22 October Tribal Invasion in State of Jammu and Kashmir a darkest day in history of Jammu and Kashmir. Speech of Dr Shabir Choudhry in a webinar organised by United Kashmir Peoples National Party. 24 October 20121.

 

22 October Tribal Invasion in State of Jammu and Kashmir a darkest day in history of Jammu and Kashmir.

Speech of Dr Shabir Choudhry in a webinar organised by United Kashmir Peoples National Party. 24 October 20121.

Mr Chairman, friends and colleagues Salam and good afternoon to all of you.

There are many aspects of the Operation Gulmarg. In my presentation, I shall mainly focus on three points:

1. Why Pakistan attacked Kashmir?

2. Why Jammu and Kashmir dispute was referred to the UN

   Security Council

3. Was Mr Jinnah aware of the Operation Gulmarg?

Mr Chairman

1. Before we look at why Pakistan attacked Kashmir and partitioned the State of Jammu and Kashmir, we need to briefly see why India was divided on religious lines.

2. With the help of America and other allies Britain won the Second World war, but lost the Status of a great military power. After the war, America and the Soviet Union emerged as two Superpowers.

3. Britain was aware of this bitter fact that it was no longer possible to hold on to a huge country like India. Both America and Britain knew in a new era, Soviet Russia was to challenge them. Also, they knew that China and united India could also challenge their interests. In view of this, it was decided that India should be divided on religious lines, and in a way that the new country should serve their interests in the region.

4. In accordance with their plan, the British India was divided to create Pakistan. The name of Islam was used to motivate people

1

to support the conspiracy of dividing territory, dividing people, promoting hatred, intolerance and extremism.

5. The new country, Pakistan, has not let them down and energetically served the interests of the West. The first task of Pakistan was to occupy the Kashmir Valley. With the occupation of Kashmir Valley Pakistan would have had control of Ladakh and Gilgit Baltistan, both areas with great strategic importance.

6. People should note that Britain and America knew the special strategic significance of Gilgit Baltistan, and yet they did not plan any attack to capture that region.

7. The planners of the

   illegal and imperialist attack would be over within a few days. They almost accomplished the task. They captured Baramulla on 24 October, and they could have taken over Srinagar within a few hours. A Pakistan army officer, Major Agha Humayun Amin, in his book ‘The 1947 - 48 Kashmir War – The war of lost opportunities’,

   wrote:

   ‘There was practically nothing between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar to stop the tribesmen.’ 1

8. Apart from him, Major General Akbar Khan, the man who masterminded the Operation Gulmarg wrote in his book ‘Raiders in Kashmir’:

   ‘Only 35 miles remained of level road and virtually no resistance. The tribesmen had barely two hours journey left – before them lay Srinagar, trembling seemingly at their mercy.’ 2

9. The raiders failed because they wasted valuable time in looting, plundering, dancing to celebrate their victory, kidnapping women and raping them in Baramulla and in other small towns.

2

Operation Gulmarg wanted to occupy

Srinagar. They were confident that their

10. Those powers which divided India, also wanted to divide the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir. They wanted certain areas of the State to go to Pakistan, and the rest to remain divided so that India and Pakistan continue to fight over these areas.

11. Apart from religion, the Muslim League leaders also talked about democracy, however, within the first week of the establishment of Pakistan, they dismissed an elected government of Dr Khan Saahb in the Frontier Province, now known as KPK. This shows their love for democracy.

12. Their love for Islam can be seen from the following events. In a reply to the telegram of the Maharaja Hari Singh, the Government of Pakistan replied on 15th August 1947, and I quote:

‘Your telegram of the 12th. The Government of Pakistan agrees to have Standstill Agreement with the Government of Jammu and Kashmir for the continuance of the existing arrangements pending settlement of details and formal execution of fresh agreements.’ 3

13. It was a written agreement between the two States. Holy Quran in Surah Bani Israel Ayat 34 says:

And honour your pledge, because the pledge involves responsibility.

14. Under the Standstill Agreement, Pakistan had many responsibilities. However, instead of paying any attention to these responsibilities, rulers of Pakistan started planning to occupy this small, but strategically important State.

15. Apart from what Major General Akbar Khan wrote about the Pakistani plan to liberate Kashmir, another Pakistani army officer, Major Agha Humayun Amin, in his book ‘The 1947 -48 Kashmir War – The war of lost opportunities’, writes:

16. ‘The Muslim League high command had asked Mian Iftikhar Ud Din, Minister for Refugees to prepare a plan aimed at

3

ensuring that the Muslim majority State of Kashmir should join Pakistan. Brigadier Akbar Khan then serving in the Pakistan GHQ wrote an appreciation of ‘Armed Revolt Inside Kashmir’ on Mian Iftikhar Ud Din’s request. It appears that Mr Jinnah had tasked Liaquat to handle the Kashmir business.’ 4

17. Brigadier Akbar Khan, at that time was posted as Director of Weapons and Equipment at GHQ of Pakistan. In his ‘appreciation’, ' Armed Revolt inside Kashmir’, he highlighted the strategic, military and economic importance of Jammu and Kashmir. To him, if Jammu and Kashmir became part of India then India could:

18. ‘Establish such stations anywhere within a few miles of the 180 miles long vital road and rail route between Lahore and Pindi. In the event of war these stations would be a dangerous threat to our most important civil and military lines of communication. If we were to protect this route properly, it would take a major portion of our army to do so and we would thereby dangerously weaken our front at Lahore. If we were to concentrate our strength at the front, we would give India the chance to cut off Lahore, Sialkot, Gujrat and even Jhelum from our military base at the Pindi’. 5

19. Major General Akbar Khan further wrote that even in peacetime the situation could not be acceptable because Pakistan:

‘Would be permanently exposed to a threat of such magnitude that our independence would never be a reality’. 6

20. After giving details of economic importance of Jammu and Kashmir and how Pakistan heavily relies on this, he concluded: ‘Kashmir’s accession is not simply a matter of desirability but absolute necessity for our separate existence’. 7

21. People of Jammu and Kashmir and people of India need to know that Pakistan is fighting Pakistan’s war in Kashmir. They want to protect, and project outdated Two Nations ideology in

4

Kashmir. They want to promote extremism, religious hatred and intolerance in the name of religion to prove that Muslims and non – Muslims cannot live together.

22. To finalise the Operation Gulmarg, a secret meeting was held in Lahore in early September 1947. This meeting was presided by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and attended by Brigadier Akbar Khan, Mian Ifitikhar Ud Din, Sardar Shaukat Ayat, the Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed who later became Governor General of Pakistan.

23. In the meeting, all the details were finalised, and logistics were worked out. Shaukat Ayat was appointed overall in charge of this operation. Ghulam Mohammed was to provide all the necessary funds. Col Azam Khanzada of the Ordnance Corps was to take care of arms and ammunition. He even agreed to secretly divert arms to Kashmir; and report that the ‘faulty’ equipment ‘would be shown as dumped in the sea’.

24. Brigadier Akbar Khan also persuaded Brigadier Sher Khan at the GHQ who was Director Intelligence. He was to provide all the necessary information needed for the success of the operation. Apart from that, some former Indian National Army officers were given different tasks for the success of the operation. Furthermore, Air Commodore Mr Janjua agreed to provide essential help in transporting weapons, ammunition, winter clothing and tents etc by using the Pakistani air force. 8

25. Brigadier Akbar Khan, in line with instructions of the political leaders of Pakistan, emphasised in his Plan that presence and involvement of the Pakistan government must not be visible. The entire matter should be presented as a local uprising of Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir against ‘cruel Hindu despot’.

26. Those Muslim citizens of Jammu and Kashmir who are still fooled by the Pakistani propaganda that Pakistan cares and love people of Jammu and Kashmir should, after 74 years, open their

5

eyes. Pakistan planned an invasion of Kashmir, in the name of jihad, to protect Pakistani military, strategic and economic interests; and welfare of the people of Jammu and Kashmir was not their concern.

27. The Indian army reached Srinagar on the morning of 27 October 1947, and pushed the invaders back from Srinagar. When the planners of the invasion realised that they cannot capture Srinagar; they activated plan B, that was to instruct Major Brown to take over Gilgit Baltistan and arrest Governor Brigadier Gansara Singh who reached there to take charge of these areas, after the British lease of the Gilgit Agency was terminated.

Did Jinnah know about the invasion?

28. As pointed out earlier, Mountbatten and the British had a big role in ensuring that strategically important areas of Jammu and Kashmir go to Pakistan. How the rest of Jammu and Kashmir is divided, did not matter to them, as long as this division continued to fester like a cancer wound; and embitter relations between India and Pakistan. They also ensured that the dispute was internationalised by taking it to the United Nations.

29. Many experts believe that Barrister Jinnah, Governor General of Pakistan knew what his government was doing in Kashmir. He had delegated powers to other people to accomplish the mission. He wanted to hide himself behind a fake smoke screen that if things go wrong, then he could intervene and try to resolve the matter.

30. Alan Campbell – Johnson, who was Mountbatten’s Press Attaché in India between 1947 till June 1948, had first-hand information of a lot of things which happened during that time in India. In his book, ‘Mission With Mountbatten’, he revealed important information.

31. Ian Stephen in his editorial in ‘The Statesman’ ‘denounced the injection of India troops in Kashmir’. Mountbatten did not like that

6

he summoned him for a meeting. When he arrived, Mountbatten said:

“You can’t build a nation on tricks. Jinnah at Abbottabad”, he continued, “had been expecting to ride in triumph into Kashmir.” 9

32. It must be pointed out that Abbottabad is a beautiful city where in the village of Kakool, the Pakistan’s Military Academy is based, and is close to Muzaffarabad. As a matter of interest, this is where Osama Bin Laden was enjoying his life, not too far from the Military Academy. The tribesmen also used this route to conquer Kashmir.

33. Jinnah talked of democracy, but there was no democracy in his Muslim League, and of course, no democracy in Jinnah’s Pakistan. As long as he was healthy, what he said was a law and no one dared to question his authority.

34. Alan Campbell – Johnson notes that Mountbatten told Jinnah: ‘The prospect of the tribesmen entering Srinagar was now remote. This led Jinnah to make his first general proposal, which was that both sides should withdraw at once and simultaneously. When Mountbatten asked him how the tribesmen could be induced to remove themselves, his reply was, “If you do this I will call the whole thing off.” 10

35. Mountbatten and Lord Ismay, his Chief of Staff, flew to Lahore on 1 November 1947. They had separate meetings with Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Governor General of Pakistan, and Liaquat Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan. Pandit Nehru was also supposed to travel with them, but due to his ‘illness’, he stayed in Delhi.

36. When during the conversation Mountbatten said that the Tribesmen and the invasion was planned and supported by Pakistan, Jinnah refused to have any knowledge of this. However, when proposals to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir were discussed, Mr Jinnah acknowledged his control over the invaders.

7

37. Mountbatten proposed the following steps to be taken before the plebiscite:

Withdrawal of all tribesmen; Withdrawal of all other fighters;

• • •

38. This proposal meant, plebiscite to be held while the army was there, and under the administration of Sheikh Abdullah government. Mr Jinnah could not have agreed to that, because he and other leaders of Pakistan believed that with the Indian troops present, a plebiscite under the administration of Sheikh Abdullah will surely go against Pakistan. He, therefore, presented his own proposal:

• An immediate cease - fire;

• A mutual withdrawal of all 'alien' troops;

• A plebiscite under joint control and supervision of two

  Governors General. 11

39. At this stage, Mountbatten asked how the tribesmen would

withdraw. Mr Jinnah reportedly said:

“I will call the whole thing off.” Mountbatten made the following note of the meeting:

40. “When I asked him how the tribesmen were to be called off, he said that all he had to do was to give them an order to come out and to warn them that if they did not comply, he would send large forces along their lines of communication. In fact, if I was prepared to fly to Srinagar with him, he would guarantee that the business would be settled within 24 hours. I expressed mild astonishment at the degree of control that he appeared to exercise over the raiders.” 12

41. Collins and Lapierre, authors of ‘Freedom At Midnight’ noted: ‘Seething with anger, Jinnah defied the British

Followed by a plebiscite under the UN auspices to determine the future status of Jammu and Kashmir;

8

commanders of his army by sending Pakistani units disguised as irregulars to stiffen the demoralised raiders.’ 13

42. Colonel Iskander Mirza, who later on became, Major General, Defence Secretary and President of Pakistan, on 25 October 1947, he met George Cunningham, Governor of the Frontier Province of Pakistan, and told him that the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali wanted to visit him to update him on ‘underground history of the present Kashmir campaign against Kashmir,’ but could not do this due to heart attack he suffered. He extended apology on behalf of Liaquat Ali Khan. During this meeting he revealed to Cunningham that Mr Jinnah was briefed on this about fifteen days ago. However, he declined to hear anymore by saying that “Don’t tell me anything about it. My conscience must be clear.” 14

43. His statement confirms Mr Jinnah was briefed on or around 10 October 1947, as to what Pakistan planned to do in Kashmir. I believe that it is not true. He said this only to ease the sentiments of George Cunningham that because of the urgency even Mr Jinnah was not properly briefed and that he (Cunningham) should not feel being left out. Reality is both Jinnah and Cunningham were aware of what was going on. Cunningham was an experienced man, and as a Governor of this important Province knew what was going on. Mr Jinnah wanted to keep ‘his conscience clear’ by pretending that he was not on board. Mr Cunningham on the hand, while talking to Colonel Iskander Mirza, confirmed by saying that “I am shutting one of my eyes.” 15.

44. Let us assume that Mr Jinnah only found out on 10 October 1947, as to what his Prime Minister, Finance Minister, some army officers and other senior Ministers were doing behind his back. As a good human being, as a lawyer, and as a Governor General of Pakistan what was his responsibility?

45. Was it not his responsibility to ensure that the Standstill Agreement with the Maharaja of Kashmir was not violated?

9

46. Was it not his responsibility to ensure that his army officers, his Prime Minister, and other Ministers must not support any adventure which could result in killing of innocent people, raping, and kidnapping of women, looting, and plundering people and destroying property of the people?

47. Above all, was it not his responsibility to ensure that there was no war between India and Pakistan? Perhaps, for Mr Jinnah the most important issue was to keep his conscience ‘clear’, by closing his eyes and pretending that nothing was happening in Kashmir, and the hands of his army, Prime Minister and other Ministers were clean.

48. A Pakistani writer, Humayun Mirza notes Mr Jinnah’s frustration like this:

‘Jinnah was watching these events with growing impatience and agitation. He sent for Iskander Mirza and declared:
“Why don’t you march in?”

Iskander Mirza replied, “Your Excellency, we are not organised on the ground. Further, we only have ammunition to last us a fortnight. We can’t possibly go to war at this time. 16

49. In view of this precarious situation, one can understand why Mountbatten urged both Liaquat Ali Khan and Nehru to approach the UN Security Council. Continuation of a full-scale war between the two countries would have resulted in a defeat of Pakistan, hence a loss of strategic areas of Gilgit Baltistan.

50. On 24 October 1947, Major General Douglas Gracey, acting Commander in Chief, informed Lt General Rob Lockhart, the Indian Army Chief, as to what was happening in Pakistan regardingcapturingKashmir. LtGeneralLockhartpassedonthis information to Mountbatten and Field Marshal Auchinleck. This information was immediately passed on to Nehru and Patel, and other senior people in India.

51. In other words, everyone with some importance in India and Pakistan knew what was happening. Even many officers with

10

ranks of Majors and Colonels knew it, Pakistani Ministers and politicians knew it, tribal leaders, religious leaders and Kashmiri collaborators knew it. But we are urged to believe that Barrister and Governor General of Pakistan, a shrewd man, who had complete control of the Muslim League, the Cabinet, the Ministers and other politicians was not aware of this.

52. During his trip to Lahore, Mountbatten also had a meeting with General Gracey, who was Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army. He, as a Governor General of an independent India, wanted to ascertain military strength and preparedness of the Pakistani army. In his Top Secret Report he wrote:

53. ......General Gracey shrugged his shoulders and said, "Pakistan has not got a hope. The air force can hardly take the air.... The army, such as it is, is quite efficient, but it is half the size of the army of India and has no proper backing. The Pakistan army would run out of ammunition very quickly indeed in the event of a large scale engagement.....In fact in any war between the two Dominions, Pakistan would be completely defeated militarily in a fairly short space of time, although the Muslim soldiers would fight gallantly and to the death"...

54. Mountbatten further wrote that, ‘I urged him to make it abundantly clear that in the event of a war, Pakistan would be finished, however gallantly they fought, in a very few weeks unless they had adequate stocks of ammunition and some war factories, which could not occur for several years..... General Gracey promised to send this (report) off as soon as he got back and fully realised that the more the government of Pakistan visualised the hopelessness of fighting India, the more likely it was that they would avoid war.' 17

55. One can see why Mountbatten and the British wanted to ensure that the Jammu and Kashmir dispute was internationalised. If the matters were left alone between the two countries, the danger was that bigger and stronger India may defeat Pakistan and take over the entire Jammu and Kashmir

11

which was not in the interest of the British national and strategic interests.

56. The role and attitude of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan towards the Kashmir dispute and his dealings with India has been perplexing to many. On one hand the Pakistan government claimed that it had no role in sending the tribesmen into Kashmir and that they had no control over them; on the other hand, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, as a Prime Minister of Pakistan, in a meeting with Mountbatten clearly said that:

57. 'It was fully within his powers to agree to issuing a statement calling upon the tribesmen to withdraw straight away... If he did so, however, without being able to make one concrete offer in return his appeal would be taken no notice of....That he would not mind in what manner the approach (by the Indian government) to UNO was made. He would even agree that it should be in the form of an accusation by India that Pakistan was assisting the raiders. He agreed with His Excellency (Mountbatten) that the first thing the UNO Commission probably would do be to ask Pakistan to use their influence to withdraw the raiders and stop further influxes. In these circumstances, his own position would be so immensely strengthened that he would be able to issue the appeal without impunity.' 18

58. It is amazing to note that the Prime Minister of Pakistan accepted that he had tremendous influence over the tribesmen fighting in Kashmir, and that he was willing to call them back. Furthermore, he agreed that India while approaching the United Nations could accuse Pakistan for 'assisting the raiders’ and that would strengthen his own position. Pakistani friends and those Kashmiris who believe that Pakistan is their "Messiah" could draw their own conclusions.

59. The Tribal invasion, as far as people of Jammu and Kashmir are concerned, was a major event in the modern history of Jammu and Kashmir. In unprovoked and unilateral violation of

12

the Standstill Agreement, the Pakistani Government decided to teach the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir a lesson; and snatch Jammu and Kashmir by military might.

60. It was not only catastrophic because it resulted in the death of tens of thousands of innocent people, rapes and kidnapping of women and girls; but it also changed the course of our history. This unprovoked aggression had the following impact:

1. It changed our destination.
2. It changed secular ethos of Jammu and Kashmir.
3. It deprived us of our independence.
4. It divided our beloved motherland.
5. It divided families and people of Jammu and Kashmir.
6. It killed innocent men and women.
7. It dishonoured women and girls of Jammu and Kashmir.
8. It plundered and looted the resources of Jammu and Kashmir.

9. It is the main cause of our present miseries and troubles on both sides of the forced division.
10. Name of Islam was used to advance imperial agenda of Pakistan, and to kill innocent people in name of religion. 11. In one sentence, it is the cause of all of our problems we face today.

Conclusion

61. I want to assert that Pakistan created this dispute by violating the Standstill Agreement, and by attacking Kashmir with intention to occupy Kashmir.

62. Mr Jinnah was a shrewd politician and a brilliant lawyer. He wanted to punish the Maharaja for not heeding to his whims. He refused to allow Mr Jinnah to visit Srinagar. He was angry that the Maharaja did not accede to Pakistan.

63. Also, he wanted to take revenge from Mountbatten and Nehru. In his view, both Nehru and Mountbatten were working as a team to outmanoeuvre Mr Jinnah. By snatching Kashmir from Mountbatten and Nehru he wanted to settle the score with them.

13

He believed that they deliberately deprived Pakistan certain Muslim areas of the British India by a well-planned conspiracy.

64. He wanted to capture Kashmir, and prove that he was better than both Mountbatten and Nehru. However, as a lawyer, he wanted to have many frontmen to accomplish the task, and provide exculpation.

65. In conclusion Mr Chairman, I assert that Pakistan entered Jammu and Kashmir:
o By violating a written agreement – Standstill Agreement;
o Against the wish of the Ruler;

o With intention to occupy the State by force;
o Attackers were allowed to kill, torture, kidnap, loot and

plunder.

66. India entered Jammu and Kashmir:

    • On request of the Ruler;

    • After a written agreement;

    • With intention to safeguard life, liberty, property and honour

      of citizens;

    • To drive out the invaders.

67. In view of the above irrefutable facts, the International

Community regarded Pakistan:

• an aggressor,

• That is why Pakistan was asked to vacate all the areas;

68. India’s presence in Jammu and Kashmir was perceived as a ‘legal one’. That is why India was permitted to keep troops for the purpose of law and order, and to save people from any future adventure from Pakistan or from any other country.

69. In other words, the world community, represented by the UN, wanted India to be responsible for law and order, and defence of Jammu and Kashmir.

70. India could be opposed, criticised and even condemned for not maintaining law and order, and for protecting life, property,

14

liberty and honour of the people; however, that does not make India’s presence in Jammu and Kashmir illegal. End

Reference:

1. MajorAghaHumayunAmin,inhisbook‘The1947-48KashmirWar–The

   war of lost opportunities’,

2. RaidersinKashmir,page37

3. LLakhanpal,‘EssentialDocumentsandNotesonKashmirDispute’,page45

4. Major Agha Humayun Amin, ‘The 1947 - 48 Kashmir War – The war of lost

   opportunities’, page 3

5. RaidersinKashmir,page9

6. Ibid,page10

7. Ibid,page10

8. Ibid,page19

9. AlanCampbellJohnson,‘MissionWithMountbatten’Page225

10.Ibid, page 229
11.Kashmir A Disputed Legacy, Alastair Lamb, page 166 12. The Pursuit of Kashmir, Zaib un Nisa Aziz

https://herald.dawn.com/news/1153341?fbclid=IwAR2jjTdttIhSh8b4P8Hai613CWrM 0_zHbZFkuXZ6SdtvzF6gFj0_CcLMC2s

13.Freedom At Midnight, Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Page 412 14.Humayun Mirza, ‘From Plassey to Pakistan’, page 157 15.Ibid, page 157

16.Ibid, page 158
17.Top Secret Report sent by Mountbatten, quoted in 'Mountbatten and

Independent India', by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, page 293/4 18.Top Secret Report of a meeting between Mountbatten, Nehru, Sardar Patel, Baldev Singh, Mr Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Liaquat Ali Khan and Ghulam

Mohammed, held on 8 December 1947.

15