Sunday, 9 August 2015

Indian Diplomacy Fashioning A New Narrative, by Bhaskar Roy

Indian Diplomacy Fashioning A New Narrative, by Bhaskar Roy
From the very first day Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi jumped into foreign policy. By inviting leaders of all SAARC nations, Mr, Modi underscored his desire to promote a “neighbourhood first” foreign policy. This was a notable departure from the past.
It was well known that economic development was high on his agenda and a friendly and cooperative neighbourhood with a shared and mutually supportive action plan would make a win-win situation for all. This strategy is well on the way. The only impediment remains Pakistan – not a surprising fact. With infusion of monetary aid from the US, and large scale investment and defence assistance from China, Pakistan’s military-politico establishment views the situation in its favour and is quite happy disturbing the development infrastructure of SAARC, if only to hurt India. The manner in which events are shaping, Pakistan may eventually be left behind like a non-performing partner of this regional group.
In two recent speeches (July 17 in New Delhi and July 20 in Singapore) Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar gave an overview of Mr. Modi’s initiative and success till date and his future ambitions. This is new approach, as foreign secretaries have generally been reticent on publicly airing the government’s policies and thought process. The Indian public has greatly benefitted with the knowledge. Mr. Jaishankar is a highly experienced diplomat, having been ambassador to China, closely associated with the process of the India-US nuclear deal from the time of the UPA-led Congress government, and also served as ambassador to the US, before being brought back by Mr. Modi as the foreign secretary. He is the prime minister’s trusted man and carrier of his policies.
There are two old but important strategic visions that need to be mentioned here. One is “he who rules Central Asia rules the world”. The other is “he who rules the Indian Ocean rules the world”. Both sayings were apt not only for their times but continue to be relevant today, though total rule over either by any one country today is out of the question. But the quantum of influence matters.
Mr. Modi, who has already visited 25 countries, toured four Central Asian countries which were generally neglected by New Delhi. He also visited the Indian Ocean countries including Sri Lanka with goodwill and support. The Maldives was the only exception because of politically irregular developments in that country. Impending summits of the Pacific Islands and African states will take India’s friendly profile wider in a concrete manner.
Mr. Jaishankar spoke about them as signals of different times, of “greater confidence, more initiative, certainly stronger determination,” as expressions of growth in India’s capabilities,
Apart from the neighbourhood policy, the main opportunities and challenges to India’s foreign policy relates to the US and China with Pakistan in between. Other relationships attach themselves to this ballpark variously, as per circumstances.
Mr. Jaishankar talked about a China policy that triangulates security, economic cooperation and international politics. He referred to the Xian (China) meeting between Mr. Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping as a high point from India’s perspective in bilateral relations, which would have been difficult to envisage a year ago. But what about real issues? The Chinese are masters in propaganda and show up with statements from which they withdraw whenever they wish. If the interlocutor is seen as someone who gets impressed by huge shows, the task of the Chinese is made even easier.
It is difficult to accept that India-China relations have undergone an “orbital jump” or a quantum jump in the last one year. If Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi agreed to describe India and China as, “two major powers in the region and the world”, it should have translated into some action on Beijing’s part.
How is the triangulation policy with China working? The latest is on terrorism, one of India’s key security interests. China vetoed India’s move in the UN Security Council to designate Mumbai carnage mastermind, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, as an international terrorist. Mr. Modi took up this issue with Xi Jinping at Ufa, Russia, but was rebuffed. The Chinese made this public immediately in a press conference in Beijing.
In international politics, China has declined to support India’s candidature as a permanent member of an expanded UN Security Council. It is not in China’s interest to push through reform of the United Nations and certainly not an expansion of permanent members with veto powers. An expansion could mean membership of Japan and Germany certainly, and perhaps that of South Africa and Brazil. It could also mean a change in veto power. India was supported by the other four members of the P-5, who also supported India’s move on Lakhvi.
China says it supports a greater role for India in the UN but this means absolutely nothing – only a tactic of deception. There can be no reform or restructure of the UN without expansion of the P-5 and a redefining of their powers.
Beijing continues to block India’s entry in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) where the membership issue requires a consensus. It opposed the India-US nuclear deal and NSG clearance till the US intervened at the highest level – US President George W. Bush had to call Chinese President Jiang Zemin.
The India-China border issue will continue to remain unresolved till China finds it strategically convenient to resolve it, as it did with Russia and the former Soviet states.
On Chinese investments in India, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) should pay greater heed to the advice of the intelligence agencies. Strategic areas must remain out of bounds, and the Indian private sector may also be appraised accordingly. Unfortunately, the private sector does not seem to be well versed on security issues.
China has demonstrated repeatedly that Pakistan is their mainstay in the region and the animosity of Islamabad and Rawalpindi toward India will continue to be exploited, short of a full-scale war with India.
The improvement of India-China relations began very slowly with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988. The movements were cautious on both sides. The first break through was marked by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to China in 1993, when the Peace and Tranquillity Treaty on the border was signed. Further improvements followed thereafter.
Chinese leader, late Deng Xiaoping saw stability in the country’s periphery as a prerequisite for its drive for reform, opening up and economic development. That policy continues to some extent but not entirely. Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “hide your strength, bide your time” began to be questioned around 2004, but most definitely from 2008. It assumed a new surge from 2012, when Xi Jinping came to power. China is now both confident and assertive, having become the world’s biggest economy with more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, and the third most powerful armed force, still growing at a fast pace.
India, of course, has to work with China and deal with China with confidence. It must be remembered that the Chinese respect strength. And India has to act to demand its space in Asia and the world.
The post-cold war India-US relations have changed positively with the shift of global balance of power and interests. Both the US and China pursue bilateral relations of mutual benefit, but also with serious strategic differences. Both are pursuing a “great power relationship” which has elements of a new cold war. The US seeks a relationship with India which can indirectly counter China, and Beijing is ever suspicious of and alert to it. India has handled this complicated challenge astutely.
It must be recognised, however, that a strong contingent of cold warriors still remain in the US foreign policy establishment. They argue for China because Beijing joined the USA in a strategic anti-Soviet axis, which included Pakistan. The same influencers, fathered by Henry Kissinger hold a pro-Pakistan and anti-India position. They were visible during the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war, the Indian nuclear test in 1998, and during the India-US nuclear deal negotiations. Things are changing but not enough.
Although communism is dead in Russia, these forces have helped push Russia into the arms of China. Russia is joining China in countering the US pivot in the Asia-Pacific region, pushing back initial indications of a possible Russia-Japan rapprochement. These are difficult waters to navigate. Mr. Modi’s Russia visit for the BRICs and SCO conference needs to be followed up by more robust engagement.
Pakistan, however, is going nowhere. No doubt India has to engage with Pakistan, but the off again, on again approach is self-defeating and only gives Pakistan an upper hand. Being helpful and co-operative to neighbours is certainly positive but being soft to a semi-rogue neighbour which takes every opportunity to harm India is weak policy.
Serious mistakes have been made in the past regarding Pakistan and terrorism. It is very difficult but not impossible to retrieve the situation. Pakistan is preparing to take India to the UN General Assembly, accusing India of terrorism in Pakistan. This requires a well-researched, calculated and effective response at appropriate fora.
An improvement of relations with Pakistan should not be seen in absolute terms. This is a long term path and should be walked on accordingly, affirmative action being taken when required. With its strategic geographical location, Pakistan has big powers quietly appeasing it. Hence, much wider diplomacy is required to hold Pakistan accountable for terrorism.
Under Mr. Modi, there has been a broadening of diplomacy, with the Indian Ocean countries and the Indo-Pacific receiving greater attention. But the underpinning, that is, the defence sector continues to lag. With a 7,500 km long coastline, strengthening of the navy, backed by long rage air force is paramount.
Unfortunately, the navy’s budget was reduced. In contrast, Pakistan will acquire eight more submarines from China, whose navy is growing rapidly, with nuclear submarines, a modern 40,000 ton landing craft under construction, five aircraft carriers planned, and one nearing completion.
Development must be supported by strong defence, otherwise it will be in jeopardy. India has traditionally paid little importance to military diplomacy, which in today’s global world is unavoidable. China followed the US in indigenous military production, supplying military weapons, aircraft, naval craft and other equipment to smaller countries, it has even reached Peru, supplying missiles! Such supplies buy a lot of influence,
Yoga has been claimed a soft-power success. But a one-off publicity is not enough. There is an urgent requirement of emphatic statements through publicity and propaganda. India’s external publicity is weak, yet publicity is an essential part of foreign policy. A dedicated structure is required, not necessarily under the foreign ministry.
The Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) exists, but mainly serves as a parking place for Foreign Service officers waiting for their next assignment. Here, out of the box thinking is required and the country has no dearth of talented human resources.
But publicity needs to go beyond culture, and policy and position on issues must be highlighted.
All achievements cannot be rested in the last one year. Most have clear lines of continuity while in some cases dormant policies have been given new life. The image of a divided polity is dangerous and will not serve the country at all.
It is time Mr. Modi enlisted other members of his cabinet to promote foreign policy. It cannot be a one-man army. Time is limited and the prime minister must spend much more time on domestic issues. Follow up and action on promises made and assurances given is a must. Otherwise credibility will be lost.
Optics is very important. Domestic developments impact foreign policy for foreign interlocutors view a country as a whole.
Finally, ministers must learn to speak in one voice. Misplaced bravado and intemperate statements could seriously impact sensitive foreign policy and diplomacy negatively. Some people, therefore, need to be quarantined.
*The writer is New Delhi based strategic analyst. He can be reached at e-mail grouchohart@yahoo.com


AJK - Asking for the moon, Tariq Naqash

AJK - Asking for the moon, Tariq Naqash

After its liberation in October, 1947, the 13,297 sq km territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) remained without a proper constitution for over two decades. However, as it draws close to the 68th anniversary of liberation, the region still remains at the crossroads in its struggle for constitutional reforms aimed at empowering the government and institutions for the benefit of the public at large, to which they are answerable and accountable.
At the same time, there have also been serious voices calling for reshaping the region’s relationship with Pakistan albeit as a provisional arrangement until the final disposition of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir.
On October 24, 1947, a ‘revolutionary’ government was installed in this territory as Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, with Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan as its founding president.
According to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Resolution of August 13, 1948, the territory of AJK is to be administered by the “local authority” under the Commission’s scrutiny.
Constitutional confusion has a detrimental effect on governance
Although the liberated territories of the State are not expressly named in the Constitution of Pakistan, it states that Pakistan’s territories include “such States and territories as are or may be included in Pakistan, whether by accession or otherwise.”
Though both AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan are territories “otherwise included” in Pakistan under the UNCIP Resolutions, Pakistan has however always treated the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory, and that’s why the liberated territories of the erstwhile princely state are not declared as part of the Federation of Pakistan.
This is also why Article 257 of the Constitution of Pakistan states that “when the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State.”
Experts say that it also suggests, inter alia, that AJK should have a government enjoying internal autonomy.
Nevertheless, for a long time the affairs of AJK were practically run by the ministry of Kashmir affairs, which was established in March 1949. There was no proper constitution and no democracy, and even though the region used to have a President it was in effect the ministry of Kashmir affairs that called the shots. The ministry would nominate AJK president (chief executive) on the “recommendation” of the working committee of Muslim Conference, then the sole political party on this side of the divide. The removal of the president was also done apparently in line with the recommendation of the same forum.
Basharat Ahmed Shaikh, a retired judge of the AJK Supreme Court, recalls that in the early days of AJK, even demanding better treatment for its citizens or equal salaries for its officials, or asking a better physical infrastructure, was considered an anti-state activity.
“A pamphlet written by me in 1964, merely inviting the attention of concerned quarters drew the wrath of the Pakistani authorities so much so that I was incarcerated in the infamous Dalai interrogation centre for several months,” he recalls.
However, the situation started improving in the late 1960s and early 1970s as the AJK people and their leadership continued their struggle for a proper constitution and governance setup.
The first formal Constitution was drafted in 1970 and is commonly referred to as Act 1970. It was under the same constitution that presidential and Legislative Assembly elections were held for the first time on the basis of adult franchise.
All executive powers and the corresponding legislative powers were vested, respectively, in the President and the Legislative Assembly except in respect of defence and security, currency and the external affairs. The Assembly was also empowered to amend the said Act.
In 1971, the Assembly affected an amendment in that Act, without having to seek prior permission of the government of Pakistan, and gave fundamental rights to the people, writ jurisdiction to the High Court and established an Apex (appellate) Court.
Not only were the powers to appoint judges to the superior courts vested in the AJK President, the subjects of foreign trade and foreign aid were also in the domain of the AJK government, raising the profile of its internal autonomy.
However, in 2015, 45 years after the promulgation of Act 1970, the region faces retrogression to post-1970 days, thanks to the Interim Constitution Act, 1974 that is in force today.
The new Constitution introduced a parliamentary form of government, but drastically curtailed the powers of the government in Muzaffarabad.
“There is no denying the fact that Act 1974 reversed the progress towards empowerment of the people and their government in this territory,” says senior lawyer Raza Ali Khan, also a former president of AJK Supreme Court Bar Association.
And there are good reasons to subscribe to his notion.
Under the Act 1974, a new institution was established by the name of AJK Council “to serve as a bridge” between the governments in Muzaffarabad and Islamabad.
Prime Minister (chief executive) of Pakistan heads it as chairman, while the Federal Minister for Kashmir affairs happens to be its in-charge minister.
Practically this institution has besmirched the representative character of the AJK government by divesting it of many powers that it enjoyed under the previous constitution.
For example, the Council has powers to legislate about 52 subjects. The AJK Department of Inland Revenue, AG Office and the Directorate General of Audit fall under the administrative control of Council. Besides, it enjoys authoritative role in the appointment of AJK high and supreme courts judges and the chief election commissioner.
The Council comprises six members elected by the AJK Legislative Assembly and as many nominated by the chairman (Pakistani prime minister) from the Parliament of Pakistan. The elected members are toothless as far as functions of the Council are concerned, because all powers are vested in the chairman, most of which are exercised on his behalf by the federal minister in charge.
Ironically, neither the chairman nor the in-charge minister is answerable to the AJK institutions, because none of them takes oath under the AJK Constitution that grants them these positions.
“The Prime Minister of Pakistan exercising full authority in AJK is a violation of the Constitution of Pakistan,” maintains retired justice Shaikh.
“I have been actively associated with the Pakistan Movement since the age of 11 years. I still look up to Pakistan with the same reverence, but this does not change the fact that the Prime Minister of Pakistan is not the representative of the people of AJK; nor is he answerable to them: he is not even responsible to the institution he is heading as chairman,” he adds.
The Council retains 20 per cent of the income tax generated from the AJK territory as well as entire license fees collected from the telecom companies operating in AJK. The remaining 80 per cent of income tax is given to the AJK government as a grant.
There has always been a lot of hue and cry against alleged corruption in the Council, but that has always turned out to be a cry in the wilderness. Neither the people at the helm in Pakistan nor the otherwise hawkish media has ever bothered to take stock of this.
“The overwhelming feeling among the Kashmiris is that the Council is drastically hampering the ability of the elected government in Muzaffarabad to take key decisions regarding finance, public policy and socio economic development,” says Tariq Masud, a former bureaucrat who now heads a nongovernmental organisation — Centre for Peace, Development and Reforms (CPDR).
“Equipping the AJK Council with legislative, executive and financial powers is by no means justified or warranted. The way this institution controls important subjects has marginalised the powers of AJK government over the area’s affairs,” he maintains.
“In fact, it leaves AJK with little autonomy or status.”
In October 2009, the then Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani announced in Muzaffarabad to constitute a committee to review and suggest long due reforms in Act 1974. But the announcement did not see the light of the day despite reminders from here.
Meanwhile, with the passage of 18th and 19th constitutional amendments in Pakistan that handed more authority to provinces in their resources, AJK hopes were rekindled regarding empowerment of the region and its institutions on the same pattern.
However, people are yet to see any glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel.
In January 2011, CPDR held a first formal roundtable of stakeholders from all shades of society for an appraisal of the existing arrangements between Muzaffarabad and Islamabad and deliberations on the possible constitutional reforms.
“In fact people believe and rightly so that the existing interim Constitution has undermined the status of the AJK government, virtually rendering it as an ineffective and impotent body with no executive powers,” maintains analyst Ershad Mahmud, also an office bearer of CPDR.
In mid-2012, the then federal minister for Kashmir affairs Mian Manzoor Wattoo invited Kashmiri leadership for an inconclusive “discussion” on constitutional reforms and around same time a special parliamentary committee was also constituted by the AJK government to recommend suitable reforms.
The committee, including eight members from the Assembly and one from the Council, tabled its “recommendations for the amendments” in the Assembly on June 23 this year, almost three years after its formation.
Though the recommendations are not ideal in the eyes of many, at least they address some of the concerns, as they include, among other things, transfer of all powers, currently exercised by the AJK Council, to the AJK government, except for the responsibilities of Pakistan government under the UNCIP resolutions.
However, as the saying goes there are many a slip twixt the cup and lip.
On June 24, Matloob Inqilabi, AJK minister and head of the committee, told media that the recommendations were approved by the Assembly and forwarded to the AJK Law Department to be presented in the Assembly in shape of a bill.
But so far there seems to be no progress, mainly because of restrictions in the Act on making amendments about the issues related to the government of Pakistan.
Section 33 of Act 1974 says (though) the provisions of this Act can be amended, but no amendment can be made in section 33, section 31 and section 56 ‘without prior approval of the government of Pakistan.’
Section 31 restricts the Assembly and Council from making any law concerning the responsibilities of the government of Pakistan under the UNCIP Resolutions; the defence and security of AJK; the current coin or the issue of any bills, notes or other paper currency; or the external affairs of AJK including foreign trade and foreign aid.
Whereas section 56 says that nothing in Act 1974 shall derogate from the responsibilities of the government of Pakistan in relation to the matters specified in section 31 or prevent the Government in Pakistan from taking such action that it may consider necessary or expedient for the effective discharge of those responsibilities.
The AJK law department itself appears to be at sixes and sevens on the issue.
“Since the recommendations were made by the committee comprising members of both houses, it should have been endorsed by the joint sitting,” maintains law secretary Idrees Abbasi.
“However, we have prepared the draft bill, which will be sent to the cabinet for a decision,” he adds. “After that the bill will be sent to the government of Pakistan, through the ministry of Kashmir affairs, for its approval. Only after that approval, it can be tabled in any of the two houses,” says Abbasi.
And that stage seems to be about who’ll bell the cat.
“Since the recommendations by the parliamentary committee fetter the arbitrary powers of the prime minister of Pakistan and federal minister, no wonder the government in Muzaffarabad is bereft of the hardihood and determination to actualise the common desire for constitutional reforms,” says lawyer Raza Ali Khan.
“Those who are running a parallel government in AJK from Islamabad through the AJK Council, spending and squandering the resources of Kashmiris without any fear of accountability, would never let this move succeed,” he adds.
One school of thought believes that the stumbling blocks to constitutional reforms in AJK actually stem from region’s non-representation in Pakistani institutions.
Syed Manzoor Hussain Gillani, a former acting chief justice of the AJK Supreme Court, leads this school of thought from the front.
“The government of Pakistan should ensure full-fledged constitutional, political and representational rights to the people of the liberated territories of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the pattern of other provinces,” he pleads, referring to AJK and GB.
Administered by Pakistan, these liberated territories (AJK and GB) are subject to all the liabilities and duties of a province, but not entitled to the rights of a province, guaranteed to the four provinces by the Constitution of Pakistan, he regrets.
“It is the future status of these territories that is in dispute, and not the rights of the territories and the people living therein.”
From the platform of his Association for the Rights of People of Jammu and Kashmir (ARJK), Mr Gillani stresses that AJK and GB should be given de-facto status of a province with provisional representation in the Parliament and institutions established under the Constitution of Pakistan, such as the Council of Common Interests (CCI), National Economic Council (NEC) National Finance Commission (NFC) and Indus River System Authority (IRSA), etc.
Interestingly, in its manifesto for the 2013 general elections, PML-N had declared that it technically considered AJK and GB as provinces, equal to Punjab, Sindh, KP and Balochistan.
In the same context, it had pledged that the functions, responsibilities and financial powers of AJK and GB will be gradually brought at par with the provinces and their legislative assemblies will be empowered.
However, more than two years on, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has not found time to honour that commitment, even though Raja Farooq Haider, his party’s president in AJK, has always vociferously opposed the Council in its present form.
The status quo is multiplying frustration in the region.
“If Pakistan is our elder brother, as we hear most of the time, it should feel contented with our empowerment, at least on a par with its federating units if not more than them … After all we are not crying for the moon,” says analyst and civil society activist Khizar Hayat Abbasi.
“At the moment, we are being made to believe that the vested interests in Islamabad are hell-bent on perpetuating the status quo — to continue to keep us impuissant and dependent.”
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 9th, 2015



AJK - Asking for the moon, Tariq Naqash

AJK - Asking for the moon, Tariq Naqash

After its liberation in October, 1947, the 13,297 sq km territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) remained without a proper constitution for over two decades. However, as it draws close to the 68th anniversary of liberation, the region still remains at the crossroads in its struggle for constitutional reforms aimed at empowering the government and institutions for the benefit of the public at large, to which they are answerable and accountable.
At the same time, there have also been serious voices calling for reshaping the region’s relationship with Pakistan albeit as a provisional arrangement until the final disposition of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir.
On October 24, 1947, a ‘revolutionary’ government was installed in this territory as Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, with Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan as its founding president.
According to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Resolution of August 13, 1948, the territory of AJK is to be administered by the “local authority” under the Commission’s scrutiny.
Constitutional confusion has a detrimental effect on governance

Although the liberated territories of the State are not expressly named in the Constitution of Pakistan, it states that Pakistan’s territories include “such States and territories as are or may be included in Pakistan, whether by accession or otherwise.”
Though both AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan are territories “otherwise included” in Pakistan under the UNCIP Resolutions, Pakistan has however always treated the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory, and that’s why the liberated territories of the erstwhile princely state are not declared as part of the Federation of Pakistan.
This is also why Article 257 of the Constitution of Pakistan states that “when the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State.”
Experts say that it also suggests, inter alia, that AJK should have a government enjoying internal autonomy.
Nevertheless, for a long time the affairs of AJK were practically run by the ministry of Kashmir affairs, which was established in March 1949. There was no proper constitution and no democracy, and even though the region used to have a President it was in effect the ministry of Kashmir affairs that called the shots. The ministry would nominate AJK president (chief executive) on the “recommendation” of the working committee of Muslim Conference, then the sole political party on this side of the divide. The removal of the president was also done apparently in line with the recommendation of the same forum.
Basharat Ahmed Shaikh, a retired judge of the AJK Supreme Court, recalls that in the early days of AJK, even demanding better treatment for its citizens or equal salaries for its officials, or asking a better physical infrastructure, was considered an anti-state activity.
“A pamphlet written by me in 1964, merely inviting the attention of concerned quarters drew the wrath of the Pakistani authorities so much so that I was incarcerated in the infamous Dalai interrogation centre for several months,” he recalls.
However, the situation started improving in the late 1960s and early 1970s as the AJK people and their leadership continued their struggle for a proper constitution and governance setup.
The first formal Constitution was drafted in 1970 and is commonly referred to as Act 1970. It was under the same constitution that presidential and Legislative Assembly elections were held for the first time on the basis of adult franchise.
All executive powers and the corresponding legislative powers were vested, respectively, in the President and the Legislative Assembly except in respect of defence and security, currency and the external affairs. The Assembly was also empowered to amend the said Act.
Although the liberated territories of the State are not expressly named in the Constitution of Pakistan, it states that Pakistan’s territories include “such States and territories as are or may be included in Pakistan, whether by accession or otherwise.”
In 1971, the Assembly affected an amendment in that Act, without having to seek prior permission of the government of Pakistan, and gave fundamental rights to the people, writ jurisdiction to the High Court and established an Apex (appellate) Court.
Not only were the powers to appoint judges to the superior courts vested in the AJK President, the subjects of foreign trade and foreign aid were also in the domain of the AJK government, raising the profile of its internal autonomy.
However, in 2015, 45 years after the promulgation of Act 1970, the region faces retrogression to post-1970 days, thanks to the Interim Constitution Act, 1974 that is in force today.
The new Constitution introduced a parliamentary form of government, but drastically curtailed the powers of the government in Muzaffarabad.
“There is no denying the fact that Act 1974 reversed the progress towards empowerment of the people and their government in this territory,” says senior lawyer Raza Ali Khan, also a former president of AJK Supreme Court Bar Association.
And there are good reasons to subscribe to his notion.
Under the Act 1974, a new institution was established by the name of AJK Council “to serve as a bridge” between the governments in Muzaffarabad and Islamabad.
Prime Minister (chief executive) of Pakistan heads it as chairman, while the Federal Minister for Kashmir affairs happens to be its in-charge minister.
Practically this institution has besmirched the representative character of the AJK government by divesting it of many powers that it enjoyed under the previous constitution.
For example, the Council has powers to legislate about 52 subjects. The AJK Department of Inland Revenue, AG Office and the Directorate General of Audit fall under the administrative control of Council. Besides, it enjoys authoritative role in the appointment of AJK high and supreme courts judges and the chief election commissioner.
The Council comprises six members elected by the AJK Legislative Assembly and as many nominated by the chairman (Pakistani prime minister) from the Parliament of Pakistan. The elected members are toothless as far as functions of the Council are concerned, because all powers are vested in the chairman, most of which are exercised on his behalf by the federal minister in charge.
Ironically, neither the chairman nor the in-charge minister is answerable to the AJK institutions, because none of them takes oath under the AJK Constitution that grants them these positions.
“The Prime Minister of Pakistan exercising full authority in AJK is a violation of the Constitution of Pakistan,” maintains retired justice Shaikh.
“I have been actively associated with the Pakistan Movement since the age of 11 years. I still look up to Pakistan with the same reverence, but this does not change the fact that the Prime Minister of Pakistan is not the representative of the people of AJK; nor is he answerable to them: he is not even responsible to the institution he is heading as chairman,” he adds.
The Council retains 20 per cent of the income tax generated from the AJK territory as well as entire license fees collected from the telecom companies operating in AJK. The remaining 80 per cent of income tax is given to the AJK government as a grant.
There has always been a lot of hue and cry against alleged corruption in the Council, but that has always turned out to be a cry in the wilderness. Neither the people at the helm in Pakistan nor the otherwise hawkish media has ever bothered to take stock of this.
“The overwhelming feeling among the Kashmiris is that the Council is drastically hampering the ability of the elected government in Muzaffarabad to take key decisions regarding finance, public policy and socio economic development,” says Tariq Masud, a former bureaucrat who now heads a nongovernmental organisation — Centre for Peace, Development and Reforms (CPDR).
“Equipping the AJK Council with legislative, executive and financial powers is by no means justified or warranted. The way this institution controls important subjects has marginalised the powers of AJK government over the area’s affairs,” he maintains.
“In fact, it leaves AJK with little autonomy or status.”
In October 2009, the then Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani announced in Muzaffarabad to constitute a committee to review and suggest long due reforms in Act 1974. But the announcement did not see the light of the day despite reminders from here.
Meanwhile, with the passage of 18th and 19th constitutional amendments in Pakistan that handed more authority to provinces in their resources, AJK hopes were rekindled regarding empowerment of the region and its institutions on the same pattern.
However, people are yet to see any glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel.
In January 2011, CPDR held a first formal roundtable of stakeholders from all shades of society for an appraisal of the existing arrangements between Muzaffarabad and Islamabad and deliberations on the possible constitutional reforms.
“In fact people believe and rightly so that the existing interim Constitution has undermined the status of the AJK government, virtually rendering it as an ineffective and impotent body with no executive powers,” maintains analyst Ershad Mahmud, also an office bearer of CPDR.
In mid-2012, the then federal minister for Kashmir affairs Mian Manzoor Wattoo invited Kashmiri leadership for an inconclusive “discussion” on constitutional reforms and around same time a special parliamentary committee was also constituted by the AJK government to recommend suitable reforms.
The committee, including eight members from the Assembly and one from the Council, tabled its “recommendations for the amendments” in the Assembly on June 23 this year, almost three years after its formation.
Though the recommendations are not ideal in the eyes of many, at least they address some of the concerns, as they include, among other things, transfer of all powers, currently exercised by the AJK Council, to the AJK government, except for the responsibilities of Pakistan government under the UNCIP resolutions.
However, as the saying goes there are many a slip twixt the cup and lip.
On June 24, Matloob Inqilabi, AJK minister and head of the committee, told media that the recommendations were approved by the Assembly and forwarded to the AJK Law Department to be presented in the Assembly in shape of a bill.
But so far there seems to be no progress, mainly because of restrictions in the Act on making amendments about the issues related to the government of Pakistan.
Section 33 of Act 1974 says (though) the provisions of this Act can be amended, but no amendment can be made in section 33, section 31 and section 56 ‘without prior approval of the government of Pakistan.’
Section 31 restricts the Assembly and Council from making any law concerning the responsibilities of the government of Pakistan under the UNCIP Resolutions; the defence and security of AJK; the current coin or the issue of any bills, notes or other paper currency; or the external affairs of AJK including foreign trade and foreign aid.
Whereas section 56 says that nothing in Act 1974 shall derogate from the responsibilities of the government of Pakistan in relation to the matters specified in section 31 or prevent the Government in Pakistan from taking such action that it may consider necessary or expedient for the effective discharge of those responsibilities.
The AJK law department itself appears to be at sixes and sevens on the issue.
“Since the recommendations were made by the committee comprising members of both houses, it should have been endorsed by the joint sitting,” maintains law secretary Idrees Abbasi.
“However, we have prepared the draft bill, which will be sent to the cabinet for a decision,” he adds. “After that the bill will be sent to the government of Pakistan, through the ministry of Kashmir affairs, for its approval. Only after that approval, it can be tabled in any of the two houses,” says Abbasi.
And that stage seems to be about who’ll bell the cat.
“Since the recommendations by the parliamentary committee fetter the arbitrary powers of the prime minister of Pakistan and federal minister, no wonder the government in Muzaffarabad is bereft of the hardihood and determination to actualise the common desire for constitutional reforms,” says lawyer Raza Ali Khan.
“Those who are running a parallel government in AJK from Islamabad through the AJK Council, spending and squandering the resources of Kashmiris without any fear of accountability, would never let this move succeed,” he adds.
One school of thought believes that the stumbling blocks to constitutional reforms in AJK actually stem from region’s non-representation in Pakistani institutions.
Syed Manzoor Hussain Gillani, a former acting chief justice of the AJK Supreme Court, leads this school of thought from the front.
“The government of Pakistan should ensure full-fledged constitutional, political and representational rights to the people of the liberated territories of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the pattern of other provinces,” he pleads, referring to AJK and GB.
Administered by Pakistan, these liberated territories (AJK and GB) are subject to all the liabilities and duties of a province, but not entitled to the rights of a province, guaranteed to the four provinces by the Constitution of Pakistan, he regrets.
“It is the future status of these territories that is in dispute, and not the rights of the territories and the people living therein.”
From the platform of his Association for the Rights of People of Jammu and Kashmir (ARJK), Mr Gillani stresses that AJK and GB should be given de-facto status of a province with provisional representation in the Parliament and institutions established under the Constitution of Pakistan, such as the Council of Common Interests (CCI), National Economic Council (NEC) National Finance Commission (NFC) and Indus River System Authority (IRSA), etc.
Interestingly, in its manifesto for the 2013 general elections, PML-N had declared that it technically considered AJK and GB as provinces, equal to Punjab, Sindh, KP and Balochistan.
In the same context, it had pledged that the functions, responsibilities and financial powers of AJK and GB will be gradually brought at par with the provinces and their legislative assemblies will be empowered.
However, more than two years on, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has not found time to honour that commitment, even though Raja Farooq Haider, his party’s president in AJK, has always vociferously opposed the Council in its present form.
The status quo is multiplying frustration in the region.
“If Pakistan is our elder brother, as we hear most of the time, it should feel contented with our empowerment, at least on a par with its federating units if not more than them … After all we are not crying for the moon,” says analyst and civil society activist Khizar Hayat Abbasi.
“At the moment, we are being made to believe that the vested interests in Islamabad are hell-bent on perpetuating the status quo — to continue to keep us impuissant and dependent.”
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 9th, 2015



Separatists part of problem not solution, Junaid Qureshi

Separatists part of problem not solution, Junaid Qureshi
Claiming that the separatist groups were the part of Kashmir problem and not its solution, diplomatic secretary foreign affairs of Democratic Liberation Party (DLP) Junaid Qureshi has claimed the pro-freedom camp has become irrelevant and thus it was time for young Kashmiris to take matters into their hand and work for peace.

He also claimed that tripartite dialogues on Kashmir was not possible, and stressed for a need to institutionalized Intra Kashmir dialogue across the LoC between all five units of Kashmir, i.e. Jammu, Ladakh, Valley, Pakistan Administered Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan.

In an exclusive interview with Kashmir Magazine (KNS’s sister organisation), Junaid Qureshi claimed, “The separatist camp has failed to build consensus between Kashmiris. They represent a small but fragmented portion of the population. Barring JKDLP and JKLF, every separatist organization represents the ideology of accession to Pakistan. They propagate of freeing us from the clutches of India and becoming slaves of Pakistan. I call these separatists not Pro-movement or pro-freedom, they actually are pro-slavery leaders.”

“I think it is time for the separatist camp to read the writing on the wall and move aside. It is time for Young Kashmir to take matters into their hand and work for peace,” he added.

Junaid, who is son DLP chairman Hashim Qureshi, claimed the separatist camp was not part of the solution, but rather part of the problem. “They become irrelevant.”

Junaid said that given the current political scenarios in India, Pakistan and Kashmir, holding tripartite dialogues on Kashmir was not possible. “I would rather advocate to take a step back. Why not pitch and aim for a genuine ‘Intra Kashmir dialogue’ before we think about a tripartite dialogue,” he said, adding “We need institutionalized Intra Kashmir Dialogue across the LOC between all five units of Kashmir, i.e. Jammu, Ladakh, Valley, Pakistan Administered Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan.”

Junaid said when “we talk about institutionalized tripartite dialogue, we first will need to determine who will speak on our behalf. Even if we have done that, we will need to determine what they will talk about. Which sentiment, opinion or solutions will they represent? As such, I think that the demand for tripartite dialogue is mere rhetoric and not practical. Intra Kashmir dialogue will have to precede any kind of tripartite dialogue, as then only a tripartite dialogue can yield tangible results.”

He said the religious radical elements have been exploiting the Kashmir issue which could have disastrous consequences in the future as “global terrorist organizations” have expressed their desire to expand their warzone into Kashmir as a new battleground.

“We need to understand the geo-political situation around us. I think the radicalization of the Kashmiri youth is part of a larger conspiracy. Daesh is gaining ground in Iraq and Syria. There are even reports that they might be knocking at the door in Afghanistan,” he said, adding that the Pakistani military establishment will not allow these elements to flourish in cities like Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar.

“They might be diverted towards India and Kashmir. This radicalization of the Kashmiri youth seems to be the foundation for what is coming next. There is indeed a threat of the Islamic fundamental gun of the Taliban and even Daesh which could be exported to Kashmir and this radicalization of the Kashmiri youth is perhaps groundwork for such a disastrous scenario.”


Friday, 7 August 2015

JIHADI THREAT TO INDIA IS NEXT DOOR, NOT IN ARABIA, Ashok Mallik

JIHADI THREAT TO INDIA IS NEXT DOOR, NOT IN ARABIA
Friday, 07 August 2015 | Ashok Mallik 
Pakistan is talking up the Islamic State’s presence in South Asia and the grave threat it poses to India to divert attention from the real issues plaguing bilateral ties and regional peace. India musn’t fall for this propaganda
On August 23 and 24, the National Security Advisers of India and Pakistan will meet in New Delhi. Few if any will hazard a prediction as to the outcome, though it would be prudent to limit expectations. Even so, what can safely be foretold is a media frenzy, non-stop television coverage and Twitter chatter.
The NSA-level talks were announced when the two Prime Ministers met in Ufa, Russia, recently. Governments in India and Pakistan have chosen to interpret the mandate of the upcoming meeting differently. The Pakistanis, particularly the team around Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, said it implied the resumption of the composite dialogue by another name and eventually “all outstanding issues” would be discussed. This was to stave-off criticism at home that the Kashmir dispute had not been mentioned in the joint statement at Ufa.
The Indian side, quizzically, decided not to refute the Pakistani Government’s briefings, arguing off-the-record that it wanted to “keep Nawaz in play” and strengthen the civilian regime vis-à-vis the Army. Many previous Prime Ministers and Governments in Delhi have suffered from the delusion that India has the capacity to bolster a civilian administration in Islamabad against the generals in Rawalpindi. Why somebody as hard-headed as Prime Minsister Narendra Modi seemed to fall for this line, even if temporarily, is not immediately clear.
Nevertheless, the reverie was soon ended by the Pakistani Army, which triggered another round of firing at the border. This diminished any confusion in Delhi and led to an iteration of the idea that India sees the NSA’s conversation as largely limited to terrorism and safeguarding Indians from religious radicalism that can turn violent and spill across the Line of Control or the Radcliffe Line.
In spite of this, the past few days have seen ambiguous messaging from various quarters. A mystifying notion is being spread that the fundamental Islamist challenge to the subcontinent comes from the Islamic State. It is said that the Islamic State is threatening Afghanistan, Pakistan and India and, as such, these countries are equal targets of the militia that has spread mayhem in Syria and Iraq.
Mystifyingly, many seem to have bought into this idea, with the domestic intelligence agencies talking up the Islamic State challenge as they talked up the alleged Al Qaeda threat to the Indian mainland a few years ago.
Papers apparently found in Islamic State hideouts, and probably indicative of outrageous dream scenarios for the Islamic State rather than workbable blueprints, have been cited. Once more, as happens every few years, apocalyptic visions of a final and defining war, of a centuries-old “Khorasan prophecy” and an attack on India (Ghazwa-e-Hind), are being spoken about.
Earlier this century, Ghazwa-e-Hind was meant to be Al Qaeda’s plan for the annihilation and Islamisation of India. Today, it is the Islamic State’s plan for the annihilation and Islamisation of India. One supposes regurgitating old theories is necessary to keep intelligence agency report writers and newspaper columnists busy.
It is worth noting though that diplomatic sources point to no imminent Islamic State threat to India. In fact, even references to the Islamic State gaining ground in Afghanistan are seen as exaggerated. One senior official told this writer that dissident and loose Taliban factions, which may have broken away from a larger group due to turf or treasure, have probably adopted the Islamic State label in Afghanistan. That apart, there have been odd displays of Islamic State flags in the Kashmir valley, largely for the benefit of television cameras. Overall, it is likely, the Islamic State has more Twitter accounts in India than actual lethal fighters
This is not to discount the Islamic State challenge nor to suggest, the Islamic State does not want to vanquish India (or for that matter make deep inroads in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as part of its caliphate project). It is just that aspiration and reality are different. The Islamic State remains a substantially Arabia-based movement for the moment. Before it turns its attention to Afghanistan and the subcontinent, it needs to defeat Iraq’s Shia south and the Shia vastness of Iran. It also needs to capture territory and influence in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Dilli, as they say, durast: Delhi is a long distance.

So where is this Islamic State phobia and this concern of a likely Islamic State invasion coming from? It is telling that the story is emphasised most often by the Pakistanis. It would appear the Inter-Services Intelligence and the Pakistani Army are talking up the Islamic State presence to divert attention from and in a sense even mainstream the Taliban. The fantasy plan of an India-Pakistan joint front against the Islamic State  has also emerged from Pakistan Government sources. Some Pakistani analysts have gone to the extent of saying the supposed age-old prophecy of Ghazwa-e-Hind actually promises war against Pakistan as well, as the Hind it refers to is undivided India. Clearly, somebody is trying sell the Modi Government a lemon.
The Islamic State is no friend of India. Having said that, the immediate threat and the danger for the foreseeable future comes from the ISI and its proxy terrorist groups in Pakistan, and from the Rawalpindi/Islamabad-backed attempts by the Taliban to re-establish itself in Afghanistan as the Americans move out. The supposed Islamic State outposts in the Indian region are a red herring.
During his recent visit to Central Asia, Mr Modi discussed the situation in Afghanistan with several of its neighbours. One feedback the Indian delegation received was the Taliban was preparing for a far wider area domination than in the late 1990s. Then, the northern areas of Afghanistan, bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, had been left free for the Taliban’s non-Pashtun rivals to re-group. This time, the Indian Prime Minister was told, the Taliban was planning to begin by consolidating northern Afghanistan.
Obviously, all this is being plotted with the assistance of the military establishment in Pakistan. The Islamic State is clearly not a huge factor, as is being made out for an Indian audience. The Government needs to approach the August 23-24 talks with that realism.
(The writer is senior fellow, Observer Research Foundation. He can be reached at malikashok@gmail.com)


Alarms in Kashmir, AG NOORANI

Alarms in Kashmir, AG NOORANI 

There is little attempt to understand the obvious message which the surge in militancy sends out.
THE situation in Kashmir is fast deteriorating, politically and militarily. One of its most respected journalists, Yusuf Jameel, reported on July 30 that “dozens of Kashmiri youth, mostly in the 17-24 age group, are joining the ranks of militants every month, a phenomenon that has set alarm bells ringing in the corridors of power, particularly the security agencies.”
Most of them have witnessed close family members, friends or neighbours picked up by any of the agencies only to ‘disappear’ or be found dead later. This is apart from the continuing humiliation of army presence for 25 years. According to figures published by the state police, the total militant presence in Jammu & Kashmir is 142, of whom 88 are locals and 54 foreigners. There are 60 militants in south Kashmir; 13 in central Kashmir and 69 in the north.
Protests are triggered off by any event that is related to a resistance movement. One Friday, 17 July, began as an expression of solidarity with Palestine and soon transformed into an anti-India demonstration. Conversely, any moves for conciliation between India and Pakistan arouse high hopes. This is true of all — the separatists and the unionists, alike. That is why the foreign secretaries’ joint briefing at Ufa on July 10 came as a bitter disappointment. It did not mention Kashmir.
There is little attempt to understand the obvious message which the surge in militancy sends out. A frozen state of denials prevails, as it has all these years. On the ground, the security forces show little sign of respect for the populace. On July 21, that most faithful of the faithful, former chief minister Farooq Abdullah, disclosed at a public meeting in New Delhi that an army officer had ordered his troops to shoot his son, Omar — also a former chief minister — on the Jammu-Srinagar highway merely because his vehicle overtook an army convoy. He cited another instance. A man was killed in cold blood by an army man. But he was never prosecuted because of the blanket immunity the army enjoys under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1990. The immunity extends even to killing.
In a scathing editorial on July 25, the New York Times said: “Rather than help quell revolt, AFSPA has hardened resentments against a military that has too often abused the extraordinary powers conferred by the Act. The Act, which can be activated by the federal government or the states, gives soldiers wide powers to kill, arrest, search an detain. It also grants them civil immunity from prosecution and punishment. India’s army, which is empowered to try soldiers in military courts for crimes against civilians, has rarely done so. The result is a shocking incidence of rapes, murders, torture, summary detention and disappearances of civilians in areas where the law applies.”
The harsh truth is that none of the Unionists — the two Abdullahs and current Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed — cares one bit for the people. Their sole concern is with pelf and power for which they will stoop to any depths to secure New Delhi’s support. After the elections to the State Assembly last December, Omar Abdullah was all too willing to win the BJP’s support. But the Mufti pipped him to the post. Former RAW Chief, A.S. Dulat, has disclosed that “Prior to the parliament election, Mufti had sent Dilawar Mir, a former minister, as his emissary to meet Modi in Ahmedabad. The PDP suits the BJP as a soft separatist; in the BJP’s way of thinking, if it can deal with Mufti then why does it need to deal with Mirwaiz? Mufti is a nationalist.”
Mufti’s PDP, which assumed office in a coalition with the BJP on March 1, performs and is seen by the people to perform to a script written by New Delhi. A couple of conciliatory steps which the Mufti took were reversed within a couple of days, to wit the release of Masarat Alam, a separatist close to Geelani, and a circular of March 12 on the display of the state’s flag. The constitution of Jammu and Kashmir itself accords recognition to the flag. But the Mufti does not risk incurring New Delhi’s displeasure.
It is unrealistic to ignore the political factor in the renewal of militancy. The militants have been disgusted by Mufti’s betrayal. But they are also disillusioned by the conduct of the Hurriyat’s leaders. They bickered even before the Hurriyat split and do so now with greater zeal after they parted company over a decade ago. They have no coherent policy bar slogans of self-determination and the like. Their sole weapon is the hartal which entails economic loss to their own followers. Except for Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, none of them concerns himself with the problems which beset the people in their daily lives. The youth have watched all this for years. Now they seem to have decided to chalk out their own path.
The writer is an author and lawyer based in Mumbai.
Published in Dawn, August 8th, 2015