Thursday, 13 August 2015

ISIS enshrines a theology of rape

ISIS enshrines a theology of rape
Claiming the Quran’s support for rape, the Islamic State codifies sex slavery in conquered regions of Iraq and Syria, and uses the practice as a recruiting tool.
QADIYA, Iraq — In the moments before he raped the 12-year-old girl, the Islamic State fighter took the time to explain that what he was about to do was not a sin. Because the preteen girl practiced a religion other than Islam, the Quran not only gave him the right to rape her — it condoned and encouraged it, he insisted.
He bound her hands and gagged her. Then he knelt beside the bed and prostrated himself in prayer before getting on top of her.
When it was over, he knelt to pray again, bookending the rape with acts of religious devotion.
“I kept telling him it hurts — please stop,” said the girl, whose body is so small an adult could circle her waist with two hands. “He told me that according to Islam he is allowed to rape an unbeliever. He said that by raping me, he is drawing closer to God,” she said in an interview alongside her family in a refugee camp here, to which she escaped after 11 months of captivity.
The systematic rape of women and girls from the Yazidi religious minority has become deeply enmeshed in the organization and the radical theology of the Islamic State in the year since the group announced it was reviving slavery as an institution. Interviews with 21 women and girls who recently escaped the Islamic State, as well as an examination of the group’s official communications, illuminate how the practice has been enshrined in the group’s core tenets.
State of Terror
Articles in this series will examine the rise of the Islamic State and life inside the territory it has conquered.
The trade in Yazidi women and girls has created a persistent infrastructure, with a network of warehouses where the victims are held, viewing rooms where they are inspected and marketed, and a dedicated fleet of buses used to transport them.
A total of 5,270 Yazidis were abducted last year, and at least 3,144 are still being held, according to community leaders. To handle them, the Islamic State has developed a detailed bureaucracy of sex slavery, including sales contracts notarized by the ISIS-run Islamic courts. And the practice has become an established recruiting tool to lure men from deeply conservative Muslim societies, where casual sex is taboo and dating is forbidden.
A growing body of internal policy memos and theological discussions has established guidelines for slavery, including a lengthy how-to manual issued by the Islamic State Research and Fatwa Department just last month. Repeatedly, the ISIS leadership has emphasized a narrow and selective reading of the Quran and other religious rulings to not only justify violence, but also to elevate and celebrate each sexual assault as spiritually beneficial, even virtuous.
“Every time that he came to rape me, he would pray,” said F, a 15-year-old girl who was captured on the shoulder of Mount Sinjar one year ago and was sold to an Iraqi fighter in his 20s. Like some others interviewed by The New York Times, she wanted to be identified only by her first initial because of the shame associated with rape.
“He kept telling me this is ibadah,” she said, using a term from Islamic scripture meaning worship.
“He said that raping me is his prayer to God. I said to him, ‘What you’re doing to me is wrong, and it will not bring you closer to God.’ And he said, ‘No, it’s allowed. It’s halal,’ ” said the teenager, who escaped in April with the help of smugglers after being enslaved for nearly nine months.

Calculated Conquest

The Islamic State’s formal introduction of systematic sexual slavery dates to Aug. 3, 2014, when its fighters invaded the villages on the southern flank of Mount Sinjar, a craggy massif of dun-colored rock in northern Iraq.
Its valleys and ravines are home to the Yazidis, a tiny religious minority who represent less than 1.5 percent of Iraq’s estimated population of 34 million.
The offensive on the mountain came just two months after the fall of Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq. At first, it appeared that the subsequent advance on the mountain was just another attempt to extend the territory controlled by Islamic State fighters.
Almost immediately, there were signs that their aim this time was different.
Survivors say that men and women were separated within the first hour of their capture. Adolescent boys were told to lift up their shirts, and if they had armpit hair, they were directed to join their older brothers and fathers. In village after village, the men and older boys were driven or marched to nearby fields, where they were forced to lie down in the dirt and sprayed with automatic fire.
The women, girls and children, however, were hauled off in open-bed trucks.
“The offensive on the mountain was as much a sexual conquest as it was for territorial gain,” said Matthew Barber, a University of Chicago expert on the Yazidi minority. He was in Sinjar when the onslaught began last summer and helped create a foundation that provides psychological support for the escapees, who number more than 2,000, according to community activists.
Fifteen-year-old F says her family of nine was trying to escape, speeding up mountain switchbacks, when their aging Opel overheated. She, her mother, and her sisters — 14, 7, and 4 years old — were helplessly standing by their stalled car when a convoy of heavily armed Islamic State fighters encircled them.
“Right away, the fighters separated the men from the women,” she said. She, her mother and sisters were first taken in trucks to the nearest town on Mount Sinjar. “There, they separated me from my mom. The young, unmarried girls were forced to get into buses.”
The buses were white, with a painted stripe next to the word “Hajj,” suggesting that the Islamic State had commandeered Iraqi government buses used to transport pilgrims for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. So many Yazidi women and girls were loaded inside F’s bus that they were forced to sit on each other’s laps, she said.
Once the bus headed out, they noticed that the windows were blocked with curtains, an accouterment that appeared to have been added because the fighters planned to transport large numbers of women who were not covered in burqas or head scarves.
F’s account, including the physical description of the bus, the placement of the curtains and the manner in which the women were transported, is echoed by a dozen other female victims interviewed for this article. They described a similar set of circumstances even though they were kidnapped on different days and in locations miles apart.

F says she was driven to the Iraqi city of Mosul some six hours away, where they herded them into the Galaxy Wedding Hall. Other groups of women and girls were taken to a palace from the Saddam Hussein era, the Badoosh prison compound and the Directory of Youth building in Mosul, recent escapees said. And in addition to Mosul, women were herded into elementary schools and municipal buildings in the Iraqi towns of Tal Afar, Solah, Ba’aj and Sinjar City.
They would be held in confinement, some for days, some for months. Then, inevitably, they were loaded into the same fleet of buses again before being sent in smaller groups to Syria or to other locations inside Iraq, where they were bought and sold for sex.
“It was 100 percent preplanned,” said Khider Domle, a Yazidi community activist who maintains a detailed database of the victims. “I spoke by telephone to the first family who arrived at the Directory of Youth in Mosul, and the hall was already prepared for them. They had mattresses, plates and utensils, food and water for hundreds of people.”
Detailed reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reach the same conclusion about the organized nature of the sex trade.
In each location, survivors say Islamic State fighters first conducted a census of their female captives.
Inside the voluminous Galaxy banquet hall, F sat on the marble floor, squeezed between other adolescent girls. In all she estimates there were over 1,300 Yazidi girls sitting, crouching, splayed out and leaning against the walls of the ballroom, a number that is confirmed by several other women held in the same location.
They each described how three Islamic State fighters walked in, holding a register. They told the girls to stand. Each one was instructed to state her first, middle and last name, her age, her hometown, whether she was married, and if she had children.
For two months, F was held inside the Galaxy hall. Then one day, they came and began removing young women. Those who refused were dragged out by their hair, she said.
In the parking lot the same fleet of Hajj buses was waiting to take them to their next destination, said F. Along with 24 other girls and young women, the 15-year-old was driven to an army base in Iraq. It was there in the parking lot that she heard the word “sabaya” for the first time.
“They laughed and jeered at us, saying ‘You are our sabaya.’ I didn’t know what that word meant,” she said. Later on, the local Islamic State leader explained it meant slave.
“He told us that Taus Malik” — one of seven angels to whom the Yazidis pray — “is not God. He said that Taus Malik is the devil and that because you worship the devil, you belong to us. We can sell you and use you as we see fit.”
The Islamic State’s sex trade appears to be based solely on enslaving women and girls from the Yazidi minority. As yet, there has been no widespread campaign aimed at enslaving women from other religious minorities, said Samer Muscati, the author of the recent Human Rights Watch report. That assertion was echoed by community leaders, government officials and other human rights workers.
Mr. Barber, of the University of Chicago, said that the focus on Yazidis was likely because they are polytheists, with an oral tradition rather than a written scripture. In the Islamic State’s eyes that puts them on the fringe of despised unbelievers, even more than Christians and Jews, who are considered to have some limited protections under the Quran as fellow “People of the Book.”
In Kojo, one of the southernmost villages on Mount Sinjar and among the farthest away from escape, residents decided to stay, believing they would be treated as the Christians of Mosul had months earlier. On Aug. 15, 2014, the Islamic State ordered the residents to report to a school in the center of town.
When she got there, 40-year-old Aishan Ali Saleh found a community elder negotiating with the Islamic State, asking if they could be allowed to hand over their money and gold in return for safe passage.
The fighters initially agreed and laid out a blanket, where Ms. Saleh placed her heart-shaped pendant and her gold rings, while the men left crumpled bills.
Instead of letting them go, the fighters began shoving the men outside, bound for death. Sometime later, a fleet of cars arrived and the women, girls and children were driven away.
Months later, the Islamic State made clear in their online magazine that their campaign of enslaving Yazidi women and girls had been extensively preplanned.
“Prior to the taking of Sinjar, Shariah students in the Islamic State were tasked to research the Yazidis,” said the English-language article, headlined “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” which appeared in the October issue of Dabiq.
The article made clear that for the Yazidis, there was no chance to pay a tax known as jizya to be set free, “unlike the Jews and Christians.”
“After capture, the Yazidi women and children were then divided according to the Shariah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar operations, after one fifth of the slaves were transferred to the Islamic State’s authority to be divided” as spoils, the article said.
In much the same way as specific Bible passages were used centuries later to support the slave trade in the United States, the Islamic State cites specific verses or stories in the Quran or else in the Sunna, the traditions based on the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, to justify their human trafficking, experts say.
Scholars of Islamic theology disagree, however, on the proper interpretation of these verses, and on the divisive question of whether Islam actually sanctions slavery.
Many argue that slavery figures in Islamic scripture in much the same way that it figures in the Bible — as a reflection of the period in antiquity in which the religion was born.
“In the milieu in which the Quran arose, there was a widespread practice of men having sexual relationships with unfree women,” said Kecia Ali, an associate professor of religion at Boston University and the author of a book on slavery in early Islam. “It wasn’t a particular religious institution. It was just how people did things.”
Cole Bunzel, a scholar of Islamic theology at Princeton University, disagrees, pointing to the numerous references to the phrase “Those your right hand possesses” in the Quran, which for centuries has been interpreted to mean female slaves. He also points to the corpus of Islamic jurisprudence, which continues into the modern era and which he says includes detailed rules for the treatment of slaves.
“There is a great deal of scripture that sanctions slavery,” said Mr. Bunzel, the author of a research paper published by the Brookings Institution on the ideology of the Islamic State. “You can argue that it is no longer relevant and has fallen into abeyance. ISIS would argue that these institutions need to be revived, because that is what the Prophet and his companions did.”
The youngest, prettiest women and girls were bought in the first weeks after their capture. Others — especially older, married women — described how they were transported from location to location, spending months in the equivalent of human holding pens, until a prospective buyer bid on them.
Their captors appeared to have a system in place, replete with its own methodology of inventorying the women, as well as their own lexicon. Women and girls were referred to as “Sabaya,” followed by their name. Some were bought by wholesalers, who photographed and gave them numbers, to advertise them to potential buyers.
Osman Hassan Ali, a Yazidi businessman who has successfully smuggled out numerous Yazidi women, said he posed as a buyer in order to be sent the photographs. He shared a dozen images, each one showing a Yazidi woman sitting in a bare room on a couch, facing the camera with a blank, unsmiling expression. On the edge of the photograph is written in Arabic, “Sabaya No. 1,” “Sabaya No. 2,” and so on.Buildings where the women were collected and held sometimes included a viewing room.
“When they put us in the building, they said we had arrived at the ‘Sabaya Market,’” said one 19-year-old victim, whose first initial is I. “I understood we were now in a slave market.
She estimated there were at least 500 other unmarried women and girls in the multistory building, with the youngest among them being 11. When the buyers arrived, the girls were taken one by one into a separate room.
“The emirs sat against the wall and called us by name. We had to sit in a chair facing them. You had to look at them, and before you went in, they took away our scarves and anything we could have used to cover ourselves,” she said.
“When it was my turn, they made me stand four times. They made me turn around.”
The captives were also forced to answer intimate questions, including reporting the exact date of their last menstrual cycle. They realized that the fighters were trying to determine whether they were pregnant, in keeping with a Shariah rule stating that a man cannot have intercourse with his slave if she is pregnant.
Property of ISIS
The use of sex slavery by the Islamic State initially surprised even the group’s most ardent supporters, many of whom sparred with journalists online after the first reports of systematic rape.
The Islamic State’s leadership has repeatedly sought to justify the practice to its internal audience.
After the initial article in Dabiq in October, the issue came up in the publication again this year, in an editorial in May that expressed the writer’s hurt and dismay at the fact that some of the group’s own sympathizers had questioned the institution of slavery.
 “What really alarmed me was that some of the Islamic State’s supporters started denying the matter as if the soldiers of the Khilafah had committed a mistake or evil,” the author wrote. “I write this while the letters drip of pride,’’ he said. “We have indeed raided and captured the kafirahwomen and drove them like sheep by the edge of the sword.” Kafirah refers to infidels.
In a pamphlet published online in December, the Research and Fatwa Department of the Islamic State detailed best practices, including explaining that slaves belong to the estate of the fighter who bought them and therefore can be willed to another man and disposed of just like any other property after his death.
Recent escapees describe an intricate bureaucracy surrounding their captivity, with their status as a slave registered in a contract. When their owner would sell them to another buyer, a new contract would be drafted, like transferring a property deed. At the same time, slaves can also be set free, and fighters are promised a heavenly reward for doing so. Though rare, this has created one avenue of escape for victims.
A 25-year-old victim who escaped last month, identified by her first initial, A, described how one day her Libyan master handed her a laminated piece of paper. He explained that he had finished his training as a suicide bomber and was planning to blow himself up, and was therefore setting her free.
Labeled a “Certificate of Emancipation,” the document was signed by the judge of the western province of the Islamic State. The Yazidi woman presented it at security checkpoints as she left Syria to return to Iraq, where she rejoined her family in July.
The Islamic State recently made it clear that sex with Christian and Jewish women captured in battle is also permissible, according to a new 34-page manual issued this summer by the terror group’s Research and Fatwa Department.
Just about the only prohibition is having sex with a pregnant slave, and the manual describes how an owner must wait for a female captive to have her menstruating cycle, in order to “make sure there is nothing in her womb,” before having intercourse with her. Of the 21 women and girls interviewed for this article, among the only ones who had not been raped were the women who were already pregnant at the moment of their capture, as well as those who were past menopause.
Beyond that, there appears to be no bounds to what is sexually permissible. Child rape is explicitly condoned: “It is permissible to have intercourse with the female slave who hasn’t reached puberty, if she is fit for intercourse,” according to a translation by the Middle East Media Research Institute of a pamphlet published on Twitter last December.
One 34-year-old Yazidi woman, who was bought and repeatedly raped by a Saudi fighter in the Syrian city of Shadadi, described how she fared better than the second slave in the household — a 12-year-old girl who was raped for days on end despite heavy bleeding.
“He destroyed her body. She was badly infected. The fighter kept coming and asking me, ‘Why does she smell so bad?’ And I said, she has an infection on the inside, you need to take care of her,” the woman said.
 “I said to him, ‘She’s just a little girl,’ ” the older woman recalled. “And he answered: ‘No. She’s not a little girl. She’s a slave. And she knows exactly how to have sex.’ ’’“And having sex with her pleases God,” he said.

Sunday, 9 August 2015

Indian Diplomacy Fashioning A New Narrative, by Bhaskar Roy

Indian Diplomacy Fashioning A New Narrative, by Bhaskar Roy
From the very first day Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi jumped into foreign policy. By inviting leaders of all SAARC nations, Mr, Modi underscored his desire to promote a “neighbourhood first” foreign policy. This was a notable departure from the past.
It was well known that economic development was high on his agenda and a friendly and cooperative neighbourhood with a shared and mutually supportive action plan would make a win-win situation for all. This strategy is well on the way. The only impediment remains Pakistan – not a surprising fact. With infusion of monetary aid from the US, and large scale investment and defence assistance from China, Pakistan’s military-politico establishment views the situation in its favour and is quite happy disturbing the development infrastructure of SAARC, if only to hurt India. The manner in which events are shaping, Pakistan may eventually be left behind like a non-performing partner of this regional group.
In two recent speeches (July 17 in New Delhi and July 20 in Singapore) Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar gave an overview of Mr. Modi’s initiative and success till date and his future ambitions. This is new approach, as foreign secretaries have generally been reticent on publicly airing the government’s policies and thought process. The Indian public has greatly benefitted with the knowledge. Mr. Jaishankar is a highly experienced diplomat, having been ambassador to China, closely associated with the process of the India-US nuclear deal from the time of the UPA-led Congress government, and also served as ambassador to the US, before being brought back by Mr. Modi as the foreign secretary. He is the prime minister’s trusted man and carrier of his policies.
There are two old but important strategic visions that need to be mentioned here. One is “he who rules Central Asia rules the world”. The other is “he who rules the Indian Ocean rules the world”. Both sayings were apt not only for their times but continue to be relevant today, though total rule over either by any one country today is out of the question. But the quantum of influence matters.
Mr. Modi, who has already visited 25 countries, toured four Central Asian countries which were generally neglected by New Delhi. He also visited the Indian Ocean countries including Sri Lanka with goodwill and support. The Maldives was the only exception because of politically irregular developments in that country. Impending summits of the Pacific Islands and African states will take India’s friendly profile wider in a concrete manner.
Mr. Jaishankar spoke about them as signals of different times, of “greater confidence, more initiative, certainly stronger determination,” as expressions of growth in India’s capabilities,
Apart from the neighbourhood policy, the main opportunities and challenges to India’s foreign policy relates to the US and China with Pakistan in between. Other relationships attach themselves to this ballpark variously, as per circumstances.
Mr. Jaishankar talked about a China policy that triangulates security, economic cooperation and international politics. He referred to the Xian (China) meeting between Mr. Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping as a high point from India’s perspective in bilateral relations, which would have been difficult to envisage a year ago. But what about real issues? The Chinese are masters in propaganda and show up with statements from which they withdraw whenever they wish. If the interlocutor is seen as someone who gets impressed by huge shows, the task of the Chinese is made even easier.
It is difficult to accept that India-China relations have undergone an “orbital jump” or a quantum jump in the last one year. If Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi agreed to describe India and China as, “two major powers in the region and the world”, it should have translated into some action on Beijing’s part.
How is the triangulation policy with China working? The latest is on terrorism, one of India’s key security interests. China vetoed India’s move in the UN Security Council to designate Mumbai carnage mastermind, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, as an international terrorist. Mr. Modi took up this issue with Xi Jinping at Ufa, Russia, but was rebuffed. The Chinese made this public immediately in a press conference in Beijing.
In international politics, China has declined to support India’s candidature as a permanent member of an expanded UN Security Council. It is not in China’s interest to push through reform of the United Nations and certainly not an expansion of permanent members with veto powers. An expansion could mean membership of Japan and Germany certainly, and perhaps that of South Africa and Brazil. It could also mean a change in veto power. India was supported by the other four members of the P-5, who also supported India’s move on Lakhvi.
China says it supports a greater role for India in the UN but this means absolutely nothing – only a tactic of deception. There can be no reform or restructure of the UN without expansion of the P-5 and a redefining of their powers.
Beijing continues to block India’s entry in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) where the membership issue requires a consensus. It opposed the India-US nuclear deal and NSG clearance till the US intervened at the highest level – US President George W. Bush had to call Chinese President Jiang Zemin.
The India-China border issue will continue to remain unresolved till China finds it strategically convenient to resolve it, as it did with Russia and the former Soviet states.
On Chinese investments in India, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) should pay greater heed to the advice of the intelligence agencies. Strategic areas must remain out of bounds, and the Indian private sector may also be appraised accordingly. Unfortunately, the private sector does not seem to be well versed on security issues.
China has demonstrated repeatedly that Pakistan is their mainstay in the region and the animosity of Islamabad and Rawalpindi toward India will continue to be exploited, short of a full-scale war with India.
The improvement of India-China relations began very slowly with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988. The movements were cautious on both sides. The first break through was marked by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to China in 1993, when the Peace and Tranquillity Treaty on the border was signed. Further improvements followed thereafter.
Chinese leader, late Deng Xiaoping saw stability in the country’s periphery as a prerequisite for its drive for reform, opening up and economic development. That policy continues to some extent but not entirely. Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “hide your strength, bide your time” began to be questioned around 2004, but most definitely from 2008. It assumed a new surge from 2012, when Xi Jinping came to power. China is now both confident and assertive, having become the world’s biggest economy with more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, and the third most powerful armed force, still growing at a fast pace.
India, of course, has to work with China and deal with China with confidence. It must be remembered that the Chinese respect strength. And India has to act to demand its space in Asia and the world.
The post-cold war India-US relations have changed positively with the shift of global balance of power and interests. Both the US and China pursue bilateral relations of mutual benefit, but also with serious strategic differences. Both are pursuing a “great power relationship” which has elements of a new cold war. The US seeks a relationship with India which can indirectly counter China, and Beijing is ever suspicious of and alert to it. India has handled this complicated challenge astutely.
It must be recognised, however, that a strong contingent of cold warriors still remain in the US foreign policy establishment. They argue for China because Beijing joined the USA in a strategic anti-Soviet axis, which included Pakistan. The same influencers, fathered by Henry Kissinger hold a pro-Pakistan and anti-India position. They were visible during the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war, the Indian nuclear test in 1998, and during the India-US nuclear deal negotiations. Things are changing but not enough.
Although communism is dead in Russia, these forces have helped push Russia into the arms of China. Russia is joining China in countering the US pivot in the Asia-Pacific region, pushing back initial indications of a possible Russia-Japan rapprochement. These are difficult waters to navigate. Mr. Modi’s Russia visit for the BRICs and SCO conference needs to be followed up by more robust engagement.
Pakistan, however, is going nowhere. No doubt India has to engage with Pakistan, but the off again, on again approach is self-defeating and only gives Pakistan an upper hand. Being helpful and co-operative to neighbours is certainly positive but being soft to a semi-rogue neighbour which takes every opportunity to harm India is weak policy.
Serious mistakes have been made in the past regarding Pakistan and terrorism. It is very difficult but not impossible to retrieve the situation. Pakistan is preparing to take India to the UN General Assembly, accusing India of terrorism in Pakistan. This requires a well-researched, calculated and effective response at appropriate fora.
An improvement of relations with Pakistan should not be seen in absolute terms. This is a long term path and should be walked on accordingly, affirmative action being taken when required. With its strategic geographical location, Pakistan has big powers quietly appeasing it. Hence, much wider diplomacy is required to hold Pakistan accountable for terrorism.
Under Mr. Modi, there has been a broadening of diplomacy, with the Indian Ocean countries and the Indo-Pacific receiving greater attention. But the underpinning, that is, the defence sector continues to lag. With a 7,500 km long coastline, strengthening of the navy, backed by long rage air force is paramount.
Unfortunately, the navy’s budget was reduced. In contrast, Pakistan will acquire eight more submarines from China, whose navy is growing rapidly, with nuclear submarines, a modern 40,000 ton landing craft under construction, five aircraft carriers planned, and one nearing completion.
Development must be supported by strong defence, otherwise it will be in jeopardy. India has traditionally paid little importance to military diplomacy, which in today’s global world is unavoidable. China followed the US in indigenous military production, supplying military weapons, aircraft, naval craft and other equipment to smaller countries, it has even reached Peru, supplying missiles! Such supplies buy a lot of influence,
Yoga has been claimed a soft-power success. But a one-off publicity is not enough. There is an urgent requirement of emphatic statements through publicity and propaganda. India’s external publicity is weak, yet publicity is an essential part of foreign policy. A dedicated structure is required, not necessarily under the foreign ministry.
The Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) exists, but mainly serves as a parking place for Foreign Service officers waiting for their next assignment. Here, out of the box thinking is required and the country has no dearth of talented human resources.
But publicity needs to go beyond culture, and policy and position on issues must be highlighted.
All achievements cannot be rested in the last one year. Most have clear lines of continuity while in some cases dormant policies have been given new life. The image of a divided polity is dangerous and will not serve the country at all.
It is time Mr. Modi enlisted other members of his cabinet to promote foreign policy. It cannot be a one-man army. Time is limited and the prime minister must spend much more time on domestic issues. Follow up and action on promises made and assurances given is a must. Otherwise credibility will be lost.
Optics is very important. Domestic developments impact foreign policy for foreign interlocutors view a country as a whole.
Finally, ministers must learn to speak in one voice. Misplaced bravado and intemperate statements could seriously impact sensitive foreign policy and diplomacy negatively. Some people, therefore, need to be quarantined.
*The writer is New Delhi based strategic analyst. He can be reached at e-mail grouchohart@yahoo.com


AJK - Asking for the moon, Tariq Naqash

AJK - Asking for the moon, Tariq Naqash

After its liberation in October, 1947, the 13,297 sq km territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) remained without a proper constitution for over two decades. However, as it draws close to the 68th anniversary of liberation, the region still remains at the crossroads in its struggle for constitutional reforms aimed at empowering the government and institutions for the benefit of the public at large, to which they are answerable and accountable.
At the same time, there have also been serious voices calling for reshaping the region’s relationship with Pakistan albeit as a provisional arrangement until the final disposition of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir.
On October 24, 1947, a ‘revolutionary’ government was installed in this territory as Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, with Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan as its founding president.
According to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Resolution of August 13, 1948, the territory of AJK is to be administered by the “local authority” under the Commission’s scrutiny.
Constitutional confusion has a detrimental effect on governance
Although the liberated territories of the State are not expressly named in the Constitution of Pakistan, it states that Pakistan’s territories include “such States and territories as are or may be included in Pakistan, whether by accession or otherwise.”
Though both AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan are territories “otherwise included” in Pakistan under the UNCIP Resolutions, Pakistan has however always treated the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory, and that’s why the liberated territories of the erstwhile princely state are not declared as part of the Federation of Pakistan.
This is also why Article 257 of the Constitution of Pakistan states that “when the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State.”
Experts say that it also suggests, inter alia, that AJK should have a government enjoying internal autonomy.
Nevertheless, for a long time the affairs of AJK were practically run by the ministry of Kashmir affairs, which was established in March 1949. There was no proper constitution and no democracy, and even though the region used to have a President it was in effect the ministry of Kashmir affairs that called the shots. The ministry would nominate AJK president (chief executive) on the “recommendation” of the working committee of Muslim Conference, then the sole political party on this side of the divide. The removal of the president was also done apparently in line with the recommendation of the same forum.
Basharat Ahmed Shaikh, a retired judge of the AJK Supreme Court, recalls that in the early days of AJK, even demanding better treatment for its citizens or equal salaries for its officials, or asking a better physical infrastructure, was considered an anti-state activity.
“A pamphlet written by me in 1964, merely inviting the attention of concerned quarters drew the wrath of the Pakistani authorities so much so that I was incarcerated in the infamous Dalai interrogation centre for several months,” he recalls.
However, the situation started improving in the late 1960s and early 1970s as the AJK people and their leadership continued their struggle for a proper constitution and governance setup.
The first formal Constitution was drafted in 1970 and is commonly referred to as Act 1970. It was under the same constitution that presidential and Legislative Assembly elections were held for the first time on the basis of adult franchise.
All executive powers and the corresponding legislative powers were vested, respectively, in the President and the Legislative Assembly except in respect of defence and security, currency and the external affairs. The Assembly was also empowered to amend the said Act.
In 1971, the Assembly affected an amendment in that Act, without having to seek prior permission of the government of Pakistan, and gave fundamental rights to the people, writ jurisdiction to the High Court and established an Apex (appellate) Court.
Not only were the powers to appoint judges to the superior courts vested in the AJK President, the subjects of foreign trade and foreign aid were also in the domain of the AJK government, raising the profile of its internal autonomy.
However, in 2015, 45 years after the promulgation of Act 1970, the region faces retrogression to post-1970 days, thanks to the Interim Constitution Act, 1974 that is in force today.
The new Constitution introduced a parliamentary form of government, but drastically curtailed the powers of the government in Muzaffarabad.
“There is no denying the fact that Act 1974 reversed the progress towards empowerment of the people and their government in this territory,” says senior lawyer Raza Ali Khan, also a former president of AJK Supreme Court Bar Association.
And there are good reasons to subscribe to his notion.
Under the Act 1974, a new institution was established by the name of AJK Council “to serve as a bridge” between the governments in Muzaffarabad and Islamabad.
Prime Minister (chief executive) of Pakistan heads it as chairman, while the Federal Minister for Kashmir affairs happens to be its in-charge minister.
Practically this institution has besmirched the representative character of the AJK government by divesting it of many powers that it enjoyed under the previous constitution.
For example, the Council has powers to legislate about 52 subjects. The AJK Department of Inland Revenue, AG Office and the Directorate General of Audit fall under the administrative control of Council. Besides, it enjoys authoritative role in the appointment of AJK high and supreme courts judges and the chief election commissioner.
The Council comprises six members elected by the AJK Legislative Assembly and as many nominated by the chairman (Pakistani prime minister) from the Parliament of Pakistan. The elected members are toothless as far as functions of the Council are concerned, because all powers are vested in the chairman, most of which are exercised on his behalf by the federal minister in charge.
Ironically, neither the chairman nor the in-charge minister is answerable to the AJK institutions, because none of them takes oath under the AJK Constitution that grants them these positions.
“The Prime Minister of Pakistan exercising full authority in AJK is a violation of the Constitution of Pakistan,” maintains retired justice Shaikh.
“I have been actively associated with the Pakistan Movement since the age of 11 years. I still look up to Pakistan with the same reverence, but this does not change the fact that the Prime Minister of Pakistan is not the representative of the people of AJK; nor is he answerable to them: he is not even responsible to the institution he is heading as chairman,” he adds.
The Council retains 20 per cent of the income tax generated from the AJK territory as well as entire license fees collected from the telecom companies operating in AJK. The remaining 80 per cent of income tax is given to the AJK government as a grant.
There has always been a lot of hue and cry against alleged corruption in the Council, but that has always turned out to be a cry in the wilderness. Neither the people at the helm in Pakistan nor the otherwise hawkish media has ever bothered to take stock of this.
“The overwhelming feeling among the Kashmiris is that the Council is drastically hampering the ability of the elected government in Muzaffarabad to take key decisions regarding finance, public policy and socio economic development,” says Tariq Masud, a former bureaucrat who now heads a nongovernmental organisation — Centre for Peace, Development and Reforms (CPDR).
“Equipping the AJK Council with legislative, executive and financial powers is by no means justified or warranted. The way this institution controls important subjects has marginalised the powers of AJK government over the area’s affairs,” he maintains.
“In fact, it leaves AJK with little autonomy or status.”
In October 2009, the then Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani announced in Muzaffarabad to constitute a committee to review and suggest long due reforms in Act 1974. But the announcement did not see the light of the day despite reminders from here.
Meanwhile, with the passage of 18th and 19th constitutional amendments in Pakistan that handed more authority to provinces in their resources, AJK hopes were rekindled regarding empowerment of the region and its institutions on the same pattern.
However, people are yet to see any glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel.
In January 2011, CPDR held a first formal roundtable of stakeholders from all shades of society for an appraisal of the existing arrangements between Muzaffarabad and Islamabad and deliberations on the possible constitutional reforms.
“In fact people believe and rightly so that the existing interim Constitution has undermined the status of the AJK government, virtually rendering it as an ineffective and impotent body with no executive powers,” maintains analyst Ershad Mahmud, also an office bearer of CPDR.
In mid-2012, the then federal minister for Kashmir affairs Mian Manzoor Wattoo invited Kashmiri leadership for an inconclusive “discussion” on constitutional reforms and around same time a special parliamentary committee was also constituted by the AJK government to recommend suitable reforms.
The committee, including eight members from the Assembly and one from the Council, tabled its “recommendations for the amendments” in the Assembly on June 23 this year, almost three years after its formation.
Though the recommendations are not ideal in the eyes of many, at least they address some of the concerns, as they include, among other things, transfer of all powers, currently exercised by the AJK Council, to the AJK government, except for the responsibilities of Pakistan government under the UNCIP resolutions.
However, as the saying goes there are many a slip twixt the cup and lip.
On June 24, Matloob Inqilabi, AJK minister and head of the committee, told media that the recommendations were approved by the Assembly and forwarded to the AJK Law Department to be presented in the Assembly in shape of a bill.
But so far there seems to be no progress, mainly because of restrictions in the Act on making amendments about the issues related to the government of Pakistan.
Section 33 of Act 1974 says (though) the provisions of this Act can be amended, but no amendment can be made in section 33, section 31 and section 56 ‘without prior approval of the government of Pakistan.’
Section 31 restricts the Assembly and Council from making any law concerning the responsibilities of the government of Pakistan under the UNCIP Resolutions; the defence and security of AJK; the current coin or the issue of any bills, notes or other paper currency; or the external affairs of AJK including foreign trade and foreign aid.
Whereas section 56 says that nothing in Act 1974 shall derogate from the responsibilities of the government of Pakistan in relation to the matters specified in section 31 or prevent the Government in Pakistan from taking such action that it may consider necessary or expedient for the effective discharge of those responsibilities.
The AJK law department itself appears to be at sixes and sevens on the issue.
“Since the recommendations were made by the committee comprising members of both houses, it should have been endorsed by the joint sitting,” maintains law secretary Idrees Abbasi.
“However, we have prepared the draft bill, which will be sent to the cabinet for a decision,” he adds. “After that the bill will be sent to the government of Pakistan, through the ministry of Kashmir affairs, for its approval. Only after that approval, it can be tabled in any of the two houses,” says Abbasi.
And that stage seems to be about who’ll bell the cat.
“Since the recommendations by the parliamentary committee fetter the arbitrary powers of the prime minister of Pakistan and federal minister, no wonder the government in Muzaffarabad is bereft of the hardihood and determination to actualise the common desire for constitutional reforms,” says lawyer Raza Ali Khan.
“Those who are running a parallel government in AJK from Islamabad through the AJK Council, spending and squandering the resources of Kashmiris without any fear of accountability, would never let this move succeed,” he adds.
One school of thought believes that the stumbling blocks to constitutional reforms in AJK actually stem from region’s non-representation in Pakistani institutions.
Syed Manzoor Hussain Gillani, a former acting chief justice of the AJK Supreme Court, leads this school of thought from the front.
“The government of Pakistan should ensure full-fledged constitutional, political and representational rights to the people of the liberated territories of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the pattern of other provinces,” he pleads, referring to AJK and GB.
Administered by Pakistan, these liberated territories (AJK and GB) are subject to all the liabilities and duties of a province, but not entitled to the rights of a province, guaranteed to the four provinces by the Constitution of Pakistan, he regrets.
“It is the future status of these territories that is in dispute, and not the rights of the territories and the people living therein.”
From the platform of his Association for the Rights of People of Jammu and Kashmir (ARJK), Mr Gillani stresses that AJK and GB should be given de-facto status of a province with provisional representation in the Parliament and institutions established under the Constitution of Pakistan, such as the Council of Common Interests (CCI), National Economic Council (NEC) National Finance Commission (NFC) and Indus River System Authority (IRSA), etc.
Interestingly, in its manifesto for the 2013 general elections, PML-N had declared that it technically considered AJK and GB as provinces, equal to Punjab, Sindh, KP and Balochistan.
In the same context, it had pledged that the functions, responsibilities and financial powers of AJK and GB will be gradually brought at par with the provinces and their legislative assemblies will be empowered.
However, more than two years on, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has not found time to honour that commitment, even though Raja Farooq Haider, his party’s president in AJK, has always vociferously opposed the Council in its present form.
The status quo is multiplying frustration in the region.
“If Pakistan is our elder brother, as we hear most of the time, it should feel contented with our empowerment, at least on a par with its federating units if not more than them … After all we are not crying for the moon,” says analyst and civil society activist Khizar Hayat Abbasi.
“At the moment, we are being made to believe that the vested interests in Islamabad are hell-bent on perpetuating the status quo — to continue to keep us impuissant and dependent.”
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 9th, 2015