Judicial imperialism? Babar Sattar
The constitution is supreme. But the constitution is what
the judges say it is. We have had direct military rule. We have seen a troika
keeping democracy in check. We have had Article 58(2)(b) used by presidents to
sack elected governments on khaki prodding, with the Supreme Court playing the
underwriter. Since 2009, we have evolved a jurisprudence that makes the
judiciary omnipotent, granting it a veto over all executive and legislative
acts. The triumph of unelected institutions over the representative ones is now
complete.
Some of us believe Nawaz Sharif is evil incarnate and any means
employed to banish him into obscurity are legitimate. This lot cheers on the SC
to delve deeper into the political thicket and produce partisan consequences.
Then there are those who profess unqualified loyalty to NS. For them too, all
is fair in love and war. It doesn’t matter how foul the PML-N’s strategy is, so
long as NS gets back in the ring. Caught in the crossfire are those struggling
to decipher the principles and norms that are guiding the conduct of
institutions in this rudderless polity.
We are in a free-for-all ‘do good’ state of frenzy. After 70 years
of existence, we still have no consensus on our foundational organising
principles. Scratch the surface and our commitment to democracy or rule of law
is inexistent. There is no separation of powers or delineation of roles. Power
and responsibility don’t go hand-in-hand. Everyone is interested in everything
other than his own job.
We are in the age of judicial rule. It started with the
restoration of Iftikhar Chaudhry and his projection as the messiah representing
the aspirations of the ‘silent’ majority. (Many of us who lionised former CJ
Chaudhry at one point or another are now ashamed of being unable to see the harm
that judicial overreach, driven by a populist rhetoric, is doing to the
polity). CJ Chaudhry used suo motu to transgress into the domain of the
executive in the name of judicial review. Back then, our present CJP was a
staunch critic of the unguided exercise of suo motu.
If at all there existed any limits to the reach and scope of
Article 184(3), they are now invisible. With some creativity, almost everything
can be a matter of public importance related to fundamental rights. We have
seen the CJP touring hospitals, inspecting their operations and issuing
instructions. Where does he derive the authority to do so? Is it provided in
the constitution or a statute or the SC Rules or is it a product of judicial
convention? What was once a quintessential executive function has been subsumed
in the SC’s on-the-go judicial review powers.
Under Iftikhar Chaudhry, the SC heard challenges to the 18th
Amendment. It didn’t like the ability of parliament to have a say in judicial
appointments. So for the first time in history, we saw a constitutional
amendment sent back to parliament, with instructions to reconsider it in view
of the SC’s desires. Parliament cowered and gave the SC most of what it wanted.
It retained some ability to block a nomination (with bipartisan support) and
ask the judicial commission for a new nominee. When it exercised such
authority, the SC set it aside in exercise of its judicial review power.
The story didn’t end there. After the APS attack, the country was
aghast and blamed the courts for the lack of convictions and for being soft on
terror. This no-confidence motion against the judiciary resulted in the 21st
Amendment and the emergence of military courts. Here, it was the military
intruding into the judiciary’s domain. The SC swallowed that bitter pill. But
while holding that secret trials in military courts are in accord with
fundamental rights, it gave itself the power to strike down constitutional
amendments. So the debate over parliament’s supremacy must end now.
The SC has interpreted the directive in Article 239(5) – “no
amendment of the constitution shall be called in question in any court on any
ground whatsoever” – to mean that the SC has a veto over amendments and will
decide which are kosher and which aren’t. Once the SC arrogates to itself the
power to second-guess the desirability of constitutional amendments in the name
of interpretation, the lesser function of exercising veto over ordinary
legislation for being in conflict with the constitutional text (or spirit)
remains hardly comment-worthy.
Beyond legislation, parliament is vested with the authority to
elect the PM. It was previously understood that the constitution mandates the
Election Commission to determine the qualification/disqualification of a member
of parliament before an election and of the speaker/chairman of the Senate
post-election. Panama changed that. The SC held that disqualification under the
law was different from disqualification under the constitution and the SC, in
exercise of its 184(3) powers, could disqualify a member without trial after
forming a tentative view that he was liable to be disqualified under articles
62 and 63.
This interpretation of the constitution has given the SC the
ability to determine who is qualified to head the executive. So, for example,
the SC just decided not to entertain a petition challenging the LNG contract in
exercise of its 184(3) powers. If it had chosen to hear the matter, reaching
the conclusion that the contract had not been awarded in a transparent manner
and forming the subsequent tentative view that PM Abbasi can’t be regarded as
‘sadiq and ameen’ would be within the realm of possibilities. Crudely put, PMs
now serve at SC’s pleasure.
When a PM can be chucked out without trial in exercise of the SC’s
discretionary 184(3) jurisdiction, the ouster of heads of statutory
organisations for being appointed in breach of due process or for lacking
requisite is a routine affair.
So, theoretically, we have a system where citizens elect
representatives and delegate to them the authority to legislate and run the
state (on behalf of citizens), with judges vested with the authority to check
the illegal actions of such representatives without second-guessing the policy
choices they make. In practice, judges have interpreted the constitution to
mean that they have the power to veto the choices parliament makes – including
legislative choices – and the power determine who is fit to be PM, and also the
power to second-guess the choices the executive makes in appointing people
during its term that it finds appropriate for executive jobs. Of course, no one
can justify nepotism in appointments. But the problem of regulating discretion
in making appointments is underlined by the equally thorny questions
surrounding judicial appointments.
Since 2009, we’ve seen an SC (with brief periods of exception)
that has produced jurisprudence that isn’t always guided by precedent;
curtailed the scope of fundamental rights; used contempt powers to silence
critics; and produced legal uncertainty instead of exercising its adjudicatory
function such that the law speaks with one discernible voice.
Let’s consider the short order in Election Act case. Eleven judges
in the Benazir Bhutto case (PLD 1988 SC 416) reiterated the ruling in the Abdul
Wali Khan case that the right to form a political party “guaranteed under
Article 17(2) is subject only to reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the
interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan. It excludes all other
constraints. This restrictive clause is exhaustive and has to be strictly
construed”. But the SC, in the name of interpretation, has just rewritten
Article 17(2) along with Section 203 of the Election Act.
While summarising the rules of statutory interpretation, the CJP
held in ‘Imrana Tiwana’ (2015 SCMR 1739) that, “there is a presumption in
favour of constitutionality and a law must not be declared unconstitutional
unless the statute is placed next to the constitution and no way can be found
in reconciling the two”. It also stated that “the court will not declare a
statute unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the spirit of the
constitution unless it also violates the letter of the constitution”. But in
the Election Act case, Article 2A’s spirit and amorphous notions of morality
have overturned the express text of the constitution and the act.
In his dissenting judgment in the 21st Amendment case (PLD 2015 SC
401), the CJP was emphatic when he said that it is not the SC’s business to
make decisions on parliament’s behalf that the latter opted not to make. In the
Election Act case, parliament deliberately removed a disqualification
introduced by Musharraf in relation to a party head. But when opposition
parties lost in parliament and brought the matter to court, the three-member
bench headed by the CJP inscribed articles 62 and 63 disqualifications into the
law, thereby extending judicial control over the internal working of political
parties.
Our democracy might not have been tamed as yet, but it sure is
controlled.
The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad.
Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu
The News 24 Feb. 18
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