India Pakistan Friends Again, by Manoj Joshi
The
resumption of high-level dialogue between India and Pakistan ends a period of
discontinuity in the relations between the two countries which have been marked
by a steady process of engagement since the mid-1980s, despite periods of
estrangement, such as after the nuclear tests of 1998, the Kargil War of 1999
and Operation Parakaram in 2002.
The Modi government came
to power in New Delhi pledging a muscular approach to relations with Islamabad,
which meant drawing new red-lines, such as the refusal to allow the Hurriyat to
talk to Pakistani representatives, as well as a ferocious response to
Pakistan’s ceasefire violations on the Jammu border. The Modi government seemed
determined to isolate Islamabad by refusing to have any diplomatic contact,
except on its own terms.
However, the government
has realised that while it can control the narrative at home and be seen by all
as a tough and nationalist-minded government, it cannot do so abroad. Most
countries saw New Delhi’s actions as somewhat over the top. As for the border
firing, they could not understand why India, which is the prime beneficiary of
the ceasefire, was going out of its way to deliver a response that could lead
to its breakdown.
More important, in
2014-2015, Islamabad re-emerged in the calculations of the big powers as the
key to peace in Afghanistan. The US and China looked to Islamabad to ‘deliver’
the Taliban to the peace process, and even Russia, India’s old friend, began
building bridges to Pakistan. This is as much a consequence of Pakistan’s
geopolitical location, as the skill with which it has conducted its diplomacy.
Just a few years ago,
Pakistan was being written off as a failing, if not failed, state. But ever
since it picked up courage to take on the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and build
bridges to the government in Kabul, it has returned into global favour. The key
factor in this has been the arrival of Raheel Sharif as the Chief of Army
Staff. Not only has he pressed home the battle against the TTP, but also taken
up the challenge to restore order in Karachi. After initial tension arising out
of Nawaz Sharif’s desire to go after Pervez Musharraf who overthrew his
government and imprisoned him in 1999, the Pakistan Army and Nawaz have worked
out a modus vivendi, and function more like a coalition government than
autonomous, conflicting institutions. The Army chief defers to the Prime
Minister, but in turn, Nawaz leaves matters relating to security to Raheel and
focuses more on the economy and related issues.
The sequential visits of
the two Sharifs to Washington DC, in October and November this year, were
instructive. Nawaz went first and was feted by the White House, itself a sign
of how the US is once again looking benignly at Pakistan. He was followed by
the General in November. Raheel met Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of
State John Kerry and Defence Secretary Ashton Carter.
Clearly, far from being
isolated Pakistan is being seen as a counter-terrorism partner and the lynchpin
in the making of peace in Afghanistan. There have been carefully placed rumours
about Pakistan-US nuclear deal.
The Americans have agreed
to sell eight new F-16 fighters to Islamabad, and will probably resume military
aid.
The one country that
failed to see the signs of the shift in Islamabad’s standing in the
international community was India. The government and Prime Minister Modi kept
up a loud drumbeat on the need to combat terrorism through the past year. The
rise of the Islamic State, and the attacks in Paris and elsewhere, ensure that
terrorism is a major issue of concern to the world. However, the international
community knows well that when Indian leaders talk about terrorism, it is
really a means of hectoring Pakistan. When they look at the figures, they
cannot but see that the incidence of terrorism and militancy originating in
Pakistan and targeting India has gone down sharply in recent years.
It is for this reason,
India’s friends abroad have pressured the Modi government to modify its
hard-line Pakistan policy. A warning of sorts was visible in the inclusion in
the US-Pakistan Joint Statement in the wake of the Nawaz Sharif visit that
called for “a sustained and resilient dialogue process between two neighbours
aimed at resolving all outstanding territorial and other disputes, including
Kashmir.”
New Delhi can be content
with the fact that in the last couple of months there have been other tectonic
shifts which buttress its ability to engage Islamabad. The announcement of the
death of Mullah Omar and the resulting power struggle has put a question mark
on Pakistan’s ability to deliver the ceasefire in Afghanistan. The heightened
Taliban bomb campaign in Kabul and the attack in Kunduz have brought home the
limits of the Pakistani capacity to manage the Taliban to President Ghani. He
has very pointedly moved to balance his earlier approach which was tilted
towards Islamabad by reaching out to New Delhi.
India and Pakistan need to
have an adult conversation on Afghanistan. By now, Pakistan should know that
the idea of gaining ‘strategic depth’ by meddling in Afghanistan is not just a
fool’s errand, but downright dangerous policy. By virtue of its long land
border, Pakistan has important interests in the stability of Afghanistan. New
Delhi should reassure Islamabad that it will not use Afghanistan to destabilise
Pakistan, provided Islamabad does not return to a policy of using Afghan
territory to set up training camps for terrorists targeting India.
It is in the interests of
India and Pakistan, as well as other regional states that Afghanistan’s long
agony is ended. The Heart of Asia Conference, which will be held in Islamabad
on December 9 and which New Delhi will host next year, provides an important
multilateral platform in which win-win solutions can be found.
*The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research
Foundation, Delhi
Courtesy: www.mid-day.com
No comments:
Post a Comment