Pakistan in Gaza-Jihad on Steroids, Kashmir Revisited, and Strategic Myopia. Dr Shabir Choudhry,

Pakistan in Gaza-Jihad on Steroids, Kashmir Revisited, and Strategic Myopia

Dr Shabir Choudhry, 23 December 2025, London

Pakistan’s categorical refusal to support any international effort aimed at disarming Hamas has once again revealed a familiar pattern in its foreign policy: ideological absolutism overriding strategic realism. While framed as principled solidarity with Palestinians, Islamabad’s position increasingly mirrors the very contradictions that have plagued its own Kashmir policy for decades—maximalist rhetoric, reliance on non-state actors, and diplomatic isolation disguised as moral clarity.

Gaza and Kashmir: Parallel Causes, Divergent Lessons

Pakistan frequently draws explicit parallels between Gaza and Jammu and Kashmir, presenting both as cases of occupation and denied self-determination. At a rhetorical level, the comparison resonates. In both cases, civilian populations live under heavy militarisation, political rights are constrained, and international law is selectively invoked or ignored.

Yet Pakistan’s policy response to these two conflicts exposes a deep inconsistency. In Kashmir, Islamabad insists that the dispute must be resolved politically, through dialogue, demilitarisation, and the will of the people. In Gaza, however, Pakistan refuses to even countenance the disarmament of Hamas, an armed non-state actor whose military strategy has repeatedly triggered devastating retaliation from Israel, in which ultimately civilians suffer immensely.

Critics question, if armed struggle is not a viable or acceptable solution for Kashmir and for Balochistan today, as Pakistan openly advocates, then why is it treated as sacrosanct in Gaza?

It must be pointed out that disarming Hamas is not a joke. Despite the destruction and massive human rights violations Israel has committed in Gaza, they have not been able to accomplish their mission of destroying Hamas and its infrastructure. The Pakistani and Turkish army chiefs are not stupid that they take on the task of eliminating Hamas and destroying all the infrastructure Hamas has built on the ground or underground.

If somehow, they agree to take the challenge, both Turkey and Pakistan will suffer badly, and hundreds of body bags would travel in the direction of Turkey and Pakistan, resulting in public anger and frustration.

Also, the Muslims of many countries, including Muslims of Turkey and Pakistan, will protest because this policy would be taken as helping Israel and America to kill and destroy the people of Palestine and helping Israel, a country that violated all the UN Resolutions and mercilessly killed civilians, destroyed their houses, starved them of food and deprived them of drinking water.

Militancy as Policy: A Recycled Strategy

The legacy of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy looms large over its Gaza posture. From the late 1980s onwards, Pakistan’s reliance on irregular forces in Kashmir internationalised the conflict briefly but ultimately backfired. It allowed India to recast a political dispute as a security problem, weakened Pakistan’s diplomatic case, and militarised Kashmiri society.

The outcome is instructive. Kashmir did not move closer to self-determination; instead, it became more tightly controlled, more securitised, and more internationally marginalised.

Gaza risks a similar fate. Hamas’s armed strategy, whatever its original rationale, has entrenched Israeli siege, devastated civilian life, and crowded out Palestinian political pluralism. By refusing to acknowledge this parallel, Pakistan appears trapped in an outdated strategic mindset—one it has already tested and failed with, in Kashmir.

Israel, Iran, and the Expansion of Proxy Conflict

Israel’s recent attack on Iranian targets further complicates this picture. The Middle East is now defined less by the Israel–Palestine binary and more by a regional confrontation between Israel and Iran, fought through proxies. Critics point out that Hamas is no longer merely a Palestinian actor fighting Israel, but it is part of a wider Iranian strategic network.

Here, the Kashmir analogy becomes even more uncomfortable. Pakistan has long rejected India’s claim that Kashmir is merely a theatre of proxy warfare. Yet by aligning rhetorically with Hamas without acknowledging its regional entanglements, Pakistan weakens its own argument that Kashmir is fundamentally different.

Selective outrage erodes credibility.

The American Factor and Lessons Unlearned

The Pakistani Field Marshal’s visit to Washington must be understood through this prism. The United States has little patience left for ambiguity regarding militancy—whether in South Asia or the Middle East. Washington’s Kashmir policy since 9/11 has steadily shifted toward “conflict management,” largely because Pakistan’s past strategies made a clean political narrative harder to defend.

There is a cautionary lesson here. Pakistan’s unqualified Gaza stance risks reproducing the same outcome: loud moral posturing, diminishing diplomatic leverage, and eventual exclusion from decision-making forums.

Just as Kashmir was effectively buried at Tashkent and Simla under the language of stability and bilateralism, Gaza risks being reshaped without Pakistan’s input—despite Islamabad’s vocal support.

Choices Before Pakistan: Kashmir as a Warning, not a Template

Pakistan now faces three strategic paths, each illuminated by its Kashmir experience:

1. Repeat the Kashmir Mistake

Persist with ideological maximalism and implicit endorsement of armed struggle. This may energise domestic constituencies but will further marginalise Pakistan internationally, just as it did on Kashmir.

2. Selective Learning

Continue rhetorical solidarity while privately recognising that militarisation undermines political causes. This mirrors Pakistan’s current de facto Kashmir posture—support without escalation.

3. Principled Consistency

Critics of the current ruling elite, even within Pakistan, strongly oppose the Pakistani army going to Gaza to disarm Hamas or Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, other critics expect to apply the same standards to Gaza that Pakistan demands for Kashmir: civilian protection, political process, international mediation, and rejection of non-state militancy as a substitute for diplomacy.

Only the third option offers coherence.

Conclusion: Kashmir’s Ghost in Gaza

Before any decision is taken, the ruler of Pakistan must understand that they already have too much on their plate. There is a conflict with India. There is uncontrolled militancy going on in various parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. There is strong militancy going on in Balochistan, and there is internal instability, and the economy is still in a mess. Taking on another very messy task may enhance their standing in some quarters, but this will soon prove to be counterproductive.

Pakistan’s Gaza policy is haunted by the unresolved legacy of Kashmir. The belief that armed resistance keeps a cause alive has already been tested—and found wanting—in South Asia. Yet instead of drawing hard lessons, Pakistan risks exporting a failed template to another tragedy.

Supporting Palestinian rights does not require sanctifying militancy, just as advocating for Kashmir does not require perpetual conflict. True solidarity lies in learning from history, not repeating its most costly errors.

If Pakistan continues to treat Gaza as a stage for ideological performance rather than strategic reflection, it may once again find itself morally vocal, strategically irrelevant, and absent when the future is decided—just as it was after 1965, after 1971, and after Kashmir slipped from the centre of global concern.

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Gaza and the Security Subcontractors: Why Pakistan Is Being Courted Again. Dr Shabir Choudhry,

 Gaza and the Security Subcontractors: Why Pakistan Is Being Courted Again.

Dr Shabir Choudhry, 20 December 2025, London.

The reported statement by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, thanking Pakistan for its “openness” to considering a role in a proposed International Stabilisation Force for Gaza, reveals far more about Washington’s geopolitical instincts than about any genuine concern for Palestinian welfare.

This is not diplomacy rooted in history, morality, or justice. It is diplomacy driven by expediency.

Gaza today is not a neutral conflict zone in need of peacekeepers. It is a devastated, besieged territory emerging from a campaign that has destroyed homes, hospitals, universities, and tens of thousands of civilian lives. Any so-called stabilisation force will not be entering a post-conflict environment shaped by consent, but an occupied landscape defined by trauma, anger, and unresolved injustice.

In this context, Pakistan’s name surfaces not because of its moral standing on Palestine, but because of its long-established role as a security subcontractor for great powers.

A troubled historical memory

For Palestinians, history matters. And Pakistan’s historical record is not neutral.

During the events of Black September in Jordan in 1970, thousands of Palestinians were killed by Jordanian forces. People have not forgotten that on Jordon’s request, Pakistani troops were sent under the command of Brigadier Zia-ul-Haq, later Pakistan’s military ruler, to deal with the unrest.

I am sure that episode remains deeply etched in Palestinian and Arab memory as a moment when Muslim solidarity gave way to regime survival and geopolitical alignment.

This history alone should caution against presenting Pakistan as a benevolent stabilising force in Gaza.

Proxy wars and the credibility problem

Pakistan’s foreign and security policy since independence has a history of relying on:

• proxy warfare,
• ideological mobilisation,
• and the instrumental use of non-state actors.
• 
  

From Kashmir to Afghanistan, this approach has left behind instability rather than peace. A state that has struggled to disentangle itself from militancy at home and abroad lacks the credibility to act as a neutral guarantor of civilian protection in one of the most politically charged conflicts on earth.

Gaza is not a UN peacekeeping mission in a post-colonial state. It is a theatre of occupation, resistance, and international hypocrisy. In view of that, Pakistan should stay out of this hotspot, as it will not add to the credibility of Pakistan; if anything, it can cause some serious problems for the country that is surrounded by many problems.

Why Washington still looks to Islamabad

If Pakistan’s record is so problematic, why does Washington still court it?

The answer is simple: control.

Pakistan offers:

• a disciplined military,
• economic dependency,
• diplomatic pliability,
• and long experience in executing externally designed security agendas.

From the Cold War to the “War on Terror,” Pakistan has repeatedly been positioned as a frontline state — not because its causes were just, but because its leadership was compliant.

Gaza now risks becoming the next chapter in this long and storied tale.

Policing the victims

Any international force that enters Gaza without Palestinian consent will inevitably be perceived not as a protector, but as an enforcer — tasked less with safeguarding civilians and more with containing resistance and stabilising Israel’s security environment.

If Pakistan participates, it will not be seen as defending Palestinian rights, but as policing Palestinian suffering.

This would fatally undermine Pakistan’s own moral claims on Kashmir, where it insists on the ‘right of self-determination’ while potentially helping suppress it elsewhere.

The larger pattern

Marco Rubio’s statement is therefore not an endorsement of Pakistan; it is a reminder of how Muslim states are selectively engaged to manage Muslim crises — not to resolve them.

Palestine does not need another stabilisation force imposed from above. It needs:

• an end to occupation,
• accountability for war crimes,
• and recognition of Palestinian political agency.

Anything less is not peacekeeping — it is damage control.

And Pakistan, once again, is being invited not to stand with the oppressed, but to serve the architects of an unjust order. END.

Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.

 

Is any fluid injected into the body before sending it home? Dr Shabir Choudhry, 16 December 2025, London.

 Is any fluid injected into the body before sending it home?

Dr Shabir Choudhry, 16 December 2025, London.

Yes — sometimes, but not always, and not automatically.

There are two different practices, often confused with each other:

(A) Embalming (full preservation)

• This involves injecting embalming fluid (usually formaldehyde-based) into the bloodstream.
• It slows decomposition and is commonly used in Western countries for long-distance transport or viewing.
• This is not required for all bodies.

(B) Minimal preservation / hygienic preparation

• In many cases (especially for Muslim burials), no embalming is done.
• The body is:
• Washed,
• Shrouded,
• Placed in a sealed coffin,
• Sometimes cooled or refrigerated.
• Some countries only require temporary preservation, such as cooling or sealing, not injection.

So, the idea that everybody has alcohol or fluid injected is incorrect.

2. Is the fluid “alcohol” and therefore haram?

Medical reality:

• Embalming fluid is not alcohol that people drink.
• It may contain methyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, or ethanol as a chemical preservatives, not as khamr (intoxicant).
• It is not consumed, not for pleasure, and not used voluntarily.

Islamic legal principle:

Classical Fiqh distinguishes between:

• Khamr (intoxicants) used for enjoyment → haram,
• Chemical substances used externally or involuntarily → not the same ruling.

Most contemporary scholars agree:

Medical or legal necessity (ḍarūrah) allows procedures otherwise disliked.

3. Is embalming required because the body can “burst”?

This part is mostly exaggerated.

What actually happens:

• After death, gases form due to decomposition.
• If a body is:
• Kept warm,
• Uncooled,
• Transported over long periods,

Pressure can build up. But:

§  Modern air transport uses:

• Refrigeration,
• Sealed zinc or hermetic coffins,
• Pressure-controlled cargo holds.
• Bodies do not normally “burst” during flights.

Embalming is done mainly to:

• Slow decay,
• Meet airline or border regulations,
• Allow long delays before burial.

Not because of air pressure explosions.

4. What does Islamic law say about embalming?

General Islamic rule:

• The human body must be respected, even after death.
• Unnecessary interference is discouraged.

However:

Islamic jurisprudence allows exceptions under:

• Necessity (ḍarūrah),
• Public interest (maṣlaḥah),
• Legal requirements of the land.

Scholarly consensus (summary):

• Embalming is discouraged if avoidable.
• Permitted if:
• Required by law,
• Needed for transportation,
• No viable alternative exists.

Major fatwa bodies (including Al-Azhar and many contemporary jurists) permit embalming, when necessary, especially for repatriation.

5. Is it sinful (haram) to send a body home after embalming?

No.

There is:

• No sin on the deceased (they had no choice),
• No sin on the family if it was required.

Islam judges’ actions by:

intention and necessity, not rumours.

 

6. Is it possible to send bodies without embalming?

Yes, in many cases.

Families can:

• Request no embalming,
• Choose rapid transport,
• Use refrigeration,
• Select airlines that allow non-embalmed Muslim burials.

Many UK–Pakistan and UK–Azad Kashmir transfers happen without embalming, especially when burial is arranged quickly.

7. Why do rumours persist?

Because:

• The process is hidden from families,
• People use the word “alcohol” loosely,
• Lack of communication from the funeral services,
• Religious anxiety mixed with grief.

8. Islamic principle to remember

“Allah does not burden a soul beyond its capacity.” (Qur’an 2:286)

And:

Necessities permit what is otherwise restricted.

(Al-ḍarūrāt tubīḥ al-maḥẓūrāt)

Conclusion (Plain Answer)

• Bodies do not normally burst.
• Not all bodies are injected with fluid.
• Embalming fluid is not khamr in the religious sense.
• If embalming is required, it is Islamically permitted.
• Families are not sinful for complying with law or necessity.
• Where possible, non-embalmed transfer can be requested.

Iddah in the Quran and Sunnah: Dignity Not Imprisonment Dr Shabir Choudhry, 15 December 2025, London

 Iddah in the Quran and Sunnah: Dignity Not Imprisonment

Dr Shabir Choudhry, 15 December 2025, London

1/ The concept of Iddah (waiting period) after the death of a husband is clearly stated in the Holy Qur’an. Allah says:

“Those of you who die and leave behind wives—let them wait by themselves for four months and ten days. Then, when they have completed their term, there is no blame upon you for what they do with themselves in a lawful manner. And Allah is fully aware of what you do.”

(Surah al-Baqarah 2:234)

This verse establishes one unambiguous rule:

A widow may not remarry during this period.

Importantly, the Qur’an:

• Does not order confinement
• Does not forbid leaving the home when necessary.
• Does not prohibit work or public interaction when necessary.

The silence of the Qur’an here is deliberate, not accidental.

2/ Prophetic Practice: The Decisive Evidence

The Sunnah clarifies how this verse was implemented in real life.

Jabir ibn Abdullah (RA) narrates:

My aunt was divorced and wanted to go out to harvest her date palms. A man objected, saying she should not leave her house during ʿiddah. She went to the Messenger of Allah ﷺ and told him. He replied:

 

“Yes, go and harvest your date palms, for perhaps you will give charity or do something good.”

(Sahih Muslim, Kitab al-Talaq, Hadith 1483)

This hadith is:

• Authentic
• Clear
• Legally decisive

The Prophet ﷺ explicitly allowed:

• Leaving the house
• Working
• Economic independence
• Social benefit

Had confinement been obligatory, he would have corrected her. He did not.

3/ Support from Classical Jurists (Where Relevant)

It is important to note that not all classical jurists held the same view, but many respected authorities explicitly supported mobility and necessity during ʿiddah.

Imam Malik (d. 179 AH)

Held that a woman in ʿiddah may leave her home for her needs, especially during the day.

Imam al-Nawawi (d. 676 AH). In his commentary on Sahih Muslim, he writes that this hadith proves: “The permissibility of a woman leaving her home during ʿiddah for her needs and livelihood.”

Imam Ibn Qudamah (d. 620 AH)

States in al-Mughni that:

“If a woman has no one to provide for her, she may go out to work during her Iddah.”

These jurists were not modern reformers; they were pillars of classical Fiqh.

4/ What Scholars Differed On — and Why It Doesn’t Override the Sunnah

Some jurists preferred that a widow remain in her marital home when possible. However:

• This was based on prudence, not prohibition
• It was context-dependent
• It never amounted to house arrest

No school of law:

• Required neglect of children
• Forbade earning a living
• Allowed harm or hardship

Islamic law is governed by the principle:

“Hardship brings ease.”

(al-mashaqqah tajlib al-taysir)

5/ The Reality of Widows Today

Consider a widow with young children:

• Who takes them to school, and collects them after school?
• Who buys food for the family?
• Who takes them to the doctor or hospital?
• Who earns if there is no male guardian?

Islam does not issue commands divorced from reality.

The Prophet ﷺ said:

“There should be neither harm nor causing harm.”

Anything that can result in harm must be avoided; the interpretation of that is:

• Harm to children, their health, well-being, etc.
• Forces dependency, which makes the family or the people dependent.
• Creates humiliation for the family or the people.

6/ Contradicts the objectives of Shariah (Maqasid al-Shariah).

Culture Is Not Revelation

Sadly, many restrictions are imposed on widows and women in general today:

• Stemming from cultural patriarchy
• Are reinforced by fear-based sermons
• Ignore authentic hadith
• Confuse social control with piety

Our lives and actions are moulded or controlled by the social norms, which many times contradict the Islamic teachings. Before doing anything, people in general will not think about what Allah will say; they think about what the people will say.

That means we cannot live how we want to live. We live how other people would like us to live. In my experience, you can never satisfy the people. So don’t live for the people, live for yourself and your family.

Islam is not honoured by cruelty; it is honoured by justice, mercy, and wisdom.

7/ Conclusion

Iddah is a period of dignity and transition, not confinement.

The Qur’an commands waiting before remarriage.

The Prophet ﷺ allowed movement, work, and social contribution.

Classical jurists confirmed this where necessity exists.

To imprison widows in the name of Islam is to betray the Prophet’s practice, not defend it. END