From the Abraham Accords to South Asia: Realignment, Escalation, and the Risk of Strategic Spillover.
Dr Shabir Choudhry
The current turbulence in the Middle East is not an isolated eruption of violence. It is the visible phase of a deeper structural transformation that began years ago with shifting alliances, normalisation agreements, and recalibrated power balances. The question now confronting policymakers is not merely whether the conflict will intensify within West Asia, but whether its consequences will extend into South Asia.
The concern is not about tanks moving across continents. It is about alliance systems, strategic compression, and geopolitical contagion.
1. The Transformation of Regional Architecture
The Abraham Accords marked more than diplomatic normalisation between Israel and certain Arab states. They represented the institutionalisation of a new security architecture in West Asia. Over the past decade:
- Israel deepened security and intelligence cooperation with the United States.
- The UAE and Bahrain formalised normalisation.
- Gulf states diversified relations toward China while maintaining U.S. security dependence.
- India strengthened defence and technological cooperation with Israel.
- Iran expanded its missile capabilities and proxy network as asymmetric deterrence.
What was once a fragmented regional system began evolving into overlapping security blocs.
The crucial shift occurred when normalisation moved from diplomacy to operational integration — particularly in air defence coordination and intelligence sharing. If Gulf states intercept projectiles aimed at Israel, normalisation becomes not merely political recognition but shared military infrastructure.
This practically mean defence alliance and reduces strategic ambiguity and increases bloc consolidation. It is clear when you have a defence alliance with one country there will be consequences if there is a serious tension or a war.
2. The Iran–Israel Threshold
For years, confrontation between Iran and Israel remained a shadow war — fought in Syria and Lebanon through cyber operations, assassinations, and proxies.
Recent escalations suggest a lowering of thresholds. Direct missile exchanges, public signalling, and overt retaliatory measures indicate that deterrence stability is under strain.
If sustained confrontation emerges, three immediate consequences follow:
- Maritime insecurity in the Gulf and Red Sea.
- Energy market volatility.
- Increased U.S. military involvement.
But beyond these tactical effects lies a deeper systemic shift: the polarisation of the region into more rigid alignment structures.
And alignment structures rarely remain geographically confined.
3. India’s Position in the Emerging Order
India’s strategic partnership with Israel has grown significantly, encompassing missile systems, surveillance technologies, cybersecurity, and intelligence cooperation.
India also has strong ties with some Arab states, particularly with the UAE, which is openly standing with Israel. India maintains strong relations with other Arab States and expanding engagement, and the proposed India–Middle East–Europe economic corridor symbolises this emerging strategic connectivity.
However, it must be noted that India is not a direct party to the Middle Eastern conflict. Nevertheless, it is embedded within the broader alignment network that supports Israel’s security ecosystem, and recent agreements to further cement their relations.
This alters South Asian strategic perceptions — particularly in Pakistan — where Israel–India cooperation has long been viewed through a security lens.
4. Strategic Compression and Pakistan
Pakistan faces a uniquely delicate balancing environment:
- It cannot openly normalise with Israel without domestic upheaval.
- It relies economically on the Gulf states.
- It shares a sensitive border with Iran.
- It is strategically tied to China.
- It remains in long-term rivalry with India.
If the Middle East hardens into two visible blocs — a U.S.–Israel–Gulf alignment on one side and an Iran-centred axis on the other — Pakistan’s manoeuvring space narrows.
This is strategic compression. Compression does not automatically produce war. It produces vulnerability, internal strain, and increased exposure to external pressures.
Economic fragility compounds this risk. When regional polarisation increases, economically weaker states experience stress first — through energy shocks, remittance fluctuations, and political polarisation.
5. Potential Spillover Mechanisms into South Asia
Spillover is unlikely to occur through conventional military expansion. Instead, it may unfold through several indirect pathways:
A. Sectarian Polarisation. Heightened Iran–Israel confrontation could intensify sectarian narratives across South Asia, particularly in Pakistan and parts of India.
B. Proxy Activation. Militant or ideological networks may seek to exploit Middle Eastern tensions to mobilise or establish symbolic linkages.
C. Diplomatic Repositioning
India could leverage deeper integration with the Middle East to strengthen its strategic partnerships, potentially altering the regional balance of power vis-à-vis Pakistan.
D. Energy and Economic Shockwaves
South Asian economies are heavily dependent on Gulf energy supplies and remittances. Prolonged instability would generate inflationary and fiscal pressures.
E. Great Power Overlay
China, the United States, and Russia all maintain strategic interests spanning both West and South Asia. Escalation in one theatre increases friction in the other.
6. Scenarios for the Coming Years. Three trajectories appear plausible:
Scenario 1: Contained Escalation
Limited but repeated exchanges between Iran and Israel, controlled through deterrence signalling. Spillover remains economic and rhetorical.
Scenario 2: Sustained Regional Polarisation
Gulf states integrate more deeply into Israeli security systems. Iran intensifies asymmetric responses. South Asia experiences indirect political and ideological turbulence.
Scenario 3: System-Level Confrontation
Direct prolonged Iran–Israel conflict draws in major powers. Energy markets destabilise. South Asian states are forced into clearer alignment positions. Internal instability risks increase.
The third scenario remains less probable but cannot be dismissed.
7. Could It Get Worse? Yes — particularly if:
- Lebanon becomes a sustained battlefield.
- Gulf states transition from defensive coordination to overt alliance commitments.
- Iran’s strategic patience erodes.
- The United States deepens visible military involvement.
At that stage, the conflict would shift from event-driven escalation to alignment-driven confrontation.
Alignment conflicts travel through economic systems, ideological networks, and power balances.
8. Conclusion: A Shrinking Neutral Space
The central risk is not immediate war between West and South Asia. The central risk is the shrinking of neutral strategic space.
As alliances consolidate and polarisation intensifies, mid-level powers and fragile states face harder choices. Strategic autonomy becomes more difficult to maintain.
South Asia is not insulated from West Asia’s transformation. It is economically connected, strategically entangled, and politically sensitive to its shifts.
Whether the current crisis stabilises or expands will depend on deterrence management, economic resilience, and the capacity of regional actors to avoid binary bloc politics.
If those mechanisms fail, the ripple effects will not stop at the Arabian Sea.
Dr Shabir Choudhry is a London-based political analyst, author, and expert on South Asian affairs, with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.
Email: drshabirchoudhry@gmail.com
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