The end of Pakistan's double games in Afghanistan by Helena Malikyar
Julian Huxley once wrote that "a nation is a society united
by a common error as to its origins and a common aversion to its
neighbours".
If there is any truth to
Huxley's remark, the recent bloody border clashes between the Afghan and
Pakistani military forces illustrate the common aversion of the Afghans towards
their antagonistic eastern neighbours, Pakistan.
The incident, which left three border guards and two children dead
on the Afghan side of the Torkham crossing in eastern Afghanistan, stirred
anger throughout the country.
Transcending internal differences, Afghans poured into streets in
protest and some began marching towards Torkham to render support to the Afghan
National Army.
A video clip has gone viral on
the social media, showing a group of men, claiming to belong to the Taliban
forces, declaring war on Pakistan and urging others to join in defending
Afghanistan's honour and territorial integrity.
Face-saving
attempt
Many Afghan observers think
that the incursion was a face-saving attempt by Islamabad to divert domestic
attention from its recent setbacks, particularly the US drone attack that
killed Taliban leader, Mulla Mansour, in Pakistani territory.
Other disconcerting events of late include the US
shift of policy, indicating the end of favouritism to Pakistan, and the opening
of Chabahar port, a collaboration of Iran, India and Afghanistan that could
isolate Pakistan in regional trade activities.
Yet others think that Pakistan was testing the waters and was
trying to take advantage of what it perceived as a vulnerable moment in
Afghanistan.
A year that has been marked
with the highest military and civilian casualty figures and increased political
discord in Kabul would probably be an opportune time to settle the disputed
border issue.
In either case, Pakistan's
calculus proved wrong. The seemingly disarrayed, multiethnic Afghan nation came
together and showed a common aversion to their aggressive neighbour.
Beyond a show of unity in the
face of foreign aggression, however, the phenomenon signals a wider shift of
dynamics in the two neighbours' historically thorny relationship.
The majority of Afghans believe
that since the days of the Afghan resistance against the Soviet invasion in the
1980s, Pakistan has been playing a ruthless game of manipulation with both the
Afghans and their largest benefactor, the US.
Indispensable
ally
Since 2001, posing as an
indispensable ally in the war against terrorism, Pakistan has been benefitting
from a lavish US military and development aid, while continuing to provide a
safe haven for the Taliban and the Haqqani network.
The two groups have been responsible for tens of thousands of
Afghan casualties and more than 3,500 US military and civilian fatalities.
In the political arena too,
Pakistan had skillfully presented itself as the key to peace in Afghanistan and
in the war against international terrorism, while threatening the Americans
that turning away from Pakistan would result in "nuclear terrorism".
Some argue that Pakistan's
interference in Afghan's internal affairs is driven by its insecurity about the
Durand Line, the disputed border demarcation upon which the Torkham crossing
sits.
As soon as Kabul accepts it as
the official dividing line, the argument goes, Pakistan will stop its meddling.
While there are ways to resolve the Durand issue
through pragmatic and mutually beneficial formulas, Pakistan has been fixated
on imposing recognition of the border by Afghanistan without making any
concessions.
Pakistan's ambitions, however, are greater. Their doctrine of
gaining "strategic depth" in Afghanistan, which is justified by their
fear of an attack from India, is one of the reasons for Islamabad's relentless
efforts to install a puppet government in Kabul.
The ISI intelligence agency's
grossly misguided Taliban project eventually gave birth to various groups of
Pakistani Taliban, the survival of al-Qaeda and the harbouring of various
Central Asian and Chinese radical groups.
But Pakistan could not have
become a godfather of sorts to most of the world's terrorist organisations had
it not been for the puzzling acquiescence, over the past 15 years, of the
United States.
Whether it was a case of
prolonged underestimation, a strong and generous Pakistani lobby in Washington,
or simply a chaotic AfPak strategy - or lack thereof - the US did not challenge
Pakistan's behaviour in any serious and consistent manner.
But, finally this spring,
American policy-makers felt the fatigue from Islamabad's double games. In
March, the US Congress began to voice doubts about the continuation of the flow
of US aid to Pakistan.
In May, Congress passed a bill
imposing strict conditions on a $450m aid package to Pakistan and opposed the
financing of eight F-16 jet fighters that would be granted to Pakistan through
the Foreign Military Financing scheme.
Since 2002, the average annual
US aid to Pakistan has been roughly $2bn. In 2010 alone, Pakistan received
about $4.5bn in military and development aid from the US. Yet, public opinion
polls in Pakistan show that the majority of Pakistanis view the US as an enemy.
The Afghan government's policy
of genuinely trying to make peace with its neighbour and changing Pakistan's
Taliban game was initiated at the beginning of 2015.
China, a long-time ally of
Pakistan, and the US, the biggest donor of Pakistan, got on board, and the
Quadrilateral Group - along with Afghanistan and Pakistan - launched a fresh
round of peace efforts.
This, along with several regional
economic cooperation initiatives involving Central, West and South Asian states
provided Islamabad with the perfect opportunity to turn around and abandon its
Taliban project.
But, Pakistan missed the chance
and stubbornly stuck to its old Afghanistan policy, and the Taliban expanded
and intensified its onslaught.
The Afghans' reaction to the
recent border incident represents the culmination of over three decades of
frustration with Pakistani malfeasance. They have fought the British and Soviet
empires against all odds. If pressured and humiliated further, the Afghans
might take on Pakistan.
Therefore, while the killing of
the former Taliban leader, Mulla Mansour, the imposition of conditions on aid
to Pakistan and the expansion of military role in Afghanistan are positive
signals in the US policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, staying the course will
be the determining factor in changing Pakistan's behaviour.
Helena Malikyar is an Afghan
political analyst and historian.
The views expressed in this
article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's
editorial policy.
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