Possibilities of a verdict, Dr Ayesha
Siddiqa
Despite its limitations, Pakistan Supreme Court ruling
against the military gives its civil society more room.
Last week’s decision by
two senior judges of Pakistan’s Supreme Court in the case that the court had
initiated suo motu in late 2017 is significant because of its sharp criticism
of the role of the military and its intelligence agencies in the country’s politics.
The case pertains to Tehreek Labaik Pakistan’s (TLP) protests in November 2017
that paralysed life in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The director-general of
Pakistan Rangers, an army general, was photographed distributing envelopes
containing 1,000 rupee notes to the TLP protestors. Delivering their verdict on
February 6, Justice Qazi Faez Isa and Justice Mushir Alam — who have a
reputation of being far more principled than many other judges in the supreme
court — criticised the military’s manipulation of Pakistan’s domestic politics.
The renowned human
rights activist (late) Asma Jahangir had raised suspicions about the financing
of the lawyer’s movement that had pitchforked Chaudhry to prominence. The
former chief justice was even known to have selected a judge of the Lahore High
Court on the recommendation of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) leader, Abdul Rehman
Makki. Another conservative judge chosen by him, Justice Shaukat Siddiqui had,
however, exposed the ISI’s interference in influencing decisions of the highest
court. Chief Justice Saqib Nisar, on the other hand, had turned Pakistan’s
highest court into a kangaroo court that interfered with governance to the
extent that it became difficult to distinguish between judicial orders and
legislative action.
Second, the court’s
latest decision opens up possibilities for the government and the civil
bureaucracy to assert themselves vis-a-vis the military. The government may,
however, not be inclined to do so since the military is the major force
behind Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).
There is a possibility of the government, or other forces, using the decision
to generate some temporary chaos over extending the term of the current army
chief — it’s known that he wants an extension. However, an overall
strengthening of Khan’s hands does not seem to be a long-term possibility.
n the past, the Pakistan
judiciary has given significant decisions that have gone against the military —
the one in 2003 in Civil Appeal 30 of 1999, for instance. The case was about an
army officer depriving a small farmer of three acres of land. Quoting
extensively from John Steinbeck’s novel Grapes of Wrath, the supreme court
judges reprimanded the state and military for hurting the rights of the poor
farmer. However, the judgment has not set any legal precedent. Imran Khan may
not be inspired to open up the military system to greater accountability and to
explore how ordinary citizens are threatened or how the deep state creates fear
amongst dissenters.
Third, there is little
possibility of implementing the decision, unless there is greater
accountability of the military’s actions. Though the Pakistan Army was involved
in politics since the mid-1950s, it has been controlling the socio-political
discourse much more extensively since 2013. The army and its intelligence
agencies pick up people and torture them, interfere in media operations on an
almost daily basis, advise private companies about giving advertisement to
media houses, stop universities from employing people and put individuals on
the exit-control list.
Recently, the director
general of the army’s PR unit, Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR),
threatened journalist Taha Siddiqui with a provocative tweet. Several
ISPR-hired trolls then attacked Siddiqui and threatened him with dire
consequences. Twitter finally removed the general’s tweet. In the past,
journalist Saleem Shahzad was abducted and tortured to death by the military
for flagging the links between segments of the navy and terrorists. Unfortunately,
Shahzad’s case was not heard by a judge like Faez Isa.
Under these
circumstances, the possibility of the military using the February 6 judgment to
its advantage is high. For instance, an organisational decision to go quieter
on social media — the one issued by the ISPR’s Director General in January, for
instance — will be showcased as the military’s deference to the court’s orders.
Unless parliament
legislates on greater accountability of the armed forces, the coercive actions
of the men in uniform will only become less visible — much like that of the
JuD. This is especially because Pakistan’s new chief justice is not inclined to
take suo motu action.
Furthermore, the
judgment will be presented as an example of the Pakistani judiciary’s
independence. A case will therefore be made of not influencing the judiciary in
other litigations, like those pertaining to the JuD and Hafiz Saeed. Even if
there is a decision regarding Nawaz Sharif, the emphasis will be on the
judiciary’s alleged independence rather than the merits of that particular
court order. The era of populism has had an adverse effect on the behaviour of
the bench — judges seem to be playing to the gallery.
Pakistan’s civil society
must not be tricked by the way an otherwise excellent decision is presented to
it; it should also not desist from using the verdict to its advantage. The
verdict indeed gives it a foot in the door to contest for greater rights. After
all, the concept of the state should not be limited to one institution. A
nation is an evolving process that is defined by its citizens. The fact that
this judgment upholds the right of legal and peaceful protest must be welcomed
and used to people’s advantage.
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