Article 257 and the Fourth Schedule: A Constitutional Contradiction in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir

 Article 257 and the Fourth Schedule: A Constitutional Contradiction in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir

Dr Shabir Choudhry, London, 9 July 2026.

Despite many twists and turns in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, Pakistan has publicly maintained before the international community that the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory whose future is yet to be determined. Successive governments have repeated this position, and it forms the basis of Pakistan's diplomatic campaign on Kashmir.

This policy also finds expression in Article 257 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which states:

"When the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State."

On the face of it, this appears to recognise an important democratic principle: that the people of Jammu and Kashmir possess the right to determine both whether they wish to accede to Pakistan and, if they do, the nature of their constitutional relationship with Pakistan.

However, the constitutional and political reality in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir presents a striking contradiction.

Freedom to Choose—or Only One Choice?

The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, places severe restrictions on political activity.

No political party may legally advocate a constitutional future other than accession to Pakistan. Candidates contesting elections must affirm their commitment to the ideology of accession to Pakistan. Likewise, holders of public office are required to take an oath supporting that objective.

This raises an obvious constitutional question. If the people of Jammu and Kashmir are genuinely free to determine their future, why are they prevented from peacefully advocating alternative constitutional options?

A democratic choice cannot be meaningful if only one outcome is legally permissible before the choice has even been made.

The Fourth Schedule

For the past several days, a list has been circulating that reportedly claims that these people have been included in the Fourth Schedule. Many people talk of the Fourth Schedule, but they don’t know what it is, and how seriously it affects the lives of the people.

Many people mistakenly believe that the Fourth Schedule is a criminal conviction. It is not true.

The Anti-Terrorism Act contains several schedules dealing with different matters.

• The First Schedule lists proscribed organisations.
• The Second Schedule identifies organisations under observation.
• The Third Schedule lists offences triable under the Anti-Terrorism Act.
• The Fourth Schedule contains the names of individuals whom the authorities consider present a security concern.

A person placed on the Fourth Schedule may not have been convicted of any offence. The designation is administrative rather than judicial.

Nevertheless, inclusion on the Fourth Schedule can have serious consequences.

These may include:

• Regular reporting to police authorities;
• Restrictions on movement and travel. The person cannot leave the city without the permission of the authorities;
• Enhanced surveillance;
• Limitations on obtaining passports – general practise is to cancel the passport and ID card, and that can very seriously affect the everyday life of the people concerned;
• Restrictions affecting financial transactions; general practise is to freeze all accounts, and the person concerned cannot obtain loans or do business, or obtain employment;
• Damage to reputation in society and a very serious impact on the family life; and
• Limitations on political activity.

Although not formally a punishment, these restrictions can significantly affect an individual's personal, social, professional and political life.

This contradiction has become even more significant with the increasing use of Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, particularly the Fourth Schedule.

Counter-Terrorism or Political Management?

No responsible person would dispute that every state has both the right and the duty to protect its citizens against terrorism.

The question is whether anti-terrorism legislation should also be used against peaceful political activists; and against those seeking fundamental rights?

In recent years, a growing number of political activists, lawyers, journalists and leaders of rights movements in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir have reportedly been subjected to anti-terrorism measures, including placement on the Fourth Schedule or prosecution under anti-terrorism laws.

If individuals advocate violence or religious hatred, they should be prosecuted in accordance with the law.

However, if their activities consist primarily of peaceful political advocacy, constitutional reform or demands for greater democratic rights, then treating them as security threats raises profound legal and constitutional questions.

A Democratic Paradox

Pakistan argues internationally that the people of Jammu and Kashmir must be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination, which in practise is not a right of self-determination, but a right of accession to either India or Pakistan. This right to accession was proposed by Pakistan, and was not opposed by India and became a part of the UNCIP Resolution.

Even though this right of accession was proposed by Pakistan, still if any citizen of Jammu and Kashmir expresses his desire to be part of India, immediately that person is declared a traitor, an Indian agent and anti-Pakistan.

That practically means Pakistan is only prepared to give the people of the divided Jammu and Kashmir one option – and that is to join Pakistan or be prepared to face the consequences.

This means within Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, the space for debating constitutional alternatives appears increasingly restricted. This produces an uncomfortable paradox.

On one hand, Article 257 appears to acknowledge the right of the people to determine their constitutional future.

On the other, political laws and administrative practices often permit discussion of only one constitutional outcome – joining Pakistan.

Whether the Pakistani policymakers, and their puppets, acknowledge the bitter facts or not, such contradictions weaken Pakistan's constitutional and diplomatic position. There are big contradictions in Pakistan’s declared Kashmir policy and the practise.

A state that argues for democratic choice internationally must also demonstrate democratic confidence domestically.

Colonial Methods in a Post-Colonial State

History teaches us that colonial administrations often governed through a combination of coercion and patronage.

Those who challenge or criticise the wrong policies of the government are systematically monitored, harassed, pressured, imprisoned or economically marginalised.

Those who demonstrate loyalty are handsomely rewarded financially, politically and with awards.

The objective was not merely to suppress resistance but to shape political behaviour through fear and dependency.

One of the disappointments of South Asian politics has been the persistence of some of these methods long after the end of colonial rule; and in the case of Pakistan and to some extent India, these methods are still regularly applied to silence dissent and control political and economic behaviour.

Instead of relying primarily upon democratic persuasion, governments have too often relied upon surveillance, preventive detention, restrictive legislation and administrative control.

The colonisers have gone, but their colonial legacy remains visible in different forms across the region; hence the suffering of the oppressed and occupied people continues.

The Way Forward

The people of Jammu and Kashmir deserve more than competing national narratives. They do not ask for the sky or moon. They seek fundamental human rights; and they deserve genuine political freedom.

If Pakistan sincerely believes that the future of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined by its people, then it should create conditions in which all peaceful political opinions may be expressed without fear.

The answer to political disagreement is not administrative restriction but democratic debate. Counter-terrorism laws should remain directed against those who advocate extremism, religious hatred or commit violence.

These laws should not become instruments for regulating peaceful political opinion, and control the lives of the people.

History demonstrates that durable political settlements are achieved not through coercion but through dialogue, constitutionalism and respect for fundamental freedoms.

If Pakistan wishes to strengthen both its democratic credentials and its international case on the Kashmir dispute, there could be no better place to begin than by ensuring that the people living under its own administration enjoy the very freedoms that it seeks for Kashmiris elsewhere.

Fourth Schedule extended to the UK and other countries.

According to recent reports and a widely circulated post which claimed that Imran Hussain MP, Chair of the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on Jammu and Kashmir, has been placed on Pakistan's Fourth Schedule, if it is true, then it raises some serious questions about the expanding use of anti-terrorism legislation. It would be unusual for a serving Member of the British Parliament, whose involvement has consisted of political advocacy and parliamentary engagement, to be subjected to such measures. Whatever reasons the authorities may advance, such action risks creating unnecessary diplomatic friction and may discourage constructive international engagement in the discourse on Jammu and Kashmir. It also raises broader questions about whether security legislation is being extended beyond its original purpose of countering terrorism into the sphere of peaceful political activity.

A serving British Member of Parliament is not an underground militant or a clandestine political activist. He is an elected representative in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. If Pakistan has formally placed him on the Fourth Schedule, then the issue is no longer merely domestic—it acquires an international and diplomatic dimension.

As Chairman of the APPG on Jammu and Kashmir, his role has been to engage with the issue politically and parliamentarily. To subject such a figure to anti-terrorism monitoring is likely to raise questions in Westminster and beyond.

The Pakistani ruling elite need to revisit the wisdom of their policies. Pakistan has traditionally sought support from British parliamentarians on the Kashmir dispute. Listing a serving British Member of Parliament as a person requiring monitoring under anti-terrorism legislation is likely to be interpreted in the United Kingdom as an unfriendly and disproportionate measure.

Furthermore, it risks undermining Pakistan's diplomatic narrative. Pakistan has consistently argued that it supports democratic rights and political freedoms in Jammu and Kashmir. If a foreign parliamentarian engaged in peaceful political advocacy is subjected to security restrictions, critics will inevitably question whether Pakistan is applying the same democratic standards that it advocates internationally.

In addition, it could discourage parliamentary engagement. Members of the British Parliament, the European Parliament and other legislatures may become reluctant to visit Pakistan or Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir if they believe they could face legal or administrative restrictions because of their political views.

Finally, it risks damaging Pakistan's relationships with long-standing friends. The APPG has historically included MPs from different political parties who have taken an interest in the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Subjecting one of its Chairs to security measures may be viewed as counterproductive.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com