The recent twin terror attacks at Kathua and
Samba have evoked a strong public outrage against Pakistan-both its Army and
civilian establishment. The legislative assembly of the state currently in
session has also passed a unanimous resolution condemning the unfriendly
neighbouring country. Unhappy with the formation of an alliance government in
partnership with the Bharatiya Janata Party, Pakistan is hell bent upon
fomenting trouble in the state. Apart from spreading terror, the aim of these
twin attacks appears to be to foment the communal tension and hit Jammu’s
economy. Hence, the time chosen for the terror attacks coincided with the
Navratra festivals that are not only celebrated with great devotion by the
locals but also attract large number of pilgrims from rest of the country to
the holy shrine of Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Ji. It is to the credit of the people
of Jammu that they have not fallen prey to the nefarious designs of the enemy.
Pakistan must realise that t Indians are resilient and wont be provoked by such
cowardly acts which in fact make their resolve to fight terror even stronger.
Pakistan continues to use terror as an
instrument of state policy to further its so called “national interests”.
Despite having been militarily defeated and diplomatically snubbed it continues
to be obsessed with the idea of Kashmir being its “umbilical cord”. Having
realised that it cannot defeat India militarily it has adopted the policy of
“thousand cuts” to keep India bleeding. It continues to classify the terrorists
in Pakistan as “good” and “bad” terrorists. All those terrorist organisations
that carry out terror attacks against India are termed “good” and their leaders
enjoy the patronage of the government despite being declared as proclaimed
international terrorists by the United Nations, USA and many western countries.
The likes of Hafiz Sayeed, Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, Dawood Ibrahim etc. are
termed as “strategic assets” by the Pak Army, ISI and the establishment. No
international rules, restrictions or bans apply to them because they are key
players in the plan to bleed India. Thus, Pakistan’s double talk on terror
continues unabated. The recent twin terror attacks thus need to be viewed in
this light.
Of late, Pakistan has preferred the
International Border (IB) sector over the Line of Control (LC) sector for
carrying out infiltration for terror attacks. There are many reasons for this,
of which weather is one such reason but very minor. The major reason is the
proximity of NH 1 to the IB which runs at a distance of 5-15 km from the
border. NH provides a target of strategic importance within striking distance
that can draw immediate media attention. ‘Striking Distance’ being the distance
within which they have the capability to carry out a one-night operation ,ie,
infiltrate and strike on the same night thus reducing the chances of being
intercepted after crossing the border. The terrain in this sector in form of
broken ground and numerous nullahs (running East-West) also assists
infiltration. A number of brick kilns and mobile towers along the NH provide
good navigational land marks at night.
There are many lucrative targets both
military and civilian available within the striking distance as compared to the
LC sector. Another important factor is the density of troop deployment. The
density is much less as compared to the LC sector which apart from a strong
anti-infiltration deployment also has a very effective counter-terrorist grid
in the hinterland. The Pak authorities also hope that a strike in this sector
may rouse communal passions leading to communal riots thus damaging the
harmonious social fabric of the state to further its failed agenda of “Two
Nation Theory”. Pakistan’s insistence on terming the IB as “Working Boundary”
and thus refusing to accept it as an accepted international border is also a
reason for preferring this sector so that it can claim the entire Jammu &
Kashmir as disputed territory. Such terror attacks can also be used as a
diversionary tactics to aid infiltration of bigger groups to the Bhaderwah-
Doda belt via Basholi-Banni. In the past this route has been used by the
terrorists both for infiltration/exfiltration as well as for rest and recoup.
Thus the area of Banni-Macheddi in the depth also assumes importance.
It is worth examining as to how the
terrorists manage to cross the border despite the claim of the BSF that it is
well guarded. The aim is not to point finger at any particular force. All
security forces are carrying out their assigned roles to the best of their
abilities within the given resources. Is it then the question of resources? I
have already highlighted the aspects of terrain. Another important point to
note is that the border fence has been erected against the lie of the ground
and hence easily gets damaged during the monsoons or periods of heavy rain thus
creating gaps. Naturally to cover these gaps greater strength of man power for
deployment is needed affecting deployment elsewhere. Moreover, it is not
difficult to breach a linear deployment like the current pattern on the border.
For the counter infiltration deployment to be effective, it needs to be an
all-weather multi-layered deployment in tiers. A counter smuggling and a
counter infiltration deployment cannot follow the same pattern. It has to be
dynamic rather than static. The first tier of deployment should be based on
all-weather, 24x7 surveillance radars, sensors, hand-held thermal imagers,
night vision binoculars and alarm systems. It must be complimented with
physical deployment based on threat assessment and terrain.
The night ambushes should be laid on a
dynamic grid pattern rather than static linear deployment. The vulnerable areas
like nullahs and gaps need to be covered with adequate deployment. Each border
out post (BOP) must have an operational command post manned by a team led by an
officer which should monitor the data being received from the surveillance grid
with authority to redeploy ambushes under its operational control. The entire
deployment needs to be backed by a reliable and secure communication system.
The second tier needs to be deployed between
the IB and NH based on high grounds or dominating ground. A similar dynamic
grid of ambushes equipped with night vision devices and night sights need to be
established in the second tier also. This tier also needs to be complimented
with police nakkas. However, the aspect of communications needs to be
coordinated and rehearsed. The third tier needs to be based on the NH and areas
immediately in depth. Village Defence Committees (VDCs) should be incorporated
in this tier. VDCs need to be properly armed, well trained and highly
motivated. Long range Surveillance Radars (LSRs) along with surveillance
command posts could also form part of the third tier. The readers would agree
that the ultimate question is of availability of resources. But then no price
is heavy for a nation when it comes to ensuring peace for her citizens. There
is a saying “If you want peace be prepared for war.” The unified command must
put its heads together to make the IB sector impregnable in order to beat the
nefarious designs of the troika that rules Pakistan and is determined to keep
the pot boiling in J&K to ensure that the citizens of this state are denied
the dividends of peace.
Looking inwards, those advocating revocation
of AFSPA must rethink whether the time is ripe for it or by insisting for its
removal they may be helping the troika in Pakistan. To sum up, a pro-active
approach towards border management, surveillance and infiltration is the need
of the hour. To achieve this, an integrated, professional and well trained
intelligence network is a pre-requisite. This network should not rely only on
electronic intelligence (ELINT) but should also be backed up by human
intelligence (HUMINT). The training camps and launch pads need to be under
constant surveillance. Since a large number of army camps are also located in
the area, there should be a seamless integration between BSF, police,
intelligence agencies and the army. The issue of command and control should be
unambiguous. There should be no duplicity at all. The coordination between
neighbouring units deployed on the border should be flawless since inter unit
and inter formation boundaries are always vulnerable. It needs to be understood
that till such time we make our borders impregnable we will continue to be the
victims of cross-border terror because Pakistan is not going to relent from
bleeding India.
(The author is a Jammu based security and
strategic analyst. The views expressed in the article are entirely personal. He
can be contacted at anil5457@gmail.com)
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