Options on Kashmir

Options on Kashmir
Dr Shabir Choudhry

Dear editor Aslamo Alaykam

In last issue of Liberty International there was an article by Muhammad Younas Malik, which I read with interest. Although there were some historical mistakes in it but it was a good article. The author has discussed some options about the future of Kashmir, and I want to submit some options for your attention which I wrote in 1998. I understand a lot has changed since 1999 but strength of argument in these options is still strong and I hope that you will present them to your readers.

A Western Think Tank requested me to analyse the Kashmir dispute and come up with possible solutions. I did that in 1999, and later on it was published as a small booklet and launched in House of Lords by Lord Nazir Ahmed. Ghulam Rasool Dar, who was Secretary General of JKLF at that time, commented on the booklet in the following words:
‘Options On Kashmir’ gives a deep insight on the problem of Kashmir. It draws the background to the problem and the present situation skilfully and advances possible options realistically.

Now that different options are being discussed on Kashmir, and Pakistani President himself has invited people to start a debate on Kashmir, it would be pertinent to forward options I discussed which I hope will go some way in helping people to understand the situation.


K
ashmir seems to be the flash point for a possible nuclear war in South Asia, and it is because of this the world community wants to have some kind of solution for the thorny issue of Kashmir. Over the past months and years many possible solutions have been put forward, and this exercise has intensified since the nuclear explosions by India and Pakistan in May 1998. It appears that the world community, and India and Pakistan are interested in some kind of solution for Kashmir to avert the threat of nuclear war in the region; and to lay down the foundations of the New Economic World Order for that area and the Central Asia. It is immaterial to them whether or not it satisfies the basic elements of justice and fairness; or if it denies the people of Kashmir their basic and most cherished right of self determination.

Present position

B
efore we can look at any possible solution of Kashmir we need to look at the current situation there and also analyse the respective stands of India and Pakistan. The State of Jammu and Kashmir is practically divided between India, Pakistan and China, though the later has never been considered as a contender or a party to the ‘Kashmir Dispute’. India has the regions of Jammu, Kashmir Valley and Ladakh with China occupying the Aksai Chin. Pakistan has the regions of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit and Baltistan - Pakistan directly controls the later and the former enjoys semi - autonomous status.

The present armed struggle is mainly confined to the Valley of Kashmir with some armed activities in district of Doda, Rajori and Poonch. This armed struggle is against India as she is the occupying power there, but areas of Ladakh and Jammu, for different reasons, are not part of this struggle. This is why many people call it the struggle of the Muslims of the Valley. By and large the Muslims of Ladakh and Jammu have not joined their brothers of the Valley to fight the war of liberation. As the result of this it is the Muslims of the Valley who have been the victim of Indian onslaught. The area of Azad Kashmir has shown a lot of political activity, and has provided some help to the armed struggle going on in Kashmir but has not practically taken part in it. The areas of Gilgit and Baltistan are completely cut off from the other areas of the State, and have no role in the armed struggle. These areas have no link with Azad Kashmir, even though the same country occupies them both.

It is because of the above situation the outside world looks at the Kashmir dispute as the problem of the Valley of Kashmir only. To them the areas of Azad Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan, Jammu and Ladakh have shown their ‘satisfaction’ with the prevailing situation and existing political arrangements. It is true there are individuals and small groups who are struggling for the unification and independence of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; but the fact remains that we have failed to persuade the world community that it is a genuine Kashmiri struggle which wants to achieve united and independent Kashmir. The tragedy is that it is the Kashmiris who have lost more than 80,000 lives and thousands are still in detention centres and prisons. Thousands of young men are disabled and maimed, honour and dignity of thousands of women is lost too, and yet the world see the Kashmir dispute as a territorial dispute, which has to be resolved bilaterally by India and Pakistan.

Stand of the parties to the dispute

Indian Position

A
t best one can say that the Indian stand on Kashmir changes with time. First her stand was that Kashmir has provisionally acceded to the Indian Union, and if that was the case then why take the Kashmir dispute to the UN Security Council and accept a plebiscite to determine the ‘future status’ of Kashmir. The first Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, while addressing the Indian Parliament on 16 June 1951 said: “If after a proper plebiscite, the people of Kashmir said, we do not want to be with India, we are committed to accept it even though it might pain us. We will not send an army against them. We will accept that, however hurt we might feel about it, we will change the constitution if necessary”. We all know what India did after making such pledges, and she still has more than half million armed personnel in Kashmir who are committing wide scale human rights abuses there.

Later on when it suited India, as a result of the ‘Cold War’, she changed her stance again and called Kashmir its ‘integral part’. But when India was under pressure after the war with China, and it was also convenient to her, she was more than willing to negotiate the ‘future status’ of Kashmir with Pakistan. When six rounds of Ministerial talks with Pakistan to find acceptable solution of Kashmir failed, Kashmir once again became an ‘integral part’ of India. During the war of 1965 and in the subsequent Tashkant Agreement, Kashmir was ‘disputed’ again, and like last time became an ‘integral part’ to satisfy the Indian public.

After the war with Pakistan in 1971, India changed her stand on Kashmir again. On previous occasions it was either the future status of whole of Kashmir or the part that was under the Indian control which was at the negotiation table. But after Pakistan’s defeat, the Indian government said that Kashmir is an ‘integral part’ of India, and dispute is only about the areas under illegal occupation of Pakistan. From time to time different Indian governments repeat this claim, but at the same time enter into negotiations to decide the future of Kashmir under its occupation.

On going armed struggle in Kashmir, Pakistan’s nuclear explosions, international pressure and economic interests have, once again, forced India to change her stance on Kashmir, though officially and in the eyes of the Indian public Kashmir is still an ‘integral part’ of the Indian Union. The present Indian government is mentally prepared to resolve the Kashmir dispute through the on going process of dialogue with Pakistan. The official Indian version is that there is no need for any plebiscite as Kashmir is already part of India; and whatever remains to be settled with Pakistan (not Kashmiris) is to be done without any interference from outside. In other words no role for the bodies like UN or mediation by a third party. In practice mediation is taking place in bilateral talks between India and Pakistan, perhaps we can call this an ‘indirect mediation’ compared to direct mediation where the parties to the dispute have talks in the presence of a third party. It is sincerely hoped that this process continues and the Indian government does not change her stance again.

Pakistani stand on Kashmir

P
akistani government out rightly rejected the controversial ‘Provisional accession’ and claimed Kashmir on the basis of ‘Two Nations Theory’, which strictly speaking did not apply to the Princely States including Kashmir. In the UN and every where else, Pakistan said that it should be the Kashmiri people who should decide the future of the State. Ironically when before the Partition of India, the Congress leadership suggested that people of the Princely States should be given a right to decide the future of their states, as opposed to their rulers, it was the same Pakistani leadership which opposed this idea stringently, and asserted that the rulers are in a better position to decide the future of their states.

On one hand Pakistan government proposed that the Kashmiri people should be given a choice to decide their future, and on the other hand limited this choice by making it conditional in the UN resolutions that they should either join India or Pakistan, hence denying them a right to become independent. Pakistani government’s stand was, and apparently still is, that these UN resolutions on Kashmir should be implemented, but she is not prepared to vacate the areas of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit and Baltistan which is required by these resolutions, a prerequisite to a plebiscite.

Despite that successive Pakistani governments claim that they want to ensure that the people of Kashmir get their ‘right of self determination’. But amazing thing is that these governments take every opportunity offered to them to divide the State of Jammu and Kashmir. So just like Indian policy on Kashmir, the Pakistani policy is also fraught with inconsistencies and self - interest, with very little consideration for the welfare of the people of Kashmir.

The Agreements of Tashkant and Simla have changed the basic character of the Kashmir dispute. The Simla Agreement, signed between India and Pakistan in 1972, sees no role for the UN or its resolutions on Kashmir, and insists on bilateral talks to find the final solution. There is also no mention of the much-talked about ‘right of self determination’ of the Kashmiri people. Yet the Pakistani government, for the consumption of Pakistani and the Kashmiri people, keep on talking about the UN resolutions.

The fact is that both governments have shifted their stands on Kashmir more than once, and they have clearly made another shift at the time of Lahore Summit. Both have agreed to make changes to their “stated positions” and find workable and agreeable solution to the Kashmir dispute.

Kashmiri Stand

I
t is unfortunate to note that the Kashmir people do not have a united stand about their future. The main reason for this is the division of the State into different parts, and the social, cultural and political environment of each part has ultimately influenced the thinking of the people living there. For example, people living in Gilgit and Baltistan may want to join Pakistan as they have been cut off from the rest of the State for the past 50 years, and the generation grown up there has only seen Pakistan and its influence in every walk of life. Similarly people in Ladakh and Jammu may act differently to their fellow countrymen of the Valley because of the reasons explained above.

In other words Kashmiri people could be put into four possible schools of thought, those who want to join India, those who want to join Pakistan, those who want to become independent and those who are happy with the present division. But the fact remains that overwhelming majority of the people would like to have an opportunity to decide their future. They DONOT like to be dictated by anyone, and would like to be a part of the solution finding process. It is believed that overwhelming majority of the Kashmiri people would like the State to remain one political entity. However it is in the interest of India and Pakistan to keep the State divided, and since they have power and political will, it is likely that they will have their way.

Options on Kashmir

N
ow that both governments have shown their willingness to change their ‘stated positions’ on Kashmir, and find a solution to the dispute, let us look at the reasons why they have decided this, and what options are available to them. Whichever solution is decided it has to be negotiated and accepted by all the parties to the dispute, and not imposed as it will create problems in future. The following factors have clearly influenced them:

 Both governments have realised that by use of force alone disputes cannot be resolved;
 International trend is to resolve disputes through continuous process of dialogue, and where necessary, with the help of mediation;
 Both are declared nuclear states and are not in a position to win a war or even take chances of a war which can bring destruction to the region;
 International pressure is becoming increasingly intolerable for both governments;
 Economic pressure from inside and outside of the Sub – Continent is becoming too strong;
 Intelligentsia in both countries has come to realise that it is not in the interest of the region to continue animosity and hostility towards each other. It is realised that both countries should enter the new century as friends not foes;
 On going armed struggle in Kashmir is also an important factor, and perhaps most important factor as it is the source of the above pressures.

First and Second Options

T
hese options were available to the Kashmiri people in the UN resolutions where they had to decide if they wanted to join India or Pakistan. Since both governments could not create the conditions required for an impartial plebiscite, the Kashmiri people never had an opportunity to exercise this limited right given to them.

Both governments have entrenched position on Kashmir and people are really emotional on the issue of Kashmir, this is why no government likes to ‘give in’ to its arch - enemy. This is the most important reason why no progress could be made in solving the Kashmir dispute. Implementation of the UN resolutions meant defeat for one country, and no government could afford such a defeat. That is why there is this status – quo, even though the cease – fire line was changed to ‘Line of Actual Control’ in the Simla Agreement. Cease – fire line meant that both parties have stopped hostilities temporarily, and permanent decision is yet to be taken; whereas the ‘Line of Control’ implies different meaning.

The ground reality in Kashmir and world politics has changed dramatically since these UN resolutions were passed. These resolutions have failed to provide a solution to the Kashmir dispute in the past nearly 50 years, and it is certain that they will not provide any solution in future. In any case the Simla Agreement between the countries requires them to talk bilaterally not on the UN floor. The UN resolutions accept the disputed nature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and something new could be worked out around them by taking the new situation into consideration.

Third Option

T
he option of becoming independent is generally known as the third option, and perhaps the most popular option as well. It is popular because it gives the people of Kashmir a right to become independent. It gives them identity – it does not bind them to two options of either becoming Pakistani or Indian.

This option also shows that Kashmir is not a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, and other countries can support it without any fear of repercussions from either India or Pakistan. If the Third Option is accepted as one of the options available to the Kashmiris, and majority vote for it, this then can work as a ‘face saving’ device for the both countries. They can tell their people that they have not lost to the arch- enemy, and once Kashmir dispute is out of way, both countries can be friends, and ‘most favoured nation’ for each other.

Important question is how to implement the third Option plan. Here we need the good will and co – operation of many parties. First of all, cooperation from India and Pakistan that they vacate the territory under their control, and place it under the UN Trusteeship for a specified period. During this time both India and Pakistan should have no role in the affairs of the State, and at the end of this specified period the people of Kashmir should be given an opportunity to decide if they wanted to accede to any of their neighbours or become independent? It is easy said than done. Apart from the co -operation of India and Pakistan, there must be enough support in the UN for this, and necessary resources made available to carry out this task.

Of course there are other problems as well. Many Pakistanis and Kashmiris think that the Third Option is part of the American New World Order, and the idea is to make Pakistan weaker and vulnerable. Although the history of an independent Kashmir is much older than the American New World Order, but it is clear that America has great interest in the region. But does that mean the Kashmiris should be deprived of their independence? America has keen interest in many other parts of the world, does it mean that the smaller countries in those regions should be deprived of their independence. It does not make sense at all, but fundamentalists in Pakistan and Kashmir have their own agenda, and they will pursue that whether or not it makes sense to the common people.

Another problem associated with the Third Option is the opposition from the countries in the region. It is quite possible that India may agree to give away the Valley of Kashmir, the centre of the present armed struggle, but it is very unlikely that India will compromise anything on Jammu and Ladakh, both very important to India for various reasons. Similarly Pakistan has great interest in Azad Kashmir, and especially in Gilgit and Baltistan which provides road link with China. It is difficult for Pakistan to ‘give away’ Azad Kashmir or Gilgit and Baltistan, especially when there is no trouble there, political or otherwise. When under a lot of pressure Pakistan might make some compromises on the territory in Azad Kashmir, especially hilly border areas, but at no cost she will agree to vacate Gilgit and Baltistan, the areas one may call life line (juggler vein) of Pakistan.

People have hitherto ignored the fourth party to the Kashmir dispute, China. China has great interest in the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as its future also affects her immensely. China occupied Aksai Chin (about 14500 sq miles) in the war with India in 1962, and still retains that. Also in the name of ‘border adjustment’ Pakistan gave some 200 miles of Kashmiri territory to China in 1963.

All three countries, China, Pakistan and India have their own interest to look after. It is more than likely that all three, for various reasons, will oppose the emergence of an independent state of Jammu and Kashmir. An independent Kashmir to China means losing some of the areas currently under her control, and losing very valuable road link with Pakistan. And more importantly, as the theory of conspiracy goes, inviting the Americans to sit next door to China.

It is very obvious that China would not like American basis in Kashmir, but I am sure the Kashmiris would not like that as well. We would not want our territory to be used against our neighbours and friends. Nation states can choose their friends and allies, and they do that in the national interest, but they can not choose their neighbours. They have to live with each other, and it is important that they live and co – operate with each other as friends, this is more important for a weak and smaller nation. We want peace, stability and prosperity in the region and that only can be achieved through friendship and co – operation between the states.

Apart from these three, countries like Iran, Afghanistan and the Central Asian states may also have some concern over the future of Kashmir. But if all the parties to the dispute are sincere in their efforts to find just and lasting solution to the Kashmir dispute, and want to have peace and prosperity in the region, then it is possible to overcome these hurdles. An independent Kashmir could become a centre of trade and commerce, and can open a new chapter of friendship and co - operation in the region. It can genuinely become a Switzerland of Asia. Assuring them that an independent Kashmir will not become centre of intrigues and there will be no basis of any country including America can allay the fears of these countries. With such assurance and guarantees, and other confidence building measures progress can be made to have a lasting peace in the region.

Fourth Option

F
ourth Option, after taking the ground realities and the positions of the parties in to consideration suggests that all parties agree to ‘give and take’. For the sake of peace and stability in the region all parties to the dispute namely India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people (China is not considered in this) should make changes to their stated positions and agree to sacrifice some to get some.

In other words Pakistan should get Gilgit and Baltistan, areas very important for Pakistan, and which are firmly under her control. India should get Ladakh and Jammu, areas which are important to India and are under her control. The remaining two areas namely the Valley and the Azad Kashmir should be merged to become a new state of Kashmir. India, Pakistan and the Security Council must guarantee the security of the new state. The new state of Kashmir would have friendly relationship with all its neighbours.

Clearly there are some incentives for both India and Pakistan if they were to accept this option. Also it is quite possible that with some effort they can sell this to their people. Since the route to China will be still under Pakistani control it is quite possible that China might not create too many hurdles in this. As for the Kashmiri people, they would be the obvious victims of this compromise. Their homeland would be divided permanently, but the question is what have they done to stop this. Are they in any position to stop this or even oppose this?

If this Option is to be accepted then some kind of mechanism has to be worked out to carry out this gigantic task. It is quite possible that in order to give this scheme some kind of legitimacy and democratic value a regional referendum might be conducted as proposed by Dixon, and known as Dixon Plan. And it is quite possible that the areas which would become part of India and Pakistan, might vote in favour of the respective governments, hence alleviating the threat of any future trouble.

Many people say that the Fourth Option also has the American blessing. If this is the case then I am afraid this could be the most ‘favoured option’ for the governments concerned with the Kashmir dispute. It may not go down well with the Kashmiri people, especially the nationalists, and they should do every thing possible to stop this. Perhaps they still have time to sink their differences and unite to oppose the division of Kashmir, and if they cannot rise to the occasion then history will never forgive them.

Fifth Option

F
ifth Option is more or less same as the Fourth Option with the following difference:

The new State of Kashmir would not be completely independent, and both India and Pakistan would have joint control over it. In other words defence and foreign affairs may not be in the Kashmiri hands.

If India and Pakistan cannot have their first options because of the reasons explained at the beginning, then it is likely that they would go for this Option as this gives them some area of Kashmir and allows considerable control over the ‘Independent Kashmir’. But this may not be acceptable to majority of the Kashmiris and possibly the Americans. Also it is hoped that the Pakistani and the Kashmiri people would oppose this compromise on Kashmir.

Sixth Option

S
ixth Option is same as the Fifth Option with the following difference:

All areas of the Azad Kashmir may not be included in the new state of Kashmir, as Pakistan has vested interest in the Mangla Dam and some other strategically important areas. This means only some hilly and borders areas, mainly from the districts of Muzaffarabad, Kotli and Poonch may become part of the new state.

It is debatable if India would accept Pakistan only losing a tiny bit from Azad Kashmir, but the interesting thing would be the response of the Kashmiri people. It is believed that there would be a strong response against this kind of division. Division of any kind is bad for the people of Kashmir, but to divide it in such a way that it loses its all purposes may not be accepted to even most modest Kashmiris.

Seventh Option

S
eventh Option perceives the concept of two semi – autonomous Kashmiri states. In this proposal India gets Ladakh and Jammu and Pakistan gets Gilgit and Baltistan, but the Valley becomes semi – autonomous, still under the protection of India, similar arrangements which Azad Kashmir has with Pakistan. Borders would be opened for the people from both sides to meet each other freely, and even trade with each other. This arrangement may continue for a specified period – possibly five years. At the end of the specified period the Kashmiri people could be asked if they are happy with the current arrangements, and if they clearly show their disagreement then other possible solutions could be looked at.

Eighth Option

T
his Option suggests that the Line of Actual Control becomes permanent after some minor adjustments to suit the needs of India and Pakistan. The Kashmiri territory under their control should be divided in to smaller semi – autonomous regions. For example, The Valley, Ladakh and Jammu would become semi – autonomous within the Indian Union, and would have separate and different arrangements than the other states of India.

On this side of the border Gilgit and Baltistan would become semi – autonomous, like Azad Kashmir, with more rights to the people at the local level. These semi -autonomous Kashmir districts will have right to meet each other and trade with each other.

This Option would be very much liked by India as it gives them control over the territory under their control. But it is difficult for the Pakistan government to go ahead with this and survive. Apart from the public the powerful army would not approve this kind of division. The Kashmiri people, of course, would not approve this kind of plan, but it is debatable if their ‘approval’ would be required if both governments decided to go ahead with it. After all to them and the world outside it is a ‘territorial dispute’ that has to be solved bilaterally.

Nineth Option
T
T
his Option suggests that the Line of Actual Control becomes permanent after some minor adjustments to suit the needs of India and Pakistan. The Kashmiri territory under their control should be divided in to smaller semi – autonomous regions. For example, The Valley, Ladakh and Jammu would become semi – autonomous within the Indian Union, and would have separate and different arrangements than the other states of India.

On this side of the border Gilgit and Baltistan would become semi – autonomous, like Azad Kashmir, with more rights to the people at the local level. These semi -autonomous Kashmir districts will have right to meet each other and trade with each other.

This Option would be very much liked by India as it gives them control over the territory under their control. But it is difficult for the Pakistan government to go ahead with this and survive. Apart from the public the powerful army would not approve this kind of division. The Kashmiri people, of course, would not approve this kind of plan, but it is debatable if their ‘approval’ would be required if both governments decided to go ahead with it. After all to them and the world outside it is a ‘territorial dispute’ that has to be solved bilaterally.

Tenth Option
T
his Option suggests that the Line of Actual Control becomes permanent after some minor adjustments to suit the needs of India and Pakistan. The Kashmiri territory under their control should be divided in to smaller semi – autonomous regions. For example, The Valley, Ladakh and Jammu would become semi – autonomous within the Indian Union, and would have separate and different arrangements than the other states of India.

On this side of the border Gilgit and Baltistan would become semi – autonomous, like Azad Kashmir, with more rights to the people at the local level. These semi -autonomous Kashmir districts will have right to meet each other and trade with each other.

This Option would be very much liked by India as it gives them control over the territory under their control. But it is difficult for the Pakistan government to go ahead with this and survive. Apart from the public the powerful army would not approve this kind of division. The Kashmiri people, of course, would not approve this kind of plan, but it is debatable if their ‘approval’ would be required if both governments decided to go ahead with it. After all to them and the world outside it is a ‘territorial dispute’ that has to be solved bilaterally.

Tenth Option
T

his is not an Option as such but the idea is that if non-of the above work on its own than solution should be found by amalgamation of Options. And even in this Option the Kashmiri people must be taken into confidence, as it is they who have the final say on the future status of Kashmir.

It is believed that overwhelming majority of the people would like the State of Jammu and Kashmir to stay as one political entity. But the signs are not very good, and fear is that the State would be divided against the wishes of the people. The Kashmir people may only be given a limited choice either to accept what is offered to them or it may be imposed.
as such but the idea is that if non-of the above work on its own than solution should be found by amalgamation of Options. And even in this Option the Kashmiri people must be taken into confidence, as it is they who have the final say on the future status of Kashmir.

It is believed that overwhelming majority of the people would like the State of Jammu and Kashmir to stay as one political entity. But the signs are not very good, and fear is that the State would be divided against the wishes of the people. The Kashmir people may only be given a limited choice either to accept what is offered to them or it may be imposed.



Conclusion

T
o conclude, a solution of the Kashmir dispute has to be found in order to move ahead with the second phase of the plan. It is very clear that the forces at work have their eyes beyond the frontiers of Kashmir. The Kashmir dispute is an obstacle which has to be removed one way or the other that the required progress could be made to complete the agenda.

The forces which renewed the ‘cricket diplomacy’ after the lapse of so many years; and which initiated the bus diplomacy have a clear drawn agenda. Who imagined that BJP Prime Minister would begin a new era by epoch making visit to Lahore, and more over to ‘Minar – E – Pakistan, and openly accept the Two Nations Theory. Not only that he agreed to solve the Kashmir dispute.

It is clear that they have decided to do something to complete the rest of the agenda, and they do not have too much time. If for any reason one of the Prime Minister is removed from the office before the final decision then it would be a deadly blow to the whole process. They are working to a time- table and their deadline is to find an acceptable solution before September 1999.

I have analysed the situation to give the readers a better understanding of the Kashmir problem. My aim is to tell the Kashmiri and the Pakistan people what is happening, and if they have the courage and stamina to stop this, then perhaps, still there is time to do something. I have written this as a Kashmiri writer and the Director of Kashmir Affairs - someone who has very good understanding of the Kashmir issue and Indo- Pakistan relations. My political organisation, Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, has nothing to do with this and whatever I have written is mine and I take full responsibility for this.

Through out my life I have worked for united and independent Kashmir, and I will continue to do so. I firmly believe that the Third Option, discussed earlier, is the best Option as it can lead to new era of friendship and co – operation in the South Asia. The other Options may provide a temporary solution, but will lead to more trouble in the future, so it is important that we act prudently and must not leave potential trouble for our next generation.