider:
l Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, went to Washington last month to see CIA Director Leon Panetta and patch up a feud over the arrest of CIA contractor Raymond Davis and U.S. drone attacks. Pasha lost face at home by coming to Washington, but the meeting seemed to go well. The day he left, the U.S. launched a big drone attack in North Waziristan that a Pakistani intelligence official described as an “FU.”
l Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, traveled to Pakistan two weeks ago to try his hand at mending fences. On the way, he stopped in Afghanistan and got a hair-raising briefing about ISI connections with the Haqqani network — a Taliban faction that is America’s main adversary in eastern Afghanistan. During two news conferences, Mullen unloaded on the Pakistanis. The Pakistanis were miffed at being chastised in public.
l Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, the Pakistani army chief of staff, met last year with Richard Holbrooke, the late special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kiyani was carrying an underlined copy of Bob Woodward’s book “Obama’s Wars,” whose revelations included some sharp criticism of Pakistan by top U.S. officials. “Mr. Ambassador, can you tell me how this happened?” demanded Kiyani.
l And then there are the drone attacks: In its frustration with Pakistan, the administration sharply increased its Predator strikes over North Waziristan last year. But a Pakistani military official says that in the 118 drone attacks they counted last year, only one al-Qaeda “high-value target” was killed. Meanwhile, the Pakistani public seethed at what it saw as a violation of sovereignty.
When you ask administration officials about the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, people just shake their heads in exasperation. They see a country beginning to crumble at the seams.
Maybe Pakistan needs a popular revolution, like Egypt’s, where people demand a stronger role in determining their future. But it’s hard to see this working out to the advantage of anyone at this point, except perhaps Osama bin Laden. And it might put Pakistan’s nuclear weapons up for grabs.
One way to bolster Pakistani sovereignty, short of such an uprising, would be for Pakistan to take a stronger role in ending a Taliban insurgency that is driving Washington and Islamabad nuts. A Pakistani intelligence official outlined to me a “framework for negotiations.” The Pakistanis would demand of Taliban groups with which they have contact — and yes, that includes the Haqqani network — that they meet U.S. requirements for a deal by rejecting al-Qaeda, halting fighting and accepting the Afghan constitution.
For Taliban groups that refuse this peace framework, says the Pakistani intelligence official, there will be “military therapy.”
There’s no way of knowing if the Pakistanis could deliver. But by putting them to the test — and granting their role in the region’s future — the United States might at least speak to the national yearning for dignity and independence. This relationship doesn’t need a divorce but maybe a little separation — to break a potentially ruinous cycle of mutual disrespect.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/will-pakistan-erupt-like-egypt/2011/04/28/AFNjwyGF_story.html?hpid=z6
Taliban video to recruit militants
Taliban video to recruit militantsk
http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/multimedia/2011/04/110427_taliban_cds_campaign.shtml
http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/multimedia/2011/04/110427_taliban_cds_campaign.shtml
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