Avoiding Incidents at Sea between India and China
By Monish Tourangbam
Editor’s note: This
essay is part of an initiative launched by the Stimson Center’s South Asia
Program which we call the Off Ramps Initiative.
The nuclear competition among China, India, and Pakistan is accelerating with
the introduction of new ballistic and cruise missiles. Counterforce
capabilities are growing. China has begun to place multiple warheads on some of
its ballistic missiles, Pakistan has advertised its ability to do so, and India
has demonstrated this capacity in its space program. Diplomacy is dormant as
these and other nuclear capabilities expand. What to do? Stimson has asked
rising talent in this field, as well as a few veterans, to offer creative ideas
that can help ameliorate and decelerate this dangerous triangular nuclear
competition.
Introduction
For the last half
century, the India-China rivalry has played out on land as both countries
consolidated their borders as independent states. Recently, this strategic
competition has begun to spill into the maritime domain. India has been
bolstering its conventional and nuclear sea-based deterrence,[1] modernizing its maritime forces
through indigenous production and foreign acquisitions and engaging in
interoperability exercises with the United States and other partners. China’s
expanded ambitions in the Indian Ocean have manifested in regularized
deployments of conventional and nuclear submarines in the subcontinent’s
littorals, significant investments in infrastructure and port development, and
enhanced maritime cooperation with Pakistan. The two countries have managed to
avoid dangerous incidents at sea thus far, but the potential for naval
friction—and even escalation—cannot be dismissed as both India and China
endeavor to project power across the Indian Ocean.
Similar dangers were
present during the Cold War. As the Soviet Union began deploying a “blue-water”
force in the 1960s, interactions between the U.S. and Soviet navies became more
and more common. More interaction led to more friction and greater potential
for escalation. The list of alarming incidents grew throughout the 1960s and
included collisions and near-collisions, provocative actions such as planes
“buzzing” warships, and simulated attacks.[2]
The U.S.-Soviet
Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), which entered into force in May 1972, was
intended to address such incidents on the “high seas,”[3] thereby reducing the risk of
military escalation between the two nuclear-armed superpowers. The U.S.-Soviet
INCSEA agreement had no bearing on the “size, weaponry, or force structure” of
their respective naval forces. Instead, the objectives were to “enhance mutual
knowledge and understanding of military activities; to reduce the possibility
of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication; and
to increase stability in times of both calm and crisis.”[4] With these objectives in mind, the
United States and the Soviet Union agreed to avoid interference, simulated
attacks, dangerous types of surveillance, and other hazardous naval maneuvers;
use accepted international naval signals; and provide information about
submarine exercises near the other side’s naval assets. The U.S.-Soviet INCSEA
agreement served as an important confidence-building mechanism (CBM) because it
provided the opportunity for both sides’ naval officers to “effectively
communicate their maneuver intentions at sea, [and] talk to each other
professionally at annual review sessions.”[5]
As India and China
expand their naval presence across the Indian Ocean, incidents of misperception
and miscalculation over freedom of navigation and overflight with escalatory
potential cannot be discounted. In this context of intensifying rivalry, the
lack of a permanent India-China incidents at sea agreement with a regular
consultative mechanism is cause for concern. Thus, this Off Ramps essay
proposes an India-China INCSEA agreement modeled on the U.S.-Soviet one. The
proposal revolves around the need to evolve standard operating procedures
(SOPs) and confidence-building measures (CBMs) for the two navies to guard
against the potential for military escalation at sea.
The Proposal
I propose that India
and China negotiate incidents at sea agreement with similar objectives and
scope as the U.S.-Soviet INCSEA agreement. The primary goals of a prospective
India-China incidents at sea agreement would be to prevent or deescalate any
crisis at sea arising either out of an accident, deliberate action, or
inadvertent miscalculation. An India-China INCSEA agreement would seek to
contribute to the reciprocal understanding of each other’s maritime
capabilities and intentions. The agreement would utilize internationally
prescribed signals[6] or other mutually agreed upon
signals when ships are within sight of each other. The mere act of a negotiating
an accord would testify that both the countries intend to arrest any escalatory
potential and show that neither is interested in a war despite strategic
signaling to assert maritime rights and positions.[7] An annual
consultative review of the previous year’s naval incidents would contribute to
confidence building, ultimately fostering a stable deterrence relationship. It
would not attempt to infringe upon weapons development or force structure, as
both countries are in the midst of efforts to modernize their navies and would
be unlikely to accept such constraints. Though the Indian Ocean is the likely
venue of incidents with escalatory potential, the agreement would govern all
India-China naval interactions on the “high seas” as redefined by the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.[8]
An India-China INCSEA
agreement would attempt to prevent the same types of incidents as the
U.S.-Soviet agreement. It would also draw inspiration from established
mechanisms such as the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea, 1972 (COLREGS)[9] and the more recent multi-national
Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) that provides a set of non-binding
rules of the road to prevent an escalation of tensions between different
militaries at sea.[10] The agreement would, however, place
a special emphasis on addressing three areas of potential friction and
escalation: 1) Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean and India’s maritime
domain awareness (MDA) operations, 2) China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
operations and India’s maritime interests in the South China Sea, and 3) Indian
and Chinese naval exercises. The following paragraphs assess these dangers—and
the need for an INCSEA agreement to address them—in detail.
The increasing foray
of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean has accentuated India’s awareness of
the weaknesses of its MDA and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and an
intention to close the gaps in these realms. This can be seen most specifically
in the kind of cooperation that India is engineering with the United States
that shares a common interest in countering China’s increasing influence in the
Indian Ocean. India has invested heavily in potent maritime-patrol aircraft
fleet, including the American-made P-8I.[11] New Delhi is also reportedly
ramping up cooperation with Tokyo to help construct “an undersea network of
seabed-based sensors stretching from the tip of Sumatra to Indira Point in the
Bay of Bengal.” If this was to become a reality, it would help augment India’s
ability to detect Chinese submarines approaching India’s exclusive economic zone.[12] Moreover, India plans to start
operating P-8Is from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, a reflection of New Delhi
elevating the strategic importance of the Tri-Services Command stationed there.
Since the Andamans are geographically close to the critical chokepoint of the
Strait of Malacca, military infrastructure there could be geared towards
bolstering India’s surveillance of Chinese vessels entering the Indian Ocean.[13] With increased surveillance comes
the need for SOPs for maintaining required distances to avoid conflict by accident
or interfering with the formations of the other party.
As China has
implemented its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) maritime strategy,[14] it has made advances in long-range
surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), anti-ship
cruise missiles (ASCMs), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities. These changes were dramatically expressed through the air
defense identification zone (ADIZ) China claimed in the East China Sea
beginning in 2013. China has also reportedly installed equipment on two of its
fortified outposts in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea capable of
jamming communications and radar systems.[15] While China’s A2/AD strategy has
been targeted towards the United States and its Pacific allies, India has also
been augmenting military cooperation with littoral countries in the East and
South China Seas. The Indian Maritime Security Strategy 2015 includes
the South and East China Seas and the Western Pacific and its littorals as
within India’s secondary areas of maritime interest. [16] Moreover, India has overtly
supported freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and has interest in oil
blocks offered by Vietnam in the South China Sea. Although crossing any Chinese
threshold is still a concern, Indian analysts have been rather categorical in
espousing the need for the Indian Navy to pursue operations in the seas close
to China, in response to China’s strategic ventures in India’s near seas.[17] Such developments increase the
likelihood of close encounters and incidents at sea between the two countries
and hence the need for an agreement that would, among other things,
provide for mutual sharing of information regarding each other’s activities and
effectively communicating intentions.
Both India and China
are increasing their naval interoperability exercises across the Indo-Pacific
waters. This trend underscores the need for both parties to manage maneuvers at
sea and refrain from simulating attacks against both military and non-military
vessels. The maritime dimension of India’s Act East Policy is most
significantly manifested in its naval-to-naval cooperation with Southeast Asian
countries like Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia, including bilateral naval
exercises in the South China Sea.[18] This is
in addition to major multilateral initiatives like the Malabar Exercises among
the Indian, U.S., and Japanese Navies. On the other hand, the PLA Navy has been
engaging in bilateral naval exercises with the Pakistani Navy, including in the
Arabian Sea.[19] These exercises either held in
India or China’s near seas tend to be viewed with suspicion. As such, the
agreement shall provide for prior notification of maritime exercises involving
either of the parties at sea.
Challenges to the
Proposal
An
India-China INCSEA agreement in possible only when both countries perceive the
need for increased security for their access to the seas, without feeding into
each other’s insecurity. This will be easier said than done, given the long
shadow of mistrust between India and China. An unresolved border dispute and
overlapping spheres of influence in Southern Asia do not bode well for an
INCSEA agreement. On the one hand, China’s strategic engagement with Indian
neighbors is viewed within India as Beijing’s intention to encircle India. On
the other hand, India’s Act East Policy aimed at increasing engagement with
Southeast and East Asian countries is viewed within China as India’s attempt to
increase its influence in China’s vicinity.
Beijing could be
disinclined to accord India an elevated status in the South and East China Sea
by signing on to an INCSEA agreement. China’s perceived vulnerability in the
Malacca choke point, through which most of its energy imports pass, and its
intention to bypass the “Malacca dilemma” through port and infrastructure
development in various Indian Ocean littoral states has been a major point of
competition in India-China relations.[20] Compared to the East and the South
China Seas, China’s naval capability is clearly limited in the Indian Ocean. As
a result, China has been seen to use the pretext of anti-piracy,
counterterrorism, and humanitarian disaster relief to justify its forays into
the Indian Ocean waters.[21] New Delhi does not view these
justifications with benign intent nor does Beijing look kindly on India’s
geographical advantage in the Indian Ocean and ability to exercise some control
over maritime traffic there. The establishment of the Tri-Services Command in
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands might also be a sore point for China’s far seas
ambitions.[22]
The evolving
geopolitical and geo-economic drivers in the region point to increased
competition, but this was also the case during the Cold War and this did not
preclude a U.S.-Soviet INCSEA agreement. Much depends on whether Beijing and
New Delhi both seek ways to ameliorate their competition. New Delhi’s emerging
power alignment in the Indo-Pacific is no doubt aimed at counter-acting the
rise of an aggressive China, most recently seen in the reactivation of the
quadrilateral initiative among India, the United States, Japan, and Australia.[23] India in recent times has not only
shown intention to leverage its superior force structure in the Indian Ocean,
but also to increase naval power projection into the Western Pacific in
partnership with like-minded countries. It has signed several white-shipping
agreements that will enable sharing of unclassified information with other
countries to help augment existing capabilities to develop MDA and signed a
Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the United States to
increase logistics capability during missions in the Indian Ocean.[24] India’s maritime military exercises
with countries in the Indo-Pacific region have certainly been of acute concern
for China. For instance, during the 2017 Malabar exercises that involves the
navies of India, the United States, and Japan, China had reportedly sent a
surveillance ship, the Haiwang Xiang, to monitor the trilateral exercise in the
Bay of Bengal. Moreover, the Indian Navy also recorded an “unusual upsurge” in
the number of Chinese warships and submarines entering the Indian Ocean around
the same time.[25]
India's intention to
become a net security provider in the Indian Ocean and China's ability to
project naval presence in the region to safeguard its maritime trade mean that
both countries have no reason to decrease their military as well as economic
footprints in the region. The Indian Navy, in the words of the Chief of Naval
Staff Admiral Sunil Lanba, has initiated “mission-based deployments” stretching
from the Gulf of Aden to the Western Pacific on almost 24/7 basis and plans to
hold theater-level operational readiness exercise on India’s western and
eastern seaboards.[26] The Indian Maritime
Security Strategy 2015 emphasizes the significance of improving MDA,
and aims to address the twin issues of ‘reach’ and ‘sustainability’ of naval
forces and opt for ‘leapfrogging’ technologies to ensure that a high percentage
of assets with contemporary equipment remains capable of combating emergent
threats.[27] According to the Strategy Paper,
India’s growing
maritime interests, across wide geographical spaces, underscores the central
importance of adequate power projection in and from the seas, and for sea
control capability in ‘blue waters’, to safeguard interests and counter threats
before they can bear upon India. The primary means for this will be potent,
balanced naval fleets supported by strong, integral and shore-based, maritime
air power.[28]
At the same
time, China’s Military Strategy 2015 aims to abandon China’s
“traditional mentality that land outweighs sea” and attached importance “to
managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.” The
Chinese strategy paper states that,
In line with the
strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open seas protection, the
PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from “offshore waters defense”
to the combination of “offshore waters defense” with “open seas protection,”
and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force
structure. The PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and
counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive
defense and comprehensive support.[29]
Hence, even a cursory
examination of these two strategy papers points to the reality that capability
developments are on the rise, and force posturing in terms of power projection
and muscle flexing at sea will remain a challenge for peaceful and stable
waters. In addition, China’s utilization of merchant ships and fishing boats—a
“maritime militia”—as a force multiplier during sea encounters and skirmishes
is cause for Indian concern.[30] The plausible deniability of
involvement by non-PLAN vessels by Beijing might further complicate the
negotiation of an INCSEA agreement.
Why the Proposal Is
Nonetheless Worth Considering
One
reason why this proposal merits consideration is that, unlike the India-China
boundary dispute on land, there does not seem to be any historical baggage and
fundamental discord between India and China at sea. While some may argue that
the absence of serious accidents and mishaps at sea suggests that an INCSEA
agreement is not necessary, the counter-argument is more persuasive: the best
time to negotiate an agreement is before serious accidents and mishaps occur at
sea.
The
enhancement of India and Chinese maritime capability and power projection can
either evolve into an unfettered competition or can be ameliorated to prevent
unwanted conflict or escalation. Farsighted leaders could see the wisdom in an
agreement that fosters an intergovernmental consultative mechanism to prevent
collisions at sea, accidents arising out of close encounters at sea, and
conflicts occurring because of miscalculation and misjudgement of maneuvers at
sea.
Even
in the event of a crisis generated because of deliberate action, an INCSEA
agreement could provide a crisis-resolution mechanism to deescalate tensions.
In lesser cases, it could be helpful in clarifying threat perceptions. A forum
created by an INCSEA agreement for regular consultations could be useful to
discuss threat perceptions emerging out of port calls by ships and submarines
in each other’s vicinity.
For instance, in 2011,
India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had to give an official response to
an incident involving the INS Airavat in South China Sea. After a news report
of an alleged confrontation between an Indian naval ship and a Chinese vessel
off the coast of Vietnam, MEA had to clarify that there was no confrontation
and that the Indian ship paid a friendly visit to Vietnam without flouting any
rules of the right of passage as per the principles of international law.[31] Irrespective of the exact nature of
this incident, the fact that the MEA had to issue a public position is a
harbinger of future “clarifications.” While Indian ships like the INS Sahyadri
visiting East Asian and Southeast Asian coasts was projected as India’s naval
diplomacy to counter China’s maritime expansion,[32] Admiral Sunil Lanba openly
questions the rationale behind China’s deployment of nuclear and diesel-powered
submarines in the IOR for anti-piracy patrols. China’s port and infrastructure
projects in countries neighboring India, especially the Gwadar port in Pakistan
and China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti are viewed within India as
“game changers” in terms of China’s power projection in the Indian Ocean.[33]
Although China’s
participation at the 2016 International Fleet Review in India—where the PLAN
sent two Type 054A Jiangkai-II-class frigates—could be seen as a positive sign
in terms of exploring convergences, realpolitik considerations of capability
display and battle readiness presently animates such rare maritime interactions
between India and China.[34]
Conclusion
The
key question raised by this essay is how much the increased offensive and
defensive capabilities of the Chinese and Indian navies will result in
increased friction. It is naive to expect that India and China will scale down
their investments in naval capabilities, but it is not naive to think that both
Asian powers would seek to avoid a war at sea or dangerous escalation resulting
from accidents.
A primordial
assumption in strategic analysis is that increased commercial interests require
increased military capabilities to secure the former, and that commercial
competition is a driver for warfare between major powers. Since the advent of
nuclear weapons, however, there have been no major conventional wars between
major powers. Friction between major powers can grow with or without trade, as
is evident in U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations. The former is far safer
than the latter. The commercial benefits that can be accrued from far greater
commercial ties between India and China could help ameliorate friction, and
most of this commerce will occur at sea. Mutual recognition of commercial
opportunities might help leaders in both countries to shift from absolute
positions to find some bargaining zone to conclude an agreement preventing
incidents at sea. Hence, the challenge for the two countries will remain
grounded in the dilemma of managing competition and cooperation.[35] India and China have to find ways
to advance their national interests at sea while developing cooperative and
consultative mechanisms to engineer greater stability in their relations. In
this context, the proposal for negotiating a prevention of incidents at sea
agreement between India and China is grounded on geopolitical realities and the
limitations that they impose on India and China’s behavior.
Monish Tourangbam is
an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geopolitics and International
Relations at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education in Karnataka, India. He is
the Coordinator of the Northeast Studies Centre of the Academy and is the
Executive Editor of The Northeast Diary. In addition to teaching,
he conducts policy and academic research on strategic and international security
issues, including the emerging geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. He
previously served as a SAV Visiting Fellow at the Stimson Center, a Visiting
Faculty at the University of Cincinnati, Ohio, and an Associate Fellow at the
Observer Research Foundation. He holds an M.Phil and a Ph.D. from the School of
International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
[1] The deterrence
in this case is both conventional and nuclear. On the one hand, India gives
importance to the sea leg of its nuclear triad and the enhancement of its
retaliatory capability. On the other hand, China’s increasing presence in the
IOR has meant the importance of steps to beef up conventional deterrence. The
latter involves power projection through aircraft carriers and enhanced MDA
through long range maritime patrol aircrafts that can scan a large expanse of
the Indian Ocean and has potent submarine killing capabilities.
[2] Nathan Cohn, “An
Incidents at Sea Agreement for South Asia,” Stimson Center, June 14,
2012, https://www.stimson.org/an-incidents-at-sea-agreement-for-south-asia.
[3] The 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas defined the “high seas” as “all parts of the sea
that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
State.”[3] See United Nations, ‘Convention on the High Seas 1958,’ https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf.
[4] U.S. Department
of State, “Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and
the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of
Incidents On and Over the High Seas,” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation,
U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm.
[5] Narushige
Michishita, Peter M. Swartz, and David F. Winkler, Lessons of the Cold
War in the Pacific: U.S. Maritime Strategy, Crisis Prevention, and Japan’s Role(Washington,
DC: Wilson Center, March 2016), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/lessons_of_the_cold_war_in_the_pacific_one_page.pdf.
[6] National Imagery
and Mapping Agency, “International Code of Signals,” http://www.seasources.net/PDF/PUB102.pdf.
[7] Steven
Stashwick, “South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and ‘Miscalculation’
Myths,” The Diplomat, September 25, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/.
[8] According to the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which replaced
the 1958 convention, the “high seas” cover “all parts of the sea that are not
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic
State.” The territorial sea of a state is established as “up to a limit not
exceeding 12 nautical miles” and the exclusive economic zone of a state “shall
not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured.” Both India and China being parties to the
UNCLOS, there is no reason to suspect any of these parties rejecting the UNCLOS
specifications regarding the “high seas.”
[9] “International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), 1972,” http://www.jag.navy.mil/distrib/instructions/COLREG-1972.pdf.
[10] The principles
of CUES that was signed by 21 Pacific nations at the 14th Western
Pacific Naval Symposium in 2014 could be expanded to include Indian Ocean
littorals, reflecting the emerging geopolitical salience of the Indo-Pacific.
See USNI News, “Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES),” https://news.usni.org/2014/06/17/document-conduct-unplanned-encounters-sea.
[11] Gulshan Luthra,
“Indian Navy looking at more P-8I Submarine Killers,” Indian Strategic,
January 2018, http://www.indiastrategic.in/2018/01/13/indian-navy-looking-at-more-p-8i-submarine-killers/.
[12] Abhijit Singh,
“India’s ‘Undersea Wall’ in the Eastern Indian Ocean,” Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, June 15, 2016, https://amti.csis.org/indias-undersea-wall-eastern-indian-ocean/.
[13] Abhijit Singh,
“The Nautical Dimension of India’s Act East Policy,” Policy Report April 2018,
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological
University, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/PR180409_The-Nautical-Dimension-of-Indias-Act-East-Policy.pdf.
[14] James R. Holmes,
“Defeating China’s Fortress Fleet and A2/AD Strategy: Lessons for the United
States and Her Allies,” The Diplomat, June 20, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/defeating-chinas-fortress-fleet-and-a2ad-strategy-lessons-for-the-united-states-and-her-allies/;
Ngo Minh Tri, “China’s A2/AD Challenge in the South China Sea: Securing the Air
From the Ground,” The Diplomat, May 19, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/chinas-a2ad-challenge-in-the-south-china-sea-securing-the-air-from-the-ground/;
and Anthony H. Cordesman and Joseph Kendall, “How China Plans to Utilize Space
for A2/AD in the Pacific,” The National Interest, August 17, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-china-plans-utilize-space-a2-ad-the-pacific-17383.
[15] Michael R.
Gordon and Jeremy Page, “China Installed Military Jamming Equipment on Spratly
Islands, U.S. Says,” The Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-installed-military-jamming-equipment-on-spratly-islands-u-s-says-1523266320.
[16] Ministry of
Defence, “Ensuring Secure Seas: India’s Maritime Security Strategy,” Integrated
Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), p. 32.
[17] Harsh V. Pant,
“Understanding India’s Interest in the South China Sea: Getting into the
Seaweeds,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, December 18,
2012, https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-india%E2%80%99s-interest-south-china-sea-getting-seaweeds;
and Abhijit Singh, “India needs a more robust naval presence in Asia,” The
Interpreter, November 1, 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-s-mission-ready-naval-posture-must-extend-beyond-indian-ocean.
[18] Singh, “The Nautical Dimension of India’s Act East Policy,” p.
12-13; and Darshana M. Baruah, “The Andaman and Nicobar Islands: India’s
Eastern Anchor in a Changing Indo-Pacific,” Southern (Dis)Comfort Series, War on the Rocks,
March 21, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/the-andaman-and-nicobar-islands-indias-eastern-anchor-in-a-changing-indo-pacific/.
[19] Ananth Krishnan,
“Eye on India: China, Pakistan Hold Naval Drills in Arabian Sea,” India
Today, June 15, 2017, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-pakistan-indian-ocean-naval-drills-chinese-military-arabian-sea-ships-submarines-982826-2017-06-15;
and Koh Swee Lean Collin, “China and Pakistan Join Forces Under the Sea,” The
National Interest, January 7, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-pakistan-join-forces-under-the-sea-14829?page=show.
[20] Jan Hornat, “The
Power Triangle in the Indian Ocean: China, India and the United States,” Cambridge
Review of International Affairs 29, no. 2, 2015, p. 429. Also see
James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China and the United States in the Indian
Ocean: An Emerging Strategic Triangle,” Naval War College Review 61,
no. 3, 2008, p. 41-60.
[21] Jabin Jacob,
“Does China Have a Maritime Strategy?,” Center for Security Studies, ETHZurich,
November 13, 2017, http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/e6468897-903a-4cb5-a28c-e4a911fa7d2e/pdf.
[22] Hornat, “The
Power Triangle in the Indian Ocean: China, India and the United States,” p.
430; and James Holmes, “Coming to the Indian Ocean, the Chinese Navy: How
Should India Respond?” The National Interest, October 7,
2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/coming-the-indian-ocean-the-chinese-navy-how-should-india-11415?page=2.
[23] Tanvi Madan,
“The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad,’” War on the Rocks,
November 16, 2017 https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/.
Ministry of Shipping,
Government of India, November 24, 2016, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=154221;
and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Logistics Agreement with U.S.: Why
Signing LEMOA is Significant for India,” Hindustan Times, August
31, 2016, http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/logistics-agreement-with-us-why-signing-lemoa-is-significant-for-india/story-btGO0oM2jVfxRZt6xkxHgJ.html.
[25] “Spooked by
Malabar Naval Exercise by India-U.S.-Japan, China Sends Surveillance Ship to
Keep a Watch,” Firstpost, July 5, 2017, http://www.firstpost.com/india/spooked-by-malabar-naval-exercise-by-india-us-japan-china-sends-surveillance-ship-to-keep-a-watch-3778381.html;
and Rajat Pandit, “Malabar Exercise to Bring Together Indian, U.S., Japanese
Warships,” July 5, 2017, Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/with-china-in-crosshairs-india-us-and-japan-deploy-largest-warships-for-malabar-exercise/articleshow/59447016.cms.
[26] Rajat Pandit,
“Eye on China: India Steps Up Naval Deployments, Kicks Off Nuclear Submarine
Project,” Times of India, December 2, 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/eye-on-china-india-steps-up-naval-deployments-kicks-off-nuclear-submarines-project/articleshow/61882815.cms.
[27] Ministry of Defence, “Ensuring Secure Seas: India’s Maritime
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Photo Credit: Indian Navy
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