5 January, UNCIP Resolutions, and the Illusion of Choice in Kashmir. By Dr Shabir Choudhry, 5 January 2026

 5 January, UNCIP Resolutions, and the Illusion of Choice in Kashmir. By Dr Shabir Choudhry, 5 January 2026

Every year on 5 January, sections of opinion in Pakistan and parts of Jammu and Kashmir mark the date as if it confirms Pakistan’s moral and legal position on Kashmir. India is condemned, Pakistan is portrayed as the aggrieved party, and Kashmiris are urged to endorse a narrative that collapses under serious historical and legal examination.

A careful reading of UNCIP resolutions, combined with Pakistan’s conduct—both diplomatic and domestic—tells a very different story.

The Standstill Agreement and the First Breach

Before the Partition of India, the State of Jammu and Kashmir signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan, not with India, as India wished to discuss this matter further. That agreement required maintenance of the status quo pending a final decision.

Pakistan violated this agreement.

On 22 October 1947, armed tribesmen, backed, supplied, and facilitated by Pakistan and under the command of Pakistani officers, entered Jammu and Kashmir. This was not a spontaneous uprising but a properly organised and managed armed intervention. Facing the collapse of authority and an existential threat, the ruler of the State, Maharaja Hari Singh, asked India for help, which was only made available after an accession to India. This was the same accession document used by India and Pakistan under the same legal framework as other princely states.

Accession was therefore a consequence of the Pakistani aggression, not its cause. If there had been no aggression, there would have been no need for the Maharaja to accede to India, hence we could have had an independent State, something the Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir wanted.

UN Involvement: What the Security Council Actually Decided

India referred the matter to the UN Security Council under provisions that could only offer a mediation and discussion, and not any enforcement. The most authoritative UN texts on Kashmir are:

• UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948
• UNCIP Resolution of 5 January 1949

These resolutions were drafted after UNCIP visited both India and Pakistan and assessed the ground situation.

What the 13 August 1948 Resolution Clearly States

The UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948 establishes a strict sequence of obligations. It states:

“Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State of Jammu and Kashmir.”

(UNCIP Resolution, 13 August 1948, Part I)

Only after Pakistan’s complete withdrawal, the resolution adds:

“India agrees to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State… retaining only such forces as may be necessary for the maintenance of law and order.” (Part II)

 

This sequencing is decisive. Pakistan was required to withdraw fully and unconditionally first because the UN regarded Pakistan as the aggressor. India’s withdrawal was conditional upon Pakistan’s compliance.

 

Pakistan never fulfilled this obligation, yet for decades has claimed that India blocked UN implementation.

“Future Status” — and How Pakistan Closed the Door on Independence

The 13 August 1948 Resolution used the phrase:

“The future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people.”

 

This wording was significant. It did not limit outcomes. It implicitly left room for independence. It was Pakistan that objected.

Pakistan proposed an amendment insisting that the people of Jammu and Kashmir be given only two options:

• Accession to India
• Accession to Pakistan

In doing so, Pakistan formally curtailed the Kashmiri right to independence—a fact rarely acknowledged in official discourse.

5 January 1949: Procedure Without Preconditions Met

The 5 January 1949 Resolution elaborated procedures for a plebiscite, but it explicitly reaffirmed that this process was contingent upon demilitarisation, beginning with Pakistan’s withdrawal.

Since Pakistan never withdrew, the mechanism never moved beyond paper.

Marking 5 January while ignoring this foundational failure is selective memory, not principled advocacy.

From Two Options to One: The Reality on the Ground

Even the two-option framework proposed by Pakistan exists only in theory. In practice:

• Anyone in Pakistan or Pakistan-administered Kashmir who argues that India’s entry was legal, based on accession by the ruler,
• Or who acknowledges that Pakistan entered Kashmir illegally,
• Or who even intellectually supports accession to India,

is routinely branded:

• Anti-Pakistan
• Anti-Islam
• A traitor
• An Indian agent

Such individuals—and often their families—face intimidation, social exclusion, legal harassment, and threats.

This reality means that only one option is permitted in public life.

A choice that cannot be freely expressed is not a choice. A plebiscite under fear is not self-determination.

Pakistan’s Record with Its Own Refugees

Claims of moral concern for Kashmiris ring hollow when examined alongside Pakistan’s broader record:

• Bihari Muslims, who sided with Pakistan in 1971, remain stranded in camps in Bangladesh decades later.
• Many Kashmiri migrants to Pakistan remain poorly settled, economically marginalised, and politically voiceless.
• “Azad Jammu and Kashmir” lacks genuine autonomy, with real authority concentrated in Islamabad.

This does not reflect a state deeply committed to the dignity or political agency of displaced Muslims or Kashmiris.

Conclusion: Law, History, and Honest Reckoning

The historical and legal record is clear:

• Pakistan violated the Standstill Agreement.
• Pakistan initiated armed intervention.
• UNCIP required Pakistan’s complete withdrawal first.
• Pakistan never complied.
• Pakistan narrowed Kashmiri options and eliminated independence.
• Pakistan’s political culture suppresses dissenting Kashmiri voices.

To commemorate 5 January without acknowledging these facts is not solidarity with Kashmir—it is participation in a carefully maintained illusion.

Justice for Jammu and Kashmir cannot be built on selective history. It begins with truth, not slogans, and with recognising Kashmiris as subjects of rights, not instruments of state narratives.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.

Email: Drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com