No Surprise: The Bomb Has Made a Bad Situation Worse in South
Asia
By
Michael Krepon
After testing nuclear devices
in 1998, Indian and Pakistani leaders genuinely believed -- or stated for the
record, while suspecting otherwise -- that bringing bombs out of the basement
would help make the region safer and more stable. They assumed, as did leading
strategic analysts in both countries, that nuclear weapon requirements could
remain modest and minimal. Subsequent developments made it is all too clear
that, in South Asia, as elsewhere, the overlay of nuclear weapons onto existing
grievances does not improve bilateral relations and reinforce conditions of
stable deterrence. Pro-bomb constituencies grow stronger once the testing
threshold is crossed. Testing nuclear devices opens up a Pandora’s box of
requirements that can be relieved only by accepting a modus vivendi with an
adversary or by accepting minimal deterrence and dropping out of the competition.
After the tests, Indian Prime
Minister A.B. Vajpayee declared that, “Ours will never
be weapons of aggression.” Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif characterized
the decision to test an act of national defense, reaffirming that “Pakistan will
continue to support the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,
especially in the Conference on Disarmament.” The CD’s agenda has subsequently
been moribund for multiple reasons, including that Pakistan has blocked negotiations on a
fissile material cut-off treaty.
Jaswant Singh, India’s Foreign
Minister, wrote in Foreign Affairs that “India shall
not engage in an arms race, nor, of course, shall it subscribe to or reinvent
the sterile doctrines of the Cold War.” One of these “sterile” doctrines is
presumably the pursuit of nuclear war-fighting capabilities by means of
counterforce targeting. It is unclear whether New Delhi can resist this
temptation. A subsequent issue of Foreign
Affairs carried a piece by Pakistan’s
Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad asserting that, “By establishing mutual
deterrence, [Pakistan and India] have served the interests of peace and
stability in South Asia.” Caveats followed about the need for India to meet
Pakistan’s security concerns at least half way.
To reduce nuclear dangers and
to head off an arms race, Vajpayee boldly ventured to Lahore in February 1999
for a chaotic summit with Nawaz. At Lahore they pledged to seek the resolution
of the Kashmir dispute, refrain from intervening in each other’s internal
affairs, engage in a composite dialogue on outstanding issues, negotiate
confidence-building agreements and other steps to prevent conflict. Nawaz reiterated his “earnest desire to
avoid an arms race" at the summit.
Indian heavyweights such as K.
Subrahmanyam, Jasjit Singh and K. Sundarji weighed in with assessments that very
few nuclear weapons would be needed for stable deterrence. Sundarji, an
adventurous former Army Chief and unapologetic booster of an Indian bomb, quipped that, for nuclear
deterrence, “more is not better if less is adequate.”
Three renowned Pakistani
strategic thinkers, Agha Shahi, Zulfikar Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar also
debunked counterforce targeting, writing that, “Nuclear deterrence, unlike the
conventional one, is not degraded by qualitative or qualitative
disparity." When Abdul Sattar became Pakistan’s Foreign Minister the
next month, he announced that, “We shall not engage in any nuclear competition
or arms race.”
Key Pakistani military leaders
did not support a reconciliation process with India. A small clique around Army
Chief Pervez Musharraf effectively set fire to the Lahore Declaration with
surreptitious advances across the Kashmir divide, resulting in a limited conventional war and
a humiliating retreat. The Kargil war was a watershed. The nuclear arms
competition picked up steam as the Indian Army adopted plans for “Cold Start” counter-thrusts into
Pakistani territory to respond to major provocations. Rawalpindi countered by
embracing short-range nuclear weapons to foil these plans.
K. Santhanam, an iconoclastic
Indian defense scientist deeply involved in nuclear matters, wryly noted that, “nuclear testing
by a debutante… is the definitive signal of crossing the nuclear threshold – an
index of arrival.” He was right, of course: arrival didn’t equate to
acceptance. Nuclear testing, as the hawkish Indian commentator Bharat Kharnad, wrote, “gained India an entry but
only on the veranda of the nuclear weapons club.” Access to the main ballroom,
symbolized by a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, has
so far been beyond reach. Beijing has no incentive to elevate New Delhi’s
standing in these forums; there are other reasons for India’s exclusion, as
well.
The quest for status by means
of membership seems blocked in the near term if not far longer. But status,
while important, was never the primary driver behind New Delhi’s decision to
test in 1998. Contrary to this metronomic Pakistani talking point, the primary
driver behind Indian testing was national security -- just as it was for
Pakistan. In 1995, the Nonproliferation Treaty was extended indefinitely. The next
year, negotiations on a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were finally concluded. The doors to the nuclear
club seemed to be closing.
Moreover, China’s economic
growth and military capabilities were far outpacing India’s. While Beijing didn’t
use its nuclear capabilities for leverage against India, there could be no
guarantees about the future. Additionally, there was reason to suspect that
Pakistan already possessed the Bomb, thanks to a reliable, tested design
courtesy of China. For many observers, confirmation on this score came when
Pakistan tested soon after India.
The newly elected government
of A.B. Vajpayee was convinced that it needed to test for reasons of national
assurance as well as deterrence. Diplomatic contortions were required, as India
was a longstanding champion of nuclear disarmament and the CTBT. New Delhi
latched on to the Treaty’s entry-into-force provision as its escape hatch,
walking away from the negotiations at the eleventh hour. This EIF provision
delayed implementation until India and every other state with bomb-making
capacity were in the fold. New Delhi asserted that this was a grave
infringement of national sovereignty – a novel interpretation because no such
infringement was imposed. Instead, the EIF provision provided New Delhi with
the time and space to go its own way. The most reluctant parties to the CTBT
roped in India and other likely non-signatories as a convenient way to put off
the Treaty’s implementation for as long as possible.
India’s national security did
not improve after moving its bomb out of the basement. Pakistan’s national
security managers were ready and able to compete vigorously, viewing nuclear
weapons as war-fighting instruments in the event deterrence failed against a
conventionally stronger foe. Nor did offsetting nuclear weapon capabilities
induce caution by Pakistan’s military overseers, who ramped up friction along
the Line of Control dividing Kashmir. Militant groups with an anti-India
agendas continued to find a safe harbor in Pakistan, groups that could trigger
Cold Start operations – if approved by India’s political leadership.
There was no such approval in
2008 after brazen attacks on symbolic venues in
Mumbai by cadres based in Pakistan. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh valued
economic growth far more than another war with Pakistan. Even before the Mumbai
attacks, little remained of the spirit of the Lahore Declaration. After the
Mumbai attacks, diplomacy became moribund as firing between forces stationed
along the Kashmir divide and unrest in the Kashmir Valley grew.
Nor did India's nuclear
capabilities help stabilize relations with an increasingly assertive China. The
security gains that failed to materialize from nuclear testing were offset,
however, by significant advances in economics and geopolitics. President Bill
Clinton was relieved of the perceived need to cold shoulder India after its
tests when the US Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999.
Clinton then pursued his long-delayed interest to improve bilateral ties in the
waning months of his administration. These gates opened far wider as the George
W. Bush administration pursued a strategic partnership
with India. The symbolic centerpiece of the Bush administration’s campaign was
selling nuclear power plants and clearing impediments to such sales within the
Nuclear Suppliers Group. The thousands of jobs advertised and anticipated as a
result turned out to be a mirage, but no matter: the Indian market beckoned,
and the Bush administration reckoned that improved defense ties would help
India serve as a counterweight to China.
Pakistan also suffered
national security losses as a result of nuclear testing. Unlike India, Pakistan
found itself increasingly isolated after the tests, which freed Washington to
rail against Pakistan's policies toward Afghanistan and its ties to militant
anti-India “strategic assets” that the rest of the world viewed as dangerous
liabilities. Whatever was gained in terms of deterrence – and Pakistan’s
national security managers believe these gains to be considerable – came with
the costs of a presumed need to compete with India. This led to open-ended
nuclear weapon requirements and defense budgets, at the expense of domestic
needs. The connection to militant, anti-India groups, along with Pakistan’s
prior role in helping to advance nuclear programs in
North Korea, Iran, and Libya worked to its disadvantage in seeking favors
similar to those accorded to India. Moreover, Pakistan lacked the market and
investment opportunities that greatly favored India.
As Washington lost patience
waiting for Pakistan’s national security establishment to change course over
Afghanistan, India and the Bomb, China became a closer strategic partner. This
major, positive development was linked to a major, negative development: Two
major benefactors are always better than one, and Pakistan lost one of its
benefactors in the years following the 1998 tests.
Twenty years after testing
nuclear devices, the Bomb provided little relief for Pakistan’s sense of
unease. Succeeding in, or at least keeping pace with India in a nuclear
competition doesn't help the state least able to afford it. Accepting a modus
vivendi with India could help greatly, but this would require far-reaching
shifts in civil-military relations that Pakistan’s military establishment
resists -- and has ample means to checkmate.
Pakistan and India have come a
long way since their confident predictions of limited nuclear deterrence and
avoiding an arms competition. They are widely believed to possess
three-digit-sized nuclear arsenals, with further increases ahead. India leads in some aspects of the
nuclear competition, while Pakistan appears to have a larger
stockpile of weapons. Both countries have combined to flight-test twenty-eight
types of nuclear-capable missiles since the 1998 tests.
These weapons are add-ons to
deterrence, but not to security and stability. This distinction is critical,
because security and stability require forms of reassurance that deterrence
cannot provide. The Bomb helps with deterrence in two overriding cases – the
prevention of nuclear exchanges and major conventional war. The Bomb doesn't
help in other cases, including limited conventional war and punishment by
proxies. The optimistic estimates by top-tier strategic thinkers in India and
Pakistan two decades ago have become distant, broken dreams.
---
Michael Krepon is Co-founder of the Stimson Center and author of Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb. A version of this piece was published in the National Interest and can be read here.
Michael Krepon is Co-founder of the Stimson Center and author of Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb. A version of this piece was published in the National Interest and can be read here.
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