When Judicial Courage Became a Career-Ending Offence
Military rule in Pakistan did not rely solely on suspending the constitution or issuing Provisional Constitutional Orders. It also relied on demonstrative punishment — carefully chosen examples meant to signal to institutions where the real limits of independence lay. The judiciary, in particular, was disciplined not through mass purges alone, but through selective humiliation, sidelining, and replacement. An episode from the early Zia period illustrates this logic with unusual clarity.
An Episode from the Zia Era: Judicial Independence and Its Price
In September 1977, following the arrest of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, lawyers of the Pakistan Peoples Party filed a bail application before the Lahore High Court. Not a single judge was willing to hear the case. The fear of displeasing General Zia-ul-Haq had paralysed the bench.
Justice K.M.A. Samdani, then the senior-most judge of the Lahore High Court and the expected next Chief Justice, agreed to hear the matter. Despite intense pressure, he granted Bhutto bail in the case relating to the murder of Ahmed Raza Kasuri. Bhutto was released — only to be rearrested by the military three days later.
The decision angered General Zia-ul-Haq. Justice Samdani was removed from the High Court and reassigned as Federal Law Secretary, bypassing him for the position of Chief Justice. Instead, Justice Maulvi Mushtaq was appointed.
Shortly thereafter, during a meeting of federal secretaries, General Zia reportedly warned the participants that if they did not “behave,” he would “strip them of their trousers.” While the civilian bureaucrats remained silent, Justice Samdani responded by asking how many generals the dictator had stripped in the same manner, adding that if the generals were subjected to such treatment first, the civilians would comply voluntarily.
The meeting ended abruptly. Later, when General Zia demanded an apology, Justice Samdani agreed — but only if he were allowed to repeat his words publicly in another meeting. No such meeting was convened.
In 1981, when judges were required to take an oath under the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), Justice Samdani refused. He returned home instead.
History remembers Justice K.M.A. Samdani not because such judges were common, but because they were rare.
The significance of this episode lies not in the personal courage of one judge, but in the institutional lesson it conveyed. Justice Samdani’s removal was not an aberration; it was a message. Judicial independence was permitted only so long as it did not obstruct the political objectives of the ruling elite. Those who complied advanced; those who resisted were marginalised, regardless of seniority or competence. The subsequent enforcement of the PCO merely formalised what had already been demonstrated in practice: that constitutional authority flowed upward from power, not downward from law.
This is not just a colourful story about General Zia’s arrogance. This revealing episode from the Zia period illustrates how judicial independence was actively punished rather than passively eroded. It demonstrates:
- How judicial independence was punished, not merely ignored
- How personal courage in judges was systematically neutralised
- How the judiciary was re-engineered through fear, inducement, and procedural manipulation
- How the PCO mechanism functioned as a loyalty filter
- How military rule did not merely override courts — it disciplined them
Justice K.M.A. Samdani is not the hero here in a romantic sense; he is evidence of:
What happens to judges who refuse to internalise authoritarian discipline?
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