Empowering Azad Kashmir, Javaid Hayat

Empowering Azad Kashmir

South Asian News Agency (SANA) ⋅ December 13, 2011 ⋅

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Javaid Hayat

Nation-states are recognized by the international community as sovereign states as per the ‘Westphalian sovereignty’ concept. Notwithstanding, there are political entities on the world map, which are mostly driven by conflict or crisis and disputed or tangibly controlled by external powers. The Azad state of Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) is one of them. Defining AJK in a legal and constitutional context under United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions on Kashmir and in international relations remain a dilemma. At the time of the formation of the Republic of Azad Kashmir on 24 October, which intended a transition from autocracy to democracy, the provisional government of Azad Kashmir made a declaration that “The new government represents the united will of Jammu and Kashmir State. The provisional government entertains sentiments of the utmost friendliness and goodwill towards its neighbouring dominions of India and Pakistan and hopes that both the dominions will sympathise with the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their efforts to exercise their birth right of political freedom. The provisional government is further anxious to safeguard the identity of Jammu and Kashmir as a political entity”.
In present context, it is difficult to define the status of the ‘Azad State of Jammu & Kashmir’. It is not a sovereign state as it looks from the outset as it has a president, a prime minister, flag and national anthem and Supreme Court that shows a symbolic statehood. Despite this, however, it lacks sovereignty and empirically possesses limited statehood. Sovereignty is generally defined as recognition of the claim by a state to exercise supreme authority over a clearly defined territory and declaration of recognition from the international community, which is not the case with this territory. However, it can be considered a non-recognized quasi-state, a sui generis, a territory with disputed and fragile statehood, a de facto and a splinted protectorate of two neighboring powers, a demarked entity with multi-ethnic, religious and political identities alongside the Line of Control (LoC). Azad state of Jammu & Kashmir is sharing sovereignty with nation-state of Pakistan but it is not constitutionally part of Pakistan. It is neither a province nor an agency of Pakistan but has a government of its own, even though it is protected, administratively controlled and economically dependent on Pakistan.
Talking about legitimate political and constitutional rights of the people of AJK is not a new phenomenon rather since for the several decades these issues were raised by the nationalist forces of AJK but it got momentum when a former prime minister of AJK Raja Farooq Haider, who belongs to the ideology of state accession with Pakistan, spoke up and demanded for redefining the political and constitutional relationship between Muzaffarabad and Islamabad. The political and constitutional relationship between the government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and government of Pakistan is a complex rather ambiguous, power- sharing system based on Interim Act 1974. The political leadership of Azad Kashmir has a ‘history of surrender’ since the establishment of so called ‘Azad State of Jammu & Kashmir’ in 1947. Despite the independence declaration of October 24th 1947 through which a new ‘revolutionary’ government was formed and claimed to be legal heir or successor of dethroned Maharaja Hari Singh, it surrendered the sovereignty while signing the Karachi agreement in 1949. Critics says, the government announcements of the 24th of October 1947 (and the 4th of October prior to that) were error-prone by design, disruptive, non-consultative, opportunistic and took the Kashmiri nation away from a genuine transition from autocracy to democracy (Shakshi Raaj to Awaami Raaj).
The power-sharing mechanism between AJK and government of Pakistan was initially based on the Karachi agreement (1949) and currently under interim constitution Act 1974. A detailed study of this ambiguous relationship has clearly indicates a ‘systematic and organized hypocrisy’ as Kashmir council holds exclusive powers over the AJK government and AJK assembly. The Azad Kashmir assembly, which is an elected forum, is only responsible for dealing with day to day affairs in given legal setup. The aim of establishing of Kashmir council was building bridge between AJK and the federation of Pakistan to overcome legal ambiguity and smooth functioning of governance issues in the territory of Azad Kashmir. However, since its inception it has failed to perform for the purpose it was made for rather it become a source of contention between the parties. All powers and responsibilities that usually should lie with an elected government for economic prosperity, transparency and other inevitable challenges regarding governance are given to AJK council, which is by default headed by the prime minister of Pakistan, who is neither elected by the people of Azad Kashmir nor accountable to the any institution or judiciary of AJK.
The ‘carrot and stick’ policy adopted by the federation of Pakistan through the Kashmir council is not only creating resentment and sense of marginalization, but depriving the people of AJK their legitimate rights. In my personal encounters with many political leaders, civil society activists, legislatures, academics, bureaucrats and journalists most of them have acknowledged growing political resentment and sense of deprivation among the people of AJK. Moreover, many indicated that this is not only because of ongoing conflict of Kashmir since several decades but due to the lack of political will and vision of leadership of Azad Jammu & Kashmir. Despite of having reservations and fear, the overwhelming majority of political forces of AJK have agreed and admitted, if not publically but at personal level, the need to revisit and redefine the current imbalanced relationship under Act 1974 but question always arises who will tie the bell on cat’s neck? Besides many of nationalists parties, the outspoken Raja Farooq Haider and Sardar Khalid Ibrahim have always criticized negative and unnecessary role by the Center and Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and its associated agencies into making and breaking approach for having their own ‘friendly- driven puppets’ in order to run this territory of Azad Kashmir. During his nine month premiership Raja Farooq Haider had opened a Pandora box while addressing to media and public proceedings regarding the rights of the people of AJK particularly on ownership and royalty rights from Mangla dam and Nehlum Jehlum hydroelectric project.
Democratic norms and practices are pre-requisites for peace building and good governance. It is agreed by many scholars that participatory governance is required because traditional ‘representative’ democracy has failed to meet with emerging challenges of people’s participation into decision-making and accountability factor particularly in disputed territories and conflict zones. Given the current controlled democratic governance structure in Azad Kashmir under Act 1974, which tides hands of AJK assembly to exercise its limited powers, whereas the Kashmir council retains exclusive financial and legislative powers, seems impossible to form a participatory governance structure.

The role of civil society is always been crucial for strengthening democracy and empowering the governance for social development that unfortunately AJK has been lacking from many decades. However, some significant interventions have been made by the civil society that includes local media and civil society organizations of AJK. For example, a blogger, writer and civil society activist Tanveer Ahmed, who heads Kashmir civil society forum and Kashmir One Secretariat, have successfully conducted many advocacy sessions and raised awareness on citizen participation and good governance in AJK. A non-governmental forum called Center for Peace and Development Reforms (CPDR) has taken a lead and proposed an appraisal for political and constitutional empowerment of AJK and Gilgit Baltistan. A former Chief Justice Supreme Court of AJK Manzoor Hussain Gillani, who heads The Association for the Rights of People of Jammu and Kashmir (ARJK), has been vocal for streamlining the current confused relationship of Azad Kashmir with government of Pakistan. In his views, all subjects and powers, which parliament of Pakistan delegated to the provinces after 18th and 19th amendments, those all need to be given to AJK assembly and AJK government by amending the Constitution of Pakistan. He argue that this must not negatively affect the Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir conflict and AJK must be treated like other provinces of Pakistan in terms of giving rights and voice into the decision-making forums of Pakistan but should not be declared as province. Many of political heads of AJK don’t share this view and criticize by arguing that such would be harmful for the Kashmir case at the international level. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of opinion leaders are in favor of restoring Act 1970, which provides quantum of autonomy with some necessary amendments, such as an interim arrangement until the final settlement of the Kashmir conflict.
It seems obvious that a new social and legal contract is required as the current political, administrative, and judicial structure in AJK based on interim Act 1974 is unworkable, non-progressive and non-accountable. The political forces of AJK should come up with solid and workable proposals for wide-reaching autonomy for AJK. They must understand that political and economic empowerment drives from constitution for which a political will and struggle is essential that unfortunately is lacking in current political leadership of Azad Kashmir. Moreover, the policy-making authorities sitting in Islamabad must realize that depriving the people of AJK from their legitimate rights and treating them as second class citizens, even though after 18th and 19th amendments in Pakistan, would fuel pubic sentiments for a violent struggle. The government of Pakistan must understand that rights of the people of AJK cannot be held hostage because of the Kashmir conflict at large. Given the conflict-centric approach and the Kashmir conflict, whose destiny yet to be decided; only a wide-reaching autonomy could help to address the legitimate rights of the people of this region and empower its governance structure.

The writer is currently a PhD candidate at Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie University, Berlin and Georg Zundel scholar at Berghof Conflict Research, an international think-tank based in Germany. He can be reached at jadee012@gmail.com

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The debate on Kashmir, Huma Yusuf

GHULAM Nabi Fai, the director of the Kashmiri American Council, last week pleaded guilty to secretly receiving $4m from the ISI to lobby for Kashmiri independence in Washington.

He explained to a Washington court that his actions were not sinister, and that he was simply trying to work towards a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute. While New Delhi has welcomed the prosecution, the Pakistani public has been largely sympathetic, hailing Fai’s dedication to a noble cause and championing the work of the KAC.

The contrasting reactions to Fai’s transgressions are a good reminder of how divisive the Kashmir issue remains, even among liberal Pakistanis and Indians who otherwise favour normalisation of the bilateral relationship. I had an opportunity to see this divisiveness in action a few weeks ago at the Frontline Club in London. A panel discussion titled ‘Kashmir: South Asia’s Palestine?’ brought together journalists, writers and an academic to reflect on the dispute and prospects for future resolution.

Rarely have I attended such an impassioned event. Mirza Waheed, author of The Collaborator and former BBC journalist, represented the Kashmiri point of view and talked eloquently about the appalling human rights situation in the valley and the Indian government’s brutal, and therefore counterproductive, response to peaceful demonstrations in Kashmir last year. He warned that the situation in the valley had reached a turning point: if steps towards resolving the dispute keeping Kashmiri desires in account were not taken, a return to militancy was possible, or even likely.

Ashis Ray, a Times of India journalist, challenged Waheed’s depiction of Indian excesses and took issue with the use of the word ‘occupation’ to describe Indian presence in Kashmir. Ray also pointed to numerous elections in the valley as a sign that Kashmiris had elected to participate in a democratic India and thus enjoyed a political voice via the ballot box. In a
gasp-inducing moment, he dismissed the deaths of peaceful Kashmiri protesters as ‘collateral damage’. Between these diametrically opposed views lay the perspectives of other panelists, Al Jazeera correspondent Imran Khan, former Times reporter Subhash Chopra and SOAS lecturer Lawrence Sáez.

It was evident through the discussion that one person’s truth was another person’s myth; one’s experience, another’s propaganda. Participants were unable to agree on historical timelines, the voter turnout at particular elections, the frequency of rape of Kashmiri women, and almost everything else. Disputations over the most basic facts — for example, the number of Indian troops present in the valley — seemed surreal among a panel of journalists and writers affiliated with reputed international publications.

The he-said, she-said tenor of the discussion re-emphasised just how well-entrenched state-created narratives about the Kashmir issue are on both sides. Honed over the decades, these narratives have replaced history and fact with emotive symbolism that serves the interests of the concerned state. On the Pakistani side, the story of grave injustices being committed against Muslims by a non-Muslim colonial state is an echo of Pakistan’s own creation story that helps validate the past and bolster the country’s Muslim identity. Across the border, the integration of a Muslim-majority state into a post-Partition India helps reaffirm the success of pluralistic democracy.

More importantly, on both sides of the border, the Kashmir issue helps rally publics around armies, justifies excessive defence expenditure and allows governments to portray themselves as the good guys as opposed to the rival militants/oppressors, depending which side of the Line of Control you’re on.

In this context, the panel’s response to one question from the audience surprised me. When a young woman asked what role Pakistani and Indian civil society can play to help facilitate a resolution to the Kashmir dispute, all the discussants mumbled responses about the first responsibility lying with armies, governments, international arbitrators, Kashmiri political parties and, of course, Kashmiris themselves.

On this point, I disagree. Civil society in both Pakistan and India can play an integral role by helping debunk, refine and update ingrained state narratives. As the Frontline Club panel demonstrated, a coherent, productive conversation about Kashmir is almost impossible because each side’s talking points are in direct opposition to the other’s. Ironically, these talking points have been formulated with little regard for history or the actual experience of the Kashmiri people.

Civil society actors can address this rhetorical anomaly by raising simple questions in order to re-articulate old narratives in light of present Kashmiri desires. In an age of online social networking, wiki-media and other interactive platforms, there’s no excuse for publics not to communicate and develop nuanced and multifaceted — rather than contradictory — interpretations. By circulating in cyberspace and independent media, these fresher narratives can start to re-centre foreign policy. A grass-roots approach to changing the thinking on Kashmir could be more effective in the long-term than Fai’s high-level politicking.

More importantly, civil society actors can add the most important missing element to the equation: the Kashmiri voice. As Waheed stressed in his comments, Kashmiris are starting to document their own version of events — in novels, memoirs, verse, blog posts, tweets, radio shows and more. It is incumbent on Pakistani and Indian publics to consume, translate and debate output from the valley so as to better align national narratives with the actual experience and desires of Kashmiris.

By acknowledging and amplifying the Kashmiri perspective in the South Asian public sphere, civil society can help reconfigure the dispute as a trilateral, rather than bilateral affair. After all, any successful resolution to the Kashmir dispute requires three parties to negotiate together: Pakistan, India and Kashmir as the principal party. To get to that point, all stakeholders will have to learn how to talk to — rather than at — each other.

The writer is a freelance journalist.

huma.yusuf@gmail.com http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/12/the-debate-on-kashmir.html

The debate on Kashmir, Huma Yusuf

GHULAM Nabi Fai, the director of the Kashmiri American Council, last week pleaded guilty to secretly receiving $4m from the ISI to lobby for Kashmiri independence in Washington.

He explained to a Washington court that his actions were not sinister, and that he was simply trying to work towards a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute. While New Delhi has welcomed the prosecution, the Pakistani public has been largely sympathetic, hailing Fai’s dedication to a noble cause and championing the work of the KAC.

The contrasting reactions to Fai’s transgressions are a good reminder of how divisive the Kashmir issue remains, even among liberal Pakistanis and Indians who otherwise favour normalisation of the bilateral relationship. I had an opportunity to see this divisiveness in action a few weeks ago at the Frontline Club in London. A panel discussion titled ‘Kashmir: South Asia’s Palestine?’ brought together journalists, writers and an academic to reflect on the dispute and prospects for future resolution.

Rarely have I attended such an impassioned event. Mirza Waheed, author of The Collaborator and former BBC journalist, represented the Kashmiri point of view and talked eloquently about the appalling human rights situation in the valley and the Indian government’s brutal, and therefore counterproductive, response to peaceful demonstrations in Kashmir last year. He warned that the situation in the valley had reached a turning point: if steps towards resolving the dispute keeping Kashmiri desires in account were not taken, a return to militancy was possible, or even likely.

Ashis Ray, a Times of India journalist, challenged Waheed’s depiction of Indian excesses and took issue with the use of the word ‘occupation’ to describe Indian presence in Kashmir. Ray also pointed to numerous elections in the valley as a sign that Kashmiris had elected to participate in a democratic India and thus enjoyed a political voice via the ballot box. In a
gasp-inducing moment, he dismissed the deaths of peaceful Kashmiri protesters as ‘collateral damage’. Between these diametrically opposed views lay the perspectives of other panelists, Al Jazeera correspondent Imran Khan, former Times reporter Subhash Chopra and SOAS lecturer Lawrence Sáez.

It was evident through the discussion that one person’s truth was another person’s myth; one’s experience, another’s propaganda. Participants were unable to agree on historical timelines, the voter turnout at particular elections, the frequency of rape of Kashmiri women, and almost everything else. Disputations over the most basic facts — for example, the number of Indian troops present in the valley — seemed surreal among a panel of journalists and writers affiliated with reputed international publications.

The he-said, she-said tenor of the discussion re-emphasised just how well-entrenched state-created narratives about the Kashmir issue are on both sides. Honed over the decades, these narratives have replaced history and fact with emotive symbolism that serves the interests of the concerned state. On the Pakistani side, the story of grave injustices being committed against Muslims by a non-Muslim colonial state is an echo of Pakistan’s own creation story that helps validate the past and bolster the country’s Muslim identity. Across the border, the integration of a Muslim-majority state into a post-Partition India helps reaffirm the success of pluralistic democracy.

More importantly, on both sides of the border, the Kashmir issue helps rally publics around armies, justifies excessive defence expenditure and allows governments to portray themselves as the good guys as opposed to the rival militants/oppressors, depending which side of the Line of Control you’re on.

In this context, the panel’s response to one question from the audience surprised me. When a young woman asked what role Pakistani and Indian civil society can play to help facilitate a resolution to the Kashmir dispute, all the discussants mumbled responses about the first responsibility lying with armies, governments, international arbitrators, Kashmiri political parties and, of course, Kashmiris themselves.

On this point, I disagree. Civil society in both Pakistan and India can play an integral role by helping debunk, refine and update ingrained state narratives. As the Frontline Club panel demonstrated, a coherent, productive conversation about Kashmir is almost impossible because each side’s talking points are in direct opposition to the other’s. Ironically, these talking points have been formulated with little regard for history or the actual experience of the Kashmiri people.

Civil society actors can address this rhetorical anomaly by raising simple questions in order to re-articulate old narratives in light of present Kashmiri desires. In an age of online social networking, wiki-media and other interactive platforms, there’s no excuse for publics not to communicate and develop nuanced and multifaceted — rather than contradictory — interpretations. By circulating in cyberspace and independent media, these fresher narratives can start to re-centre foreign policy. A grass-roots approach to changing the thinking on Kashmir could be more effective in the long-term than Fai’s high-level politicking.

More importantly, civil society actors can add the most important missing element to the equation: the Kashmiri voice. As Waheed stressed in his comments, Kashmiris are starting to document their own version of events — in novels, memoirs, verse, blog posts, tweets, radio shows and more. It is incumbent on Pakistani and Indian publics to consume, translate and debate output from the valley so as to better align national narratives with the actual experience and desires of Kashmiris.

By acknowledging and amplifying the Kashmiri perspective in the South Asian public sphere, civil society can help reconfigure the dispute as a trilateral, rather than bilateral affair. After all, any successful resolution to the Kashmir dispute requires three parties to negotiate together: Pakistan, India and Kashmir as the principal party. To get to that point, all stakeholders will have to learn how to talk to — rather than at — each other.

The writer is a freelance journalist.

huma.yusuf@gmail.com

Zardari will return in a style, Dr Shabir Choudhry

Zardari will return in a style

Dr Shabir Choudhry 11 December 2011

Last week it appeared that Asif Zaradri, President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Supreme Commander of armed forces was on the run to save his life, not because he was under attack by some enemy country, but because he feared that institutions of his own country will take some action against him and might put him behind the bars.

Asif Zardari very mysteriously left the country for Dubai under pretext of ‘ill health’. His ruling party and all Presidential staff looked unprepared for this sudden departure and were in shambles. They were contradicting each other as to what was wrong with their leader and the President, and failed to provide satisfactory replies. They looked part of a team that suffered a defeat and did not know what justification to provide to their supporters.

Whereas this news created chaos in Pakistan; it also unnerved many outside the country as well because Pakistan - a nuclear country with unstable government is an important partner in war against terrorism. However, relations between Pakistan and the United States deteriorated over the months due to conflicting interests and continued violation of Pakistani territorial integrity; and it looked that both were heading for some kind of armed conflict.

No doubt Azif Zardari was under extreme pressure over the past few weeks, and that exacerbated his health. Tension and political pressure gave him sleep less nights, no doubt, but doctors in Pakistan were quite capable of treating him in Pakistan, so why fly out to another country. Did he not trust the Pakistani doctors, or he thought some unforeseen powers might harm him even when he was treated. It looks he wanted to leave the country under cover of the illness. If he was seriously ill, flying out to another country could only add to his health problems. No sane doctor will advise a patient with heart attack or stroke to take three hours flight to another country, as that has its own dangers.

It appears that the ‘treatment’ which Asif Zardari’s ailing political health and declining political fortunes required was not available in Pakistan. Power brokers or ‘specialists’ who can provide power booster to Azif Zardari and save his Presidency hold surgeries in Dubai. He had to travel to Dubai, even if that meant taking some risks; and tell them nature of threat to his Presidency and Peoples Party government.

There are five important people with power and influence in Pakistan, namely General Kiani who has a power base in Rawalpindi, Nawaz Sharif with a power base in Punjab, Imran Khan with a power base in Aab Para, Chief Justice with a power base in Supreme Court and Asif Zaradri with a power base in UAE.

Prime Minister Gilani, though legally a Chief Executive of Pakistan, has a limited role as he derives his powers from Zardari House. His main task is not to govern the country for benefit of the people, but to provide support to Zardari and company and cover all the marks and tracks leading to Zardari and Bhutto family. Of course he was given a free hand to make whatever he can for himself and his family.

Anyhow Asif Zardari made it to Dubai, and once again became focus of attention around the globe. Among conflicting news about his health it was learnt that he was recovering well - why not, specialists knew what to do; and within few days his team back home was in a position to boast that Asif Zaradri is not among those who run away in fear of his life.

It is presumed that he told the specialists that he has done everything he promised to do, and has, in fact, done some extra bits to demonstrate his worth and ability. In return he was assured that there would be no military intervention, and no other action to dethrone him, at least for five years. He must have told them that instead of getting some bonus for his performance, and for doing extra bits, he was being forced out of office. He must have told them that his down - fall will have very serious repercussions on war on terrorism; and could bring havoc to the entire region.

Peoples Party government and Asif Zardari’s other colleagues and friends have recovered from the shock of his sudden departure to Dubai. They now feel confident that despite serious cases against them in the Supreme Court, Memogate, Salalabad attacks by NATO, Abbotabad fiasco and with many other things there is no immediate threat to their government or at least to their President.

Many members of the Pakistani establishment and some opposition leaders believe that Zardari was the man behind the Memogate; and in their view this is treason. Critics believe he is against the army and the ISI; and by hook or crook wants to bring them under his control. However some analysts question why the army would want him out when he does exactly what he is told.

In any case, even if he was behind many alleged ‘crimes’, can he be removed legally. There could be no impeachment of the President, as the required numbers are not there in the Parliament. He is not the kind of person who would resign as a result of political and other pressures. One can dislike him or hate him, but credit goes to him that he is a fighter and shrewd manipulator with strong nerves.

Of course, the Supreme Court can take some action which could end his rule. But the question is, won’t that give the most corrupt and unpopular government a justification to go to the people and create chaos in the country, even leading to some kind of civil war by playing the Sindh card.

This kind of action could be unpopular even among some lawyers and some sections of the establishment, which could further divide already embittered and deeply divided society. Some sane voices are saying that we have tolerated worst kind of corruption and maladministration in the past four years, can’t we wait another 5-6 months as the government will be forced to hold elections after the Senate elections in March 2012.

In view of some it is better to get rid of the government as soon as possible, especially before the Senate elections, as that would strengthen their political position in the Upper House no matter what the outcome is of the next general elections. The other view is that it would be unwise to make a political martyr when his government is unpopular and has failed to deliver to the people and will not be in a position to win the next general elections which they will have to hold after March Senate elections.

In my view Asif Zardari knows what is at stake – he knows what life is like in Pakistani jails. Even when he is fully ‘fit’ and despite assurances and power boosters he will play safe; and won’t go to the President House until he gets a green signal which could take a few more weeks. Important events are unfolding in Pakistan in the form of Supreme Court cases, NRO, Memogate investigation and Abbotabad Commission report; and he is not a fool to rush to Pakistan when the exit route is not assured.

It will be safe for him to stay in Dubai, take rest, plan his next move by closely observing the situation and start his offensive while resting in Dubai. His team and government have recovered from the initial shock, and are getting its act together. They have great experience in fighting legal cases and delaying the final outcome especially when the going is not favourable. They have also mastered the art of making deals with various stake holders. They also know how to win public support and play ‘victim’, all they need is some assurance from President Zardari that is physically still sound and plans to come back.

In view of the above, in my opinion, Asif Zardari is out of danger and he will return to Pakistan in a style; and possibly with more power and influence. His return and increased power and influence will weather the political storm; and will help him to plan his second tenure as a President.

Writer is Director Diplomatic Committee of Kashmir National Party, political analyst and author of many books and booklets. Also he is Director Institute of Kashmir Affairs.Email:drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com

View: www.drshabirchoudhry.blogspot.com www.k4kashmir.com

Fall of Dacca by Col. Riaz Jafri (Retd)

Fall of Dacca

by

Col. Riaz Jafri (Retd)

December 16 comes every year to haunt the nation, particularly those few remaining who were witness to the debacle. I had the misfortune to be one. On this day the Quaid’s Pakistan, which was considered an epitome of ‘Divided we Stand’, was actually divided by breaking loose all bonds of unity between the two wings. That day the largest Muslim army suffered the ignominious humiliation of the greatest defeat. This was the darkest day of our national history that stunned everyone. How did it happen? Equipped with the hindsight knowledge, I will try to reconstruct some of the sad saga.

In early July 1971 I was posted to East Pakistan as the Principal Staff Officer (GSO-1) to late Major General Rao Farman Ali Khan – in charge Martial Law (Civil Affairs). In my such capacity I was more or less responsible for the Civil Administration of the Province and had the opportunity of seeing the events unfolding themselves from the vantage viewpoint of the Governor House, Dacca – the then epicentre of the entire activity in East Pakistan. I had also access to the events of the past buried in the files which kept popping up randomly during my daily official work there. This all presented me with a fairly clear picture of all that was happening there and why.

If I am asked who to blame for the debacle I would say that we were all – from the common man in the street to the highest person in the office, equally responsible for it. The common man for committing the sin of keeping himself ignorant of the under currents simmering there ever since that fateful 19^th day of March 1948 when Quaid raising his admonishing finger to the Bengali students at the Dacca University convocation had warned them that Urdu will be the only official state language of Pakistan, and not trying to assess the anguish caused to the Bengalis and take measures to bring any rapprochement. The highest in authority were guilty of being too greedy, power hungry and selfish. Unfortunately we all treated East Pakistan as a colony and never granted them their justly deserved status of being the major human organ of Pakistan’s body – 54 percent of the population. As power barons of the Federal government mostly hailed from West Pakistan they never shared the power willingly or happily with their Bengali brethren. Imagine, the Bengalis though in majority going jubilant in 1956 when Suhrawardy got them ‘parity’ (equal treatment) with the West Pakistanis! Ever heard of a majority people thanking obligingly the minority people for treating them equal?! We did it again in 1971. The minority pronouncing the majority unpatriotic, traitor and secessionist! Minority forcing the majority to leave the country whose foundations they had laid in 1906! Not only, that the Bengalis were treated as unequals, but it is also a fact that they were the major revenue earner for Pakistan, mainly through the export of their Golden Fibre to Manchester and Dundee jute mills in the UK. They bore the major financial burden of Pakistan and happily too for more than 15 years and until 1962 the cash flow was from East Pakistan to West Pakistan. Thereafter, after an equilibrium of about two years the process revers ed but not that heavily. Bengalis had, therefore, every reason to be chary of and chagrin with the sala Punzabis. (every West Pakistani was a Punjabi to them). Though the Bengalis proved themselves to be equally, if not more, patriotic than the West Pakistanis during the 65 war with India, yet the state of mutual confidence between the two left more to be desired. By 1971 the relations deteriorated further and irreversibly. The last straw that broke the proverbial camel’s back was Bhutto’s rejection of 1970 election results which had given Shaikh Mujib ur Rehman’s Awami League a clear cut majority to form the government at the centre. ZAB’s one after the other statements like “we will break the legs of anyone going to Dacca to attend the NA session there”, “Udhar tum idhar hum” and “I would rather be a top dog of half of Pakistan than be an underdog of full Pakistan” left little doubt in the minds of Mujib and company who opted for the Civil Disobedience in the province. Their provincial autonomy stance kept becoming harder by the day and all negotiations between them and the West Pakistani leaders and the Federal government led by Gen.Yahya himself failed. The civil disobedience had transformed itself into an outright mutiny and to quell it the army struck on the night of 25^th March 1971, starting an internecine guerrilla war between the military and Mukti Bahini lasting for 8 long months. On 21^st November 1971 – Eid Day – the Indians launched a fully fledged armed attack on East Pakistan which lasted for 26 days of intense fighting by the Pakistan army under extremely adverse conditions of (1) being badly out-numbered in men and material – 3 Indian Corps’ against one and that too lame, under-strength and ill equipped, no tanks, very little artillery – only the infantry and a battalion of Engineers, (2) hostility of the local populace – no army can fight without the support of the civilians, but here what to talk of the support the civil populace was totally hostile, supporting the Indians by providing them with the crucial intelligence needed by them, (3) poor communications and logistics – no reinforcements or arms and equipment could be supplied from West Pakistan. India had stopped the over flights since February 70 after the clever and clandestine planting of Ganga episode, (4) lack of air cover – the only squadron of the F-86s that we had could not operate as the runway of the only military airport Kurmi Tola had been rendered out of operation by the Indians bombing it incessantly. If anything, under such impossible conditions, it goes to the credit of the army that it could fight for over nine months in East Pakistan.

In the second half of the year 1971 those in power – both civil and military – seemed to be suffering from a stupor and behaving like silent spectators waiting helplessly for the catastrophe to fall. I distinctly remember Major General A Rahim Khan – later Secretary General Defence, while addressing a batch of newly posted two dozen Lt Cols and Majors to East Pakistan saying on or around 11 July 1971 “Gentlemen, the entire administration of the province had collapsed. I have made it stand but only on its knees. Now it will be for you to make it stand and stand it erect.” Having said that the General went on to add, “I have given my word to the Chief (Gen. Yahya) to give me three months for the task, and if I cannot do it, he can — (I murmured under my lip, hang me!) he can – replace me”. I was shocked that the general had equated the stakes simply to his being replaced! There would be nothing in three months to replace him for !! On another occasion Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi – alias Tiger Niazi – the GOC Eastern Command as late as in October 71, before the start of a special briefing to the visiting high powered army team from the GHQ on the latest military situation in East Pakistan, advised his senior staff officers not to depress the visiting generals from the GHQ by giving them the dismal military picture of East Pakistan or ask them for more troops. He quipped, “gentlemen, if they send us more troops – more the merrier, but if they don’t – lesser the better”. With the result that the operational military map on the board showed more of ‘Green’ pins all over the area than the ‘Red’ pins depicting the area under Mukti Bahini control. Whereas the map should have been clustered with the Red pins. The GHQ team returned satisfied about all being hunky-dory in East Pakistan. Similar ‘Sab Achha’ reports kept ema nating from various sectors and parts of East Pakistan to West Pakistan, till the water passed over the head. But by then it was too late for any political solution that the likes of Gen. Farman were advocating from the beginning but being too junior in the army hierarchy were not given due importance. To a few others it was a case of misplaced egoistic valour – not to be dubbed as having been ‘chickened out’ in the army parlance. The true information was not only denied to the common man in West Pakistan but even to those at the helm also.

Handling of the East Pakistan issue at the International level, too, was a fiasco on our part. Not that we did not mobilise any world opinion in our favour, we on the contrary rather alienated them mostly. On the other hand Indira undertook a whirlwind tour of 19 countries in October 1971 propagating the imaginary atrocities against the Bengalis and particularly the Hindus of East Pakistan and yet assuring each one of them that India had no intentions of aggression. Ironically, while she was convincing and canvassing the world powers, her army’s Eastern Command was giving the final touches to the Attack Plan in Fort William at the eastern bank of river Hoogli, Calcutta. Whereas in our case despite Nixon’s more or less ordering Kissinger to ‘do some thing’ their 7^th Fleet just passed by the Bay of Bengal without even radioing the customary courtesy good will message or tooting its horns thrice the Navy style. I am personally witn ess to the Chinese repeated enquiries as to what could they do for us, after we had established am emergency radio link with them? But all that we could get from the stupor struck President’s Secretariat at Rawalpindi was, “Just wait, please”. Hopes from the sincere Chinese friends were so high that when the Indian para troopers chuted down over Narain Ganj every one waived them jubilantly taking them to be Chinese coming to our aid! Our Eastern Command had a morbid fear of the Indians capturing a piece of land and passing it on to the Muktis to plant a flag there and declare it to be the Bangla Desh. The Indians would recognise it instantly thus giving birth to Bangla Desh. Consequently the troops were spread in a thin line all along the border that weakened the defence all over. There was no depth, no reserves, no second lines. There was enemy (Indians) in the front and enemy at the back (Muktis).They never realised that it was not the l oss of any territory but the fall of the capital of a country that mattered. It had to be the Warsaw, the Paris, the Moscow, the Berlin and in our case Dacca that until captured the country would not fall. If they had only concentrated all the troops in Dacca, made a fortress out of it and held it for months, which they could do, the East Pakistan story would have been different today. Agreed, the Bangla Desh would have still come into being but instead of taking birth in battle field it would have come into being on a negotiating table. Negotiations by the world powers and probably the UNO itself and Pakistan would not have had to suffer the ignominy of the defeat.

End:

Col. Riaz Jafri (Retd)

30, Werstridge-1

Rawalpindi46000

Tel: (051) 5158 033

Statement of Dr Fai in the Alexandria Court House, Virginia) Why Kashmir is Important to Me?

Posted by K4Kashmir on December 8, 2011 in Kashmir | 0 CommentEdit

Statement of Dr Fai in the Alexandria Court House, Virginia)

Why Kashmir is Important to Me?

Dr. Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai

Washington, D.C.

December 7, 2011

(The statement was issued at the Alexandria Court House, Virginia)

The Kashmir issue is simply this: the people of a large territory which is not part of any existing sovereign state were assured by the entire international community represented by the United States that they would be enabled to decide their future by a free vote. Until now, this assurance has not been honored.

I, as an American of Kashmiri origin am profoundly grateful to the Administration for upholding the position of principle which the United States has sustained throughout the existence of the contentious issue relating to the status of Kashmir. When the Kashmir dispute erupted in 1947-1948, the United States championed the stand that the future status of Kashmir must be determined by the will of the people of the territory and that their wishes must be ascertained through an impartial plebiscite under the supervision and control of the United Nations. The U.S. was a principle sponsor of the resolution # 47 which was adopted by the Security Council on April 21, 1948 and which was based on that unchallenged principle. It was also upheld equally by both India and Pakistan when the Kashmir dispute was brought before the Security Council in 1948. The commitment of the U.S. was indicated by a personal appeal made by President Harry Truman that differences over demilitarization be submitted to arbitration by the Plebiscite Administrator, a distinguished American war hero: Admiral Chester Nimitz.

It was most gratifying for Kashmiri American community when President George W. Bush (Republican) said on February 22, 2006 that the United States supports a solution of Kashmir dispute acceptable not only to India and Pakistan but also to “citizens of Kashmir.” It was equally gratifying for us when President Barack Obama said on October 30, 2008, “We should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants.’

Today, Kashmir is a living proof that it is not going to compromise, far less abandon, its demand for Azaadi (independence) which is its birthright and for which it has paid a price in blood and suffering which has not been exacted from any other people of the South Asian subcontinent. Compared to the sacrifice Kashmir has had to endure, India and Pakistan themselves gained their freedom through a highly civilized process.

The scale of the popular backing for Kashmiri resistance can be judged from the established fact that virtually all the citizenry of Srinagar (Capital city of Kashmir) – men, women and children – came out multiple times on the streets to lodge a non-violent protest against the continuance of alien occupation. The fact that they presented petitions at the office of the United Nations Military Observers Group shows the essentially peaceful nature of the aims of the uprising and its trust in justice under international law. At times the number of people in these peaceful processions exceeded 1 million. India has tried to portray the uprising as the work of terrorists or fanatics. Terrorists do not compose an entire population, including women and children; fanatics do not look to the United Nations to achieve pacific, and rational settlement.

That is a most poignant truth. But even more bitterly ironical is the contrast between the complex and decades-long agony the Kashmir issue has caused to Kashmiris, to Pakistan and to India itself and the simple, rational measures that would be needed for its solution. No sleight of hand is required, no subtle concepts are to be deployed, and no ingenious deal needs to be struck between an Indian and a Pakistani leader with the endorsement of the more pliable Kashmiri figures. The time for subterfuges is gone. All that is needed is going back — yes, going back — to the point of agreement which historically existed beyond doubt between India and Pakistan and jointly resolving to retrieve it with such modifications as are necessitated by the passage of time.

That point of agreement was one of inescapable principle- — that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be decided by the will of the people of the State as impartially ascertained in conditions free from coercion. The two elements of a peaceful settlement thus were, first, the demilitarization of the State (i.e. the withdrawal of the forces of both India and Pakistan) and a plebiscite supervised by the United Nations.

Between India’s insistence that a settlement must be “within the four corners of the Indian constitution” and Pakistan’s demand that it must be based on the international agreement embodied in the UN Security Council resolutions, there cannot be a meeting point which the two governments can find by themselves. Neither can disentangle itself from the massive under growth of the dispute. There needs to be a third way which neither admits nor challenges any claim or proposition on the question of sovereignty over Kashmir nor on the desirability or otherwise of the partition or reunification of the State. Both these questions need to be set aside if the dispute is to be put on the road to a settlement.

There is nothing in the United Nations plan that is incompatible with pluralism. We do not wish to foreclose any of the three possible options for the people: independence, accession to Pakistan or accession to India. We refuse to believe that fairness is an impractical proposition.

Its object should be not to answer what is the correct or best solution of the Kashmir problem but how that solution can be arrived at. In other words, it should by itself neither promote nor preclude any rational settlement of the dispute, be it accession to India or Pakistan or independence. Rather than seek to impose a settlement on Kashmir, it should engage the peoples of each region of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir to work out a settlement themselves without any external constraint.

I am equally proud of Kashmiri pluralism. The term fundamentalism is quite inapplicable to Kashmiri society. One of the proud distinctions of Kashmir has been the sustained tradition of tolerance, amity, good will and friendship between the members of different religious and cultural communities. It has a long tradition of moderation and non-violence. Its culture does not generate extremism and fundamentalism. Kashmir conflict was never a fight between Hindus and Muslims. It was never a struggle between theocracy and secularism. It has always been about the destiny and future of 17 million people of Kashmir, be they Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs or Buddhists.

The Policy Of

The Kashmiri American Council

After the uprising in Kashmir in 1989, a group of Kashmiri Americans established the Kashmiri American Council (KAC) in Washington in 1990. The primary objective of KAC was simply to raise the consciousness of the international community toward the issue of Kashmir; and to seek the understanding of the United States to help achieve the right of self-determination which was guaranteed to the people of Kashmir under the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The U.S. has, since the adoption of the UN resolutions in 1948, always held the position that Kashmir is a disputed territory; that it is not an integral part of either India or Pakistan; and that India and Pakistan should resolve the issue, taking into account the wishes and aspirations of the people of Kashmir. Therefore, there was no need to influence U.S. foreign policy which has always been consistent with the goals of the Kashmiri people. However, we felt that there was a need to educate and encourage policy makers to take concrete steps to help achieve this goal.

Who I Represent

Kashmiri American Council and I have always tried to represent the sentiments of the people of Kashmir, irrespective of the religious background and cultural affiliations. Sometimes it meant to state the hard facts which people in the halls of power in New Delhi or Islamabad might not always find agreeable. But unfortunately facts are facts and ignoring them would not have done justice not only to people of Kashmir but to the people of both India and Pakistan. This fact can be understood from an article of mine which was published in Washington Times on January 18, 2004, when I was analyzing various possibilities that could lead us to a just settlement of Kashmiri issue. I wrote, under the title, “The taproot of South Asian turbulence,” (an article particularly harsh to the sensitivities of both the Indian government and the government of Pakistan.) “Finding a solution to the stalemate over self-determination in Kashmir, however, is vastly more complex than articulating the problem. Some in India profit from Kashmir’s tumults. They appeal to extreme Hindu nationalists who insist on Muslim inferiority and envision India as an expanding sun in the South Asian universe. Likewise, some in Pakistan gain by keeping Kashmir unresolved. It distracts attention from Pakistan’s enormous domestic faults, and provides indigenous militants with an outlet unthreatening to [its own] government.”

Had it been true that I was being dictated by someone from New Delhi or Islamabad, then it would not have been easy for me to publish my article in Boston Globe on January 5, 2002, “Kashmir Rights Cannot Be Denied,” I wrote, “There are suggestions in some quarters that the United Nations should broker a deal on Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Kashmiris wish to stress that their land is not real estate that can be parceled out between two [non-resident] disputants but the home of nation with a history far more compact and coherent than India’s and far longer than Pakistan’s. No settlement of their status will hold unless it is explicitly based on the principles of self-determination and erases the so-called line of control, which is in reality the line of conflict. ”

Likewise it would not have been easy to question the involvement of India and Pakistan in the talks to resolve the Kashmir issue. I wrote in The Quarterly Magazine About the Developing World published by the National Peace Corps Association in its August through October 1998 issue, Volume 11, number 4, entitled “Colony Kashmir, a Voice for independence.” I said, “I wish to emphasize the point that as the dispute involves three parties– India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir — who are the most directly affected. Any attempt to strike a deal between two without the association of the third, will fail to yield a credible settlement. The contemporary history of South Asia is abundantly clear that bilateral efforts have never met with success.”

In that same article, I also stated, “but we believe that India and Pakistan cannot by themselves reach a settlement over Kashmir without associating the genuine Kashmiri leadership–All Parties Hurriyet Conference–with the negotiations. It would be performing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.”

My approach has been consistent and there was absolutely no reason for me to do otherwise, and that is to inform the world powers that India and Pakistan by themselves are not able to resolve the issue of Kashmir. They have tried over decades but failed. That’s why in an article called “The New Clinton Doctrine” which I published in July 1997, I wrote: “But the Kashmir problem should not be viewed as a territorial dispute between these two countries. The reality is that it is first and foremost a problem that involves the life and future of the thirteen million people of Kashmir– a people with a historical identity, a distinct individuality and the same aspirations for freedom as that of any other people on earth.”
The most important constituency which we have to address is not United States, not Pakistan, not elsewhere, but India itself. Meeting with Indian officials was fundamental to my strategy in communicating with New Delhi to find the means by which we as Kashmiri Americans could contribute to peace in that part of the world and in resolving the crisis in Kashmir. During the past twenty years, I along with Ambassador Yusuf Buch, former Senior Advisor to the United Nations Secretary General and late Dr. Ayub Thuker, President, World Kashmir Freedom Movement, have met with various Indian Cabinet Ministers, belonging to the administrations of Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, Prime Minister Atel Behari Vajpayee and current Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh. And during the past eleven years, I also met with four different officials at the Indian embassy who succeeded each other periodically and introduced me to the new incoming official before leaving for a new post.

It has always been my habit to keep the channel of communication open to the Indian embassy. I have met with the officials of Indian embassy in Washington since 1999, sometimes monthly, sometimes bi-monthly. From March 2006 onward we met monthly and at times twice a month. Whenever we had a seminar or a conference on Kashmir I would invite the Indian ambassador to speak. I had a habit of exchanging information and establishing the details in advance with an official of the embassy, and then a final copy of the invitation for the ambassador would be given to the official, whom I usually met at a public cafeteria. An Indian official called me either on July 18 or July 19, 2011, the day I was arrested. He left a voicemail that we must meet, which I heard ten days later after my release.

I have made personal mistakes that I deeply regret and I feel great sorrow for that, but I have never compromised our goals of independence and self-determination for the Kashmiri people and our commitment to peaceful negotiations between India, Pakistan and the leadership of the Kashmiri people. My own passion for the plight of Kashmir is clearly nothing unique. As a child of Kashmir, born and raised in this environment myself, I am just one of the hundreds of thousands of youth who, through no fault or choice of their own, have become directly or indirectly involved and deeply and passionately motivated to do something positive for their country, however insignificant in the context of global affairs, to make a difference. A country can be destroyed but a nation cannot be defeated. Our own independence from this tyranny is the song in our heart, the poetry on our lips, and the vision that solidly unites us. It is the bedrock of our determination to continue unrelentingly to seek justice and truth for the people of Kashmir, despite our seeming powerlessness in the face of this occupation. Our hope is in our unity, in our love for one another as a people, as a nation, and as a divine spirit that pervades our history as a people with a unique cultural identity regardless of race, religion or creed, and our lasting belief that we cannot be denied our birth right to self-determination.

Conclusion

Win-win solutions are further important because they safeguard against prospective bitterness or humiliation that are the fuel of new conflict. If one party to a solution feels exploited or unfairly treated, then national sentiments to undo the settlement will naturally swell. We must not belittle, embarrass, or humiliate any party. Every participant should be treated with dignity and humanity. Charity, not the triumphal, should be the earmark of the negotiating enterprise. Also, we should not sacrifice the good on the altar of the perfect. Compromises are the staple of conflict resolution. To achieve some good is worthwhile even though not all good is achieved.

gnfai2003@yahoo.com

New book of Dr Shabir Choudhry, ‘Azad Kashmir And Gilgit Baltistan’ is published. Details are as follows:

New book of Dr Shabir Choudhry, ‘Azad Kashmir And Gilgit Baltistan’ is published. Details are as follows:

Azad Kashmir And Gilgit Baltistan

Bitter Realities About Situation In Pakistani Occupied Kashmir

LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing (2011-12-02)

ISBN-13: 978-3-8465-1495-5

ISBN-10: 3846514950

EAN: 9783846514955

Book language: English

https://www.morebooks.de/store/gb/book/azad-kashmir-and-gilgit-baltistan/isbn/978-3-8465-1495-5

Blurb/Shorttext:

Pakistani ruling elite have been very clever as they managed to camouflage their imperial designs in the holy name of Islam, and presented themselves as ‘friends’ and ‘liberators’ of Kashmiris. They presented the Kashmiri struggle for right of self determination as a struggle between Hinduism and Islam. Of course, majority of Muslims fell in to this trap; however, with time they are beginning to understand the game plan of Islamabad. Majority of them now know that the struggle is political in nature; and name of religion was used to divide the people of Jammu and Kashmir and exacerbate already complicated situation. Pakistani policy makers and their secret agencies with use of stick and carrot policy manipulated people in believing that India was the aggressor and in occupation of Muslim Kashmir; and that areas under Pakistan were ‘azad’ – independent. Reality, however, was totally different.

Publishing house:

LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing

Website:

http://www.lap-publishing.com/

By (author) Shabir Choudhry

Number of pages: 304

Published at: 2011-12-02

Category: State and political administration studies

Price: 79.00 €

Keywords: Azad Kashmir, Kashmir Dispute, Gilgit Baltistan, Pakistani occupied Kashmir