The Emerging ‘New Tan’: Geopolitical Fault Lines and the Reconfiguration of South Asia
By Dr Shabir Choudhry
Introduction
About fourteen years ago, at a small meeting in London, I remarked that I could visualise another “Tan” emerging in the region. The term “Tan” was a reference to the suffix shared by many Central and South Asian states — Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and others — signifying territorial and often ethnic-political entities that were shaped or reshaped by imperial powers.
At the time, some thought my remark was speculative. But today, as tensions intensify between India and Pakistan, and as Afghanistan’s instability once again becomes a catalyst for regional turmoil, that prediction seems increasingly prescient. The possibility of another “Tan” — a newly defined territorial entity in or around Pakistan’s western belt — appears more plausible now than ever before.
Colonial Engineering and the Politics of Partition
To understand the logic behind a potential “new Tan,” we must revisit the imperial legacy of divide and rule. When the British left the subcontinent in 1947, they did not leave behind a united, peaceful South Asia. Instead, they left behind a fractured political geography — an India and a Pakistan divided not just by borders but by narratives of religious and civilizational opposition.
The creation of Pakistan, in this reading, was not merely an accident of communal politics but part of a deliberate imperial strategy: to prevent the emergence of a unified, resource-rich, and militarily capable power that could challenge Western strategic interests in Asia. Pakistan was to serve as both a buffer state and a proxy, containing India to the east and influencing Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia to the west.
For decades, Pakistan played this role effectively — as a Western ally during the Cold War, a partner during the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s, and a frontline state in the so-called War on Terror after 2001. But this usefulness has steadily diminished as Pakistan’s internal weaknesses have multiplied.
Pakistan’s Strategic Decline
Today, Pakistan faces multiple and simultaneous crises:
• Economic collapse driven by debt, corruption, and mismanagement.
• Political fragmentation with deep civil-military divides.
• Ethnic and regional discontent in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Sindh, and Punjab.
• Erosion of international credibility, as the country’s traditional allies — particularly the US and Gulf monarchies — reassess its strategic worth.
In geopolitical terms, Pakistan has become a problem rather than a solution for Western interests. It can no longer be relied upon to maintain regional balance or to act as a stabilising partner in Afghanistan or Central Asia.
Thus, from a strategic standpoint, the logic that created Pakistan may now favour the reconfiguration of Pakistan itself.
The Idea of a ‘New Tan’
The term “New Tan” refers not to a specific map but to an emerging geopolitical concept — the potential carving out of another entity from Pakistan’s northwestern and western territories to serve as a new buffer zone between global powers.
The territories that could form this “Tan” — parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the former FATA region, parts of Balochistan, and perhaps adjoining areas of eastern Afghanistan — are already zones of chronic instability. They are ethnically connected (predominantly Pashtun and Baloch), politically alienated from Islamabad, and strategically valuable because they sit on the fault line between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
In essence, a new “Pashtunistan” or “AfPak Tan” could emerge under the following conditions:
1. A major war between India and Pakistan weakens the Pakistani state apparatus.
2. Western or regional powers intervene to “stabilise” the border regions.
3. Local militias and ethnic movements exploit the chaos to assert autonomy.
4. The international community, citing “security and governance” concerns, recognises a new de facto arrangement.
This process would not be entirely new — it would echo the imperial restructuring of borders that created Pakistan itself in 1947.
In essence, a new “Pashtunistan” or “AfPak Tan” could emerge under the following conditions:
1. A major war between India and Pakistan weakens the Pakistani state apparatus.
2. Western or regional powers intervene to “stabilise” the border regions.
3. Local militias and ethnic movements exploit the chaos to assert autonomy.
4. The international community, citing “security and governance” concerns, recognises a new de facto arrangement.
This process would not be entirely new — it would echo the imperial restructuring of borders that created Pakistan itself in 1947.
Historical Parallels: The Durand Line and the British Frontier Policy
The Durand Line, drawn by the British in 1893 to divide Afghanistan from British India, remains one of the most contentious borders in the world. It split Pashtun tribes and sowed the seeds for a century of cross-border tensions. When Pakistan inherited this line, it also inherited the Pashtun question — a persistent challenge to its national unity.
Similarly, the British also manipulated the Baloch frontier, separating it from Iran and Afghanistan to create a controllable buffer. These policies were part of the “Great Game” — the 19th-century contest between Britain and Russia for influence in Central Asia. Today’s geopolitical dynamics — involving the US, China, Russia, and regional actors like India and Iran — mirror that old contest in many ways.
Just as the British once created Pakistan to serve their interests, the current configuration of global power could lead to another artificial construct to serve new strategic goals — such as containing Chinese influence or managing transnational militancy.
Contemporary Catalysts: War, Militancy, and Realignment
Several developments now point toward a possible reconfiguration of Pakistan’s borders or internal structure:
1. India–Pakistan Escalation
A military conflict between India and Pakistan could trigger internal fractures in Pakistan, especially if the army is stretched across multiple fronts — the eastern border with India, western border with Afghanistan, and internal insurgencies in Balochistan and KPK.
2. Afghan Factor
The Taliban regime in Kabul, facing its own legitimacy crisis, may exploit Pakistan’s vulnerabilities to assert territorial claims or expand influence into the former FATA region. A resurgent cross-border Pashtun movement could align with this momentum.
3. Western Strategic Shifts
The US and its allies, seeking to counterbalance both China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia’s outreach in Central Asia, may view a restructured “buffer zone” as a means to reassert control — without the liabilities of direct occupation.
4. Internal Ethnic Pressures
Movements like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) and the ongoing Baloch insurgency indicate deep-rooted alienation. These could form the grassroots justification for an externally encouraged redrawing of the map.
Can Pakistan Control the Situation?
Theoretically, Pakistan’s military establishment remains powerful. However, control is not stability. Islamabad can impose short-term order but cannot eliminate the structural causes of disintegration — economic dependency, ethnic suppression, and geopolitical manipulation.
Pakistan’s strategic geography, once its greatest asset, has become its Achilles’ heel: every external actor — from Washington to Beijing, from Tehran to Delhi — views Pakistan not as a partner but as a piece on the chessboard.
Unless Pakistan embarks on genuine internal reform — political federalism, economic transparency, and regional reconciliation — it may not be able to prevent further fragmentation.
The Strategic Logic Behind the ‘New Tan’
From a geopolitical lens, a new “Tan” would serve multiple objectives for external powers:
• For the West: A manageable buffer state replacing an unreliable Pakistan.
• For India: The neutralisation of Pakistan’s western threat and the weakening of its military establishment.
• For Afghanistan: Potential realisation of Pashtun irredentist claims.
• For China: A complication — but also an opportunity to consolidate its CPEC routes through secure zones.
In essence, the emergence of another “Tan” would reflect the rebalancing of global interests — a new round of the “Great Game” where borders are redrawn not for the people, but for strategic utility.
Conclusion: The Future of the ‘Tans’
When I spoke of another “Tan” more than a decade ago, it was not a prophecy but an observation of historical patterns — the way empires engineer states to serve their agendas. The British once created Pakistan to secure their imperial interests; today, the decline of Pakistan’s strategic value makes it vulnerable to the same logic that brought it into being.
The potential emergence of a new “Tan” — whether in the form of a Pashtun corridor, a semi-autonomous frontier zone, or a Western-managed security belt — would not be a surprise but a continuation of the unfinished colonial project.
The tragedy, however, is that once again, the people of the region — Pashtuns, Baloch, Punjabis, and others — may bear the human cost of geopolitical games waged in distant capitals.
Unless Pakistan redefines its purpose — not as a proxy for others, but as a sovereign, inclusive, and just state — it risks becoming, once again, the object rather than the author of history. End
Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.
