India plays its cards in
Gilgit Baltistan
In his
Independence Day Address from Red Fort on Aug 15, Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi highlighted the plight of the people of Baluchistan in
Pakistan to deflect public attention from the mess in Jammu and Kashmir state
where his party is a coalition partner. Pro-independence Baluchis were
impressed by Modi’s gesture and now hope India might set them free like it
liberated Bangladesh in 1971. But nuclear-armed Pakistan will not allow that to
happen this time and for India, the best potential for mischief is the
backward, neglected and disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region.
India’s
Prime Minister Narendra Modi created quite a furor with his coy reference to
Pak-occupied Kashmir (PoK), Baluchistan, and Gilgit Baltistan during his Independence Day speech on August 15:
In the
last few days, people of Baluchistan, Gilgit, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir have
thanked me, have expressed gratitude, and expressed good wishes for me. The
people who are living far away, whom I have never seen, never met – such people
have expressed appreciation for Prime Minister of India, for 125 crore
countrymen.
The proximate cause of this statement was, I
expect, Modi’s interest in deflecting attention from the unpleasantness in
India-controlled Kashmir, which has seen sizable unrest and dozens of deaths in
recent weeks, by highlighting the dismal and brutal sway of Pakistan over its
subjugated regions.
His speech was followed by an avalanche of coverage
pushing the theme in the papers and on YouTube.
Modi’s remarks occasioned instantaneous
hyperventilating from the Indian hyper-nationalist segment, which itches to
erase Pakistan as a South Asian power presuming parity with India by depriving
it of its disaffected Pashtun and Baluch minorities, reducing it to a local
Punjabistan Muslim rump, and establishing India’s sway as unchallenged hegemon
throughout the region.
Modi also created considerable excitement among
Baluch independence advocates who hope that India might pull a Bangladesh i.e.
provide significant covert and eventually open support to separatists as it did
to the rebels who detached East Pakistan as an independent nation in 1971.
Not likely, I think. Nuclear-armed Pakistan
would probably see any Indian gambit in favor of Baluchistan as an existential
threat to be met by unleashing the horrors of its jihadi proxies against Indian
targets, and India’s new-found friends in Iran would not look kindly upon
anything that threatened to further destabilize its easterly province of Sistan
and Baluchistan.
And there’s China, which has designated the China
Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC, which terminates at the port of Gwadar in
the province of Baluchistan, as the strategic keystone of its One Belt One Road
outreach to Central Asia and Europe.
Among
China hawks, PM Modi’s rather equivocal murmurings elicited enthusiastic crowing along the lines of
“Mr. Modi, also sent a message to China that without India’s support, CPEC will
remain a pipe-dream.”
But India does have another card to play other than
extra-legally meddling in the security of Baluchistan.
The best
potential for mischief is in the contested region of Gilgit-Baltistan, the
mountainous area occupied by Pakistan up by the Chinese border. The main
CPEC arteries have to cross Gilgit-Baltistan to get to the Khunjerab Pass and
enter the PRC’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region on their way to Kashgar.
Gilgit-Baltistan, or GB, is a disputed territory
that is part of the Kashmir mess. Populated by a mixture of Shia, Sunni,
and Ismaili (followers of the Aga Khan) Muslims with rather tenuous links to
the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, GB fell under Pakistan’s control along
with western Kashmir in 1947. Gilgit-Baltistan is now a territory
administered by the federal government with very limited local autonomy.
Reportedly, the PRC is rather anxious for Pakistan
to regularize, at least nominally, the status of Gilgit-Baltistan by decoupling
it from the Kashmir dispute, possibly through some “popular referendum”
jiggery-pokery that declares that the residents of GB desire full incorporation
into the nation of Pakistan.
Pakistan, however, is resistant since splitting off
a piece of disputed Kashmir would negate the diplomatic posture it has adopted
for decades: insisting on a UN-supervised plebiscite of all of Kashmir, the
Indian as well as Pakistan-controlled portions, one that it expects would, if
ever held, deliver Kashmir in its entirety to Pakistan.
GB is a beautiful place, but not a particularly
happy one. Its remoteness and anomalous political status relegated
Gilgit-Baltistan to resentful backwater status, at least until the CPEC came
along.
Sectarianism has become a miserable fact of life in
GB thanks to the central government’s promotion of Wahabbi-based and
madrassa-transmitted Sunni Islam even to the remote areas of Gilgit Baltistan,
and a countervailing movement sponsored by Iran to protect the region’s
Shias. Provocations and the intermittent conduct of bloody pogroms have
apparently become a fact of life for this bucolic region, where Sunnis, Shias,
and Ismailis used to dwell in communal harmony.
Islamabad also overturned the previous ban on
outside immigration to GB, apparently with the idea of stacking the demographic
deck with Punjabis loyal to the Center as the region moves toward local
elections and a semblance of self-government. A frequent complaint is
that Punjabi carpetbaggers monopolize the best commercial and political
opportunities while the local youth remain mired in poverty.
With its
usual clumsiness, the Pakistan government martyred a GB activist, Baba Jan,
sentencing him to life imprisonment for leadership of a demonstration cum government
shooting cum riot protesting the indifferent federal response
to a fatal landslide and flood that killed 19 and displaced thousands, and then
blocking his attempts to run as candidate for the local assembly despite his
incarceration.
An
indication of the sophistication of federal government political co-option
strategies is provided byan account that after Baba Jan and four
other activists were bootstomped and had their fingers broken and wax dripped
on their genitals…
…the
activists were also asked to stop struggling for the rights of the oppressed
and join any one of the mainstream parties, the PPP, the PML-N or the MQM!
Ditto, apparently, for the local politicians, if
Baba Jan’s partisans are to be believed:
… Local
members of all the mainstream parties have approached Baba Jan with offers of
pardon and high privilege, if only he apologized to the authorities for his
stubborn resistance — and joined their party.
Abusing Baba Jan and the other activists has not
eliminated the sense of grievance in GB.
Perhaps
not coincidentally on the day of Modi’s speech, the Awami Action
Committee (AAC) called a shutters down or general strike in GB’s two largest
towns. The action was triggered by long-standing dissatisfaction against
the federal government including, but not limited to, the fact that the locals
believe they are getting jobbed out of their proper share of the CPEC bonanza.
It appears to have been widely honored, not just by shopkeepers but also by
professionals such as lawyers, who shut down the BG high court.
The AAC,
which has managed to set itself up on a refreshingly pan-sectarian foundation,
was originally formed in 2014 to protest federal government attempts to phase
out a subsidy of wheat at the behest of the IMF—which residents regard as an entitlement legally owed them
by virtue of their status as occupants of a disputed territory.
The AAC’s grievances this year give a pretty clear
picture of the state of play in GB and a growing localist movement seeking
formal recognition of fundamental political and economic rights:
The
speakers at the event also rejected the Mining Concession Rules, 2016, and
alleged that the law had deprived the people of Gilgit-Baltistan of their own
resources and shifted their ownership to federal ministry of Kashmir affairs
and Gilgit-Baltistan. “GB has the potential to generate cheap hydropower, but
the federal government is reluctant to initiate the projects, due to which GB
people are facing 12 to 14 hours power outages daily,” a participant noted.
The
protesters said that the subsidy on wheat was the right of the people of
Gilgit-Baltistan, and that the federal government’s decision to cut the subsidy
and decrease wheat supply had caused shortage of wheat in the remote areas. The
speakers strongly held that the laws which had no backing of the
Gilgit-Baltistan people should not be implemented.
The
Pakistan government is freaked out by the prospect of journalists reporting
from GB, so local coverage is hard to come by. Indian media made its best
efforts to paint the situation in GB as a mirror of
the brutal Pakistan occupation of Kashmir, reporting the alarming but
unconfirmed allegation that Pakistani authorities had detained 500 youth during
the strike — a huge number in the sparsely populated territory — and describing
the situation in GB with a touch of anticipatory schadenfreude:
The Awami
Action Committee of Gilgit-Baltistan has called for an indefinite strike in the
entire area unless and until Pakistan withdraws its security forces and also
rollbacks China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
This account in Pakistani media seems
somewhat more circumstantial and probably more accurate concerning local hopes
for a ride on the CPEC gravy train:
Addressing
the rallies in Gilgit, Sultan Rais, Chairman Awami Action Committee GB, said
that CPEC will pass through 600 kilometers area of Gilgit-Baltistan but it is
unfortunate that they are not getting even a single industrial zone or any
development project.
“We are
not opposing the CPEC. People want that at least they should be informed
about the project, be taken into confidence so that they could get to know what
all benefits they will get from this project,” he said.
The AAC
could draw encouragement both from Modi’s remarks on Indian Independence Day,
and also from the eagerness of the opposition PPP party to
score political points against the ruling PML-N by questioning its handling of
the CPEC and promising a higher priority to GB interests.
Baba Jan was trying to run; another activist will
run under the banner of the Awami Workers Party in his stead; and will compete
against candidates of the national PML-N and PPP parties, turning the poll into
something of a referendum on central government policies or the efficacy of big
party vote fixing and vote banks.
As a matter of practical logistics, apparently
Gilgit-Baltistan looks south to Pakistan as a source of commerce and detested
Punjabi encroachment; to the west for links with ethnic-Pashtun regions; and
not too much to the east, to Kashmir or India, which yearns to clasp the people
of GB to its bosom.
In fact, one of the most interesting elements of
the recent demonstrations was a march north, to the Chinese border at the
Khunjerab Pass, to make the wishes of the people of GB known to the dispenser
of CPEC goodies and source of maximum leverage over Pakistan, the People’s
Republic of China.
It seems to me that this would be a rare
opportunity for the PRC to show the smiling soft-power face of Chinese
strategic outreach.
With Pakistan’s army promising to turn the
Baluchistan section of the CPEC into a fortified lager patrolled by 15,000
troops, Gilgit-Baltistan may be the PRC’s best chance to lean on the federal
government and use GB as a showcase to demonstrate its much-advertised
“win-win” foreign policy to Pakistan’s localities and the world.
Peter Lee runs the China Matters
blog. He writes on the intersection of US policy with Asian and world affairs.
(Copyright 2016 Asia Times Holdings Limited, a
duly registered Hong Kong company. All rights reserved. Please contact us about
sales, syndication and republishing.)
http://atimes.com/2016/08/india-plays-its-cards-in-gilgit-baltistan/
