BY ADMIN 24/12/13
Azm-e-Nau
refined
Pakistan continued to refine a
military response to perceived Indian attack, with the Azm-e-Nau-4 exercise
that took place in November. The Pakistani military claims that its forces can
now be effectively deployed faster than their Indian counter-parts, and hold on
against Indian advances for longer.
Tactically
speaking, Pakistan is better suited for a defensive posture at the moment.
Firstly because Pakistan does not, now or for the last decade, have the
political traction required to stand against the international outcry of a
pre-emptive strike, which India can easily present as an aggressive first move
by Pakistan. The resulting damage to Pakistan’s reputation will not allow it to
draw out favourable ceasefire conditions in the United Nations (as the plan
envisions).
Secondly,
Pakistan’s air force is outclassed by Indian inventory, especially as India
moves to acquire modern aircraft like the Dassault Rafale and possibly the
American F-35 which has a higher service ceiling than Pakistan’s latest JF-17
Thunder’s, and possibly the latest from the American technology (America is
desperate for customers for its F-35 Joint Strike Fighter). In such an event,
Pakistan will not be able to guarantee air superiority inside Indian Territory.
However, using its advanced missile technology available, Pakistan will be able
to create a shallow defensive umbrella (like Egypt in the Yom-Kippur War) where
its armour and artillery can manoeuvre without the fear of attacks by enemy
airforce. This will allow Pakistani forces to either blunt Indian advances or
carry out their own limited thrusts into Indian Territory.
Having
said that, in the current scenario, chances of drawing down India while
Pakistan gathers international support for a ceasefire are sketchy because of
(as previously mentioned) Pakistan’s lack of international support vis-à-vis
India. This is especially damning given China’s relative lack of interest in
Pakistan’s problems. As of late, Pakistan’s ‘all weather friend’ has (for good
reason) refused to reciprocate the overly joyous warm words that Pakistan
offers it. Without strong support from China, even military mobilisation like
it did in 1965, India will feel no need to step back.
Afghanistan
and NATO drawdown: Opportunities and threats
With the
deadline for the Nato withdrawal getting closer, and Karzai’s rebuke of further
US assistance until his demands are met, Afghanistan is placed at a precarious
cross-roads that presents an opportunity for Pakistan.
Pakistan
has so far failed to create strong institutional level relationships with its
Afghan counterparts. But with the Nato drawdown, there one very acute shortage
that the Pakistani military can help their Afghanistan in.
Currently
the attrition rate for Afghan recruits in the Afghan National Army (ANA) is
upto 50%. Almost half of this is due injuries sustained in the battlefield.
Before the reduction in ISAF forces, the ANA had access to Blackhawk
helicopters that could quickly airlift injured soldiers to hospitals. With the
sustained drawdown, the ANA has seen a shortage of such facilities, even basic
field hospitals, which has resulted in such a high attrition rate and great
loss of life for the Afghan people.
The
Pakistani military can fill this gap by offering to provide and train army
doctors. The dividends of such a move, in Afghan goodwill and trust, will be
enormous. So far Pakistan has concentrated too much on individuals when dealing
with the Afghan government, instead of institutions like the Afghan military,
intelligentsia, and diplomatic core; a fact that India has used to its
advantage. This is an excellent opportunity for expanding the foundation of the
relationship with Afghanistan to sustain regime change even as Indian presence
shrinks along with Nato.
Without
concrete overtures by Pakistan, the threat of a two-front war will become all
the more real. Pakistan cannot afford to maintain troops in its northern
province indefinitely, nor can it assume to control proxies in Afghanistan
without spillover into Pakistan. The recent case of the Afghan intelligence
wing trying to cultivate similar proxies against Pakistan should be a wakeup
call for the Pakistani security agency: we do not have the resources to outlive
an Indian-funded proxy war; our populations, national identity and federal
unity will crack under the pressure.
The next
election is likely to see a Karzai-backed candidate come to power again. Even
if Karzai’s ambitions are not filled, Pakistan still has to overcome widespread
distrust among the Afghan populations. Eitherway, it’s an uphill battle. But if
Paksitan is able to create relations, and eventually treaties with in-built
mechanisms that can accommodate political changes (much like the Indus Water
Treaty between India and Pakistan which has survived four wars), it can hope to
create a list of goods and services it can offer the Afghan people which will
eventually become an ‘off the table’ list in any future negotiation.
Economy,
the ability to sustain total war, and the nuclear option
On
December 6th, Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves fell to an
all-time low of $2.9 billion (enough for only one month of imports). In the
next week however, Pakistan received an inflow $500 million from various
multilateral organisations, bringing reserves up to $3.4 billion. After this
rise, Finance Minister Ishaq Dar confidently advised citizens to ‘sell their
dollars’ as he claimed the rupee would bounce back.
Realistically
speaking, this is not possible. The minister’s positive sentiment and temporary
cash inflows has managed to strengthen the rupee for the time being, but it is
a temporary solution.
Basic
economics- to strengthen reserves a country must increase exports (inflow of
money) and decrease imports (outflow of money). The current government is
putting its money on the GSP-Plus status with Europe and various
Free-Trade-Agreements with smaller trade partners to increase exports. This
might work, especially the GSP-Plus status which is expected to increase
textile trade alone by at least $1 billion. However, keep in mind that a)
Pakistan has to invest heavily in power projects, which will results in large
import of machinery and construction material, b) even though Pakistan is
switching from oil-fired power plants to coal-fired, which will result in a
significant reduction in the import bill, it will still have to import coal for
a while before its hydel-generation projects and nuclear power plants are
online, c) and most importantly, Pakistan still has to payback previous IMF
loans.
As a
result, the current appreciation in the Pakistani is temporary and artificial,
no more than a political stunt by the ruling party.
With such
weak reserves, Pakistan will be unable to survive even up to a month during a
war, as supplies run out and fuel is spent. Any offensive operations are out of
the question, and the resulting sense of insecurity will lead to an increased
reliance on the country’s nuclear arsenal to ward of threats (both Indian and
others). In such a scenario, it is imperative that the nuclear option is in no
way allowed to seen as a permanent solution.
Keep in
mind that this solution was adopted out of a sense of insecurity. The basic
premise of this option is that ‘only mutually assured destruction will
guarantee our survival’. This does nothing for the sense of insecurity. Such an
option must have very clear and clearly outlined parameters in policy and
discourse. The Pakistani generals must know, up to the closest inch, the lines
in the sand that have to be crossed before the nuclear option is warranted.
The
sectarian schism
Azm-e-Nau
notwithstanding, Pakistan’s ‘threat from within’ remains stronger. 2013 began
with attacks on the Hazaara community in Balochistan. The attacks continued
throughout the year and the army was called in several times to provide
security to Shiite processions and pilgrims in sensitive locations. The focal
centre of sectarian violence was seen to shift from Balochistan to the Punjab.
The government bent over backwards trying to appease both sides to no avail.
Despite the government’s ‘foolproof security plan’ for Ashura, the Rawalpindi
Ashura massacre gave the nation a rude awakening call.
More than
7,000 army officials have been deployed in Rawalpindi to maintain peace today
for the chehlum procession of Hazrat Imam Hussain.
The army,
stretched between two borders and an internal security situation, has more
challenges today than ever before. Hopefully, the government’s plan to create
an Anti-Terrorism Force and absorb the Elite Force and Special Police Branch
within the Home Department, will remove some of the burden for the army.
The
creation of new institutions must of course be carried out so as to define
clear parametres and boundaries so that there are no overlapping areas of
duty.. That leads to confusion and conflict of interest within institutions.
The
battle continues
2013 was
a year of violence and political theatrics as far as the security situation is
concerned. From talks with Taliban, to the aftermath of Mehsud’s death, lack of
political consensus on counterinsurgencies, the drone strike dilemma and NATO
supply blockades, the national security strategy has been on a turbulent roller
coaster throughout the year.
The army
saw a change of command this year and a new minister of defence. What with the
government’s committment to the National Security Plan, restructuring of the
police department and the constitution of the Anti-Terrorism Force, Pakistan is
in a better place to combat security threats in the coming year than it was
last year.
The
challenges of this year have helped shape, streamline and focus the direction
of peace keeping strategies.
One can
only hope that the security challenges of the next year are well met by the
government and the army. This can only happen if the well intentioned plans
devised in collaboration with all peace keeping stakeholders are put into
practice honestly and deftly. 2014 – The year of the end game- might as well be
the year our security challenges end as well.
By:
Taimour Khan and Sarah Eleazar
SPEARHEAD RESEARCH ANALYSIS
SPEARHEAD RESEARCH ANALYSIS
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