CPEC and the
Baloch Insurgency, by Shazar Shafqat February 08, 2017
Balochistan stands to gain little
from the massive project, despite being in desperate need of economic
opportunity.
Pakistan’s economic resurgence seems
to be looming large. Trade through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has
partially begun, further upping the excitement surrounding the $50 billion
megaproject. But what does this mean for the impoverished province of
Balochistan? After all, despite being home to Gwadar port, the crown jewel
of CPEC, the province’s share in the CPEC bounty is a mere 0.5 percent.
Balochistan is undoubtedly in need of
an economic lifeline. The metrics paint a dire picture for its residents: 70 percent of people in Balochistan live in
poverty. In Balochistan, there are about 1.8 million
children not attending school, which is perhaps related to the fact that more
than 5,000 public schools in the region consist of nothing more than a single
room. Health indicators are equally bad. The maternal death rate
in Pakistan is 278 per 100,000, whereas in Balochistan it stands at 785 out of
every 100,000. Almost 15 percent of the people of Balochistan suffer from
Hepatitis B or C. Added to this, there’s an acute water shortage. These
appalling statistics cut a sorry figure.
Yet with all the talk of CPEC being a
game-changer for the country, the Balochs are still left waiting on the
sidelines. Worse, the division of CPEC benefits repeats a long-standing pattern
where the people of Balochistan are not allowed to benefit from the province’s
own advantages. Natural gas was discovered at Sui in Balochistan, yet major parts of the province are
still deprived of natural gas. Now Balochistan’s beneficial
geography – namely, Gwadar port – might be used to enrich other provinces.
Pakistani authorities must ensure that CPEC doesn’t repeat the earlier
injustice meted out to the native Balochs. Balochistan must get its fair share
of the economic corridor. Otherwise, faced with extreme poverty and
disconsolate social indicators, the local people aren’t left with many options
other than taking up arms.
Indeed, most of the insurgent movements in Balochistan have been
linked with a sense of deprivation and underdevelopment. The people of
Balochistan, as indicated, have been living in miserly conditions for too long.
CPEC appeared to be a ray of hope. If that too fails to impact their lives for
the better, the possibility of a full-on civil war, akin to that waged by the LTTE in Sri Lanka,
can’t be ruled out.
Balochistan has been teetering on the brink of collapse for many years.
Since 2003, there have been 817 deaths caused by
suicide attacks in Balochistan, with more than 1,600 people
severely injured. Sectarian outfits also continue to roam around freely in
Balochistan. Since 2009, more than 760 people have been killed in sectarian
clashes.
The Pakistani government and military officials tend to blame the
violence in Balochistan on Indian meddling in the province. Predictably, Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi’s remarks on Balochistan last year resulted in a lot of outcry in Pakistan.
But playing the “India card” all the time won’t assuage the grievances of
the Balochs. Conspiracy theories might be lucrative and have the potential to
unite the jingoists under one banner, but the Baloch people will still be
suffering the most. To truly solve the problems in Balochistan, Pakistan’s
focus must be inward.
Balochistan has historically been mired in conflicts that have shaken
the security apparatus from within. It’s important to understand that the
violence in Balochistan is not just a question of terrorist safe havens; the
insurgents are, to a large extent, local people longing for their
constitutional rights and welfare.
There are, primarily, three sub-nationalist groups operating in
Balochistan: the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Republican Army
(BRA), and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF). Pakistan’s government has
generally regarded Brahamdagh Bugti, the alleged leader-in-exile of the BRA, as
the sole representative of the Baloch conflict, particularly pointing to
Bugti’s India-centric policy. This is the wrong approach; Bugti is one part of,
and not necessarily representative of, a much larger picture.
Going forward, Pakistan should implement two changes to its current
approach.
First, the state needs to de-hyphenate sub-nationalists from the
terrorist outfits operating from within Balochistan. Organizations like
Jamaat al Ahrar, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Jundullah pose a terrorist threat to
the country. These need to be dealt with accordingly as per the national
counterterrorism strategies. Sub-national groups, on the other hand, should be
encouraged to come into the national fold by addressing legitimate concerns. If
the violence still gets out of hand, then counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies
can be employed. Such a minor tweak in Pakistan’s warfare policy could have a
big impact.
Second, Pakistan’s Baloch policy should no longer be shrouded in
mystery. If someone is guilty of conniving with non-state actors, including
operatives from other countries, then he or she should be subject to normal
court proceedings. The ever-growing number of “missing persons” will only lead
to more mistrust toward the central government. Media coverage in the region
should also be ramped up, rather than the current situation of reporters going
missing from Balochistan. Even a bit of transparency could take the region to new
heights.
For now, if the current conditions hold, the world will just have to
wait and see whether Balochistan can weather the storm. This time, thanks to
CPEC, the choices for economic progress in the region are plentiful – but the
results will depend on what policy Pakistan has in the offing. For the people
of Balochistan, hope springs eternal.
Shazar Shafqat is an independent researcher and a security
analyst. His work is regularly featured in the Middle East Eye,
World Policy Journal, Asia Times, The Nation, Daily Times, and more.
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