Thursday, 7 May 2020

Who has made Jammu and Kashmir a ‘bilateral issue’?

Who has made Jammu and Kashmir a ‘bilateral issue’?
London      08 May 2020

While commenting on statement of the Labour Party, Kier Starmer, Dr Shabir Choudhry, President Foreign Affairs Committee of UKPNP, and Usman Kayani, President of UKPNP, Britain said, ‘Labour Party is an important political Party of Britain, and they formulate policies that suits their Party and national interests; and that doesn’t have to be in consonant with our wishes.’

The Labour Leader, while speaking to Friends of India, said, “Any constitutional issues in India are a matter for the Indian Parliament, and Kashmir is a bilateral issue for India and Pakistan to resolve peacefully.”

The UKPNP leaders said, the above statement has annoyed some sections of the Jammu and Kashmir. However, non-Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir, including some Muslims have welcomed this statement.

They said, ‘People have a right to comment on any political issue; and we cannot deny anyone of that right. However, we should not give this impression that Mr Kier Starmer’s statement has made Jammu and Kashmir a ‘bilateral issue’.

The joint statement said, ‘Although we say, we are the principal party to the dispute, but the bitter fact is that Jammu and Kashmir dispute has always been dealt as a dispute between India and Pakistan. We should criticise those who have made this dispute a bilateral one.’
UKPNP leaders emphasised that, ‘While using our right of expression we need to ensure that we do not promote extremism, intolerance and religious hatred; and antagonise South Asian communities in Britain. In this context we agree with the Labour Leader that  “We must not allow issues of the sub-continent to divide communities here.” END

Wednesday, 4 March 2020

Inside Delhi: beaten, lynched and burnt alive

Inside Delhi: beaten, lynched and burnt alive. Hannah Ellis-Petersen  Sun 1 Mar 2020               Observer special report  India
Violence in India’s capital has left more than 40 dead and hundreds injured after a Hindu nationalist rampage, stoked by the rhetoric of Narendra Modi’s populist government

He lay in a bloodied ball on the floor, but the baton blows kept on coming. As the 30 strangers beat him without stopping, Mohammad Zubair closed his eyes, brought his forehead to the ground and prayed.

“The blows kept raining on my head, hands and back,” said Zubair, 37. “I did not ask them to stop beating me. I became silent, tried to hold my breath and stiffen my body.”

As he spoke, tears rolled down his face. “First I asked, ‘Why are you attacking me? What wrong have I done?’ But they did not listen to my words and went on hitting me from all sides. They were shouting maro shaale mulleko [kill the bastard Muslim] and jai Sri Ram [a Hindu nationalist slogan]. There were many other men who stood by who did not come to save me.” The photo of Zubair being ruthlessly beaten in broad daylight in the streets of Delhi by a mob of young Hindu men was one of the most shocking images of the brutal religious riots that engulfed Delhi, where Hindus were pitted against Muslims, thousands were injured and 43 people killed.

The violence raged across the north-east of India’s capital for four days as mosques were set alight, Muslims were burned alive in their homes or dragged out into the streets and lynched. Muslim businesses and property were also set alight. In streets where Hindus and Muslims had lived peacefully side by side, bodies lay bloodied alongside discarded and burned-out cars, bikes, shattered glass and smouldering shopfronts. The police have been accused of enabling, encouraging or even joining in with Hindu mobs.
Hindu mobs were stopping men in the streets demanding to see their ID cards. If anyone refused, they were forced to show whether or not they were circumcised, as is common among Muslim men. Imran Khan, 30, a street hawker who lives in Shiv Vihar, north-east Delhi, was walking home on Monday evening when a group descended on him.

“Some of them forced me to pull down my trousers,” he said. “They started beating me violently as soon as they became sure that I was Muslim.”

Armed with iron rods, crowbars and metal pipes, the Hindu mob beat Khan unconscious. When he came to hours later, he found that the attackers, assuming he was dead, had tied a rope around his neck and dragged him into a gutter.

 ‘They saw I was a Muslim and just started attacking. What kind of humanity is this?’ Mohammad Zubair after being beaten by a group of men chanting pro-Hindu slogans.
There has been brutality on both sides, but it was the Muslim community of Delhi who were overwhelmingly targeted by Hindu mobs in their tens of thousands. In Chand Bagh, one of the worst hit areas, only the Muslim businesses – hairdressers, ice-cream shops, butchers – lay in ruins. On one corner, the charred husks of hundreds of oranges, bananas and watermelons spilled out of the front of a Muslim fruit stall, filling the air with the putrid smell of burnt fruit.

Among the 43 dead was Musharraf, a 30-year-old Muslim man. He was at home with his wife and children in the Bhagirathi Vihar area of Gokalpuri, north-east Delhi, when a mob of around 30 men with iron rods, knives and chains – many wearing motorcycle helmets so they could not be identified – broke down the locked door shouting jai Sri Ram.

“They cut the electricity, so it was all dark, and started smashing the house,” recounted Shakir, his brother-in-law. “His wife was calling the police but they did not come. Everyone got into the beds to hide but the men covered everything with kerosene and shouted: ‘Will you come out or do you want us to burn you alive?’.”

Shakir continued: “They smashed the bed where Musharraf was hiding underneath and he screamed, so they grabbed him and dragged him out into the street. The children ran out, too, and were screaming. His daughter, Kushi – she is just 11 – fell on the feet of those men, pleading ‘Don’t kill my father’. She tried to save him but they beat him to death in the middle of the street and threw him in the gutter.”

Like so many other Muslims in Delhi, Shakir and his family said that after the riots they could no longer stay in the city they had called home for decades and were moving back to their ancestral village. “We have never felt threatened and always lived peacefully with our Hindu brothers,” he said. “But I don’t feel safe anywhere in Delhi now.”

Violence has been a stain on India’s history since partition in 1947, when Pakistan was formed as a separate Muslim state and up to two million people died in the fighting and its aftermath. Riots have continued to erupt along religious lines in a country where around 14% of the population are Muslim, with an 80% Hindu majority. The fracturing of relations began in the 1960s and 1970s, but a flashpoint took place in 1992, when a rightwing Hindu mob of thousands, which included several members of the now ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata party (BJP), tore down the Babri mosque in Ayodhya.

When the BJP were elected to government in 2014, led by prime minister Narendra Modi, divisions widened. The BJP is the political wing of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a militant Hindu nationalist paramilitary organisation that has been accused repeatedly of orchestrating attacks on Muslims. The BJP, which believes that India should be a Hindu, not a secular, nation, has fostered an environment of hate in India. Lynchings of Muslims began and Muslims have been gradually relegated to second-class citizens in their own country.

Even before he became prime minister, Modi’s reputation had been tainted by hatred and violence. As chief minister of Gujarat, he had been accused of encouraging sectarian riots in 2002 that left more than 1,000 people dead, 800 of them Muslims. Modi denies the charges, which resulted in him being banned from the US. He was cleared by the Indian supreme court in 2012 but has never apologised nor expressed remorse for the killings.

His landslide re-election victory in May 2019 prompted an escalation of the Hindu nationalist agenda. But it was the passing of a citizenship amendment act (CAA) in December last year that proved the tipping point. The law, which grants citizenship for refugees of every major South Asian religion except Muslims, was widely condemned as discriminatory. Many saw it as an attempt to enshrine the Hindu nationalist agenda into law and undermine the country’s secular foundations.

The controversy has triggered India’s longest period of unrest in 40 years, with millions of people of all religions taking to the streets in protest. But the BJP response has been to ramp up their rhetoric, particularly in the recent Delhi state assembly elections. “The BJP began fermenting this crisis in Delhi weeks ago, as a way to win Hindu votes in the election,” said Ashis Nandy, a well-known political commentator.

The spark for the latest violence was provided by Kapil Mishra, a BJP leader who had just lost his seat in those elections, when he incited a Hindu mob to violently remove a group of Muslims who were blocking a road in north-east Delhi in protest against the CAA. 

Addressing the peaceful protest, Mishra issued an inflammatory ultimatum: “If the roads are not cleared … we will be forced to hit the streets.” Stone pelting began between Muslims and Hindus, which quickly descended into the violence that spread through the city.

But these riots were not simply neighbours turning against neighbours. Last Sunday, false rumours of a Muslim uprising spread across rightwing Hindu social media, alleging dozens of mosques in Delhi had announced over loudspeakers that they would throw all Hindus out of Delhi and that the police had arrested 32 imams. It prompted many outside Delhi to comment that they would come out to “teach our Muslim brothers a lesson”.

They kicked my stomach and my whole body. I pleaded with them not to harm my baby, but they kept kicking Muskan, 20, victim of the mob

Soon after, residents in Mustafabad, an area right on the edge of Delhi badly affected by the riots, reported seeing Hindu youths armed with machetes, metal rods and wooden sticks coming in trucks from the neighbouring states of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana. “We all saw truckloads of these mobs coming over the border from Uttar Pradesh, it was outsiders who came in and incited the violence,” said Shoaib Alam, 32. “And that then stirred up local people.”

Uttar Pradesh, whose BJP chief minister is the firebrand Hindu nationalist and openly Islamaphobic Yogi Adityanath, is a notorious hotbed of criminal activity and lawlessness. Uttar Pradesh has also been the state accused of carrying out some of the worst state-sponsored attacks, detention and torture of Muslims in a crackdown against the anti-CAA protests.

“I have not the slightest doubt that this was not a chance, spontaneous riot,” said Harsh Mander, an author and activist who is director of the Centre for Equity Studies, a Delhi research organisation. “It was certainly orchestrated and built up as part of the politics of the ruling party. I think the BJP were unnerved by the scale of the protest against the citizenship amendment law and, more specifically, that it was Hindus and Muslims coming out together in the resistance.

“It was only a matter of time before they would try and convert it into a Hindu-Muslim violent riot and encourage the most primal kind of hatred that wins them support. And after their defeat in the Delhi election, it seems this was an outlet for all the hatred they built up.”
Government spokesman Raveesh Kumar denied that the Modi government had inflamed religious tensions or had any role in the riots. “These are factually inaccurate and misleading, and appear to be aimed at politicising the issue,” he said.

In al-Hind hospital, a cramped and basic medical facility in Mustafabad which was on the frontline of the violence, Dr Meeraj Ekram looked shellshocked as he spoke of the more than 500 victims that had come through its doors since the riots began. Mainly they had gunshot wounds, but there were also stabbings, acid burns and mutilated genitalia. Police were not allowing ambulances into Mustafabad to rescue the wounded, and hundreds of patients lay on the floor.

“The injuries we were seeing were horrifying; I have never seen such terrible things in my whole life,” said Ekram. Muskan, a 20-year-old Muslim girl who was eight months pregnant, lay in a critical condition in a hospital bed after she was set upon by a Hindu mob. “They threw me to the ground, kicked my stomach and my whole body,” she whispered. “I pleaded with them not to harm my baby, I said ‘please, please’ over and over, but they kept kicking.”
Also among the patients brought into al-Hind on Tuesday night were two local imams. With a grimace, Ekram showed photos of the imam of Shiv Vihar mosque, whose face had been badly disfigured. When men had entered the mosque, the imam had attempted to run away but had been caught by the mobs, who threw a bucket of acid into his face.

Mufti Mohammad Tahir, the imam of Farooqia mosque, near Mustafabad, suffered a similar fate. He told the Observer how he had locked himself in an upper room of the mosque when the riots broke out. But police broke down the door, dragged him out and handed him to the waiting Hindu mobs, who beat him unconscious, smashing his limbs. The mosque was torched: shelves of dozens of blackened qu’rans lined one wall and a bowl containing burned fragments of Islamic religious scripture sat on a table.

Many who witnessed the riots claim that police stood by as Muslims were attacked or helped the Hindu mobs. Most of those who called the police for help did so in vain.

While the Delhi government is controlled by the progressive Aam Aadmi party (AAP), the Delhi police are under the control of the BJP minister for home affairs, Amit Shah. The police have said the focus of their investigation into the riots is on local Muslim leaders, while no BJP leaders have been charged. Delhi police were not available for comment.

Even the local politician for Mustafabad, the AAP’s Haji Yunus, described how the police ignored his requests for help. “I made several calls to the police station and they did nothing to help,” he said. “My entire government felt helpless, there was no way for us get the situation under control. There was no effort from police at all for at least two days. The police were not even allowing the ambulances through to carry out the injured people.”
Yunus said that the hatred stirred up by the BJP in the Delhi elections should be investigated. “The BJP did not think they could be defeated so badly in the election and so after they lost, they let out their frustration this way.”

Yet the prospect of holding Delhi police to account for their role in the riots through the legal system looks increasingly unlikely. Justice S Muralidhar, a judge in the Delhi high court, openly condemned the actions of the police and government last Wednesday at a hearing into the riots. But by Thursday morning, the judge was transferred to another court and the case was taken from him. The new judge gave the government four weeks to respond to the charges.

But for all the tales of discord, dozens of accounts were also given to the Observer of how Sikh and Hindu families helped save their Muslim neighbours, sheltering them in their homes as the violence broke out or helping them escape as the mobs descended.
One Hindu man, who asked to remain anonymous for fear of retaliation, spoke of how he secretly escorted seven Muslim families to safety in Shiv Vihar.

“I formed a small group involving a few other elderly Hindu neighbours and we managed to thwart the planned attacks on those Muslim households,” he said.

Meanwhile, in the Hindu-majority neighbourhood of Gokalpuri, a Sikh father, Mohinder Singh, 53, and his son Inderjit used their motorcycles to rescue around 70 Muslim men and children, the youngest just nine years old. They had been trapped in the mosque and madrasa, as a mob roamed the streets outside. Singh took the children two at a time on his bike, putting turbans on their heads as a disguise.

“I did not see if they were Muslim or Hindu, I did this for humanity,” said Mohinder. “I had to save them.”

Majinder Singh Sirsa, a Sikh leader in Delhi, said the community had opened up its gurdwaras for shelter, but had been attacked by hardline Hindu and Muslim groups for doing so. “We do feel the pain because we were also targeted 35 years ago,” he said, referring to the anti-Sikh pogroms in Delhi in 1984 where more than 3,000 Sikhs were killed. “Back then, Delhi was burning and humanity died. This week, it has happened once again.”
Shaikh Azizur Rahman contributed to this report

Two Christians Shot in Pakistan While Attempting to Construct New Church

Two Christians Shot in Pakistan While Attempting to Construct New Church

03/01/2020 Pakistan (International Christian Concern) – According to The Union of Catholic Asia News (UCAN), three Christians in Pakistan’s Sahiwal district were attacked and severely injured by a mob of enraged Muslims on February 2. The mob reportedly attacked the Christians because they were constructing a new church.
Azeem Gulzar, age 25, donated a 550-square-foot plot of land to be used to construct a church for the village’s 150 Christians. However, the planned construction of the church enraged local Muslims, especially Muhammad Laiqat, a Muslim school teacher who owns the neighboring plot.
According to UCAN, the attack happened after the Christian community won permission to build the church from the District Coordinator of Sahiwal. Local Muslims, however, claim that they successfully secured an injunction against the construction of the church from a local court.
On February 2, Gulzar, his younger brother Waseem, and his uncle, began constructing a wall and door on the disputed plot. That night, a mob of approximately 15 Muslims came and attempted to tear down the construction. When the Christians tried to intervene, Gulzar and his younger brother were shot and their uncle was attacked with an ax.
All three Christians were hospitalized with severe injuries following the attack. According to UCAN, Gulzar is now paralyzed from the shoulder down after he was shot in the head during the February 2 dispute.
Christians face severe discrimination and persecution in Pakistan. According Open Doors USA, Pakistan is ranked the fifth most dangerous country in the world for Christians.

One of China’s Most Ambitious Projects Becomes a Corridor to Nowhere. By Sheridan Prasso

One of China’s Most Ambitious Projects Becomes a Corridor to Nowhere. By  Sheridan Prasso       2 March 2020

A planned $62 billion initiative in Pakistan has been beset by delays and a lack of funding — more signs of trouble for President Xi Jinping’s signature policy.

The four-times-a-week propeller plane from Karachi whips up a cloud of dust as it lands on an arid airstrip. Passengers cross the tarmac in the scorching sun and enter an arrivals terminal not much larger than a tractor-trailer. Outside, soldiers carrying AK-47s are waiting. This is Gwadar, a remote scratch of land on Pakistan’s southwest coast. Its port is the last stop on a planned $62 billion corridor connecting China’s landlocked westernmost province to the Arabian Sea, the crown jewel of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, designed to build infrastructure and influence around the world. 

Plans originally called for a seaport, roads, railways, pipelines, dozens of factories and the largest airport in Pakistan. But, almost seven years after the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was established, there’s little evidence of that vision being realized. The site of the new airport, which was supposed to have been completed with Chinese funding more than three years ago, is a fenced-off area of scrub and dun-colored sand. Specks of mica in the dirt are the only things that glitter. The factories have yet to materialize on a stretch of beach along the bay south of the airport. And traffic at Gwadar’s tiny, three-berth port is sparse. A Pakistan Navy frigate is the only ship docked there during a recent visit, and there’s no sign of the sole scheduled weekly cargo run from Karachi. 

Less than one-third of announced CPEC projects have been completed, totaling about $19 billion, according to government statements. Pakistan bears much of the blame. It has repeatedly missed construction targets as it ran out of money; it got a $6 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund last year, the country’s 13th since the late 1980s. Two successive prime ministers have been jailed on corruption charges. And the Baloch Liberation Army’s desire for a separate homeland in Balochistan province, where Gwadar is located, has made life there uneasy. In May, militants stormed the city’s only luxury hotel, shooting up the white-marbled lobby and killing five people.
But setbacks in Gwadar point to larger problems along the Belt and Road. China is scaling back its ambitions, not just in Pakistan but around the world. Its economic growth has slowed to the lowest rate in three decades, inflation is rising and the country has been feeling the effects of a trade war with the U.S. The picture is getting even darker as a coronavirus epidemic that originated in central China threatens to cause further delays and cutbacks. “The biggest constraint for China now is its own economy,” says Jonathan Hillman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
End of the Road
A planned $62 billion project to connect China to the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea is running out of steam.
In a number of countries, projects have been canceled, downsized or scrutinized. Malaysia renegotiated the terms of a rail link being built by China and scrapped $3 billion of planned pipelines. In Kenya, a court halted construction last year on a $2 billion power plant financed by China. And in Sri Lanka, new leaders said they want to regain control of a port in Hambantota that was leased to a Chinese company for 99 years when the previous government couldn’t pay back a loan. That takeover sparked concern in many Belt and Road countries that China’s largesse comes with the risk of ceding critical infrastructure. And it has increased wariness about the price of indebtedness to China, which the Washington-based Center for Global Development says puts at least eight nations, including Pakistan, at high risk of debt distress. 
All that could result in shaving hundreds of billions of dollars off an estimated $1 trillion of planned Belt and Road spending, according to a September report by law firm Baker McKenzie. While the value of signed projects increased last year, data from China’s Ministry of Commerce show actual spending stalled at $75 billion in 2019 after falling 14% the previous year. Total spending from the beginning of 2014, shortly after President Xi announced the initiative, through November 2019 is $337 billion, government figures show, far short of China’s ambitious goals. 

Pakistan may be a harbinger of bigger problems, according to Hillman, who directs Reconnecting Asia, a project that tracks Belt and Road progress. “That is generally where the rest of the Belt and Road seems to be going,” he says. “It’s not dead in the water, but I’m skeptical whether China is going to be able to achieve what it set out to do.” 

Gwadar is shaped like a barbell dangling from Pakistan’s coastline. A strip of sandbar and rocks less than 1 kilometer wide at its narrowest connects to a rocky outcrop where the luxury Zaver Pearl-Continental hotel sits like fortress. The city of 140,000 is closer to the Iranian border than to Karachi, a 10-hour drive, in an area so remote it was part of the Sultanate of Oman until 1958.
Just getting around is a challenge. Foreign visitors must be accompanied by an entourage of 10 Pakistani soldiers in flatbed trucks. At the deep-water port on the eastern side of the barbell, there’s little sign of commerce on a hot October day. The only cargo ship that calls in Gwadar, operated by China’s Cosco Shipping Holdings Co., delivers construction materials and sometimes departs with seafood. Occasionally, it doesn’t arrive at all. A manager who answers Cosco’s phone in Karachi, where the weekly run originates, says the line is operational, but it’s up to the captain whether he wants to stop in Gwadar or go directly to Oman. The captain recently had a cold and didn’t want to stop, the manager says.

Yet Naseer Khan Kashani, chairman of the Gwadar Port Authority, maintains that all is well. Cosco was frustrated by problems with a web-based customs system, but it has been sorted out, he says, sitting in his office at the port. He declines to give figures for cargo volume. “Everything is going to be fine,” Kashani says. “The volume of trade is going to increase tremendously.” 
That view is echoed by Zhang Baozhong, chairman of China Overseas Ports Holding Co., which operates Gwadar’s port and free-trade zone. He dismisses the apparent inactivity with a wave of his hand, comparing it to four years earlier when he first arrived. Then, there was only one flight a week to Gwadar, with a handful of people on it. “My impression was that this place was completely neglected by the whole world,” Zhang says. “I felt this was a mission impossible.” 
Now, he says, there’s progress—$250 million in port renovations, including new cranes for unloading cargo, a business center, a desalination plant and sewage disposal. “This port is now becoming a node in international shipping,” he says. “Of course, the quantity is not big enough, but it takes time. By 2030, we believe Gwadar will be a new economic hub of Pakistan and will be the highest GDP contributor to Pakistan’s economy.” 
A free-trade zone was established in Gwadar in 2015, and officials say nine or 10 companies, including a Chinese steelmaker and a Pakistani producer of edible oils, have signed up. But there are no signs of any factories operating. An additional 30 are targeted for the Free Zone’s Phase II, closer to the site of the new airport, officials say, and $400 million has been invested so far. Zhang says twice that number of companies applied, including some from European countries. “It’s going to be established in the near future,” says Kashani. “They talk about CPEC slowing down, but nothing is slowing down.” 
The zones still need critical infrastructure, including water and power, according to CPEC’s website. Construction began in November on a 300-megawatt, $542 million plant, which will run on imported coal and is expected to reduce the frequency of power cuts. An acute scarcity of water, with annual rainfall less than 4 inches, was alleviated by freak rains in 2018 that temporarily filled reservoirs, according to Shahzeb Kakar, director general of the Gwadar Development Authority. He says the city will meet future needs by building desalination plants. A plan for a “safe city” project with surveillance cameras may reduce the need for Gwadar to feel like it’s under military occupation. “We have three basic issues—power, water and security,” Kakar says. “All three of these issues have now been taken care of. Now things are moving in the right direction.”


Not everyone is so upbeat. Mariyam Suleman, the Gwadar-based editor of the Balochistan Review, says life for people in the area hasn’t improved much after five years of planned developments. “Their neighborhoods are still without good infrastructure; there's a sewage issue; there isn’t electricity for long hours, especially in summer; and the water crisis has always been an issue,” she says.  

Even if Gwadar weren’t under threat of violence and had sufficient power and water to build and operate 40 factories, it doesn’t have enough people to work in them. The city’s population, mostly fishermen and their families, is about one-fifth that of Washington’s. A proposal for a project called China-Pak Hills envisages a gated community with a “Hong Kong financial district” and luxury housing for 500,000 Chinese professionals who could move to Gwadar and provide a labor force by 2022—an influx that wouldn’t sit well with either Baloch separatists or the Pakistani government, according to Asad Sayeed, an economist at the Collective for Social Science Research in Karachi.

It’s also hard to imagine how Gwadar would need Pakistan’s largest airport, with capacity for Airbus A300 jets and 30,000 tons of cargo annually. Yet that’s the plan for the 4,300-acre area demarcated by razor-wire fence on the outskirts of town. Announced in 2014, the new airport was supposed to have been built by China Communications Construction Co., the largest builder of projects along the Belt and Road, with a $230 million loan from China and a grant from Oman. But construction never started. The following year, the Chinese government said it would convert the loan to a grant, and Pakistani officials said the airport would be completed by the end of 2016, then by October 2017. Still nothing. 

Last year, Prime Minister Imran Khan traveled to Gwadar and broke ground on a new airport site. And a new contractor was announced to take over from CCCC: a branch of state-owned China Railway Engineering Corp. that would also build schools and a hospital. Completion is now scheduled for 2022. 

During a visit in October, a tractor started up and began driving around the empty, dusty stretch of land without evident purpose. “They are doing as much as they can at the moment to show it is still happening,” says Andrew Small, author of the 2015 book “The China-Pakistan Axis” and a senior fellow at the Washington-based German Marshall Fund. Small says Khan’s government is simply trying to complete about $20 billion worth of CPEC projects already in the works, mostly power plants, under pressure from China. “The full-scale version is not really in the cards,” he says. “It’s going to land in a far more modest place than envisaged. It’s not going to be a game changer.”
The CPEC project was intended to reduce oil and gas routes from the Middle East by thousands of miles, a way to cut overland into western China instead of going thousands of miles around South Asia and Southeast Asia by ship. Pakistan was supposed to get 2.3 million jobs and a 2.5 percentage-point boost to its gross domestic product. The deal, negotiated by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and touted in a 2017 communique by his successor Shahid Khaqan Abbasi after Sharif was jailed on corruption charges, called for the corridor to start taking shape by 2020. It was described as a pilot project, a model for Belt and Road countries around the world.
Pakistan, long allied with China to counter the regional weight of India, wanted help developing its mineral-rich but poorest and most restive province. It also wanted to quell separatists in the Baloch Liberation Army who not only attacked the Pearl-Continental last year but also killed four people at the Chinese consulate in Karachi in 2018. The militant group was seeking to halt plans they believed would enable Pakistan’s government to take more resources from the area, rather than aid residents. Further attacks in recent months have killed more than a dozen Pakistani soldiers and security personnel. 

China may have objectives besides better oil and gas routes. Western governments have long been concerned that Belt and Road spending is helping China develop what’s known as a “string of pearls”—ports that can be used by its navy, from the South China Sea across the Arabian Sea and on to Africa. Though China and Pakistan both deny any military intentions, Gwadar could be a stopping point on the way from Sri Lanka through the Maldives to Djibouti, where China has built its first military base on the Horn of Africa. China’s plans for the Pakistan corridor also include development in Xinjiang province, where it has attempted to curb unrest. The United Nations has estimated that 1 million Uighur people were being held in camps there, which the Chinese government has said was for reeducation and training.
If China’s interests were purely economic, says economist Sayeed, it could have helped expand the port of Karachi, already connected to the highway from China, instead of seeking to build new roads through desolate, dusty and dangerous Balochistan. 
Whatever their ambitions, China and Pakistan have had to scale them back. Khan, the former cricketer who was elected in 2018 on an anti-corruption platform and who had criticized expensive infrastructure deals signed with China by previous governments, inherited an economic disaster. To address its current account deficit, his administration has cut imports, depreciated the rupee, slashed spending and raised taxes. GDP growth fell to an estimated 2.4% last year, from 5.8% in 2018, as manufacturing experienced double-digit declines and exports remained flat. 
As for China, which has become the world’s largest creditor, it is refocusing on smaller projects crafted for the needs of recipient countries. Winning hearts and minds has become more important than announcements of gargantuan airports. Instead, according to guidelines issued by President Xi in late 2018, people-to-people exchanges in education, science and technology, culture, and tourism will help make Belt and Road projects “deeply rooted in the hearts of the people.”
All this seeks to downplay the more strategic aspects of what China has sought to achieve, says Nadege Rolland, senior fellow at the Washington-based National Bureau of Asian Research. “My hunch is there won’t be big splashes of money anymore,” she says. “The investments were only an incentive.” China’s ultimate objective, she says, “is not to build connectivity but to increase Beijing's political and strategic influence.” 
This means that even if Belt and Road spending ends up being a third of what was originally forecast, China may still have gotten its money’s worth. It will have broadened its influence in countries that are potential providers of natural resources, as well as future markets, and gained allies in international arenas such as the United Nations at a time when the U.S. is pulling back.
In Pakistan, an oil refinery in Gwadar and a railway and oil pipeline to China are among projects that have yet to materialize. An expressway connecting the new airport to Gwadar was supposed to have been completed by CCCC in 2018 for $168 million. It’s now scheduled to open later this year. In October, dump trucks with piles of rocks were parked on the edge of the existing roadway nearby, but no work was being done. The Chinese site manager says he’s too busy to speak. His assistant explains there’s no need for an interview, as all information about CCCC’s work can be found on the internet.
On a visit to Beijing in October, Khan assured Chinese officials that CPEC plans are proceeding. But with Pakistan’s budget maxed out and austerity imposed by the International Monetary Fund, it is clear there won’t be any big, new projects and unclear how many of the current ones can be finished, says CSIS’s Hillman. Still, both Pakistan and China pledged during Khan’s visit “to speedily execute the CPEC so that its growth potential can be fully realized,” according to an official communique.


Full realization may mean figuring out how much can be built to save face, provide some benefit to both sides and declare success. An update on the project from Pakistan’s ambassador to Beijing, published in Chinese state media last year, said 11 projects had been completed in the past five years and another 11 were underway, with total spending of $18.9 billion. It said an additional 20 were planned, without giving amounts, details or a time frame. There’s no longer any mention of the original $62 billion pledged. 
Adding to Gwadar’s development challenges, other parts of Pakistan such as Karachi have started their own special economic zones. Even if the corridor to Gwadar could be developed and security issues resolved, there’s only the Karakoram Highway, an inhospitable, two-lane route through the treacherous mountains separating China and Pakistan. It is prone to landslides and threatened by attacks, and has yet to be connected to roads leading to Gwadar, says Alyssa Ayres, Washington-based senior fellow for India, Pakistan and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. “It’s hard to imagine this as a viable freight corridor,” she says.
Hillman has come to a similar conclusion, though one with wider implications. “The Chinese are having some regret about making Pakistan the flagship,” he says. “There’s a lot more caution on all sides.”
With assistance by Jeremy C.F. Lin


Saturday, 15 February 2020

Pakistan’s Efforts to Silence Dissenters Amplifies Their Causes. By Daud Khattak


Pakistan’s Efforts to Silence Dissenters Amplifies Their Causes. By Daud Khattak

In the age of social media, labelling people traitors, infidels and foreign agents doesn’t necessarily inspire the self-censorship it once did.

February 14, 2020
The colonial-era relic of “sedition” is being used in present-day Pakistan to whip dissenting politicians, outspoken journalists, writers, poets, artists, lawyers and rights activists. 
The offense is defined in section 124-A of the Pakistan Penal Code that charges citizens with jeopardizing safety and stability of the state, spreading hatred and feelings of disloyalty among the people, and creating public disorder. 
This section, which India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had once termed “highly objectionable and obnoxious,” should have been scrapped after the end of the colonial era that paved way for the emergence of two independent states of India and Pakistan out of British India in 1947. But the legacy, among many others, lingers on to silence opponents and tame the forthright and undaunted.
Charging political opponents with “sedition” by labeling them “ghaddar” (traitor), anti-state, and foreign agents to suppress their voices is an old tactic in Pakistan. But it has touched new heights over the past year due to its arbitrary use to silence the critics and opponents. 
Fatima Jinah, sister of Pakistan’s founder Muhammad Ali Jinah, who is officially known is Quaid-e-Azam or the greatest leader, was among the first who was labelled as a threat to Pakistan. She was then labeled as a foreign agent when she challenged the then -military dictator Ayub Khan. Her death is shrouded in mystery, many believe she did not die a natural death.  
Also standing in the long row of ghaddars, anti-state and foreign agents are the leaders who suffered years in prisons and lost their wealth and properties before and after the independence of Pakistan. They include Bengali politician and briefly Pakistan’s prime minister, Huseyn Suhrawardy, ethnic Pashtun leaders Ghaffar Khan and Samad Khan, Baloch leaders Ataullah Mengal and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, and Sindhi politician Ghulam Murtaza Syed. 
“How could you question someone’s patriotism” was the key question raised by a Pakistani court while hearing a case concerning the arrest of civil rights activists in the country’s federal capital Islamabad on January 28.
Justice Athar Minallah, the chief justice of the Islamabad High Court, then granted post-arrest bail to 23 activists who were protesting the arrest of Manzoor Pashteen, leader of the two-year-old civil rights movement PTM or Pashtun Tahafuz (Protection) Movement. Pashteen was arrested in Pakistan’s northwestern city of Peshawar on January 27 under five different charges, including conspiracy and sedition.
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In what seems to be Pakistan’s new normal, those following the state narrative on national, regional and international issues in toto are the true patriots, while those challenging the official line are reckoned among the ranks of traitors, anti-state, foreign agents. 
This standard of patriotism encompasses a wide range of issues including national politics, regional conflicts, relations with other states, and militant proxies with the fresh addition of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the much-multibillion project involving Chinese investment in infrastructure development. 
It is as easy to understand as this: When former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif questioned the military’s role in supporting proxies, he was loathed as sympathetic toward India and was targeted with a vicious campaign of “Modi Ka Jo Yar Hai, Ghaddar Hai” which means whoever is Modi’s friend, is a traitor. Cyril Almeida, the journalist who reported the 2016 story linked above had to temporarily leave Pakistan. In October 2019, Almeida announced his resignation from Dawn and the end of his Sunday column.  
On the contrary, no feathers were ruffled when Prime Minister Imran Khan told the audience at a think tank event in New York in September 2019 that Pakistan’s army and military spy agency trained al-Qaeda and then maintained links with the militants afterwards. Moreover, it was Imran Khan who wished victory for Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with the hope that his  victory will pave way for “some kind of settlement” in Kashmir.  
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In fact, traitor, foreign agent and infidel are the time-tested tools being used in Pakistan to silence and vilify opponents. Many of the Taliban who conduct suicidal missions that target individuals, places and political parties have been brainwashed about the faith and religious views of their targets. For them, politicians like Benazir Bhutto, Bashir Bilour, Salmaan Taseer and many others were infidels, out of the ambit of Islam. 
Similarly, once declared as traitor, anti-state or a foreign agent, and that too by the state-backed propaganda machine, an individual or group of individuals not only lose due standing in the society, but also face dire threats to their lives. 
For example, former spokesman for the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Pakistan military’s media wing, Major General Asif Ghafoor warned the PTM leadership that “their time is up” during a wide-ranging news conference at the military’s general headquarters in April 2019, he accused them of getting money from Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) and India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). There were times when some nationalist leaders used to be accused of working for and getting money from the Russian KGB. 
The reasons behind leveling such charges, coupled with raids on houses and offices, abductions and enforced disappearances, is to restrict free speech ranging from individuals to groups and political parties, forums, discussions and debates, opinions and comments, conventional as well as social media. 
The charges and arrests, threats and abductions, taking television shows and interviews off the air and blocking social media accounts are most likely intended to inspire self-censorship. But unlike the past, such measures seem to be proving counterproductive in the age of social media. 
Filmmaker and actor Sarmad Khoosat’s movie Zindagi Tamasha got more publicity on social media when Pakistan’s Central Board of Film Censors advised him against its release. A radical Islamic group had called for protests against the film, which was scheduled to be released on January 24. 
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The same month, authorities raided the offices of a Pakistani publisher and confiscated Urdu translation copies of author Mohammed Hanif’s book. Published in 2008 in English language, A Case of Exploding Mangoes is a satire about the mystery surrounding the death of Pakistan military dictator General Zia ul Haq in a plane crash in 1988. News about the raid, with widespread condemnations and people’s quest to get more information about the Urdu-translated version of the book, were everywhere on social media within no time. 
Pashteen’s January 27 arrest, apparently meant to suppress his voice, triggered a debate on social media in Pakistan besides attracting wide coverage internationally. It may have taken him months, if not years, to get such an attention had he not been arrested.
Like Pashteen, a majority of the leaders accused of sedition or labelled as anti-state and foreign agents, demanded their political and social rights guaranteed under the constitution. “We are not seeking a violent revolution, but we are determined to push Pakistan back toward a constitutional order,” Pashteen wrote in a New York Times op-ed in February 2019. 
Then and now, the struggle is the same. Only time has changed. And the changing times demand a change in the approach. Instead of silencing the lawful demands of the peaceful citizens, it is time for the state to accept and recognize their lawful rights. 
Daud Khattak is Senior Editor for Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty’s Pashto language Mashaal Radio. Before joining RFE/RL, Khattak worked for The News International and London’s Sunday Times in Peshawar, Pakistan. He has also worked for Pajhwok Afghan News in Kabul. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not represent those of RFE/RL.