Sunday, 12 June 2016

The new Great Game - America is and will remain a major player in the new Asian Great Game.

The new Great Game America is and will remain a major player in the new Asian Great Game.
MUNIR AKRAM - The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
THE recent India-Iran-Afghanistan agreement to develop a trade route from Chabahar to Central Asia has been portrayed by Indian commentators as having changed the historical ‘Great Game’ for control of the connection between South and Central Asia through Afghanistan. It has been claimed that the agreement will end India’s ‘isolation’ from Central Asia and Pakistan’s ‘stranglehold’ over Afghanistan and create a ‘new security paradigm’ and a ‘geopolitical shift’.
But the Great Game has already changed. It is being played on a wider canvas with different players and rules. The power contest in Asia is now mainly between China and America, and, to a lesser extent, between America and Russia — with India, Pakistan, Iran and others in subsidiary roles. In this context, the strategic and economic implications of the tripartite agreement are likely to be limited.
Chabahar port has been on the drawing board for many years. Its main purpose was and will remain to expand Iran’s oil and other trade including with India.
Implementation of the trade route to Central Asia will remain challenging until peace can be restored in Afghanistan. With the collapse of the inter-Afghan negotiations, Afghanistan is likely to witness a further escalation of conflict and chaos. Transit to Central Asia via Iran, or Pakistan, is not viable at present.
Even once the route is operational, its economic significance will remain modest. India’s oil needs can be met by Iran (and Saudi Arabia). The Central Asians do not have pipelines to Chabahar; they do to China. New gas pipelines are being constructed to Europe. Their mineral resources are also flowing north, east and west; not south.

America is and will remain a major player in the new Asian Great Game.

With a population of only around 50 million, Central Asia will not become a huge market for manufactured goods. It will be twice as expensive for India to send goods to Central Asia through Chabahar than it would be overland across Pakistan. Indian goods are thus unlikely to be competitive against Chinese products shipped overland.
The strategic advantages for India are also questionable. Its influence in Afghanistan will be more dependent on Iran. Pakistan’s cooperation will continue to be essential to restoring peace in Afghanistan. Indian shipping lanes to Chabahar will be vulnerable to disruption. India’s limited influence in Central Asia will not dent that of Russia and China.
The new Great Game will increasingly revolve around China’s One Belt, One Road vision of land and sea connections between Asia, Europe and beyond. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the first component of this ambitious project.
In comparison to the Chabahar route, the strategic and economic implications of CPEC are enormous. It will transform China from a one- to a two-ocean power; enable a part of its $4000 billion annual trade to circumvent the Malacca straits and other potential choke points in the Indian Ocean and shorten China’s supply lines to the Gulf, West Asia and Africa. For these reasons, if no other, China has a vital stake in Pakistan’s strategic stability and socioeconomic development. The Chinese commitment of $46bn for CPEC projects is but the first instalment of the massive capital which China is prepared to deploy in Pakistan.
Instead of being distracted by the moves of its adversaries, Pakistan must remain focused on the implementation of CPEC. This strategic enterprise should not be allowed to be stalled or delayed by external pressure or internal politics, inefficiency or corruption. It would be wise to create a separate and independent CPEC Authority which can be a ‘one-stop-shop’ entrusted with achieving CPEC’s enormous potential for Pakistan’s development. CPEC projects must go beyond infrastructure development to encompass manufacture, consumer goods, housing, health, textiles, finance and other sectors. To this end, the interaction between Pakistani and Chinese private- and public-sector companies must be actively expanded and intensified. Some of the externally imposed limitations on CPEC investment projects, such as restrictions on ‘sovereign guarantees’ for debt finance, need to be removed expeditiously.
CPEC faces threats from Pakistan and China’s adversaries. These will have to be met forcefully.
India’s opposition has been announced openly. New Delhi will continue to utilise Afghanistan as a base to destabilise Pakistan and undermine CPEC. The recent spate of attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan is no accident. Pakistan will have to further enhance security for them and consider direct action to remove the Afghan-based threat from the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.
Iran has assured that Chabahar is not designed to compete with Gwadar or CPEC. Pakistan and Iran can cooperate for mutual benefit: to end terrorism in Balochistan, expand trade, and construct the Iranian gas pipeline and a Gwadar-Chabahar economic corridor. However, Tehran often wants to run with the hare and hunt with the hound. Some recent events have sent disturbing signals which Pakistan cannot ignore.
To balance the growing Indo-Iranian relationship, Pakistan must maintain and reinforce its relationship with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. It would be in Pakistan’s interest to help in giving substance and form to the ‘Islamic coalition’ hastily formed by Riyadh. It should also convince the GCC states of the benefits of CPEC as a path to their closer connection with China.
America is and will remain a major player in the new Asian Great Game. To bolster its strategic contest with China, the US is moving towards a military alliance with India. The Obama administration is also cooperating tactically with Iran in the fight against the militant Islamic State group in Iraq and, less clearly, in Syria. It wants Iran to help in stabilising Afghanistan. But the US-Iran relationship could again become hostile if new sanctions are imposed by the US Congress or differences arise over Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah or Israel.
For Islamabad, the major threat now is possible hostile US action to destabilise Pakistan and disrupt CPEC. Wisely, China has invited US participation in CPEC. The US has declared, perhaps diplomatically, that it is not opposed to CPEC. But the signals from Washington, as it hosts India’s Modi, are ominous. The new Great Game is about to get tougher and rougher.
Published in Dawn, June 12th, 2016



Saturday, 11 June 2016

Pakistan In The US The US In Pakistan Self denial Is Biggest Threat To World Peace

Pakistan In The US The US In Pakistan Self denial Is Biggest Threat To World Peace 

One of the ironies of being a Pakistani living abroad, especially in the West, is having to pose as Indian. According to Asghar Choudhri, the chairman of Brooklyn’s Pakistani American Merchant Association, a lot of Pakistanis can’t get jobs after 9/11 and after the botched Times Square bombing of 2010, it’s even worse. “They are now pretending they are Indian so they can get a job,” he told a US wire service.

That is because while Indians are highly integrated immigrants – besides being the highest educated and best paid of all ethnic groups in the US – Pakistanis have taken part in terrorist activities in the very lands that gave them shelter. (Even the frequent Gallup surveys conducted in the US, found out repeatedly that the biggest threat to the international security and peace are: nr. 3 Saudis; nr. 2 Pakistanis, and nr.1 – surprise, surprise – the US itself.)

From Ramzi Yousef, who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 (8 years before Bin Laden) and is now serving a 240-year prison sentence to Mir Aimal Kansi, who shot dead CIA agents and was later executed by lethal injection, to Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square “Idiot Bomber”, there is a long line of Pakistanis who have left a trail of terror.

The San Bernardino, California, attack of December 2015 by a Pakistani American couple was the most spectacular in recent times. The husband was American-born raised and yet he chose to launch a terror act against the people of the United States.
But while Pakistanis wear an Indian mask for Western consumption, back home it’s business as usual.

Two incidents amply demonstrate that Pakistanis have learnt nothing. One was the widespread outrage across the country over Osama Bin Laden’s killing by American commandos. In response to America’s exposure of Bin Laden’s hiding place, Pakistan moved to shut down the informant network that lead the Americans there.

The other was the unholy fracas over CIA shooter Kansi’s execution. The day after Kansi was sentenced to death by an American court, four Americans were shot dead on the streets of Pakistan. His funeral was attended by the entire civilian administration in his hometown Quetta, the local Pakistani Corps Commander, and the then Pakistani ambassador to the United States.

Thousands of mourners turned out as Quetta city shuttered down. Kansi’s coffin, draped in black cloth with verses from the Koran embroidered on it in gold, was carried on the shoulders of young men some 10 miles from the airport to his family’s home in Quetta. In Islamabad, the capital city, lawyers and university students poured out on the streets.

Misplaced sympathy
The irony of outpourings of support for hardened terrorists is that Pakistan is seriously impacted by terrorism. A global study by the London-based Institute for Economics and Peace ranks Pakistan fourth on the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) list, behind Iraq, 

Afghanistan and Nigeria.
According to the study, “Terrorism remains highly concentrated with most (58 per cent) of the activity occurring in just five countries — Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria.”
It mentions the most fatal terrorist attack in Pakistan, of 2014: “Assailants detonated an explosives-laden vehicle and then stormed the Army Public School in Peshawar city, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan. At least 150 students and staff were killed and 131 were wounded in the attack. All seven assailants were either killed by security forces or detonated their explosives-laden vests.”

The gunmen belonged to the terrorist group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is also known as the Pakistani Taliban because it is based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It is an offshoot of the original Taliban which was created by Pakistan as a weapon to be used against Afghanistan and India.

State sponsored terror
That Pakistan is a state sponsor of terror is well known. In Hillary Clinton’s words to Islamabad, if you harbour snakes in your backyard, don’t expect them to only bite your neighbour.

It was Pakistan’s demagogue dictator General Zia-ul-Haq who declared that “we will bleed India with a thousand cuts”. The reckoning was that since Pakistan can never hope to win a war against India, then India must be hit with terrorism. To this effect, Pakistan first supported Kashmiri and Sikh separatists, armed them and provided them safe bases on its territory.

When both these terror campaigns failed, Pakistan created an alphabet soup of home grown terror groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami. These two were complemented by the Haqqani network and the original Taliban, which has now split into dozens of splinter groups, some of which are still controlled by the Pakistan military and its chief intelligence agency, the ISI.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of US, Mike Mullen has described the Haqqani Network as the “veritable arm of Pakistan’s ISI”. Mullen said the ISI was supporting the Haqqani network, which attacked the US embassy in Kabul in September 2011 and also the September 2011 NATO truck bombing which injured 77 coalition soldiers and killed five Afghan civilians.

In a November 2014 interview to the BBC, the adviser to the Pakistani Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz said Pakistan should not target militants like the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network, which do not threaten Pakistan’s security.
Indeed, Pakistan is one of the few countries in the world which believes in good terrorists (who attack the West, India and Israel) and bad terrorists (who target Pakistan). An example of a ‘good’ terrorist group is the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which regularly conducts mass rallies and congregation, advocating jihad in Kashmir. For its December 2014 rally, Pakistan ran two special trains to carry the crowd to Lahore. India’s foreign ministry termed this as “nothing short of mainstreaming of terrorism”. The congregation was held near Pakistan’s national monument, the Minar-e-Pakistan, where 4000 policemen provided security.

Lashkar-e-Taiba is the group responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai terror attack, which led to the deaths of 156 innocent people. On December 3, 2008 Indian officials named Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhavi, a top leader of the Lashkar, as one of four possible major planners behind the attacks. Four days later, Pakistani armed forces arrested Lakhvi in a raid on a training camp near Muzafarabad in Pakistani Kashmir.
Destroying evidence

Pakistan doesn’t want to bring terrorists like Lakhavi to justice because that would expose its sponsorship of terror groups. After India produced evidence of the Lashkar’s hand in the Mumbai attacks, Pakistan did the predictable. In order to claim that none of these guys were technically within Pakistan, the ISI asked the terrorists involved in the attack to leave the country.
But it turned out to be a big mistake as one of these terrorists was caught in Saudi Arabia, which presented him on a platter to India. During his interrogation by Indian investigators, the terrorist revealed he was one of the key people tasked with training the 10 Mumbai attackers. He said he was in the control room near the international airport in Karachi from where Lakhavi was directing the attackers. He also said that after Lakhvi’s arrest in December 2008, the Pakistanis destroyed the control room in Karachi.

Pathankot denial
The January 2016 attack on an air force base in Pathankot, India, in which seven Indian security guards and six terrorists were killed, will give you an idea of how Pakistan continues to deny links with terror groups on its own soil.

After the Indians allowed a Pakistani investigation team to visit the air base, the Pakistanis raised the outrageous claim that the attack was carried out by India to defame Islamabad. This has a parallel in 9/11 deniers in Muslim countries where everyone seems to be convinced that Israel and the US were behind the Twin Tower attacks.

According to the Indian Express newspaper, the Pakistani investigators were given a full transcript of the telephonic conversations between the terrorists and their Pakistani handlers along with their identity. The Indian side gave the Pakistanis “the links of Pakistani officials, believed to be ISI personnel, with the handlers of the terrorists”. They were provided with “electronic and forensic evidence regarding the slain terrorists’ Pakistani links, name of the terrorists and several other critical evidence after an exhaustive probe conducted” by India.
The Pakistani team was given concrete proof that a senior terrorist leader of the Jaish-e-Mohammed was in constant touch with the terrorists and giving them necessary instructions during the three-day carnage.
And yet Pakistan claims it was a stage managed attack by India.
Pakistan’s image

The stark reality is that Pakistan has now become synonymous with terror. An unfortunate fallout of the country’s long association with terror is that ordinary Pakistanis worldwide appear tainted. A broad survey released on June 27, 2012 by the United States-based Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes says that in a number countries, including China, as well as several Muslim countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon, the majority populations negatively view Pakistanis.

Pakistan is not only a universally disliked country but the Pakistanis themselves have learnt nothing from their history, continuing to support the very actors who are responsible for Pakistan’s negative image.

It is a measure of Pakistan’s penchant for exporting terrorists, counterfeit currency and drugs that India has constructed a 1400 km long steel fence across its border with its wayward western neighbour. The floodlit fence, which is patrolled 24/7, can be seen from space as a bright orange line snaking from the coast to Kashmir.

Iran is also building a 700 km steel and concrete security fence along its border with Pakistan “to prevent border crossing by terrorists and drug traffickers”. When complete it will make Pakistan the most fenced-in country in the world.

In four of the five predominantly Muslim nations covered by the survey, over half gave Pakistan negative ratings. Jordan (57 percent), Lebanon (56 percent), Tunisia (54 percent) and Egypt (53 percent) had an unfavourable opinion of Pakistan. The only exception was Turkey, where attitudes were divided (43 percent negative and 37 percent favourable).

In East Asia, 52 percent of Chinese saw Pakistan unfavourably, as did 59 percent in Japan and 59 percent in India. The Chinese statistic is not surprising as Pakistan-trained Chinese Uighur Muslims have launched terror strikes in their remote province in China. Japan deported around 15,000 Pakistanis after 9/11.
Beaten, corrupt military most loved

Every country has an army but the Pakistan Army has a country. The Pakistani military is the most corrupt institution in the land, with a finger in every national pie. Army officers get prime plots of land post-retirement at a third of the market price. It is certainly a case of generals fattening at the expense of an increasingly poor population.

The Pakistani military has lost fours against India. After every war, Pakistan has lost territory, face and the credibility of its fighting forces. And yet Pakistanis rate this military very highly.As many as 77 percent said the military has a good influence on the country.

The media came next with a 68 percent rating, followed by religious leaders at 66 percent.
With religious zealots getting a solid two-thirds rating, is it any surprise that support for using the Pakistani military to fight extremist groups has declined over the last three years? Opposition to using the army to fight extremist organisations is especially high in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (where 54 percent opposed) and Baluchistan (50 percent).

Biting the hand that feeds
India does not get any aid from the United States and yet among all 21 nations Pew surveyed, Indians seemed most favourably disposed towards it. Only 12 percent said they had unfavourable opinion of the United States. On the other hand, 80 percent of Pakistanis had a negative opinion of America, with 74 percent regarding it as an enemy country.

American aid efforts were seen in a negative light by Pakistanis although the country continues to get billions of dollars of US aid. Around four-in-ten (38 percent) said US economic aid was having a mostly negative impact on Pakistan, while just 12 percent believed it was mostly positive. Similarly, 40 percent thought American military aid was having a mostly negative effect, while only 8 percent said it was largely positive.
This is a snapshot of Pakistan, where the arrow of time is travelling backwards, taking them into a cycle of medieval madness. Where the death of a terrorist merely means he will be instantly replaced by a hundred clones.
About the author:
*Rakesh Krishnan Simha,
 New Zealand-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. According to him, he writes on stuff the media distorts, misses or ignores. Rakesh started his career in 1995 with New Delhi-based Business World magazine, and later worked in a string of positions at other leading media houses such as India Today, Hindustan Times, Business Standard and the Financial Express, where he was the news editor. He is the Senior Advisory Board member of one of the fastest growing Europe’s foreign policy platforms: Modern Diplomacy.


India Iran Agreement On Chabahar Is A Strategic Opportunity, Monish Gulati

India Iran Agreement On Chabahar Is A Strategic Opportunity, Monish Gulati 

Following the Indo-Iran bilateral summit in Tehran in May 2016, the two countries signed 12 pacts, including two agreements on India’s participation in the expansion and operation of the Chabahar port. The Chabahar agreement since then has been debated as a ‘strategic game changer.’
Some of the analysis and comments have framed Chabahar in the correct strategic context; not just as a gateway to Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan but as India’s first truly strategic connectivity endeavour. To that end, while Chabahar is a symbol of Indo-Iranian cooperation, it is also India’s gateway to Eurasia. This article examines the Indo-Iranian agreement on the port of Chabahar, in a strategic context.
The Deal
India has pledged to invest $500 million for the development of the Chabahar port. [1] The bilateral contract signed between IPGPL (India Ports Global Private Limited) and Arya Banader of Iran envisages development and operation of two terminals of five berths handling both multipurpose and general cargo for the next ten years.[2]

Also India’s Export Import Bank (EXIM) has signed a MoU with Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization (PMO) that will enable it to extend a credit of $150 million for the development of Chabahar port. For rail connectivity, a MoU between IRCON and Construction, Development of Transport and Infrastructure Company (CDTIC) of Iran will enable the former to provide all superstructure work and financing the project (around USD 1.6 billion) for the construction of the Chabahar-Zahedan railway line which forms part of transit and transportation corridor in trilateral agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan.

Earlier in May 2015, Nitin Gadkari, Minister for Shipping and Road Transport & Highways had concluded an inter-Governmental MoU regarding India’s participation in the development of the Chabahar Port with Iran.[3] The MoU paved the way for designated Indian and Iranian commercial entities to commence negotiations towards finalization of a commercial contract under which Indian firms were to lease two existing berths at Chabahar and operationalize them as container and multi-purpose cargo terminals through an investment of $85 million.
Strategic Context
The port is not just about Afghanistan for India nor is it about India for Afghanistan. India’s effort to develop a trade route to Afghanistan, in face of Pakistan’s denial of an overland access will seek to co-exist with other trade corridors which may come up in the region and involve Afghanistan. The Chabahar route in the case of Afghanistan, supplements its existing sea access routes through Karachi in the south and Bandar Abbas in the west. The fact that it provides Afghanistan options in routing its trade and lessens Pakistan’s leverage on the country is incidental. It would be a bonus if Pakistan would view the Chabahar access in a positive light and compete to provide better facilities to the Afghans at Karachi/Port Qasim and possibly at Gwadar (via Chaman) in the future. On the other hand loosening of the Pakistani chokehold on its sea access will allow Afghanistan to more effectively leverage the overland transit rights to the Central Asian Republics (CARs) which Pakistan has been seeking.

From the Indian point of view, the broadening of the connectivity scope of Chabahar to include the INSTC or the International North South Transport Corridor (earlier Bandar Abbas was the only proposed maritime access gateway) as distinct from only serving the security unpredictable Afghanistan, has increased the economic potential and viability of the project and sustainability of Indian investment. The Indian component of the port is reportedly part of the ‘Ashgabat agreement’ for creating transport and transit corridor for facilitating transportation of goods.[4] Iran supports India’s desire to join the Ashgabat Agreement on connectivity[5].

By seeing Chabahar just as a means to rid Afghanistan of the Pakistani chokehold, India had appeared to have marked down Chabahar’s importance and consequently pursued it with less urgency and vigour that it actually merited. On the other hand, the Pakistani development of Gwadar had been more farsighted. Pakistan appreciated far earlier the advantage geography had bestowed on it not only in terms of their dealing with Afghanistan but also with the CARs bordering Afghanistan. It was only their desire to keep India and possibly Iran out of the equation that led to Gwadar’s under-utilisation and other woes, till the Chinese stepped in with their proposal on CPEC.
The China Factor

The current India-Iran understanding on Chabahar provides the indication that, post its nuclear deal with the P5+1, Iran still feels the need to strategically balance China and that India is the option. However the China factor also needs to be correctly understood. Iran’s approach to balancing Chinese presence is not by keeping them out but by giving equal opportunity to other regional stakeholders to participate and partner Iran in the country’s development. In the case of Chabahar port given China’s overbearing presence in Gwadar, it would be imperative from the Iranian point of view that in the near and midterm, Chabahar port is developed and operated by a third country. Hence, India remained the preferred choice despite the see-saw developments over the last decade. There were of course two other factors in India’s favour; its determination to support Afghanistan (therefore the tripartite India-Iran-Afghanistan pact) and its partnership with Iran in the INSTC.

Conclusion
The deal comes with its own set of imponderables; stability in Afghanistan, the security situation in Sistan-Baluchestan and the progressive operationalisation of the Iranian nuclear deal. There is also the much talked about Indian ability to deliver projects in time. India’s resolve is not in question here and projects such as the Delaram-Zaranj road, Salma Dam and other projects particularly in western Afghanistan are a testament.

India intends to undertake projects worth $20 billion in Iran including setting up an LNG plant and a gas cracker unit in the Chabahar free trade zone.[6] Having also been identified as the start point of Iran-Oman-Iran undersea pipeline, Chabahar is the pivot of India’s cooperation with Iran and the region; it remains to be seen how India’s plans are realised.
About the author:
Monish Gulati is an independent defence analyst based in New Delhi.Views expressed by the Author are personal.
Source:
This article appeared at CLAWS
References:
[1]http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26841/List_of_AgreementsMOUs_signed_during_the_visit_of_Prime_Minister_to_Iran_May_23_2016#
[2] India Ports Global, a recently formed port project investment arm of the shipping ministry and a joint venture between the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust and the Kandla port, will invest $85 million in developing two container berths with a length of 640 metres and three multi-cargo berths. The contract is for 10 years and extendable. It will take 18 months to complete phase one of the Chabahar port construction. The first two years of the contract are grace period during which India doesn’t have to guarantee any cargo for the port.) From the third year, India will facilitate 30,000 TEUs (Twenty Foot Equivalent) of cargo at the port. The quantum will rise to 2,50,000 TEUs by the 10th year. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/52400399.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
[3]Inter-Governmental MoU between India and Iran, Ministry of External affairs GoI, May 06, 2015
[4]Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury. ‘India, Iran and Afghanistan sign historic three-way transit accord,’ The Economic Times, May 24, 2016. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016-05-24/news/73315308_1_chabahar-port-india-gains-modi
[5] Monish Gulati.’ India’s Central Asia connect may lie through Ashgabat,’ South Asia Monitor, November03, 2015.
[6] Devirupa Mitra. With Chabahar Text Finalised, India’s Dream of a Road to Afghanistan Gathers Speed, The Wire, 13/04/2016.



Friday, 10 June 2016

What Can The US Congress’ Interest In PM Modi’s Visit Translate To?

What Can The US Congress’ Interest In PM Modi’s Visit Translate To?
Posted: 07/06/2016 20:39 IST Updated: 07/06/2016 23:01 IST
On his fourth trip to the U.S. as Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi will spend some quality time on Capitol Hill on Wednesday, where he'll address a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress. House Speaker Paul Ryan will also host the Indian premier for a lunch, which will be followed by a reception hosted jointly by the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees and the India Caucus. What's the significance of this Congressional engagement and what might be Modi's message?
Given that all the most-recent Indian leaders who've held five-year terms have addressed such joint meetings of Congress, some have asked whether Ryan's invitation to Modi is a big deal. The answer is, yes, it is an honour and not one extended all that often. Since 1934, there have been only 117 such speeches. Leaders from France, Israel and the United Kingdom have addressed joint meetings the most times (8 each), followed by Mexico (7), and Ireland, Italy and South Korea (6 each). With this speech, India will join Germany on the list with leaders having addressed 5 joint meetings of Congress: Rajiv Gandhi in 1985, P.V. Narashima Rao in 1994, Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2000 and Manmohan Singh in 2005. India's first premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, spoke to the House and Senate in separate back-to-back sessions in 1949 as well.
With this speech, India will join Germany on the list with leaders having addressed 5 joint meetings of Congress.
Congress is a key stakeholder in the U.S.-India relationship and can play a significant supportive or spoiler role. While American presidents have a lot more lee-way on foreign policy than domestic policy, Congress is not without influence on U.S. foreign relations, and shapes the context for American engagement abroad. Moreover, the breadth and depth of the U.S.-India relationship, as well as the blurring of the line between what constitutes domestic and foreign policy these days means that India's options can be affected by American legislative decisions or the political mood on a range of issues from trade to immigration, energy to defense.
The Indian Foreign Secretary recently said that the U.S. legislature was at "very much at the heart" of the relationship today. He noted it has been "very supportive" and "even in some more difficult days where actually the Congress has been the part of the US polity which has been very sympathetic to India." But India's had rocky experiences on the Hill as well--which only heightens the need to engage members of Congress at the highest levels.
The speech and the other interactions offer Modi an opportunity to acknowledge the role of Congress in building bilateral relations, highlight shared interests and values, outline his vision for India and the relationship, as well as tackle some Congressional concerns and note some of India's own.
The speech and the other interactions offer Modi an opportunity to acknowledge the role of Congress in building bilateral relations, highlight shared interests and values, outline his vision for India and the relationship, as well as tackle some Congressional concerns and note some of India's own. He'll be speaking to multiple audiences in Congress, with members there either because of the strategic imperative for the relationship, others because of the economic potential, yet others because of the values imperative--and then there are those who'll be there because it is important to their constituents, whether business or the Indian diaspora. There is also the audience outside Congress, including in India, where the speech will play in primetime. What will Modi's message be? A glimpse at previous speeches might offer some clues, though Modi is likely also to want to emphasize change.
The Speeches That Came Before
The speeches of previous prime ministers have addressed some common themes. They've acknowledged shared democratic values. They've mentioned the two-way flow of inspiration and ideas with individuals like Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King getting multiple mentions. They've noted the influence of American founding documents or fathers on the Indian constitution. They've highlighted India's achievements, while stressing that much remains to be done.
They've noted their country's diversity, and the almost-unique task Indian leaders have had--to achieve development for hundreds of millions in a democratic context. Since Gandhi, each has mentioned the Indian diaspora, noting its contributions to the U.S. Each prime minister has also expressed gratitude for American support or the contribution the U.S. partnership has made to India's development and security. They've acknowledged differences, without dwelling on them. They've addressed contemporary Congressional concerns that existed about Indian policy--in some cases offering a defense of them, in others' explaining the reason behind the policy.
Many of the premiers called for Congress to understand that India, while a democracy like the U.S. and sharing many common interests, would not necessarily achieve its objectives the same way as the U.S.
Many of the premiers called for Congress to understand that India, while a democracy like the U.S. and sharing many common interests, would not necessarily achieve its objectives the same way as the U.S. And each subtly has asked for time and space, accommodation and support to achieve their goals--and argued it's in American interests to see a strong, stable, prosperous, democratic India.
In terms of subjects, each previous speech has mentioned economic growth and development as a key government priority, highlighting what policymakers were doing to achieve them. Since Gandhi, all have mentioned nuclear weapons though with different emphases: he spoke of disarmament; Rao of de-nuclearization and concerns about proliferation; two years after India's nuclear test, Vajpayee noted India's voluntary moratorium on testing and tried to reassure Congress about Indian intentions; and speaking in the context of the U.S.-India civil nuclear talks, Singh noted the importance of civil nuclear energy and defended India's track record on nuclear non-proliferation.
Since Rao, every prime minister has mentioned the challenge that terrorism posed for both the U.S. and India, with Vajpayee and Singh implicitly noting the challenge that a neighboring country poses in this regard from India's perspective. And Rao and Singh made the case for India to get a permanent seat on the U. N. Security Council.
The style of the speeches has changed, as has the tone. Earlier speeches were littered with quotes from sources like Christopher Columbus, Swami Vivekananda, Abraham Lincoln, Lala Lajpat Rai and the Rig Veda. Perhaps that was reflective of the style of speechwriting in those eras, but perhaps it was also because there were fewer concrete issues in the bilateral relationship to address. The evolution in the areas of cooperation is evident in the speeches.
Rao's speech about two decades ago, for instance, listed U.S.-India common interests as peacekeeping, environmental crises, and combating international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking.
Rao's speech about two decades ago, for instance, listed U.S.-India common interests as peacekeeping, environmental crises, and combating international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking. Compare that to Singh's address which talked of cooperation on a range of issues from counterterrorism, the economy, agriculture, energy security, healthy policy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), democracy promotion, and global governance.

The Speech Yet to Come
Modi will likely strike some similar themes, acknowledging the role that the U.S. Congress has played in shaping the relationship and expressing gratitude for its support. Like Vajpayee, particularly in a U.S. election year, Modi might note the bipartisan support the relationship has enjoyed in recent years. He'll undoubtedly talk about shared democratic values in America's "temple of democracy"--a phrase he used for the Indian parliament when he first entered it after his 2014 election victory. Modi will not necessarily mention the concerns about human rights, trade and investment policies, non-proliferation or India's Iran policy that have arisen on the Hill, but he will likely address them indirectly.
For example, by emphasizing India's pluralism and diversity and the protection its Constitution gives to minorities, or the constructive role the country could play regionally (he might give examples such as the recently inaugurated dam in Afghanistan). Given the issues on the bilateral agenda, he'll likely mention the strategic convergence, his economic policy plans, terrorism, India's non-proliferation record, defense and security cooperation, and perhaps--like Vajpayee--the Asia-Pacific (without directly mentioning China). And like Vajpayee, he might be more upfront about Indian concerns and the need to accommodate them.
While he might strike some similar themes as his predecessors and highlight aspects of continuity, Modi will also want to emphasize that it's not business as usual. He'll likely try to outline the change that he has brought and wants to bring. In the past, he has noted the generational shift that he himself represents as the first Indian prime minister born after independence and the Modi government's latest tag line is, of course, "Transforming India." And he might emphasize that this changed India represents an opportunity for the U.S.
He [Modi] won't wade directly into American election issues, but might note the importance of U.S. global engagement.
He won't wade directly into American election issues, but might note the importance of U.S. global engagement. He might also try to address some of the angst in the U.S. about other countries taking advantage of it and being "takers." He could do this by making the case that India is not a free rider--that through its businesses, market, talent and diaspora it is contributing to American economy and society, through its economic development it will contribute to global growth, and through Indian prosperity, security and a more proactive international role--with a different approach than another Asian country has taken--it'll contribute to regional stability and order. He might also suggest ways that the U.S. can facilitate India playing such a role.
Unlike previous leaders, he has not tended to appeal to others not to ask India to do more regionally and globally because it's just a developing country and needs to focus internally. The Modi government has been highlighting the contributions of India and Indians to global and regional peace and prosperity--through peacekeeping, the millions that fought in the World Wars, HADR operations in its neighborhood, evacuation operations in Yemen in which it rescued not just Indian citizens, but Americans as well.
His government has been more vocal in joint contexts of expressing its views on the importance of a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions--and we might hear more on this in his address. Overall, a theme will likely be that India is not just a "taker," and will be a responsible, collaborative stakeholder.
Modi will be competing for media attention in the U.S. thanks to the focus in the U.S. on the Democratic primaries this week, but he'll have Congressional attention.
It'll be interesting to see whether the Indian prime minister notes the role that his predecessors have played in getting the relationship to this point. With some exceptions--for example, he acknowledged Manmohan Singh's contribution during President Obama's visit to India last year--he has not tended to do so. But there's a case to be made for doing so--it can reassure members of Congress that the relationship transcends one person or party and is based on a strategic rationale, thus making it more sustainable. Such an acknowledgement could be in the context of noting that it's not just Delhi and Washington that have built and are building this relationship, but the two countries' states, private sectors, educational institutions and people.
This wouldn't prevent Modi from highlighting the heightened intensity of the last two years, particularly the progress in defense and security cooperation. (From a more political perspective, given that there has been criticism in some quarters of India-U.S. relations becoming closer, it can also serve as a reminder that the Congress party-led government followed a similar path).
Modi will be competing for media attention in the U.S. thanks to the focus in the U.S. on the Democratic primaries this week, but he'll have Congressional attention. But it's worth remembering that Indian prime ministers have been feted before, but if they don't deliver on the promise of India and India-U.S. relations that they often outline, disillusionment sets in. Modi will have to convince them that India is a strategic bet worth making--one that will pay off.
Follow Tanvi Madan on Twitter: www.twitter.com/tanvi_madan
MORE: