The Future of
Pakistan
Dr Stephen P Cohen, a Senior Fellow at the Washington
DC-based think tank the Brookings Institution, is considered as the ‘dean of
the Pakistan experts’. He is known as one of the world’s most trusted
authorities on the Pakistani military and its relationship with the civilian
governments.
Author of Pakistan
Army and the Idea of Pakistan,
Dr Cohen recently edited a new book called The
Future of Pakistan. The 325-page book focuses on a number of
challenges Pakistan currently faces. Here are excerpts from a conversation with
Dr Cohen about the predictions the book makes about Pakistan’s future.
Some of the best experts on Pakistan
contribute to your book The Future of Pakistan. Why did you choose this title?
The book does not look at yesterday or
today, but the day after tomorrow by examining the factors and variables which
will influence the future of Pakistan. I became more concerned after publishing
my 2004 book, The
Idea of Pakistan, as many of its more pessimistic judgments were
coming true. So, I invited some of the best scholars on the subject to share
their ideas. All of them expressed concern about the existing situation. Most
seemed to agree, however, that Pakistan would not experience major
transformation in the next five to seven years. We did not try to look beyond
that.
In my chapter, I paid special attention to
the decline of the Pakistani state. The more I looked, the more pessimistic I
became.
You say you did not want to offend your
Pakistani friends while writing this book but you also insist that a hurtful
truth is better than a pleasant lie. What are these hurtful truths about
Pakistan that you think need to be told now?
One was that General Pervez Musharraf
fooled himself and he fooled everyone else. He lacked toughness, he tried to
please everyone. He was not capable of leading Pakistan’s liberal
transformation, although he personally held a liberal vision of the future.
Some Pakistanis and many Americans thought that Musharraf was the last hope for
Pakistan. I disagree, there are a lot of good Pakistanis around, both in the
military and outside of it.
However, the army can’t govern the
country effectively but it won’t let others govern it either. This is the
governance dilemma. Pakistan is stuck between being an outright military
dictatorship and a stable democracy. Neither are likely, and an even less
likely future would be a radical transformation and the rise of Islamists or a
breakaway movement led by the Baloch or other separatist groups. We did not see
this coming soon, yet with the obvious breakdown of law and order, the decline
of the economy, as well as a dysfunctional civilian-military relationship —
change seems to be in the wind — but few of us can be precise about what that
change will be. Pakistan is muddling through, but change and transformation are
coming, I just don’t know when or how.
Weakness in governance, education, and the
absence of land reform made Pakistan a victim of contemporary globalisation. It
doesn’t make much that anyone wants to buy, and it is cut off from its natural
regional trading partners. Yet, the negative aspects of Islamist globalisation
have hit Pakistan hard. Some of the weirdest ideas in the Islamic world have
found rich soil in Pakistan, and the country is regarded as an epicentre of
terrorism. Pakistan, which was once held up as the most moderate of the Islamic
states, seems to be embracing extremists and their dysfunctional violent ideas.
Is Pakistan on the verge of collapse?
No,
it is not going to collapse. The military will ensure that the state will not
collapse. It is not a country in need of critical support for its survival but
it may yet happen some day, especially if the economy collapses.
Pakistan
has to make a breakthrough and become a South Asian country. It should join
India in a number of cooperative ventures while protecting its sovereignty
against foreign interests and intrusions.
The
Indians tend to be bullying when it comes to their neighbours, but Pakistanis
are capable of defending their interests. Many Indians are ready for a change
now. India sees itself as a major rising Asian state and Pakistan is a drag on
it.
Yet,
because of nuclearisation India can’t conceive of finishing off Pakistan. The
only realistic option for India is cooperation. Islamabad’s decision to grant
India the most favoured nation (MFN) status offers an opportunity to both
countries; will it lead to a peace process? I don’t know, but their dilemma is
that they cannot live with each other and they cannot live without each other. They
need to cooperate along several dimensions, there is no military solution for
the problems each has with the other.
Why
do you call Pakistan a major foreign policy headache for the United States?
In
the book I quote an American who said we assumed that with all our aid and
alliances we believed that Pakistan would emerge as an independent democratic
state. However, it turned out that India, which did not get our military
assistance and partnership, has emerged as that kind of country.
The
Pakistanis, particularly the military, have a hard time looking around for role
models. Turkey, Indonesia or Malaysia may not be the perfect role models for
Pakistan. Perhaps the best political role model for you is India which is also
a diverse South Asian state, but now with a stable political order and growing
economic power. In India, the military has a legitimate role but still remains
under the government’s control.
It
is the responsibility of the Pakistani civilian government to find a legitimate
role for the Pakistani army, and the army must help in that search, the present
arrangement is not working.
You
say you don’t know where Pakistan is heading to but once it gets there you will
explain why it was inevitable.
I
quoted a former US ambassador to the Soviet Union who said, “I don’t know what
is going to happen to the Soviet Union but when it does happen I will tell you
exactly why it was inevitable.” So, looking ahead at Pakistan’s future, we
don’t know what is going to happen to Pakistan but we know something alarming
is happening to it. Pakistan will remain, but its identity is changing.
As
for America’s mixed role in Pakistan, there were two areas where we should have
been more accommodating. First, we should have recognised Pakistan as a nuclear
power after it tested its weapons in 1998 — as we did with the Indians. This
would have legitimised the Pakistani nuclear programme and reduced the paranoia
that the Americans were trying to deprive them of their nuclear capability; it
might also have contributed to more responsible Pakistani nuclear policy, right
now it is the fastest growing nuclear weapons state in the world — and one with
a bad record of transferring nuclear technology in the past. Second, the US
should have provided trade opportunities, instead of only military aid, to
Pakistan after 9/11. There was a serious Pakistani interest in increasing
trade, not just receiving military aid; the US did not respond to this.
How
can Pakistan get out of what you call the burden of its history and narrative
of victimhood?
First,
economic trade between Pakistan and the rest of South Asia should be
encouraged. It should hook up with India, one of the fastest growing economies
in the world, as well as continue its ties with China. The Iran-Pakistan-Indian
pipeline is a good idea and I am baffled why the Americans have always opposed
it. Yes, it will help the Iranians, but the pipeline will also help the
Afghans, the Indians and the Pakistanis. In my math, three positives outweigh
one negative.
Second,
Pakistani governments have been cowardly in dealing with those who oppose
modernity and try to push the country back to the seventh century. Perhaps the
cowardice comes from the fact that the state uses some of these groups for its
own strategic purposes, a fatal and self-defeating miscalculation.
Why
do you argue that the Pakistani military has neither run the country
effectively nor allowed others to run it?
Well,
because they are not trained to be economists or how to run businesses although
the military manages a lot of businesses once they retire. They are not trained
to be politicians. Being a politician is a difficult skill to acquire. People
cannot be ordered about, especially Pakistanis. As a politician, you have to
find common interests by working with people who dislike each other; Pakistan
needs to develop a true political class.
In
Pakistan, the military has identified enemies among its fellow-citizens. If you
demonise your own people, you are in deep trouble. I mean you can’t treat the
Bengalis or the Baloch, or other ethnic or religious minorities the way you
treat foreign enemies. That’s the route to catastrophe, as we have
seen both in Pakistan and other countries that have given up on pluralism and
tolerance and headed down the road to self-destruction.
Of
Pakistan’s military leaders, Ayub Khan tried to act as a politician but failed
because he could not address two deeper problems, education and land reforms.
If you look at the East Asian tigers, they all dealt with land reforms early
and invested heavily in education at all levels. Even China has done this,
albeit through totalitarian coercion, which would not work in pluralistic
Pakistan.
How
much influence will Islam and the army continue to exercise on the future of
Pakistan?
I
like the idea of seeing Islamic parties getting a chance to govern, and then
discovering whether they succeed or fail. I’d also like to see somebody like
Imran Khan get elected — not that I am a particular fan of his, but let him get
elected and assume the burden and responsibilities of governance, and be held
accountable. Let him succeed or fail on these terms.
I
had a conversation with Musharraf right after his coup and told him that while
the obviously corrupt and extremist political leaders had to be held
accountable, that he should also hold elections and let the democratic process
move forward. He responded to the effect that he was going to fix the system
once and for all. I knew then he was in deep trouble. In a normal state you
have to allow people to fail. They must run for office, get elected and then
fail on their own terms. It should be left to the people of Pakistan to decide
who they elect to rule them. In the long run, they will make the right
decision, but the courts, the press, and, rarely, even the military, will be
around to prevent disaster. Failure should be seen as helping to perfect the
system, not a sign of a bad system. The cure for bad democracy is more and
better democracy, not an incompetent military regime, which only breeds
resentment as it covers up its failures. In Pakistan the mentality seems to be
that having won an election, the victor can persecute his or political rivals.
I’d prefer a moderate competent military regime to this kind of pseudo
democracy.
How
is failure in Afghanistan going to affect Pakistan?
If
the Taliban come back to power or if they play a significant role in the future
dispensation, there will be a major blowback on Pakistan. We may yet see how
the government of Pakistan responds to the Taliban mindset which says that ‘we
[Taliban] have defeated one superpower, the United States, in Afghanistan and
now we will take control of Pakistan and then India.’ This is a revolutionary
movement that has to be contained and stopped, not provided with safe-haven and
political support. Staying away from Bonn was a strategic gaffe that put
Pakistan on the opposite side of virtually the entire world.
What
are some of the future scenarios and options you discuss in the book about
Pakistan?
Some
American experts are talking about containing Pakistan. This is premature
language, but if Pakistan pursues policies which are hostile to American
interests in Afghanistan and if they support terrorism then we might move to a
policy of containment. This would have two dimensions: erecting a military
barrier while supporting internal transformation. I don’t know about containing
Pakistan militarily, it seems to be pursing self-defeating policies in any
case, but I support the latter kind of policy. America’s goal should be a
normal Pakistan.
What
should or can be done to immediately bring Pakistan into what you call a
‘normal state category’?
The
long-term key to normalising Pakistan is India. The fear of India drives the
Pakistan army and the army drives Pakistan. If India can normalise with
Pakistan in one way or the other, then Pakistan can devote its resources and
energy to becoming a more attractive and respected country.
What
are the warning signs and revolutionary options for Pakistan?
An
interesting part of the book is where I compare Pakistan with a number of other
states. Pakistan is unlikely to follow the Iranian model of a clergy-led
revolution because the army in Pakistan is stronger than its counterpart was in
Iran. The negative case for Pakistan would be that of Tsarist Russia where the
country was destabilised by World War I, the army fell apart and Russia’s
ruling nobility had no credibility, and revolutionary groups filled the gap.
There are also other bad examples like the Balkans or Yugoslavia, or interwar
Japan, where the military pursued fatally self-destructive policies vis-a-vis
the West and China.
Never
in history have we seen a country so big with so many nuclear weapons in this
kind of trouble. When the Chinese went through their cultural revolution, they
did not have nuclear weapons. Hence, people were not much afraid of China. When
the Soviet Union disintegrated and became Russia, they knew they wanted to
become Europeans. Pakistanis should now decide to become South Asians by
becoming once again a part of South Asia.
Can
China become an alternative strategic partner of Pakistan to replace the US?
If
the Chinese could teach Pakistan how to become an economic power, that would be
great. Yet, the Chinese are not going to teach Pakistan how to become a
democracy. Given Pakistan’s complexity and social diversity, democracy is a
good system for it because it allows most people to have a say in the affairs
of the state. You can’t run Pakistan from the centre. The army has tried that
many times but has failed. After every military takeover, they called back the
civilians within three years. On the political front, China is not a role model
for Pakistan.
Out
of nukes, huge population and geostrategic location, what worries the world the
most about an unstable Pakistan?
The
nuclear weapons are probably under responsible control. If Pakistan breaks down
or some separatist movements succeed, as happened in 1971, then we’ll begin to
worry about the nuclear weapons. Pakistan, like North Korea, is “too nuclear to
fail,” that is, no one wants to see a real nuclear weapons state disintegrate.
Also
Pakistan, like North Korea, uses its nuclear asset and its political fragility
as a means to extract concessions from other countries. We’ve contributed to
this begging-bowl syndrome, for years. The US should provide aid to Pakistan
but link it to more concrete reforms in education, administration, and
democratisation. Otherwise we are wasting our time and money. I don’t like the
term ‘trust deficit’; trust will grow when there are clear — and public — links
between our respective obligations over time.
(Malik
Siraj Akbar is a freelance journalist based in Washington DC.)
Published in The Express
Tribune, Sunday Magazine, January 15th, 2012.
