With its cross-border covert strike into Myanmar, India’s views on hard
power come into focus.
On June 4, tribal
guerrillas, using rocket-propelled grenades and detonating improvised explosive
devices, killed 20 soldiers and injured several others, in an ambush when a
military convoy was traveling to the state capital Imphal from the town of
Motul in Manipur. This was one of the most serious attacks on Indian security
forces in Manipur for some time. India has struggled to contain the unrest in
Manipur despite granting its security forces sweeping shoot-to-kill powers in
so-called “disturbed areas” under the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers
Act (AFSPA).
India’s response to
these attacks came five days later—on June 9—when the Indian army attacked
rebel camps inside Myanmar early Tuesday morning, destroying two camps and
killing up to 15 rebels. Underlining India’s resolve to preempt terror threats,
undeterred by borders, Para Commandos of the Indian Army carried out surgical
operations deep inside Myanmar killing several militants in two rebel camps.
The Army’s message was terse: “while ensuring peace and tranquility along the
border and in border states, any threat to our security, safety and national
integrity will meet a firm response.” Indian Army had “credible and specific
intelligence” on the basis of which it carried out the attacks. The director of
the office of Myanmar President Thein Sein, Zaw Htay, confirmed a day later
that Indian troops had entered his country’s borders. He said that there was
“coordination and cooperation” between authorities but no Myanmar soldiers were
directly involved.
Responding to a query as
to whether India can conduct such an operation inside Pakistan, Indian Minister
of State for Information and Broadcasting Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore said:
“This should be a message to all countries and organizations who foster
terrorism against India, including Pakistan.” This set off alarm bells in
Pakistan, where sections of the media and defense officials suggested that the
incident could set a precedent for more cross-border raids. Pakistan’s interior
minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, warned India that “Pakistan is not
Myanmar”—a fact all too obvious to most Indians.
By all accounts, the
raid was well-planned and competently executed. The operation was important to
lift the sagging morale of the armed forces, especially after attacks by
insurgents in Manipur. All sections of the government—the intelligence
agencies, the armed forces, and the Ministry of External Affairs—worked as an
organic whole under the leadership of the prime minister and the national
security adviser. This is a rarity in Indian policy-making and should be recognized
as such.
Though the Indian Army
had conducted a number of cross-border raids in the past in collaboration with
partner countries, the speed with which this attack was carried out after the
initial terror attacks was not only unprecedented but also demonstrates a new
level of confidence among India’s political authorities in wielding hard power.
Also, with this raid, a
multi-layered border policy seems to be emerging. The Modi government has, from
the very beginning, followed a policy of ‘disproportionate response’ to border
provocations. Indian troops have been given greater operational autonomy to be
aggressive in responding to ceasefire violations by Pakistan. The Indian
military has been given the much-needed operational space to carve out a response
which was swift, sharp and effective, underlining the costs of Pakistan’s
dangerous escalatory tactics with massive targeted attacks on Pakistani Ranger
posts along the border. What has worked on the border with Myanmar will clearly
not work on the western borders against jihadi groups and that
contextualization has been part of the Indian government’s response. Also,
cooperation with like-minded states such as Myanmar and Bangladesh will be
crucial to deny terror group safe havens across the borders. The government of
Myanmar reportedly approved the Indian plan to send in special forces to attack
insurgent camps into its territory. To justify its attack, New Delhi invoked
the May 2014 border agreement with Myanmar which provides for a framework for
security cooperation and intelligence exchange between the two states.
Despite this, a
narrative has emerged in the country which holds that while the operation was
well planned, the political communication was unnecessary and immature.
Sections of the media, former diplomats, and armchair strategists have
converged in suggesting that the Modi government messed up a fine operation by
talking about it. The argument goes that covert operations by their very
definition should not be talked about. Clearly, restraint should be the norm
while discussing security operations but the Indian Army’s operation in Myanmar
was important to be publicized. To say that the Indian government should have
undertaken such a risky move with little or no publicity is a bit of a nonsense
really. It was imperative for the Modi government to send out a message in
unambiguous terms that India retains the ability to hit back at the insurgents.
Signalling intent and
demonstrating capabilities are key in establishing and strengthening deterrence
in interstate relations. There is a reason why all major powers make a big deal
when they resort to the use of their military instruments of hard power. In
fact, rather than a junior minister, it would have been better for the NSA or
the prime minister to speak directly to the people of India about the Myanmar
raid and its implications. This is the norm in mature democracies. After all,
the message is not simply for the domestic audience. It is also there to
reassure allies and to deter adversaries.
India’s friends and
enemies have long stopped taking India seriously as a military power. A
nation’s vital interests, in the ultimate analysis, can only be preserved and
enhanced if the nation has sufficient power capabilities at its disposal. But
not only must a nation possess such capabilities – there must also be a
willingness to employ the required forms of power in pursuit of those
interests. India’s lack of an instinct for power is most palpable in the realm
of the military, where, unlike other major global powers of the past and the
present, India has failed to master the creation, deployment and use of its
military instruments in support of its national objectives. A state’s
legitimacy is tied to its ability to monopolize the use of force and operate effectively
in an international strategic environment, and India has lacked clarity on this
relationship between the use of force and its strategic priorities.
New Delhi is sending a
clear signal to its adversaries—both state and non-state—that hostilities against
India will not go on without a robust response. The Myanmar operation was a
step towards restoring India’s credibility. But it is a long road ahead and the
effectiveness of this new “Modi-Doval” doctrine, as it has been termed in the
media, will be known only over the long-term.
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