Wednesday, 24 June 2020

‘Chinese intrusion in Ladakh- Jammu and Kashmir. New Threats and Challenges to Peace and Security in the South Asian Region’.

My presentation in International conference on ‘Chinese intrusion in Ladakh- Jammu and Kashmir. New Threats and Challenges to Peace and Security in the South Asian Region’.

The Conference arranged by UNITED KASHMIR PEOPLE`S NATIONAL PARTY (UKPNP) on Wednesday 24 June 2020

Mr Chairman, friends and colleagues Salam to all of you.

Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte once said:

“China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world.”
What he meant was to let this giant sleep, because if he wakes up there will be trouble for the region and the world.

Sadly this giant woke up some decades ago, and many of the problems of our region and world can be attributed to policies of this giant.

During this apparent sleep, China suffered humiliation, and degradation of various kinds. However, for some decades the rulers of China have started to assert China at the centre-stage of the world politics.

No country can become great without economic muscle, and many wars in the world are started because of economic reasons. With help of unprecedent economic growth and careful planning, China is emerging as a new Superpower, with intention to play a leading role in the world politics. Slowly, but surely they are asserting themselves in many countries, and especially in Asia and its peripheries.

China is on a mission to build a new kind of empire, which will be different to the empires of the past. China does not use gun boat diplomacy in its zeal to build an empire; rather they use their economic muscle, and stringent conditions attached to loans they provide to vulnerable client countries. Also, they use coercion, cajoling and diplomatic skills to achieve their targets.

It was evident many years ago that China will not be able to sustain its economic growth. When things start going wrong, signs of this become visible not only to the local experts, but also to the international experts.

When I anchored a TV programme in 2014 in London, I pointed out that China will not be able to maintain this economic growth. My guests disagreed with me.

Anyhow, economic slowdown generally result in flight of capital; and international investment stops. The scale of the problem can be judged by this fact that in 2016, an estimated one Trillion US Dollars were taken out of China. At that time China’s GDP was ten Trillion US Dollars.

To counter the economic slowdown and other challenges, China initiated the CPEC and One Belt One Road; which were designed to boost China’s economy. The ruling elite of China decided to use cement and steel production and the Chinese money to build infrastructure in other countries. Many countries got trapped in this debt trap, including our neighbour, Pakistan.

Mr Chairman

With this short background, I want to examine China’s recent intrusion in Ladakh, a region which is legal and constitutional part of the former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir.

After the imperialist attack by Pakistan to capture Kashmir on 22 October 1947, the Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir was forced to seek help from India, which was only provided after he agreed to accede to India.

Many citizens of Jammu and Kashmir regard the entire forcibly divided State of Jammu and Kashmir disputed, however, the fact remains that this region is administered and controlled by India. It is India’s responsibility to protect this region, and drive out all the invaders form Jammu and Kashmir, and ensure that life, liberty, honour and property of all citizens is protected.

Current India and China trade

It is not the first time that China and India are squabbling. To some, it is on - going thing, which erupts from time to time; and for some it is a normal practise in disputed areas. Remember, Ladakh is not the only disputed region between China and India.

Despite their disagreements and stand offs along the Line of Actual Control, their trade continues unhindered. According to CNN, the trade between China and India in 2019 was:

·      87 billion US Dollars;

·      Chinese investment in India is 26 billion US Dollars;

·      In the field of Telecom, China is a big player in India;

·      Four out of five big companies which sell smart phones in India, are Chinese;

·      These companies are: Realtime, Opo, Vivo and Xiomi;

·      In 2019, these four companies have earned 16 billion US dollars;

·      95% of trade of Xiomi is with India.

Main focus of both countries is economic growth, and both want to avoid a disastrous military clash that can ruin their economies. In nutshell, the Chinese intrusion in Ladakh is not related to economic interests.

Mr Chairman, Other possible reasons for the Chinese intrusion

Whenever legitimacy and power of the ruling elite is questioned, or they feel they need to divert attention of the people, they start boosting nationalism to control dissent and muster support of the people.

In this context, some people claim China is facing many domestic and international challenges, and a war like situation can help to divert attention from those problems and muster support by drumming up the Chinese nationalism.

China has serious challenges of international magnitude in the South China Sea. There are serious problems with economy, with Belt and Road Initiative and the CPEC. Also there are serious challenges in Hong Kong and in various parts of China.

India also has a number of domestic and international challenges. Therefore, a war like situation suits both countries, as long as it does not escalate in to a full scale war.

The Chinese experts assert that this war like situation developed because of the Indian foreign policy, and support of America in the New Cold war between China and America.

Global Times, a state owned Chinese daily in its recent report advised India, ‘not to engage and get embroiled in the larger US - China confrontation’, as that could be ‘detrimental for the Indian economy and its interests in the region’.

A section of policymakers in China think the ‘present Sino-Indian standoff is an outcome of India’s willingness to toe the U.S. line on China, rather than one of many border disputes that have emerged between the two countries since the demarcation of territories after the Sino-Indian war in 1962’.

The Chinese experts advise India to formulate their China policy independent of America, that both countries can resolve the issues diplomatically and establish peace in this region.

Mr Chairman, we need to look at the Chines game plan.

In my opinion, China is playing a dangerous game. While there can be some merit in all of the reasons pointed above, I think China has other motives to assert its claim and invade a territory that does not belong to them.

As noted above, Ladakh is part of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Security Council Resolution of 13 August 1948, allowed India to maintain its troops in the areas of Jammu and Kashmir under their control. It means, in the eyes of the international community, the presence of the Indian troops in that region is legal and it is their responsibility to protect these areas.

India was building some roads in Daulat Beg Oldi strategic camp area to strengthen their defences. This was known to the Pakistani and the Chinese intelligence. They thought if the new infrastructure is built as planned, that could help India to attack Siachin and Gilgit Baltistan, and possibly take over this region in future.

That was a nightmare scenario for both Islamabad and Beijing. Surely both of them have economic and strategic interests attached with this region. If India was to take over Gilgit Baltistan that would have been a very serious blow to the interests of Islamabad and Beijing.

The Indian takeover of Gilgit Baltistan could have throttled the CPEC and cut off the land access between China and Pakistan. Fearing this looming threat, the Chinese intrusion was a pre-emptive measure to stop India completing its planned infrastructure.

It should be noted that India was building this infrastructure on their side of the demarcation. China has no right to invade a territory that does not belong to them.

Although India and China under the rules of engagement on the Line of Actual Control, cannot use weapons, still there have been causalities on both sides. It is believed that India has lost twenty soldiers and Chinese causalities is more than thirty.

Despite a number of meetings between Chines and the Indians, the issue has not been resolved yet. China stands by with its claim over the Galwan Valley, and India rejects it. China is determined to establish an observatory post at the side of the Galwan River. The objective of that is to keep an eye on what India is doing or may do in future in this region.

India, for obvious reason, does not agree with that and the disagreement with all its tension and dangers continues. Some people claim that both sides need a face saving. I disagree with that. The territory in question is part of Jammu and Kashmir. It is my territory, and China is not a party to this in any form or shape. They must leave our territory.

It is sad to note that some naïve citizens of Jammu and Kashmir were dancing up and down that China has invaded Ladakh. They were happy that India was punished. These people are anti national, who work against the interests of our motherland – Jammu and Kashmir.

These are the people, who betrayed their oath to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, and helped the neighbouring country to attack and invade Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947. As a result of their treachery, Pakistan occupied so called Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan.

India and Pakistan are recognised parties to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, and in presence of these two countries, we people of Jammu and Kashmir are not represented anywhere at the international level.

With these two countries being a party to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute we have suffered since 1947. Just imagine, how difficult it will become if we, in order to strengthen the Pakistani narrative, also make China party to the dispute.

With addition of China, the Jammu and Kashmir dispute will become more complicated, and more difficult to resolve. Surely, it will add to our miseries and suffering; and it will endanger the peace and security of the region.

Mr Chairman, I thank you.



Monday, 15 June 2020

The China - India Standoff and the Myth of a New Cold War

The China - India Standoff and the Myth of a New Cold War
Chinese media are trying to cast the present crisis as a part of the “New Cold War” between the United States and China. Don’t be fooled.
By Sajid Farid Shapoo   June 13, 2020

A recent report in Global Times, a state-owned Chinese daily, while commenting on the ongoing border standoff between China and India, advised India not to engage and get embroiled in the larger U.S.-China confrontation. Baked in the advice was also a subtle warning that becoming a U.S. front in the “New Cold War” could be detrimental for the Indian economy and its interests in the region.
The report is revealing in many ways. It signals that a section of, if not all, Chinese policymakers see the present Sino-Indian standoff as an outcome of India’s willingness to toe the U.S. line on China, rather than one of many border disputes that have emerged between the two countries since the demarcation of territories after the Sino-Indian war in 1962.
More importantly it reiterates the Chinese rhetoric of the heralding of a “New Cold War” era between the United States and China. While most Western experts do not see any merit in the hyperbole of the beginning of a new era of superpower competition, Chinese media, its policymakers, and scholars have audaciously attempted to craft the narrative of the advent of the “New Cold War.”
Such a portrayal comes across as a brazen attempt to present the world with a fait accompli: China as an established superpower and an adversarial second pole in the global distribution of power. This discourse has another immediate implication. While the current standoff between India and China may be resolved with diplomatic efforts, the future of India-China peace, in the Chinese view, depends on India’s ability to pursue its China policy independently and not under the shadow of the growing U.S.-India alliance.
However, viewing the current Sino-Indian stand off as a part of global geopolitical gameplay would be an example of strategic myopia. It is not the first time that India and China have come face to face on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), that came to be the de facto border between the two countries after the 1962 Sino-Indian War.
In last 50 years, both countries have squabbled over territorial demarcations all along the China- Indian border. There are over a dozen places in the Ladakh area, near the Bhutan-China border, and in Arunachal Pradesh where the two countries differ over the on-ground position of the LAC. The 2017 Doklam dispute, in the central sector, was one such dispute. The current crisis has seen Chinese troops build up at Galwan Nala and Pangong lake area in the Ladakh region and at the Nathu La pass near the Bhutan-China border. The simultaneous face off at three different places along the LAC appears not only well coordinated but also part of a plan that could not have been conceived at the local or sub-area level.
Some experts opine that India’s newfound assertiveness along the LAC in terms constructing feeder roads and supportive infrastructure may perhaps be seen as the trigger for the current standoff. The Chinese transgression may therefore be a bid to stop India from building permanent infrastructure, which could potentially give India a strategic advantage.
This argument has baffled some security analysts in India as the troop build-up by China along the LAC started when the most of the Indian roads and feeder roads construction near those points was said to have reached near completion. The chances of China having missed this construction and being caught unaware are slim as China boasts fairly robust reconnaissance (both ground and space-based) capabilities.
Moreover, the road and infrastructure development by both sides along the LAC to shore up their respective strategic positions has continued for many years; these have led to minor skirmishes but rarely triggered a major border transgression, that too at multiple points. As M. Taylor Fravel wrote, the scope, scale, and position of China’s build-up appears unprecedented. Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh acknowledged that a large number of Chinese troops have been stationed on the other side of Galwan Nala, and that Chinese fighters were making sorties within 30 km of their side of the LAC.
Another proffered explanation is that China is trying to signal its strength in a bid to restore its credibility and rebuild its image, both of which have taken a severe beating in the continuing fallout from the global pandemic. Many scholars and China watchers claim that the economic setbacks suffered by China due to COVID-19, along with its already shaky economy, may have prompted Beijing to resort to the latest transgression, with the twin goals of diverting the focus from domestic issues to an external enemy, and at the same time exhibiting China’s strength to the world audience.
Some South Asian experts also allude to a conspiracy theory that sees the current standoff as a possible preemptive move by China to forestall India’s supposed intentions for a military adventure in the northern areas of Pakistan (Gilgit and Baltistan), through which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes.
Both these arguments, however, fall more in the realm of speculation and hypotheticals with no evidence of such moves on the ground. Such views also do not seem to reflect the narrative prevalent in the Chinese domestic space. China has avoided escalating the current border issue by toning down the nationalistic rhetoric and also by not taking a firm stand on the issue. This could be a useful strategy to avoid any audience costs in case of having to back down to the pre-crisis position.
Even an authoritarian regime like China has been seen to be sensitive to domestic audience costs. During the Doklam crisis, many Chinese felt that that China had lost the war of perceptions as it was domestically seen as having backed down from its stated position to end the crisis.
Additionally, Chinese leadership does not believe that the pandemic has dented its international position. In fact, many within the CCP see the current global crisis, particularly the devastating impact of COVID-19 on the U.S. economy, as an opportunity to stake claim to its great power status, ushering in an end to U.S. primacy and a transition toward a bipolar world.
Chinese belligerence should in fact be seen more through the context of its emerging self-narrative of China as the second pole in the new bipolar world. Leader Xi Jinping sees the time as ripe for replacing the “rising China” narrative with the rhetoric of China having arrived as a global superpower.
The “third revolution” of Xi Jinping, as identified by scholar Elizabeth Economy, is predicated on upending the Deng era adage of “hide your strength and bide your time.” For Xi, China must now claim its position in the global distribution of power. The current border standoff is thus being projected more in terms of global geopolitics.
China is trying to portray the crisis as part of superpower gameplay in the so called “New Cold War.” Both Chinese national media and its experts see U.S. support as one of the main drivers behind India’s firmness and aggression in dealing with its border issues with China.
By asking India not to get played by the United States, China attempts to convey that its real competition is with the U.S. and not India. This backdoor attempt to gain entry into the superpower club, by harping on the narrative of “New Cold War” is apparently working. Many Western scholars have also fallen prey to this rhetoric and have started seeing it as a real thing.
India, on its part, has received considerable support from the United States during both the 2017 Doklam standoff and the current crisis. The growing voices in the West that the U.S. should forge a deep strategic alliance, both economic and defense oriented, with India also gels with the emerging view of India being a natural ally of the United States and thus a bulwark against China in Asia. While this may come as a big boost to India’s position in the region, New Delhi must tread this path cautiously.
The “New Cold War,” if it ever becomes a reality, would be completely different from the Cold War of the twentieth century. The U.S. no longer enjoys the same hegemonic status as it did decades ago. Its position as the leader of the liberal international order has long been eroded. Its European partners no longer see the United States as a dependable ally.
Suffice to say that the Cold War doubts over U.S. extended deterrence are far more pertinent today. It may thus not be advisable for India to put all its eggs in one basket. India must, as it is trying to, handle its bilateral issues with China in an independent manner without falling prey to the Chinese narrative.
Handling the current standoff as purely a bilateral issue without linking it to the so called “New Cold War” would not only be strategically beneficial for India but also undermine Chinese efforts to craft the superpower gameplay narrative and thus its bid to elevate itself to the position of a new pole in the international distribution of power.
China’s backdoor machinations of claiming superpower status are predicated on its ability to be accepted first as a regional hegemon. Its lingering disputes with most of its neighbors would make it difficult for regional states to accept or accord such a status to China. India by playing on its own strengths would deny China the strategic space it is trying to grab by casting the present crisis as a part of the “New Cold War” between the United States and China. Instead, it should solely be seen and handled purely as a bilateral dispute between the two neighbors.
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Sajid Farid Shapoo is a highly decorated Indian Police Service officer (two star general) and is currently a PhD scholar at the Princeton University. He also holds a Masters in International Affairs from Columbia University and regularly writes on geopolitical and security related issues.

Tuesday, 26 May 2020

Nehru wanted Jayaprakash Narayan as his political successor, not Indira Gandhi. RAVI VISVESVARAYA SHARADA PRASAD

Nehru wanted Jayaprakash Narayan as his political successor not Indira Gandhi
After Nehru’s death in 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri’s instincts that neither Indira Gandhi nor JP would put a claim to prime ministership turned out to be accurate.
It is said that Jawaharlal Nehru wanted his daughter Indira Gandhi to succeed him as the prime minister. But an examination of the accounts of those who were closely associated with both father and the daughter reveals that it is nothing but just another convenient truth.
The Congress party in pre-Independence India was very concerned about succession planning, and often chose young presidents. Most presidents of the Congress party were in their forties (Nehru was 40 when he first became Congress president in 1929), and many like Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Subhas Chandra Bose and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad were in their thirties.
One of the many reasons why Nehru was chosen prime minister over Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in 1947 was that Nehru was 58 compared to Patel who was 72, and the former was in far better health.
After Patel’s death in 1950, two key questions that would decide the future of politics in India arose: who would be number two in the cabinet? And who would succeed Nehru as prime minister?

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Nehru’s first choice
Nehru was keen on Jayaprakash Narayan, or JP (born 1902) to succeed him, in view of JP’s amazing organisational abilities which were exhibited during the Freedom struggle. The intellectual in Nehru admired JP’s modern education in the US.
Nehru often remarked that he was not infallible. He was also aware that many of his cabinet colleagues were too scared of him to voice their differences. In fact, Nehru had this contempt for many of his cabinet colleagues: they were men of straw who lacked the courage to frankly disagree with him. This had also been observed by Mahatma Gandhi.
After his massive victory in the 1952 Lok Sabha elections, Nehru invited JP to join his government as his deputy, to be his conscience keeper, and to counsel him whenever he felt Nehru was wrong. In fact, Nehru even proposed a merger between the Congress and JP’s Praja Socialist Party.
But JP rebuffed all of Nehru’s overtures. JP had this image of himself as being a saint and as a successor to Gandhi, far above the lure of office. Nehru interpreted this as JP’s not wanting to take responsibility for governance and administration, and he felt let down that the man he wanted to groom as his chosen successor was not willing to take on responsibility for running a difficult country.
The civil servant who recorded the minutes of meetings between Nehru and JP was Nehru’s relative, ICS officer Braj Kumar Nehru.
Braj Kumar Nehru’s aide memoire of Nehru inviting JP to join his Cabinet in 1952 says: “The Prime Minister was naturally delighted at his complete victory in the election. What he was unhappy about was the absence of an Opposition whom he could respect and who could suggest constructive alternatives. The PM told Mr Narayan that he was not all-knowing; he needed somebody to point out where he was going wrong and to suggest alternatives to achieve agreed goals. His Cabinet were all hollow pusillanimous men; whatever their inner qualms were, they did not dare give voice to their misgivings. The Prime Minister invited Mr Narayan to form such an Opposition within his Cabinet…”
“…The Prime Minister asked Mr Narayan, cajoled him, then begged him, then again tried to persuade him to perform such a role, to lead him back to the right path whenever he was about to stray. But Mr Narayan’s answer was steadfastly ‘No’…”
“…Mr Narayan was totally negative, not positive. He was totally destructive, not constructive. He would criticize, he would agitate, he would even encourage violence, but he would not suggest any positive, constructive way to achieve what he thought required to be done. He did not, in fact, know what should, in positive terms, be done….”
Nehru’s offer to JP to join his cabinet and be groomed as his successor, and of JP repeatedly declining, continued through 1952 and 1953. In JP’s Praja Socialist Party, the issue of JP and Acharya J.B. Kripalani taking up Nehru’s invitation to join his cabinet was discussed at length. Asoka Mehta was in favour of it, but Kripalani said that the party should provide support to Nehru’s government from outside and neither JP nor he himself should join Nehru’s cabinet. However, Ram Manohar Lohia and Acharya Narendra Deva were vehemently opposed to any support for Nehru at all.
My father, H.Y. Sharada Prasad, who worked with Nehru and later became one of the closest advisers and spokesperson for Indira Gandhi had written then: “JP’s persistent refusal to assume political authority is a real waste of a vast and unusual national resource….JP is a very baffling philosophical anarchist, ready to fight the aberrations of the state, but reluctant to assume any office of responsibility himself…”


Who encouraged Indira?
H.Y. Sharada Prasad mentions in The Book I won’t be Writing & Other Essays how Govind Ballabh Pant and Uchharangrai Navalshankar Dhebar exploited JP’s reluctance to join the Nehru government and rooted for Indira Gandhi to enter politics, thereby pushing their Right-wing policies by influencing her. They kept telling her that there was no one else that Nehru could rely on, and that it was her duty to assist him because everyone else would let him down, just as JP had.
G.B. Pant and U.N. Dhebar were nearing the end of their lives. Politically, they were more conservative and to the right of Nehru. They wanted to curb Nehru’s cozying up to the communists, and thought that they would be able to influence future policies if they got Indira Gandhi into politics and operated through her as a pliant facade.
G.B. Pant got Indira into various important committees of the Congress, and U.N. Dhebar, president of the party president for five successive terms from 1955 to 1959, engineered her election as his successor as president of Congress in 1959.
Nehru himself was quite equivocal about Indira Gandhi’s entry into politics. While he did not explicitly encourage her, he did not dissuade her or her backers. Nehru did publicly state that it would not be correct for her to be president of the Congress party while he was still the prime minister. But he soon also said that whenever Indira was given any responsibility, she performed brilliantly. He also remarked a few times that Indira seemed to have a flair for diplomacy and international affairs.
Nehru wanted to retire in 1958 when he turned 70. But he could not decide on a suitable successor. G.B. Pant and Maulana Azad were older than Nehru, and in poor health. V.K. Krishna Menon and Morarji Desai were detested for their obnoxious personalities, and had too many enemies. Gulzari Lal Nanda and Lal Bahadur Shastri were too mild-mannered, without the drive required, and were little known outside India’s cow belt. Jagjivan Ram had allegations of corruption against him, and was not acceptable to large parts of the nation. K. Kamaraj Nadar and Y.B. Chavan were regional leaders with no experience at the Centre.
Without Nehru’s knowledge, G.B Pant and Indira Gandhi ousted the Communist government in Kerala in 1959 by inciting riots there, and then claimed that the Communist government in Kerala could not manage the law and order situation. Nehru was absolutely livid with Indira Gandhi.
After one year as Congress president, Indira Gandhi declined to be renominated, and withdrew from politics, to concentrate on being Nehru’s official hostess. Even though she functioned as his official hostess in state functions, and ran the prime minister’s household, father and daughter barely spoke to each other for several months because of the Kerala episode.
H.Y. Sharada Prasad stated in a public lecture in Vienna in August 1984: “More than once she told me that it was Govind Ballabh Pant and U.N. Dhebar, and not her father, who had persuaded her to take an active part in the party councils, and that Pant also showed her many files. There was one corroborative piece of evidence to support her assertion that she had not foreseen that she might one day be called upon to hold the top spot. And that is, she, who took great care about her father’s papers, took none whatever about her own papers – her letters, her speeches, etc. There were no papers with her of her own months as Congress President. She was truly torn between remaining a private person and becoming a public personage”.


The power struggle
After the death of G.B. Pant in March 1961, Morarji Desai and Jagjivan Ram engaged in a power struggle to be declared number two in the cabinet. In fact, Jagjivan Ram even asked Indira Gandhi and V.K. Krishna Menon for their support. It was Nehru who had to intervene and settle the strife between Morarji Desai and Jagjivan Ram because that would have split the Congress party.
Biju Patnaik urged Nehru to make Indira Gandhi the minister for external affairs, and anoint her as his successor. But Nehru shot down this proposal saying that if he announced a successor, it would doom that person because she/he would attract too many enemies.
Nehru’s views about Morarji Desai too were not very encouraging. He knew that Morarji Desai succeeding him would be disastrous for the Congress party. While Morarji was by far the most competent administrator in the cabinet, he was detested for his rigid views, and he did not have the charisma to win elections.
In 1963, the American political journalist Putnam Welles Hangen, who had served as the Delhi correspondent of National Broadcasting Corporation since 1959, wrote a book, After Nehru, Who?, in which he listed the names of likely successors, in descending order:
1.   Morarji Desai, Finance Minister
2.   Indira Gandhi
3.   Lal Bahadur Shastri, Home Minister
4.   YB Chavan, Defence Minister
5.   Jaya Prakash Narayan
6.   SK Patil, Food and Agriculture Minister
7.   General Brij Mohan Kaul, Chief of Army Staff
8.   VK Krishna Menon, who had been dismissed as defence minister after the China war.
Nehru harshly upbraided Indira Gandhi for speaking to Hangen. An upset Indira Gandhi told Sharada Prasad: “There is no doubt at all that it is going to be Lal Bahadur Shastri”.
In early January 1964, after Nehru suffered a stroke and was incapacitated, it was Shastri who looked after the prime minister’s work. This was a clear indication that Shastri was to be Nehru’s successor. Biju Patnaik and K.D. Malaviya lobbied for Indira Gandhi to be included in the cabinet, but Nehru shot down their suggestions.
Sharada Prasad had written: “Nehru planned his succession very ingeniously through the Kamaraj plan. Morarji Desai, one of the leading claimants, always believed that the Kamaraj plan was Nehru’s plot to do him out of his due. The other leading claimant was Lal Bahadur Shastri. It would have been ideal for the nation if there had been a candidate who combined in himself the best qualities of the two. But that was not to be. Shastri and Desai were wholly different in temperament and endowments. Both were divested of office (along with a few others) under the Kamaraj plan, and asked to work for the party. The whole country had a chance to see which of the two would prove more acceptable to the Congress rank and file, to whom they would turn for settling their disputes. They turned to the affable, humble Shastri rather than to the stern and rather imperiously aloof Morarji.”


Kuldip Nayar’s version
Veteran journalist Kuldip Nayar, who also served as a press secretary to G.B. Pant and Lal Bahadur Shastri believed that Nehru always wanted Indira Gandhi to succeed him as prime minister, “even though he may have never enunciated it”. Nayar in his book On Leaders and Icons: From Jinnah to Modi has mentioned his interactions with various leaders to give his version of the theory of succession.
Nayar recounted an incident to support his claim. Shastri had once told Nayar that he wanted to go back to Allahabad. Nayar reminded Shastri that he was Nehru’s chosen successor. To this Shastri snapped that Nehru’s heart was set on his daughter, but added that even so it would not be easy for her to ascend to the prime minister’s post.
This might have just been a momentary fit of pique on part of Shastri.
In fact, some of Kuldip Nayar’s commentaries over the decades have been self-contradictory. Nayar wrote: “Kamaraj told me that Nehru had indicated his preference for Shastri as his immediate successor when he appointed him as minister without portfolio after all ministers, including Morarji, had resigned under the Kamaraj Plan”.
However, Nayar also observed that: “When Kamaraj discussed the matter of succession with Nehru, (Nehru) was deliberately vague. He (Nehru) said that the people were the best judge in a democratic polity. Yet he mentioned the names of Shastri and Indira during the discussion…As a true and loyal soldier, Kamaraj had in mind first Shastri and then Indira as the prime minister. In the election of both, Kamaraj played a key role. Morarji was rebuffed every time because Kamaraj represented mainline Congress opinion and he personally did not want Morarji”.
But, on another occasion, well after Shastri’s demise, Nayar wrote: “The truth is that he (Shastri) nursed a burning ambition to take over after Nehru. All of us who worked with him (Shastri) could see that he wanted nothing more than to become India’s next prime minister…”  In another column around the same time, Nayar said: “He (Shastri) exclaimed to me: ‘Do you think that I am so much of a saint that I do not want to become prime minister?’” These assertions of Nayar were later objected to by Shastri’s sons.


Shastri’s succession theory
Regarding the succession, Kuldip Nayar wrote: “Shastri did propose two names, Jaya Prakash Narayan and Indira Gandhi, in that order.”
Based on my interactions with senior leaders of the Congress party, Shastri had discussed three possibilities about the succession to Nehru with his confidantes in the Congress party:
1) In Shastri’s opinion, the most probable scenario was that it would come down to a contest between him and Morarji Desai, and that he would be able to defeat Morarji easily, because Morarji was widely disliked. It would be an “anyone but Morarji”, according to Shastri, and he would be the beneficiary.
2) Shastri thought that it would be unlikely that Indira Gandhi would contest against him because she would be in mourning. But in the event that she did so, it would be a close contest between them, but Shastri felt that he still held a slight edge over her, mainly because he had the support of Kamaraj.
3) Shastri stated that the best person to lead the nation was JP. He stated that if there was even the slightest indication of interest from JP, he would step aside in favour of JP at once. But Shastri felt that it was unlikely that JP would be interested at all.


How Moraji failed
After Nehru’s death on 27 May 1964, home minister Gulzari Lal Nanda was sworn in as interim prime minister. Five powerful party bosses – K. Kamaraj Nadar of Madras, Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy of Andhra Pradesh, S Nijalingappa of Mysore, S.K. Patil of Bombay, and Atulya Ghosh of Bengal, were dead set against Morarji Desai.
Kuldip Nayar played a key role in eliminating the chances of Morarji Desai. In his book, Nayar said that Morarji’s son, Kanti Desai had told him immediately after Nehru’s cremation: “You can tell Shastri that we have the overwhelming support”. Nayar immediately put out a story in the United News of India that Morarji had staked his claim even before Nehru’s ashes were cold: “…Morarji’s son Kanti is busy collating lists of possible supporters. In a deeply conservative society like India, this comes across as sacrilegious. In sharp contrast, Shastri spent his time and energy supervising Nehru’s funeral rites. People will never forget that Shastri served Nehru honestly and loyally…”
Nayar later mentioned about the impact of his report: “When my story came out, Congress MPs were disgusted by what they saw as Morarji’s crude ambition. At least 100 hitherto undecided MPs switched their support to Shastri…” Nayar added that Kamaraj personally thanked him for his role in making Shastri prime minister, and that Morarji always maintained that Nayar had destroyed his chances.
Shastri’s political instincts that neither Indira Gandhi nor JP would put in a claim were accurate. Nayar’s article ensured that Shastri was the unanimous choice.


Indira joins govt
According to N.K. Seshan, Nehru’s trusted private secretary since 1944 whom he referred to as the son he never had, Biju Patnaik and K.D. Malaviya pushed then Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to include Indira Gandhi in his cabinet. When Shastri approached her, Indira Gandhi snapped testily that she was in mourning, and that it was not appropriate for him to ask her at that point, Seshan had told H.Y. Sharada Prasad.
Shastri stated that he would have to include one member of the Nehru family in his cabinet. If Indira would not accept, then he would offer the post to Nehru’s sister, Vijayalakshmi Pandit. Indira Gandhi and her aunt were at loggerheads since her early childhood, and Indira knew that if her aunt was in the cabinet, her life would be made miserable. It is not clear to me from N.K. Seshan’s statements whether Shastri saying that he would invite Vijayalakshmi Pandit was a bluff to get Indira to join his cabinet, or whether he genuinely intended to have Pandit in his cabinet if Indira refused.
Indira Gandhi accepted Shastri’s offer of a cabinet post. Shastri assigned her the middle-level portfolio of Information and Broadcasting. While not one of the top cabinet portfolios, it would, for the time being, satisfy her ambitions.


Shastri’s death and Indira’s arrival
Kuldip Nayar had written that in the moments just after Shastri’s demise in Tashkent: “Swaran Singh turned to me and asked, ‘Kuldip, who do you think could be the next prime minister?’ I repeated to him what Shastri had himself told me a few months earlier, ‘If I die in the next two years, my successor will be Indira Gandhi. If I survive, it will be YB Chavan’. Chavan, who was also part of our group that day, commented, ‘Kuldip, make sure you write this’….” This assertion of Nayar’s is true, and has been corroborated by my sources.
Home minister Gulzari Lal Nanda was again sworn in as interim prime minister. Morarji Desai moved quickly to publicly declare his candidature. The lure of office bit even a self-abnegating person like Nanda. According to N.K. Seshan, Nanda approached Indira Gandhi, and tactfully inquired if she was a candidate. Indira was evasive. Nanda then hinted that he would be grateful for Indira’s support to continue in office till the 1967 elections. Indira cautiously replied that she would go along with whatever the party decided. Nanda misinterpreted this as her support, and he went to Kamaraj, and asserted that he should be allowed to continue as prime minister until the 1967 elections, Seshan had told H.Y. Sharada Prasad.
But Kamaraj had already set his mind on Indira Gandhi as the person who had the charisma to defeat Morarji. The other four members of the Syndicate wanted Kamaraj himself to take over as prime minister. But Kamaraj made his now-famous statement: “No English, no Hindi. How?”, and set about gathering support for Indira.
Kamaraj asserted: “She knows all the world leaders, has travelled widely with her father, has grown up amongst the great men of the freedom movement, has a rational and modern mind, is totally free of any parochialism — state, caste or religion. She has possibly inherited her father’s scientific temper and, above all, in 1967 she can win the election”.
Morarji’s remarks–“That chit of a girl” further alienated those who held Nehru’s memory sacred, and Indira easily defeated Morarji by 355 votes to 169, to become prime minister.


Nehru wanted JP, but India got Indira
There is no convincing evidence that Nehru positioned Indira Gandhi to succeed him as prime minister, other than a couple of stray remarks like ‘she possessed a flair for diplomacy’. She certainly received excellent grounding while she served as his official hostess, observing national leaders and world statesmen at close quarters. But she was not privy to cabinet papers or government files, and did not receive intelligence or military briefings. During my discussions with him, Kuldip Nayar was not able to provide me any concrete evidence of Nehru actively promoting his daughter. Former finance minister T.T. Krishnamachari had told my father H.Y. Sharada Prasad that the maximum all Nehru hoped for Indira was that she would be minister of state for external affairs in Shastri’s council of ministers.
If JP had accepted Nehru’s pleas to join his cabinet and succeed him as prime minister, the history of India would have been very different.
The only person who probably captured the succession story right was cartoonist K. Shankar Pillai. His cartoon published in Shankar’s Weekly depicted a marathon race, with the winners being Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964), followed by Indira Gandhi (1966) and Morarji Desai (1977), with all the other candidates collapsing on the race track.
Ravi Visvesvaraya Sharada Prasad is an alumnus of Carnegie Mellon and IIT Kanpur, and a New Delhi-based technology and security consultant. Views are personal.

Pakistan Discovers the High Cost of Chinese Investment, by Hussain Haqqani

Pakistan Discovers the High Cost of Chinese Investment, by Hussain Haqqani 
A new report sheds light on the true costs of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor for Pakistan.
May 18, 2020

Pakistan’s desire to maintain strategic relations with China has resulted in the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a set of infrastructure projects, being mired in insufficient transparency.
But a Committee formed by Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan to examine the causes for the high cost of electricity to Pakistani consumers has lifted the lid on corruption involving Chinese private power producers in Pakistan.
The report reveals that the Huaneng Shandong Ruyi (Pak) Energy (HSR) or the Sahiwal and the Port Qasim Electric Power Company Limited (PQEPCL) coal plants under CPEC inflated their set-up costs.
For Pakistan’s citizens, who are always told how China is their most reliable friend in the world, it was a shock to discover that China does business mercilessly and unscrupulously.
Successive civilian governments and Pakistan’s military have looked upon China as their principal backer against India.
China’s consistent strategic support, including help with Pakistan’s nuclear program, is often held out by Pakistan’s military establishment favorably in contrast with the more conditional Pakistani alliance with the United States.
But it seems now that China is not in Pakistan to help its people but rather as a predatory economic actor.
The 278-page report by the “Committee for Power Sector Audit, Circular Debt Reservation, and Future RoadMap” listed malpractices to the tune of 100 billion Pakistani rupees ($625 million) in the independent power generating sector, with at least a third of it relating to Chinese projects.
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Given the close ties between CPEC and the all-powerful Pakistan military — the CPEC Authority is currently chaired by Lt. General Asim Saleem Bajwa, who is also the Prime Minister’s Special Assistant on Information and Broadcasting — the Committee treaded softly in relation to the Chinese projects.
According to the committee’s report, “excess set-up costs of Rs. 32.46 billion (approximately $204 million) was allowed to the two coal-based [Chinese] plants due to misrepresentation by sponsors regarding [deductions for] the ‘Interest During Construction’ (IDC) as well as non-consideration of earlier completion of plants.”
The interest deduction was apparently allowed for 48 months whereas the plants were actually completed within 27-29 months leading to entitlement of an excess Return on Equity (RoE) of $27.4 million annually over the entire project life of 30 years in the case of the Sahiwal plant.
The estimated excess payment, keeping in mind the 6 percent annual rupee depreciation against the dollar, works out to a whopping Rs. 291.04 billion (approximately $1.8 billion).
The Chinese company HSR claimed IDC based on a long-term loan at the rate of LIBOR +4.5 percent for the length of the entire construction period, even though it borrowed no money during the first year of construction and used only short-term loans at substantially lower interest rates during the second year.
The magnitude of profiteering by the Chinese companies is incomprehensible. The two projects examined by the Pakistani experts’ Committee were worth $3.8 billion at the time of their launch. The Committee found over­payments of Rs. 483.64 billion, which amounts to $3 billion at current rates of exchange.
This includes overpayment of Rs. 376.71 billion (approximately $2.3 billion) to HSR and Rs. 106.93 billion (approximately $672 million) to PQEPCL on account of excess set-up cost, excess return due to excess set-up cost in 30 years, and excess return due to miscalculation in Internal Rate of Return (IRR).
In its report, the Committee recommended that Rs. 32.46 billion (approximately $204 million) be deducted from the project cost of PQEPCL and HSR; the return payment formula be corrected to reflect actual construction time; and Tariff of PQEPCL and HSR be adjusted accordingly.
Under the current formula, in two years of operation, HSR has already recovered 71.18 percent of its original equity invested whereas PQEPCL has recovered 32.46 percent of its original equity in the first year of operation.
This is over and above the profits that the companies would have made without subterfuge. Imagine the return the Chinese will generate on the $62 billion CPEC projects. These numbers are way too large to have been missed as oversight or malfeasance of individuals within the companies and their Pakistani counterparts.
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The experience of the Sri Lankan and Maldives governments suggests that these overpayments are generated with the complicity of leaders in the Pakistan government and the loot shared by all parties.
Pakistan’s economy has been teetering on the verge of bankruptcy for some time and the COVID-19 pandemic has made the situation even worse.
Instead of reforming their country’s policies, Pakistan’s leaders, once again, sought debt restructuring and waivers on account of the pandemic, just as they previously sought international assistance  as a reward for fighting terrorism.
But expecting the international community to repeatedly bail Pakistan out from one economic crisis after the other is unrealistic. Massive military expenditure, deep rooted corruption, and lack of accountability are at the heart of Pakistan’s perennial and ever widening gulf between revenue and expenditure.
Now, it seems, Chinese investments have become a new liability. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been pushing Pakistan’s officials to raise taxes and power tariffs, effectively asking the Pakistani public to foot the bill for China’s rapacious practices.
The United States and Western financial institutions should not help Pakistan’s ruling elites in their own and China’s predatory behavior. The people of Pakistan deserve better.
Husain Haqqani, director for South and Central Asia at the Hudson Institute, was Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2011.