Growing Dangers on the
Subcontinent, by Michael Krepon
Very bad news often follows when adversaries give up on
improved relations. We’re at this juncture now on the Subcontinent.
High-ranking Indian and Pakistani officials are lobbing over-heated public
recriminations about abetting terrorism in each other’s sensitive spaces.
Pakistan has elevated the Kashmir issue – never a good sign for Pakistan or for
India – and firing across
the Kashmir divide has increased in recent years. Absent top-down
initiatives to mend fences – initiatives that New Delhi appears unwilling to
take and that Pakistan’s civilian government is handcuffed from taking – the
stage will be set for another nuclear-tinged crisis in the region.
Increased firing across the Line of Control dividing
Kashmir accompanied the advent of another Pakistani government led by Nawaz
Sharif, who makes no secret of his desire to improve relations with India.
Firing intensified after the election of a new Indian government led by
Narendra Modi, who has made no secret about responding in more than tit-for-tat
fashion to cease-fire violations.
Indian officials see bad omens in Pakistan’s release
from polite confinement of Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi – the Lashkar e-Toiba’s
operational commander who was deeply involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Intercepts
of communications confirming Lakhvi’s role are publicly available, and copious
evidence against Lakhvi provided by New Delhi was initially deemed inadmissible
in Pakistani courts; his release was accompanied by statements blaming India
for insufficient evidence to prosecute him.
Pakistani officials read bad omens in statements by senior Indian officials regarding a willingness to engage in “sub-conventional” warfare, if warranted by Rawalpindi’s actions. On January 5th, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval gave a talk in which he conveyed the message that, “You can do one Mumbai and you may lose Baluchistan.” Then, on January 13th, Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar, a neophyte in the art of public obfuscation, warned Pakistan against stepping up a proxy war in Kashmir: “There are certain things that I obviously cannot discuss here. But if there is any country, why only Pakistan, planning something against my country, we will definitely take some pro-active steps.” Parrikar used the the colloquial Hindi phrase for “removing a thorn using another thorn,” adding, “We have to neutralize terrorists through terrorists only. Why can’t we do it? We should do it. Why does my soldier have to do it?”
Pakistani officials read bad omens in statements by senior Indian officials regarding a willingness to engage in “sub-conventional” warfare, if warranted by Rawalpindi’s actions. On January 5th, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval gave a talk in which he conveyed the message that, “You can do one Mumbai and you may lose Baluchistan.” Then, on January 13th, Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar, a neophyte in the art of public obfuscation, warned Pakistan against stepping up a proxy war in Kashmir: “There are certain things that I obviously cannot discuss here. But if there is any country, why only Pakistan, planning something against my country, we will definitely take some pro-active steps.” Parrikar used the the colloquial Hindi phrase for “removing a thorn using another thorn,” adding, “We have to neutralize terrorists through terrorists only. Why can’t we do it? We should do it. Why does my soldier have to do it?”
Hopes for improved relations generated by Modi’s invitation
to Nawaz to attend his inauguration in May 2014 have now ebbed completely.
Nawaz is in a bind. He has nothing to show for accepting Modi’s invitation.
Civilian-led governments in Pakistan have been unable or unwilling to
reciprocate India’s granting of Most Favored Nation trade status back in 1996.
Pakistan understandably uses different terminology – non-discriminatory market
access – which the previous government led by Asif Ali Zardari chose not to
finalize, and which Nawaz is in no position to pursue. If he takes further
initiatives and is left empty-handed, he will be in an untenable position back
home. With Rawalpindi now signaling a hard line, this is out of the question.
Lakhvi’s release and Nawaz’s inability to push ahead on
trade have reaffirmed New Delhi’s lack of interest in investing time and effort
on improved relations. One of its key conditions for forward progress is
tangible steps by Pakistan against the groups that target India. Statements by
Doval and Parrikar have now allowed Pakistan to turn these tables, reverting to
habitual themes about Indian subversion when bilateral relations take a turn
for the worse.
A chorus of outrage has followed from the Foreign
Ministry, government-inspired news accounts and opinion columns. The Chief
of Army Staff has weighed in, decrying the actions of Indian intelligence
services and clarifying that the fortunes of Pakistan and Kashmir are
inseparable.
Modi has now entered the fray with remarks in Dhaka
that, “Every now and then Pakistan keeps disturbing India, creates nuisance,
promotes terrorism and such incidents keep recurring.” Modi was there to sign a
long-delayed border settlement. The contrast between New Delhi’s commitment to
improve relations with Bangladesh and its lack of interest in improving ties
with Pakistan could not be starker.
The blame games now underway mask
an important shift in the dynamics of deterrence on the Subcontinent. New
Delhi’s hand has been strengthened and Rawalpindi’s efforts to shore up
deterrence by means of a nuclear build up are being circumvented.
Back in October, 2014, Doval reportedly said, “We would like to resolve
our problems through negotiations, through talks. I can’t think of any problem
that cannot be resolved through negotiations. But on the other hand, India
would like to have an effective deterrence to deal with terrorism.” The January
statements by Doval and Parrikar suggest that the Modi government has landed on
a strategy of sending deterrent messages in the coinage Rawalpindi understands
best.
As the stronger power, India only loses by making
nuclear threats, while threatening to respond to severe provocations with
conventional military thrusts into Pakistan offer headache without gain – which
is why the Indian Army’s interest in “Cold Start” lost traction. Doval and
Parrikar are telegraphing a different Indian response if Rawalpindi turns up
the heat in Kashmir or if the LeT carries out another spectacular act of
terrorism within India. New Delhi can respond in Baluchistan or exploit other
internal security problems in Pakistan, of which there are many. And as with
the firing along the LoC, New Delhi can respond twofold to whatever cuts
Rawalpindi inflicts.
Rawalpindi has been counting on a
deterrence strategy that threatens first use if conventional capabilities are
not up to the task. First use includes the detonation of short-range, or
tactical, nuclear weapons against Indian troop concentrations and armor. New
Delhi has studiously underplayed this threat; Rawalpindi can build as many tactical
nuclear weapons as it likes and still not be able to use them against a
strategy of fighting fire with fire – one that the previous Congress
Party-led government was loathe to pursue.
New Delhi’s recent deterrent messages are far more
convincing than beefing up conventional or nuclear forces, which is why
Pakistan has reacted so vigorously against them. It knows that India’s leaders
will seek to avoid using nuclear weapons and that New Delhi has backed away
from threats to fight a limited ground war on Pakistani soil in the past. In
contrast, India’s amped-up deterrent threats of proxy or sub-conventional
warfare are credible because Pakistani leaders assume that India is already
swimming in these waters.
Pakistan blames India for the widespread disaffection
in Baluchistan, where its own military actions have sown disaffection, just as
Indian military forces’ have in Kashmir. New Delhi has been able to handle
everything Rawalpindi has thrown at it in Kashmir. Can Rawalpindi do the same
in Baluchistan? China’s newly-announced, high-profile infrastructure corridor
will pass through this province, where gas lines are periodically blown up and
where Rawalpindi is raising a special security contingent for Chinese workers.
The hullaballoo in Pakistan over Doval and Parrikar’s
statements is partly contrived, since the context and conditionality of these
threats have been conveniently disregarded. But Pakistan’s concerns are very
real, since hopes for the country’s economic future rest on Chinese investment
through this corridor.
Deterrent messages can help avoid limited wars on the
Subcontinent, but they cannot improve India-Pakistan relations. Diplomatic
initiatives are required for this purpose. Once the sting of Lakhvi’s release
subsides, New Delhi will be well-positioned to shift gears. No one’s interests
are served by concurrent proxy campaigns in Kashmir and Baluchistan, so new
deterrent threats could serve a useful purpose. But what then? It has been
seven years since the Mumbai attacks. How much time needs to pass before
resuming the composite dialogue?
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